occurred to the mind of man, in any other way than The inference that in which it did occur to its authors.

I would draw from the whole is, that this is not a human invention, but the evolution of a scheme composed and designed by the same mighty mind which devised the structure of the universe.

Had Doctors Gall and Spurzheim sat down to devise a system from their own imagination, it is morally impossible they could have contrived one which harmonizes so completely with itself, and with the actual state of the human faculties, and the uses to which these are subservient. This is a problem which has puzzled the most eminent philosophers, so as almost to entitle us to conclude that its solution was beyond the reach of human ingenuity. Independently, therefore, of more direct evidence, the presumption is exceedingly strong, that they did not invent, but discovered it by observation.

Supposing that we knew nothing of human nature but what we are able to gather from systems of philosophy, what notion could we form of man from perusing all the works that have ever been written on the metaphysics of the schools? Is it not obvious that they afford a very indistinct or inadequate account of what man really is, and of what are his powers, dispositions, and functions. On the contrary, the system we have been now considering, to use the expression of an acute writer,* seems to present us with "a portrait from the life."

If we take our account of man from this system, would it not be evident, that a being possessed of the powers and faculties here attributed to him must be a wonderful being; that if the intellectual faculties are active and predominant, he must be a great and powerful being ; that if to these be added a large share of the destructive propensities, he must be a terrible being; and if the * The late Mr Abernethy of London.

He's here in double trust:

First, as I am his kinsman and his friend,

Strong both against the deed; then as his host,
Who should against his murderer shut the door,

Not bear the knife myself.

He warms as he goes on, and represents the amiable qualities of his victim in terms that appear sincere; but still what he seems most to regard is not the pleading of natural compassion and moral principle in himself, but the universal condemnation of the world which will pursue the perpetrator of so great a crime.

Besides this, Duncan

Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been
So clear in his great office, that his virtues
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against
The deep damnation of his taking off.

And pity, like a naked new born babe,

Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubim, horsed
Upon the sightless coursers of the air,

Will blow the horrid deed in every eye,

That tears shall drown the wind.

He has by this time brought his whole feelings into a proper tone-he gives but a glance at the worthless cause for which he would plunge into so irremediable guilt.

I have no spur

To prick the sides of my intent, but only

Vaulting ambition, &c.

The result of the whole is, that his bloody purpose is for the present abandoned.

The above exhibits, as I conceive, a correct picture of premonitive conscience, suggesting, in its own quiet way, all the motives which, in such a mind as Macbeth's, might occur to dissuade him from so horrid a deed as murder; and we find that, except in one or two allusions, the real guilt of the deed is hardly so much as thought of. It is not the crime, but the consequences of the

S

action, as brute creatures have; some leading most directly and immediately to the good of the community, and some most directly to private good.

"Man has several which brutes have not; particularly reflection, or conscience, an approbation of some principles or actions, and a disapprobation of others."

It is remarkable how very exactly these views tally with the system revealed by Phrenology.

"Brutes obey their instincts or principles of action, according to certain rules; suppose, the constitution of their body, and the objects around them.

“The generality of mankind also obey their instincts and principles, all of them, those propensions we call good, as well as the bad, according to the same rules, namely the constitution of their body, and the external circumstances which they are in.

"Brutes, in acting according to the rules before mentioned, their bodily constitution and circumstances, act suitably to their whole nature.

"Mankind also, in acting thus, would act suitably to their whole nature, if no more were to be said of man's nature than what has been said; if that, as it is a true, were also a complete, adequate account of our nature.

"But that is not a complete account of man's nature. Somewhat farther must be brought in to give us an adequate notion of it, namely, that one of these principles of action, conscience, or reflection, compared with the rest, as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification, being in itself a principle manifestly superior to a mere propension. And the conclusion is, that to allow no more to this superior principle or part of our nature than to other parts, to let it govern and guide only occasionally in common

with the rest, as its turn happens to come, from the temper and circumstances one happens to be in, this is not to act conformably to the constitution of man: neither can any human creature be said to act conformably to his constitution of nature, unless he allows to that superior principle the absolute authority which is due to it."

To the doctrine here delivered I cordially and entirely subscribe.

Mr Combe has discarded the term conscience- -a term universally used, and perfectly understood by all mankind, as applied to those internal feelings which dictate to us what is right and wrong in conduct-and has adopted in its place a formula involving a theory of his own. "Right conduct," he says, "is that which is approved of by the whole moral and intellectual faculties, fully enlightened, and acting in harmonious combination. This," he adds, "is what I call the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect."

Now in order to understand this, it is necessary to know what is here meant by the term "moral and intellectual faculties." Taking the expression in its popular acceptation, it is universally admitted, that the moral and intellectual faculties are those by which the conduct is to be regulated; and, therefore, to tell us that right conduct is that which is approved of by these faculties, gives us no information whatever. We knew all that before phrenology was discovered. But these expressions are used by Mr Combe in a limited and technical sense-not applied to the whole moral capacities of our nature, but to certain distinct feelings or propensions, of which the precise functions have been specified by phrenological writers, and which they have chosen to denominate, specially and exclusively, the moral sentiments. But although thus limited to a special class of

the feelings, his language with respect to them is far from precise. He sometimes speaks of the moral sentiments and intellect generally; at other times he states them to be the faculties peculiar to man. Here we begin to see the defects of the arrangement and classification of the faculties which he has adopted, as mentioned in the last chapter. The sentiments peculiar to man are there stated by him to be veneration, firmness, conscientiousness, hope, wonder, ideality, wit, and imitation. Benevolence is there excluded, as that is stated to be a sentiment common to man and the inferior animals.

When, however, he comes more closely to the subject, he finds that this enumeration will not answer his purpose. If there be a principle of benevolence in man, which doubtless there is, it is impossible to exclude it from the list of the moral powers. Mr Combe gets over the difficulty in this way: "Benevolence," he says in a note, "is stated in the works on phrenology as common to man with the lower animals; but in these creatures it appears to produce rather passive meekness and good nature than actual desire for each other's happiness. In the human race, this last is its proper function; and, viewed in this light, I treat of it as exclusively a human faculty." To this I answer, that if the feelings of benevolence in man and in the lower animals are feelings the same in kind, and having the same tendency, (which I presume they must be from their being called by the same name by all phrenologists,) they must be essentially the same feelings, and the only difference between them must be either a difference in degree, which we can perfectly understand, or the difference occasioned by the superior intellect of man, giving the sentiment a larger scope, or field of action. There can, I think, be no other differences; and if so, Mr Combe is not entitled to state this as peculiarly a human sentiment, unless he