THE DECISIONS OF THE Supreme Court of the United States, AT OCTOBER TERM, 1890. [Authenticated copy of opinion record strictly followed, except as to such reference words and figures as are inclosed in brackets.] JAMES F. JOY ET AL., Appts., v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS ET AL. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 1-51.) 6. Use by one railroad of the right of way of another, when permissible punctuation—covenant, when binding on subsequent purchasers -notice-reference in deed-agreements, when construed together-public interests estoppel 7. -condition, when binding—authority of park commissioners-power of court of equity-use which the right of way was granted, is notice to the parties to the deed and to purchasers at a foreclosure sale of the railroad on a subsequent mortgage, of the contents of the contract, and of another contract referred to therein, and they purchase subject to such conditions. Where two agreements and a deed, of same date, constitute a single transaction relating to the same subject matter, they should be construed together. Where the subject matter of a contract concerns the interests of the public, the contract is to be construed liberally in favor of the public. of tracks of railroad—injunction, when proper 8. One party to an agreement, who has, by virtue mutuality. 1. Where two railroad companies have received from the public authorities a grant of a joint right of way through a public park, upon the agreement and condition to permit, upon reasonable regulations and terms, other railroads to use such right of way through the park and the terminus of their road in the city, for a fair and equitable compensation, an easement for the benefit of the public is created, and one of said companies which has become the successor in interest of the other is bound to permit another railroad company, upon the consent of the public authorities, to use such right of way for a fair and equitable compensation. 2. Although the punctuation of an agreement cannot defeat its obvious intent, yet when the meaning is doubtful the punctuation may be considered to ascertain such meaning. 8. A covenant in an agreement made by a railroad company with park commissioners, from whom it received a grant of a right of way through a public park, to permit other railroad companies to use such right of way, is binding upon subsequent purchasers, with notice, from such company. 4. Where the right of mortgagees and purchasers at a foreclosure sale of a railroad is based solely upon an agreement made prior to the execution of the mortgage, they must be held to have had notice of it and they hold subject to its terms and conditions, whether the covenants thereof run with the land or not. 6. A reference, in a deed of a right of way to a railroad company, to the conditions of a contract on 9. of it, obtained property and the benefit of moneys expended thereon by the other party, cannot be heard to allege that the agreement was against the policy of the law, without offering to return the property. Where a share of an incomplete right of way was conveyed to a railroad company subject to certain conditions, the completion by such com. pany of the right of way, by the purchase of intervening and isolated tracts, does not destroy such conditions. 10. The confining, by park commissioners, railroads crossing a public park to the use of a single right of way is within the power of the commissioners, when it is a reasonable precaution, in the interest of public safety. 11. When a railroad company is entitled to use the right of way of another railroad company upon such reasonable terms and for such fair and equitable compensation as may be agreed upon by such companies, if the parties do not agree, & court of equity, having taken cognizance of the controversy, has power to settle the right and the amount of compensation. 12. Where a railroad company becomes entitled to use the right of way, or road-bed, of another company, it is entitled to use the tracks thereon, where the entire right of way is covered with tracks so that there is no room for an independent track, subject, however, to the prior right of the other company to use the same as its convenience requires. 13. A suit in equity is the proper remedy to enforce the right of one railroad company to use the right of way of another, conferred by contract; and in such a suit a prayer for an injunction against refusing to permit the use of said right of way is a prayer for all that is necessary to secure the spe- | 9 Ch. 279; Brace v. Wehnert, 25 Bea cific performance of the contract. 14. Where a decree of a court of equity is complete in itself and disposes of the controversy, it is no objection to it that the court will have to take supplemental proceedings to carry it out and make it effective under altered circumstances. 15. Considerations of the public interests are controlling upon a court of equity, when a public means of transportation, such as a railroad, comes into the possession and under the dominion of the court. 16. The details of the manner of use of a right of way of a railroad company by another company are sufficiently furnished by the agreement for such use to enable a court to decree specific performance, where the agreement provides that one company shall have the sole control of the starting, running and regulating the time tables of and for its own trains, and of the relative times of the starting, coming in and running of the trains of both companies. 