much as forty dollars a ton. That represented quite a substantial difference annually. So if a balance sheet for Sweden could be made up for the time before the war compared with the time after the war, I am pretty sure that it would not show any considerable increase in the national wealth. In any case not enough to compensate for the very great hardships that the greater part of our population had for long periods to endure from lack of food and lack of clothes and lack of all kinds of necessities of life.

At any

Now, with regard to the economic situation in Sweden, as has been pointed out, it has been brought about from her conservative governmental policy--conservative in borrowing and conservative in making up budgets. The Swedish budget has always in modern times balanced, although during the war it could be made to balance only by very heavy taxation-taxation which we business-people found much too heavy, and which was one of the causes of the very marked inflation which followed. rate, the balancing of the budget was upheld, even during the governments of the socialists. That probably sounds very curious to you, that a country can prosper under a socialistic government; so much the more that it is not socialism of the kind that you find in France, but real socialism, backed up by the trade unionists. Three times in the last few years we have had purely socialistic governments, and we have one now. It might interest you to hear that our present Minister of Finance, who is now serving his fourth term, was originally a shoemaker, and is entirely a self-educated man; he has had no high school training at all, but nevertheless there is a widespread opinion in Sweden that he is one of the very best Ministers of Finance that the country has ever had. That must sound very curious to you, I know, and I had better add that I am not a socialist myself.

As you perhaps know, the wave of inflation in Sweden was more acute than in any other European non-belligerent country. When it was at its height we had a price level of 380% as compared to 1913-1914. In one year it went down by 50%. It is difficult to figure the shock such a heavy fall in prices involves to an economic community. There was, however, in Sweden, a deeply rooted opinion that we must get back to a solid basis again for our currency. Even if these were sound principles, it was perhaps a little precipitate to act in the way we did. This had, however, a very curious background. We have in Sweden only one note-issuing bank, and this bank is entirely possessed by the State, which in this case does not mean the government or the ministry in power. It is controlled entirely by the Parliament, and the Parliament has sole power over that bank. The only thing that the Government has to do with it is to appoint the Chairman of the Board of Directors. The other members of the Board are elected by the Riksdag, that is, our House of Representatives, and they are elected on party lines.

Now, you might say that in such a situation there are very great risks that the bank itself would be conducted on political lines, but that has not been the case. There has, however, been another curious effect. By the Parliament owning the bank, every member of Parliament regards himself more or less as a banker, more or less as a competitor with the other banks. Therefore, during the war, when the Government took over all import of and trade in fuel, grain and other big commodities, and there was appointed a commission to handle these things, a very pompous socialist member of the House made a motion that the financing of that commission-that meant the financing of our fuel imports and so on-should be put not in the hands of the banks, who had been used to doing it, but in the hands of the State bank, in order that the State should not have to pay heavy interest to the private banks. Well, that was carried, and the Riksbank was ordered by the Parliament to finance these commissions. The consequence was that lots of money usually engaged at different periods of the year in these trades, became idle and looked to other employment; and during the same time the Riksbank had to print new and beautiful notes to be distributed as payment for the services of these commissions. In that way political influence over the bank directly led to a much higher degree of inflation in our country than probably otherwise would have been the case. But realizing where we were drifting, the Parliament turned around and wanted the Riksbank to stop the inflation, and ordered the bank to work upon the currency so that it got back to the gold parity. Well, that is very easily said, but very difficult to put through, but the Riksbank and the Parliament went very conscientiously about it. The discount was raised to seven and a half per cent., credit was restricted, not so much through direct restriction, but more through pressure exercised upon the banks, and the result was, as I have already said, that we got our prices down in one year from 380% to 190%, and then later to the present level of about 160%. The consequences were, in many cases, disastrous. People who had been interested in stocks saw their fortunes lost in a very short while, the stocks suffering more than anything else in the general depression. Fortunes changed hands, but the people who are now in possession of the money-and the money is still there, of course are not accustomed to that kind of business and prefer to have their money in mortgages, treasury bills, with savings banks and so on. For this reason the Stock Exchange in Sweden is still suffering under strong depression. I should think that the average quotation of stocks at present is about one-fifth of the quotations when prices were at their top-level; and there is still in many cases a much too low quotation of the shares in our best Swedish enterprises.

Well, all these measures put together contributed, of course, ·

to create another situation. To this the banks contributed perhaps in a way, too. They formed, with the co-operation of the Government, a capital control commission, in order to prevent waste in capital; and every bank or other enterprise, and every municipality wanting to make an issue of bonds or stocks, had to apply to that commission and to ask for their consent. If the commission found that the purpose for which the issue was contemplated was not, in its opinion, necessary at the moment, the application was rejected and the banks had agreed not to advance any money against these shares or these bonds if nevertheless issued. The commission has, a few years since, ceased its activities, and it did not, in fact, have to make use of its authority many times; but its mere existence prevented a great many enterprises from being floated at an inconvenient period from the monetary policy point of view.

