DE LA PROVINCE DE QUÉBEC.

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and appointment of such sequestrator and receiver, doth dismiss the said conclusion, and so much of the action and demand of the Plaintiffs as relates thereto; and doth also dismiss all and every the other conclusions by the Plaintiffs in their said declaration taken, and not hereinbefore adjudged upon. (2 D. T. B. C., p. 71.)

DEVLIN, Attorney for Plaintiff.

GUGY, for Defendant.

PROCEDURE.-SAISIE-ARRET.-HUISSIER.-RESPONSABILITE.

CIRCUIT COURT, Québec, 29 novembre 1851.

Before DUVAL, Justice.

LAMPSON VS. BARRET.

Jugé: Que d'après les disposions de la 12 Vict., ch. xxxvIII, sec.79, un writ de saisie-arrêt, après jugement, peut être rapporté en vacance, si tel writ émane dans une cause appelable.

Qu'il est du devoir de l'huissier de délivrer tel writ, le ou avant le jour du rapport, soit au procureur ou à la partie qui le lui a remis, ou de l'enfiler au Bureau du Greffier de la Cour dans laquelle il est rapportable, quand même il n'en a pas été spécialement requis.

Qu'ayant reçu tel writ comme huissier, pour en faire la signification, il ne lui sera pas permis de soutenir qu'il n'y a pas de preuve qu'il soit huissier.

Que la preuve du montant dû par le Tiers-saisi au Défendeur, ainsi que de la saisie faite entre les mains du Tiers-saisi, et du paiement de tel montant à d'autres qu'au Demandeur, le jugement du Demandeur n'étant pas payé, est suffisante pour donner au Demandeur le droit de recouvrer des dommages jusqu'au montant dû par tel Tiers-saisi, sans qu'il soit besoin de preuve directe de l'insolvabilité du Défendeur.

The declaration complained that Defendant, being a bailiff, the Plaintiff, at Quebec, on the 31st December, 1850, retained and employed him as such, and he, Defendant, as such bailiff, for reward and fees, by law allowed him, to be paid him by Plaintiff, when requested, and which Plaintiff was always ready to pay, when so requested, received from him, Plaintiff, a certain writ of saisie-arret to be executed, by which writ Defendant, as such bailiff, was commanded to attach all the sums of money, &c., in the hands of John Sharples, garnishee, belonging to John Curtain, to the amount of £50 currency, to summon the said John Curtain and John Sharples, to appear in court on the 13th day of January, 1851, and to have then and there, before the said court, the said writ. That Defendant received said writ, and promised to serve and execute the same, and to return and have the same before said court on the said day according to the command of said

writ, and, although it was his duty so to do, and although he did attach, under the said writ, the sum of £29, which the said Sharples then owed to the said Curtain, in the hands of the said Sharples, he, Defendant, did not return said writ on the said 13th January, 1851, but illegally retained the same in his own possession; by reason whereof, the sum attached was paid over by Sharples to Curtain, and Plaintiff was deprived of the benefit of the seizure to his damage of £29.

To this action Defendant pleaded: That Plaintiff caused the writ to be issued without the ministry of an attorney, and by reason thereof, and of the Plaintiff's ignorance of the practice of the court, said writ was not returned into court on the return day; that it never has been the duty of the bailiff to return such writ into court, but to the person charging him with the execution thereof, and that Plaintiff never demanded the same, although Defendant was always ready to deliver it to him; that when Defendant undertook to serve said writ, Plaintiff promised to call at the Defendant's residence for the said writ, and Defendant's return thereon, but neglected so to do; that Defendant undertook to serve said writ in consideration of certain fees which Plaintiff did not pay, and that Defendant was not therefore bound to return the writ previously to the payment of his lawful fees; that, on the return day of the said writ Plaintiff, knowing the same was not returned, by reason of his own neglect, afterwards, caused another writ to be issued, and, thereby, attached, in the hands of said John Sharples, the same sum of £50, and, thereby, discharged Defendant from all liability arising out of his supposed neglect.