17. It is no objection to specific performance of an agreement to permit the right of way of a railroad to be used by other railroads, that the railroads entitled to such use are not named in the agreement. 18. A contract by one railroad company to permit other railroad companies to use its right of way does not lack mutuality, where the consideration is ample, and such company cannot resist the enforcement of the privilege on the ground that it cannot compel the other company to continue in its enjoyment. [No. 106.] Argued Dec. 9, 10, 1890. Decided Jan. 19, 1891. PPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court A of the United States for the Eastern Dis. trict of Missouri on a bill of intervention filed in two causes pending in the same court consolidated into one in favor of the intervenors that the Colorado Company had the right to use the right of way and track named in the opinion and fixing the compensation therefor and granting a perpetual injunction against obstructing such use. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Wells H. Blodgett, for appellants: The covenant of the County Company did not create an equitable easement in the road between the park and the City which affected that property in the hands of Joy and others, as purchasers from the Kansas City Company. Whitney v. Union R. Co. 11 Gray, 359; Jenks v. Williams, 115 Mass. 217; Jeffries v. Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184; Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188; Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517; Haywood v. Brunswick Permanent Ben. Bldg. Soc. L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 403; London & 8. W. R. Co. v. Gomm, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 562. The court erred in holding that the agreement is sufficiently definite to be specifically enforced in a court of equity. Colson v. Thompson, 15 U. S. 2 Wheat. 336 (4: 253); Hennessy v. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438 (32: 500); McKibbin v. Brown, 14 N. J. Eq. 13; Nichole v. Williams, 22 N. J. Eq. 63; Whitlock v. Duffield, 1 Hoff. Ch. 110; Huff v. Shepard, 58 Mo. 242; Morgan v. Milman, 3 DeG. M. & G. 24; Darbey v. Whitaker, 4 Drew. 184; Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. Jr. 33; Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves. Jr. 406; Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333; Taylor v. Portington, 7 DeG. M. & G. 328; Wilson v. Northampton & B. J. R. Co. L. R. Wilks v. Davis, 3 Meriv. 507; Blundell targh, 17 Ves. Jr. 232; South Wales R Wythes, 5 De G. M. & G. 880; Fry, Spe SS 164-203; Kendall v. Almy, 2 Sumn. The court erred in entering a decree c ing the specific performance, by the V Company, of a continuous duty requir exercise of skill and personal judgment as the constant expenditure of money, a quiring the court to retain perpetual con Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U. Wall. 339 (19: 955); Port Clinton R. Cleveland & T. R. Co. 13 Ohio St. 544; Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v. Taff Vale R. R. 9 Ch. 331; Ross v Union Pac. R. Woolw. 26; St. Thomas v. Credit Valley 7 Ont. Ch. Div. 332; Blanchard v. & L. M. R. Co. 31 Mich. 43: Pollard v. ton, 1 Kay & J. 462; Pom. Spec. Perf. SS 288, 307, 312. Detr Purchasers are not bound to inquire in lateral contracts and circumstances. Acer v. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384; Bur Carter, 44 Ala. 115; Atty-Gen. v. Back 17 Ves. Jr. 283; Mueller v. Engeln, 12 441; Penrose v. Griffith, 4 Binn. 231. Messrs. Leverett Bell, John C. Orrick George R. Peck, for appellees: The covenants and conditions in the t tite agreement, as to the use of the rig way by other roads, run with the land bind subsequent purchasers. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phill. Ch. 774; Luk Dennis, L. R. 7 Čh. Div. 227; Bronson v. fin, 108 Mass. 175; Whitney v. Union R. C Gray, 359-364; Parker Nightingale, & A 341-344; Van Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. 256; Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, 24 N. J. Eq. Western v. Macdermott, L. R. 2 Ch. 77; W town v. Cowen, 4 Paige, 510-513; Randa Latham, 36 Conn. 48-53; Winfield v. Henr 21 N. J. Eq. 188; Verplanck v. Wright Wend. 506; Stockett v. Howard, 34 Md. 12 Where a covenant does not run with the la it confers an equitable right in the covenan as against a subsequent purchaser with no and this right must exist if the instrum containing the covenant is a link in his ch of title. Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen, 341; Doren v. Robinson, 16 N. J. Eq. 256; Kirk rick v. Peshine, 24 N. J. Eq. 206; Atla Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35. Where a purchaser is put on inquiry, be deemed as purchasing with notice of all fa which such an inquiry would reveal. Stephenson v. Smith, 7 Mo. 610; Mense McLean, 13 Mo. 298; Meier v. Blume, 80 1 184; Widdicombe v. Childers, 84 Mo. 383; Bi v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472; McCamant v. Pat son, 39 Mo. 110; Crockett v. Maguire, 10 34; Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo. 404; Digm v. McCollum, 47 Mo. 375; Musick v. Barn 49 Mo. 458; Speck v. Riggin, 40 Mo. 405; M pin v. Emmons, 47 Mo. 304. The mortgagees and purchasing commit are chargeable with notice of the tripart agreement. Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472. The mortgagees and their grantee, the p chasing committee, are bound by the covenar |