The Limits of International LawOxford University Press, 03/02/2005 - 272 من الصفحات International law is much debated and discussed, but poorly understood. Does international law matter, or do states regularly violate it with impunity? If international law is of no importance, then why do states devote so much energy to negotiating treaties and providing legal defenses for their actions? In turn, if international law does matter, why does it reflect the interests of powerful states, why does it change so often, and why are violations of international law usually not punished? In this book, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that international law matters but that it is less powerful and less significant than public officials, legal experts, and the media believe. International law, they contend, is simply a product of states pursuing their interests on the international stage. It does not pull states towards compliance contrary to their interests, and the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited. It follows that many global problems are simply unsolvable. The book has important implications for debates about the role of international law in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. The authors see international law as an instrument for advancing national policy, but one that is precarious and delicate, constantly changing in unpredictable ways based on non-legal changes in international politics. They believe that efforts to replace international politics with international law rest on unjustified optimism about international law's past accomplishments and present capacities. |
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الصفحة 14
... agreements relate to legalized agreements; what multilateral treaties accomplish and why their efficacy tends to depend on the logic of bilateral monitoring and enforcement; and the relative roles of retaliation and reputation in treaty ...
... agreements relate to legalized agreements; what multilateral treaties accomplish and why their efficacy tends to depend on the logic of bilateral monitoring and enforcement; and the relative roles of retaliation and reputation in treaty ...
الصفحة 21
... multilateral institutions (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001). This view assumes that international law consists primarily of formal international organizations made by multilateral ... treaties: customary international law.
... multilateral institutions (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001). This view assumes that international law consists primarily of formal international organizations made by multilateral ... treaties: customary international law.
الصفحة 23
... agreement about what type of state action counts as state practice. Policy statements, legislation, and diplomatic correspondence are the least controversial sources. Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, but also bilateral ones ...
... agreement about what type of state action counts as state practice. Policy statements, legislation, and diplomatic correspondence are the least controversial sources. Treaties, especially multilateral treaties, but also bilateral ones ...
الصفحة 24
... international law. To avoid this problem, courts and scholars sometimes require independent evidence of opinio juris, such as a statement by a high-level government official, ratification of a treaty that contains a norm similar to the ...
... international law. To avoid this problem, courts and scholars sometimes require independent evidence of opinio juris, such as a statement by a high-level government official, ratification of a treaty that contains a norm similar to the ...
الصفحة 36
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المحتوى
3 | |
19 | |
Part 2 Treaties | 79 |
Part 3 Rhetoric Morality and International Law | 163 |
Conclusion | 225 |
Acknowledgments | 227 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 235 |
Index | 253 |
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argue behavioral regularity belligerent benefits bilateral Britain British chapter cheap talk citizens claim coastal fishing vessels coercion coincidence of interest collective action problems commitment compliance comply with international consent coordination game cosmopolitan cosmopolitan action cosmopolitan duties cosmopolitan sentiments costs Court customary international law democratic diplomatic diplomatic immunity domestic law enforcement engage evidence example explain fishing vessel exemption foreign policy free ships GATT human rights abuses human rights law human rights treaties ICCPR individuals institutions international relations leaders legal obligation liberal democracies ment military moral obligation multilateral treaties navy negotiations neutral ships nonlegal agreements norms opinio juris other’s Paquete Habana parties payoffs preferences ratify rational choice rational choice theory reason reflect regime retaliation RUDs self-interest sense of legal slave trade Soviet Union state’s talk tariffs ternational territorial sea three-mile rule tions trade barriers trade treaties U.S. Civil War United vessel exemption rule violate voters