ANDREWS, for Plaintiff: It was the Defendant's duty to return the writ into court, he is commanded by the writ itself to do so; that is the instrument from whence he derives his authority, and, if he acted at all under it, he was bound to yield obedience to it in all its particulars (1).

But, the Defendant undertook to make this return, and the law would presume such an undertaking, though not specifically proved, for the law implies a promise to do that which a party is legally bound to do. When the obligation is a legal one, the party who ought to discharge it is liable, although there be no previous request or subsequent promise. (2)

The sum demanded as damages has been seized, and afterwards paid over by the garnishee, to the injury of Plaintiff, who has thus, by Defendant's neglect, been deprived of the benefit of the attachment made under the writ, and suffered

(1) Stephen, on Pleading, p. 20. (6th American Ed.)

(2) 2 Starkie, on Evid. Part 1, p. 727; Stephen, on Pleading, p. 18.

damage to the extent of the amount seized by him. The law will presume damage where the Defendant has been guilty of a breach of duty imposed upon him by law; the damages suffered by Plaintiff may arise, either from his having been delayed in recovering his debt, or from his having lost it altogether, or from his being likely to lose it (1).

Where a party is entitled to a reward for the performance of his act, he is by law answerable for any degree of neglect on his part, the reward may be considered as an insurance for the due performance of what he has undertaken.

The bailiff is strictly no agent of the Plaintiff, but he is the officer of the court, for the execution of its process, and must perform that which the writ commands him, and, if he do not, he is liable to the party for the damage caused, by reason of his neglect, although he was not aware that it was his duty to return the writ. (2)

But, that the Defendant knew it was his duty to return the writ is evident, from his having offered so to do on a day subsequent to the return day, when the officer of the court, whose particular duty it is to receive the returns, would not then receive it, because the return day was past.

VANNOVOUS, for Defendant: Plaintiff's plaint rests upon the supposition that, had the Defendant discharged his duty perfectly, in respect of the writ, Plaintiff would have derived benefit from it. To establish satisfactorily that position, it is necessary to show that the writ was a legal process, and one that might have issued, carrying with it all the penal consequences of a disobedience to the mandate contained in it. If, on the contrary, such cannot be shewn, it is manifest to the least susceptible, that if no benefit were conferred upon the person at whose instance the writ was issued, by the issuing of it, he cannot possibly have sustained a loss: hence, it follows, that, if the writ, in this case was invalid, a right of action against Defendant never accrued to Plaintiff.

To render the position assumed by Defendant intelligible, I will advert to the recent Judicature Act, 12 Vict,ch. XXXVIII, by the provisions of which an extended jurisdiction has been given to the Circuit Court, and, more particularly, to the section of the act which settles the terms of the Circuit Court in the Quebec Circuit. The terms of the court are held periodically, on the six last days of every month (except August), where and when only the court is in session. The writ, in the

(1) 2 Starkie, on Evid., Part 1, pp. 299, 1014.

(2) 2 Starkie, on Evid., Part 1, p. 727; 14 East, 468, Slackford et al., vs. Austen; 3 Toullier, Brussels Edit., p. 109, Note 2, p. 110, Note 1; Ignorance de ce qu'on doit savoir, rend responsable; 5 Paris Edit. Note (2) to No. 389.

present instance, was issued and bears date on the 3rd January, 1851, and required the attendance of the tiers-saisi, and the Defendant on the 13th January instant before the court; the tiers-saisi to make his declaration upon oath, and the Defendant then and there to shew cause why the attachment should not be declared valid. The first question which claims attention is, whether there was a court in session on the 14th January, and if there was no court on that day, will the parties enjoined by the writ to do a given thing, be deemed contumacious for not yielding obedience to a writ which, upon the face of it, requires an act to be done before a court which was not in session on that day, and which act (if the premises be true) could not be accomplished. The Defendant submits that the tiers-saisi could not obey the writ, and cannot have incurred any penalty for neglect to attend, because, there being no court, he could make no legal declaration; and in the absence of any provision of law empowering the administration of oaths, I contend that either the clerk of the court, ex officio, nor any other person had the power to administer an oath to the tierssaisi, and if he did so, the oath would be illegal, and no penalty would attach if the matter sworn to were false. (1)

I would also urge that the Plaintiff, having failed to show that Curtain is unable to pay the debt due by him, cannot maintain his action without proof of actual damage. (2) Judgment for Plaintiff. (2 D. T. B. C., p. 77.) ANDREWS and CAMPBELL, for Plaintiff." STUART and VANNOVOUS, for Defendant.