However, all such palliatives and artificial restrictions have proved to be rather doubtful as to their efficiency. Also, in another way, the Swedish banks effectively contributed in the work to make it possible for Swedish society in general to pull through the crisis. This was the way in which they co-operated to prevent such banks as had been more severely hit by the fall in prices, from getting into difficulties. As soon as it was reported—and I think there were four or five cases-that a bank wanted support all the other banks, otherwise keen competitors, stuck together, and made it possible for those in difficulties to write off their losses, and to get new capital, enabling them to work on. So that we can always say, and are glad to be able to say, even after such a terrible crisis as the one we have had to live through, that no one ever lost one crown on a deposit with a Swedish bank. Small and very insignificant exceptions, in local banks, only serve to prove the rule.

Even if the deflation process in Sweden was, perhaps, carried through in too precipitate a manner, Sweden has at least had the satisfaction of attaining a stable level of her currency on the old gold basis. Our exporters did not always regard this high quotation of the Swedish crown as an advantage. So, for instance, last spring there was a great movement amongst some of our exporters to the end that our crown should be kept in parity not with the dollar but with the pound sterling. They thought that if we got only just a little inflation-just enough to carry us down to the level of the pound sterling, it would improve their prices for their export products, and they believed that it would not be necessary at the same time to increase wages; an increase which is indeed very much needed. But they overlooked the vigilance of our trade unions in Sweden. The unions simply made it understood that they were not going to let the laborers receive their wages in a crown of a deteriorated value. "If," they said, "the value of the crown is going down,

say more than 10%, we will consider it as a 'force majeure,' allowing us to consider all existing agreements about salaries void."

The position thus taken by the socialists became one of the reasons whereby our going back to the legal gold standard was precipitated. We had already reached the level of the dollar about two years ago; and, for my part, I should have preferred that we should have waited to go back to the gold standard, until we could have done it in company with other countries. But just this fear on the part of the socialists that the value of the crown would be allowed to go down, precipitated the whole thing, and suddenly our Parliament decided in March to go back on the 1st of April, on a few days' notice, to the gold standard. I think the experiment was a very risky one, because we made ourselves quite dependent upon the value of gold, and thereby upon the monetary policy of America. I think we ought to have waited until gold itself got the stability which is a necessary quality of a standard of value. But, anyhow, we did not. wait, and there is no doubt now that, once introduced, the gold standard will be maintained. Of course, we all hope that the time is not very far away when England, Switzerland, Holland and other countries also will decide to go back to the gold standard. That is the only way in which gold can get a real quotation, not only the quotation which the United States has been so kind as to uphold during all these years, but a quotation which is an expression for all the economic forces working in all those countries which have accepted the gold standard. We are looking forward to that time very eagerly, because we believe that that will perhaps mean even more than the Dawes Plan for creating a firm foundation upon which can be based the work of reconstruction to recover what the world has lost during the last ten trying years. (Applause)

VICE-PRESIDENT MARLING.-Is there any further business? (No response)

The meeting will adjourn.

THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH ANNUAL BANQUET

The One Hundred and Fifty-Sixth Anniversary Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce was held at the Waldorf-Astoria on Thursday evening, November 13th, 1924. Six hundred and ninety members and guests were present. It was a particularly interesting affair in view of the high character of the addresses, the large attendance of eminent men of affairs, the quality of the menu, and beauty of the hall and table decorations.

President FREDERICK H. ECKER presided and his address and remarks as toastmaster met with considerable applause. Grace was pronounced by the Right Reverend WILLIAM T. MANNING, D.D., Bishop of New York. Musical selections were played during the service of the dinner by the orchestra and on the pipe organ. Mr. ERNERT K. SATTERLEE, a member of the Chamber, served as organist. At the close of the service of the dinner a toast was drunk to the President of the United States, and a message was presented from him expressing his sincere regret at being unable to accept the Chamber's invitation to be present. The speakers of the evening, in addition to President ECKER, were Brigadier-General HERBERT M. LORD, Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Doctor CHARLES H. JUDD, Director of the School of Education of the University of Chicago, and Major-General ROBERT LEE BULLARD, Commanding the Second Corps Area of the United States Army.

Besides the speakers, the following were seated at the President's Table: The Right Reverend WILLIAM T. MANNING, D.D., Bishop of New York; Honourable ELBERT H. GARY, Chairman of the Chamber's Banquet Committee; Ex-Presidents of the Chamber EUGENIUS H. OUTERBRIDGE, Esquire, ALFRED E. MARLING, Esquire, DARWIN P. KINGSLEY, Esquire, and IRVING T. BUSH, Esquire; Honourable RICHARD E. ENRIGHT, Police Commissioner of the City of New York; WILLIS H. BOOTH, Esquire, President, International Chamber of Commerce; FREDRICK V. BRUNS, Esquire, President, Chamber of Commerce, Syracuse; C. W. FERGUSON, Esquire, President, Chamber of Commerce, Troy; R. A. TATE, Esquire, President, Chamber of Commerce, Utica; ROBERT BOETTGER, Esquire, President, Hudson Valley Federated Chamber of Commerce, and CHARLES T. GWYNNE, Esquire, Executive Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York.