1,67 LECTURE VII. Because the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. ROM. viii. 21. As has been proposed, we are now prepared to speak fully of the salvation of man, in the highest sense of the word; or, as it is expressed in our text, the deliverance of the creature (which was made subject to vanity, &c.) from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God.But I regret that I am now obliged to abridge what I have written on this subject, as the proposed limits will not admit of my inserting the whole. I cannot dispense, however, with inserting here a few thoughts (which were written several years ago) on the justice of God; as they have an immediate reference to this subject, and therefore may not be an improper introduction to this lecture. For if they should contain a recapitulation of some of the ideas in the foregoing lectures, it is thought to be not only excusable, but perfectly admissible and proper in this place. Serious Thoughts on the Justice of God respecting the Falland Restoration of Man. God is ONE and INDIVISIBLE: and it is conceived, that a Being infinitely perfect must be infinite in all his attributes:-yea, this is a self-evident proposition:-and if such a Being be infinitely good, as well as PERFECT, no one attribute can be opposite to another; for each attribute is consistent with the infinite perfection of all the rest. There can be but one NATURE in the DEITY, though that nature may be variously modified, or have various qualities, or proper ties, as it operates on different beings, or on the same being in different circumstances; but all those modifications spring from infinite goodness, as their source, and tend to promote the best good of each individual object in the great system of universal being; for as nothing can act contrary to its own nature, so as the nature of God is infinitely good, every act of his, whether it be considered an act of wisdom, mercy, benevolence, or justice, must be considered an act of infinite goodness. Infinite goodness, or benevolence, (which are about, if not quite, synonymous, has been defined, and I think justly, thus: "Infinite benevolence consists in a constant determination in God, to do that, in all cases, by which the greatest possible good and happiness of the universe may be promoted."* If therefore the above definition be correct, and if it be conceded that God is infinitely benevolent, which none will deny, then all that can be rationally inferred from "a constant determination in God, to do that, in all cases, by which the greatest possible good and happiness of the universe may be promoted," rationally results from the nature and character of God. And, furthermore, as justice is an attribute of Deity, as well as mercy, the exercise of justice, in God, as well as mercy, is an exercise of "a constant determination"-to do good; therefore, all that would be inconsistent with such "a constant determination, would be as inconsistent with the justice as it would be with the mercy of God. In treating, therefore, on the justice of God, let it be remembered that we are treating on an attribute that springs spontaneously from "a constant determination in God to do that, in all cases, by which the greatest possible good and happiness of the universe may be promoted." But as there are some who hold that " the greatest possible good and happiness of the universe" do not necessarily imply the "greatest possible good and happiness" of each individual that compose the universe, let us reflect, for a few moments, and inquire-whether the greatest possible evil and misery of the universe would not necessarily imply the greatest possible evil and misery of each individual! It appears that this is as self-evident a proposition as can be named. But if any think otherwise, let them inquire further; if the greatest possible evil of the whole do not necessarily imply the greatest possible evil of each individual, and the greatest possible good of the whole do not necessarily imply the greatest possible good of each individual, then wherein does the difference consist between the greatest possible good and the greatest possible evil? Pause! -reflect! -consider! Again: As benevolence is "a constant determination," &c. so justice, in God, which is one branch of benevolence, is a constant determination, &c. that is, it constantly determines whatever it does determine; therefore there never was a time, nor ever will be, when the justice of God could, or will, determine, or even suffer any thing to take place, which will not eventually terminate in the "greatest possible good and happiness" of his creatures. We shall therefore, I. Consider the justice of God, in what is commonly termed the lapse, or fall, of man. And, II. Attempt to show that it is not inconsistent with pure and strict justice that the self-same creature, man, should be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God." I. The fall of man has generally been considered altogether a creature act, as though the wisdom, justice, or benevolence of God was not in the least consulted or exercised on the occasion; but rather it was in opposition to every attribute of the Deity except his foreknowledge, and therefore his wisdom and power were only exercised in providing a remedy.Not that he was under the least obligation to man, after he had sinned, but it was all "out of his mere good pleasure!" Here, as will be made to appear, is the sole fundamental error in divinity. It is an error, to which all others, of consequence, may be traced. It is unreasonable, unscriptural, and very pernicious. It is unreasonable: 1st. Because it supposes that man by one act of disobedience forfeited every right and title to the divine favour! that it would have been just in God to have cast man off eternally without any remedy! 2dly. It is unreasonable: Because it denies the moral relation between God and his creatures; for if God were under any obligation to man in consequence of that relation which existed between him and them by creation, and in consequence of man's being altogether dependent on him, then that obligation must be as permanent as this relation and dependence, which can neither be increased or diminished by any act of the creature. But it is evident that if God were ever under any obligations, or, in other words, if it were ever consistent with his justice to bestow favours on man in consequence of relation and dependence, it is equally consistent with his justice to bestow favours on them now; for all the relation, in consequence of creation, exists now, between God and his creatures, that ever did; and man is as much dependent on God now as he ever was, the fall of man notwithstanding. sdly.It is unreasonable: because it supposes justice and mercy to be two opposite attributes in the Deity, notwithstanding they come from the same source: and we know that the same fountain cannot send forth salt water and fresh, sweet things and bitter; yet according to this proposition it would be just in God to cast his disobedient children off eternally! but no one will pretend that in so doing he would be merciful-nor can it be of any good or use to the sufferer, to be endlessly suffering! This proposition is unscriptural: for there, we are taught that "the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope:" (Rom. viii. 20:) but this proposition supposes man's imperfection is sin ; or "his inability is his criminality." The scriptures teach us that God loved us while we were dead in trespasses and sins; but this proposition supposes that God loves none but holy beings, and it would not be inconsistent with his justice to make those who are otherwise endlessly miserable! But, above all, This proposition is pernicious. Let us state it again in full, as it frequently and commonly is stated. Man, in consequence of the fall, forfeited every right and title to the divine favour, and it would have been just in God to have cut him down as a cumberer of the ground, and cast his soul into hell, where he must have been MISERABLE TO ALL ETERNITY! Now, upon serious reflection, it must be evident that such a principle is very pernicious; yea, we can not conceive of any thing that would be more so, if it were only to be put in practice, as far as it might be, among men. What would be the practice upon such a principle? Let us examine it with candour and attention. A man has a family of children, who, we will say, have all disobeyed him; (and where is there a man whose children have not disobeyed him more or less;) and what is the consequence? According to the principle under consideration, they have forfeited every right and title to the loving kind |