CONTRAT DE MARIAGE.-ENREGISTREMENT.

COUR SUPÉRIEURE, Québec, 13 octobre 1851.

Présents: DUVAL et MEREDITH, Juges.

PANET, Demandeur, vs. LARUE, Défendeur, et PANET et LARUE, Opposants.

Jugé: Qu'un contrat de mariage, assignant une rente viagère à la femme, doit être enregistré, pour lui conserver son rang d'hypothèque.

Dans cette cause, les biens dépendant de la succession de feu Wilbrod Larue, avaient été vendus, et il s'agissait d'en distribuer le produit entre divers créanciers hypothécaires. Parmi

(1) 20 Law Journal Rep: (N. S.) M. C. 197, Regina vs. Hallett.

(2) 4 Meeson & Welsby, 145; 1 Meeson & Welsby, 709; 5 Term Rep., 37; 1 M. & Rob, 227.

eux, s'était présentée Louise Badelard Panet, veuve du dit Wilbrod Larue, qui réclamait, outre des arrérages, un capital de £1,200, pour assurer le paiement à l'avenir d'une rente et pension viagère, constituée en sa faveur par son contrat de mariage avec le dit Wilbrod Larue, en date du 24 mai 1841 dans les termes suivants: "Et en considération de l'amitié que "le futur époux porte à la future épouse, et pour lui assurer une existence honnête, au cas qu'elle lui survive, il lui fait, par ces présentes, donation entre-vifs, pure et simple, ce qui "est accepté par la future épouse, sous l'autorisation de ses père et mère, d'une rente annuelle et viagère de la somme de soixante-quinze livres courant, payable en deux termes égaux, 'laquelle commencera du jour du décès du futur époux, et “s'éteindra au décès de la future épouse, et sera à prendre généralement sur les biens du futur époux."

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Dans le projet de distribution préparé par le protonotaire, la veuve Larue, n'était colloquée ni pour le capital de cette rente, ni pour ses arrérages, tandis que des créanciers hypothécaires postérieures à la date de son contrat de mariage, et entre autres Charles Larue, dont l'hypothèque (duement enregistrée) ne remontait qu'au 6 mars 1847, étaient mis en ordre de collocation.

En conséquence, la Veuve Larue, contesta ce projet de distribution, et la collocation du dit Charles Larue, alléguant que sa créance hypothécaire, datant du 6 mars 1847, était postérieure à la sienne, qui remontait au 24 mai 1841, date de son contrat de mariage. Elle alléguait aussi que ce contrat de mariage avait été insinué du vivant de son époux,le 12 octobre 1849, et enregistré le 17 octobre 1849.

La créance hypothécaire du dit Charles Larue remontait au 6 mars 1847 : elle résultait de l'hypothèque produite par l'acte de tutelle, duement enregistré, nommant Wilbrod Larue, tuteur à son frère, Charles Larue.

Deux questions furent soumises à la cour:

1. Le contrat de mariage du 24 mai 1841, portant la donation de cette rente viagère, ne devait-il pas être insinué, suivant la loi, dans les 4 mois de sa date; et ce défaut d'insinuation ne pouvait-il pas être invoqué avec raison par Charles Larue, nonobstant l'insinuation tardive faite le 16 octobre 1849 ?

2. La Dame Larue n'avait-elle pas perdu son rang d'hypothèque, à l'égard du dit Charles Larue, en ne faisant enregistrer son contrat de mariage que le 17 octobre 1849 ?

Le conseil de la Dame Larue soutenait : 1. que l'insinuation faite du vivant du mari, le 17 octobre 1849, avait été faite à temps; 2. que, d'ailleurs, cette rente viagère était un gain de survie, qui,à l'instar du douaire, n'était pas sujet à l'insinuation; 3. qu'il n'était pas nécessaire, aux termes des ordon