The Limits of International LawOxford University Press, 03/02/2005 - 272 من الصفحات International law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities. |
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الصفحة 6
... argue that we can adjust state interests as necessary to fit the conclusions we want to reach. It is true that the power of our explanations depends on the accuracy of our identification of state interests, and that state interests are ...
... argue that we can adjust state interests as necessary to fit the conclusions we want to reach. It is true that the power of our explanations depends on the accuracy of our identification of state interests, and that state interests are ...
الصفحة 12
... of states with convergent interests) forces weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests (defined independently of the coercion). This book argues that some combination of these four models 12 Introduction.
... of states with convergent interests) forces weaker states to engage in acts that are contrary to their interests (defined independently of the coercion). This book argues that some combination of these four models 12 Introduction.
الصفحة 13
... argument unfolds in three parts. Part 1 analyzes customary international law. We are skeptical of the traditional claim that customary international law reflects universal behavioral regularities. And, we argue, the actual patterns of ...
... argument unfolds in three parts. Part 1 analyzes customary international law. We are skeptical of the traditional claim that customary international law reflects universal behavioral regularities. And, we argue, the actual patterns of ...
الصفحة 14
... argue, to the contrary, that states have no such moral obligation. We also address a related challenge from cosmopolitan theory, which argues that states have a duty in crafting international law to act on the basis of global rather ...
... argue, to the contrary, that states have no such moral obligation. We also address a related challenge from cosmopolitan theory, which argues that states have a duty in crafting international law to act on the basis of global rather ...
الصفحة 26
... argues that “repeated compliance [with international law] gradually becomes habitual obedience” as international law “penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of that nation's internal value set” (Koh 1997, 2603). Yet ...
... argues that “repeated compliance [with international law] gradually becomes habitual obedience” as international law “penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of that nation's internal value set” (Koh 1997, 2603). Yet ...
المحتوى
3 | |
19 | |
Part 2 Treaties | 79 |
Part 3 Rhetoric Morality and International Law | 163 |
Conclusion | 225 |
Acknowledgments | 227 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 235 |
Index | 253 |
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argue behavioral regularity belligerent benefits bilateral Britain British chapter cheap talk citizens claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest collective action problems commitment compliance comply with international consent coordination game cosmopolitan cosmopolitan action cosmopolitan duties cosmopolitan sentiments costs Court customary international law democratic diplomatic diplomatic immunity domestic law enforcement engage evidence example explain fishing vessel exemption foreign policy free ships GATT human rights abuses human rights law human rights treaties ICCPR individuals institutions international relations leaders legal obligation liberal democracies ment military moral obligation multilateral treaties navy negotiations neutral ships nonlegal agreements norms opinio juris other’s Paquete Habana parties payoffs preferences ratify rational choice rational choice theory reason reflect regime retaliation RUDs self-interest sense of legal slave trade Soviet Union state’s talk tariffs ternational territorial sea three-mile rule tions trade barriers trade treaties U.S. Civil War United vessel exemption rule violate voters