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whether man, as originally constituted, possessed the organs of these propensities or not. If he did possess them, it will be incumbent on them to shew the objects of them in a world where there was no sorrow, sin, death, or danger. If these organs were bestowed after the Fall, the question will remain to be solved, whether man, with new organs added to his brain, and new propensities to his mind, continued the same being as when these did not form parts of his constitution. Or, finally, they may consider whether the existence of these organs, and of an external world adapted to them, does not prove that man, as he now exists, is actually the same being as, when he was created, and that his corruption consists in the tendency to abuse his faculties, and not in any inherent viciousness attributable to his nature itself."

This passage proves Mr Combe either to be entirely ignorant or entirely neglectful of the proper objects of philosophical inquiry, and of the boundary which separates its legitimate sphere from those subjects into which reason is unable to penetrate. He has overstepped this boundary. He has departed completely from the course which he had marked out for himself in his preface. He there says, "I confine my observations exclusively to man AS HE EXISTS in the present world, and I beg that, on perusing the subsequent pages, this explanation may be constantly kept in view." I humbly apprehend that Mr Combe has here forgotten his own limitation, and extended his inquiry to subjects not relating to man as he exists in the present world, but relating to man as he existed in a different state, as to which natural reason furnishes no information.

Theologians are not called upon to consider whether man, as originally constituted, possessed the organs of the propensities alluded to or not. Their duty, as

theologians, is to give a correct interpretation of Scripture, and not to presume to be wise above what is written. Scripture furnishes no information whatever respecting the organs of the brain, either as they existed at the creation, or as they exist now. As an object of natural science we may properly inquire into their present state, but all information fails as to their condition in a previous order of things. The bare proposing of such a question indicates a mind not thoroughly imbued with that true philosophical spirit, so beautifully alluded to by Dr Thomas Brown, in his introductory lecture," a spirit which is quick to pursue whatever is within the reach of human intellect, but which is not less quick to discern the bounds that limit every human inquiry, and which, therefore, in seeking much, seeks only that which man may learn.”

Again, supposing man to have possessed such faculties at his creation, it is just as little incumbent upon theologians to shew what were the objects of them in a paradisaical state, a world where there was no sorrow, sin, death, or danger. We may conjecture what might have been their use in such a world, but we never can possibly know. Mr Combe has pointed out certain uses which they serve in the world as it now exists, and that was enough for his avowed purpose, and all that as a philosopher he was entitled to do. Had he been inclined to treat the subject philosophically, he would have said, that he was not called upon to shew their uses in such a state ; but that doubtless, in whatever state man may have been placed before the commencement of the present system of things, from the known wisdom and goodness of the Creator, we may be sure that he would be furnished with proper objects for the employment and gratification of all his faculties.

The next question is not excelled in absurdity, by any

siderable, when compared with the immense interval that separates all from a state of perfect allegiance to God."

Holding this, then, to be the doctrine, I shall endeavour to illustrate it in different ways. First, in regard to our original state: man was created in the image of God, and while he remained in paradise, enjoyed an intercourse with him far nearer and more perfect than we at present possess. Hence, he had a more accurate knowledge of the will of God, and more constraining motives for its performance. He was formed for intercourse with and an entire dependence upon God, and while he remained in that state, he was perfect. He walked in the sight of God; and having inclinations agreeable to his will, he could not act otherwise than according to it. In this state there could be no imperfection, and no sin.

The phrenological view of such a state would be this: Having all his faculties and sentiments in perfection, these would always lead him "to seek to God" as their highest object. Veneration would impress him constantly with ideas of the greatness of God and his own dependence upon him, and lead him in all things to inquire after his will, and to obey it. Wonder would be constantly excited by new discoveries of the character of God, and the greatness and variety of his works. Ideality would receive constant delight from the unfading perfection of the one, and the splendour and beauty of the other. Benevolence and conscientiousness would instinctively lead him to that conduct towards his fellow-men, which would conduce most to their happiness, being that which God designed when he implanted such sentiments in his mind; the one making those actions a pleasure, which the other would point out to be a duty. An enlightened self-esteem would lead to the same conduct,

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can be none whatever. Viciousness, is a tendency to abuse; and a tendency to abuse, is just viciousness. If Mr Combe admits a natural tendency in man to abuse his faculties, he admits quite enough to establish the doctrine of human depravity.

But to return to the questions put respecting the existence of such propensities as Combativeness and Destructiveness, — although the questions themselves are utterly unphilosophical, and though they neither deserve nor admit of an answer, so far as regards the facts, it is easy to answer the objection which they are intended to raise against the paradisaical state of man at his creation. To the question, whether man was originally endowed with propensities of Combativeness and Destructiveness, we answer, that we have no means of knowing; but supposing he was, this affords no objection to the supposition that he was originally placed in a world from which sorrow, sin, death, and danger were excluded; for even in such a world, there might have been abundant exercise for such propensities. Mr Combe himself states, (p. 26,) that in his philosophical millennium, after man shall have been able to discover and obey all the natural laws, and when, consequently, on his own principles, pain and evil must be banished from the world, Combativeness and Destructiveness "would receive full gratification in muscular exercises,” or “in any employment requiring the exertion of muscular strength."

I have already alluded to what Mr Combe has mentioned in his "System," (though he has not chosen to repeat it in his "Constitution of Man,") that these two propensities are general powers, not limited to the outward acts of fighting and killing, but communicating to the mind, each in its own way, a certain species of energy, which be turned to account even in carrying

may

into effect the purposes of benevolence. This is the true view of the matter; and what is there in the fact of the existence of such faculties as these, inconsistent with the supposition of a paradisaical state? The fact is, that such faculties are not useful merely, they are absolutely necessary to the perfection of such a being as man in any state whatever. Without them he must have been a poor, weak, nerveless, and inefficient creature, unfit for maintaining the prominent place in creation he was destined to hold, and utterly incapable of exercising that dominion which was given to him over the creatures.

Combativeness is now perfectly understood to be a quality which gives the love of strenuous exertion of any kind, physical or mental. Destructiveness, or the feeling which goes under that name, communicates to the mind an energy superior to this, a vehemence and fiery impetuousity which bears down all before it, and which is necessary on various occasions to give effect to the brightest exhibitions of moral excellence, and the most splendid exertions of genius. Who that has heard the finest bursts of eloquence from some of our first rate orators, whether at the bar, in the senate, or in the pulpit, but must be satisfied of the immense effect which the powers we have mentioned have in exhibiting to advantage all the highest qualities of mind? Who, for instance, that has heard our own orator, Dr Chalmers, in some of his most transcendent displays of genius, but must be satisfied that the truths which he inculcates with regard to the condition of man, or the magnificent views which he opens up of the greatness and goodness of the Deity, owe more than half their power and effect to the overwhelming vehemence with which they are poured forth, and brought home to the consciences and the understandings of his hearers?

In fact, the qualities we have mentioned have not only

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