de payer, au reste, n'est pas une des formalités voulues par l'Ordonnance de 1667, qui a établi toutes les formalités nécessaires pour cette saisie: l'ordonnance de 1539, exigeait trois jours entre le commandement et la saisie-exécution; mais sa disposition est tombée en désuétude. (1)

La question de savoir si ce commandement était nécessaire s'est présentée à plusieurs reprises devant les cours de justice en ce pays, et il a toujours été jugé que cette formalité n'était pas nécessaire. (2)

L'opposition est donc déboutée avec dépens. (2 D. T. B. C., p. 148.)

STUART et VANNOVOUS, pour Lampson.
AHERN, pour RENAUD et al.

TRANSPORT.-SIGNIFICATION.-PROCEDURE.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montréal, 30 décembre 1851.

Before DAY, SMITH and MONDELET, Justices.

ST. JOHN vs. DELISLE et al.

Jugé: 1° Que le certificat de l'huissier n'est pas une preuve authentique de la signification d'un transport fait devant notaires.

2° Qu'une réponse générale à un plaidoyer est suffisante pour obliger le Défendeur à la preuve des allégués de tel plaidoyer.

Action to recover £72 11s. 3d., balance of a notarial obligation for £1000, consented by Defendant Delisle, as principal, and the other Defendants as sureties, in favor of the Montreal Provident and Savings Bank, and by the bank assigned to Plaintiff, by deed executed before notaries, the 15th December, 1848.

Defendants pleaded:

1. That the pretended transfer to Plaintiff from the bank

(1) 1 Pigeau, 607. Avant de saisir, il est d'usage de faire un commandement au débiteur, pour qu'il paye et évite l'éclat fâcheux des contraintes.

On ne voit aucune loi qui exige cet acte; il paraît qu'il était pratiqué avant l'ordonnance de 1539, puisque cette loi le suppose usité, et prescrit de le faire à personne ou domicile. L'ordonnance de 1667, qui a établi toutes les formalités nécessaires pour cette saisie, ne parle nullement de commandement.

L'ordonnance de 1539, exige trois jours entre le commandement et la saisieexécution; mais sa disposition est tombée en désuétude et avec raison: un débiteur de mauvaise volonté, ou qui serait hors d'état de payer, pourrait facilement détourner ses effets. A Paris et dans nombre d'endroits, on pense que l'on peut saisir dès le lendemain mais non auparavant, M. Jousse, sur l'article 3 du titre XXXIII de l'ordonnance de 1667, estime que le commandement peut être fait par le procès-verbal même de saisie, et qu'il n'est besoin par conséquent d'aucun intervalle.

(2) N° 5 de 1808, Volant vs. Drapeau; N° 384 de 1812, Pozer vs. L'Espérance; N° 604 de 1818, Robinson vs. Wilson; Couturier et Lacroix, en appel.

was only signified to Defendant Delisle, on 21st December, 1848, at twelve minutes before noon. That, on the 20th December, W. H. Coffin transferred to Delisle £72 15s. 2d. part of a larger sum deposited by the cédant in the Savings Bank; that this transfer was signified to the bank at a quarter past nine o'clock A. M., on the twenty-first December, by Wm. MOORE, one of the bailiffs of the Court of Queen's Bench for the District of Montreal, by delivery of a copy thereof to Charles Freeland, actuary of the Bank, at the office of the bank, and that, thereby, the debt due by Delisle to the bank was compensated and extinguished.

2. That the bank had no power to make the transfer to Plaintiff, inasmuch as the bank had neglected to fulfil the formalities required by the 4 and 5 Vict., ch. XXXII, providing for the establishment of savings banks, and had therefore no legal existence.

The second plea was demurred to and dismissed.

Defendants proved the signification to Mr. Delisle, of the transfer to Plaintiff, at the time alleged in their plea, by two witnesses who were present in Mr. Delisle's office, and noted the time of the signification and delivery of the copy by the notary. The copy of transfer, filed by Defendants, had endorsed on it the certificate of one William Moore, as one of the baillifs of the Court of Queen's Bench for the district of Montreal, setting forth a signification of the transfer in the manner and at the time alleged in Defendant's plea. It appeared also, that Mr. Coffin was a depositor in the bank, at the time of the transfer to Mr. Delisle, to the amount of £216, and that the bank had been in the habit of granting to depositors transfers against debtors of the bank, to the extent of ninety per cent. on the amounts deposited.

DAY, Justice: The attention of the counsel in this case was directed, by the court, to the question as to the sufficiency of a bailiff's certificate, to establish the signification of a transfer before notaries; as also to the question as to how far the signification is to be taken as admitted by the pleadings in the cause. On the first point, the court has seen no ground for changing the opinion expressed at the time the case was submitted to the counsel on this point. We think the bailiff's return is not to be taken as authentic. As to the other point, the court is not disposed, for the present, to adopt the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals in the case of Copps vs. Copps, (1) although, as a general rule, I hold that this court is bound to yield implicit obedience to judgments rendered in the Court of Appeals, yet cases may arise in which it

(1) Supra, p. 105.

may be our duty to pause before doing so. By the eightyfifth clause of the Judicature Act, it is enacted," that every allegation of fact, the truth of which the opposite party shall not expressly deny or declare to be unknown to him, shall be held to be admitted by him." It is known that the opinion of the court on this section of the law has been expressed to the effect that, when the truth of all the allegations of a pleading is denied, this is equivalent to the express denial referred to in the act; that by denying all the allegations unequivocally, each allegation is denied, and that it is not necsssary specially to negative each allegation (1). This opinion has been held by some of the judges in the other districts. The case of Copps vs. Copps came up from the Circuit Court at Quebec before the judges of the superior court, who were divided in opinion. It was then carried into appeal, three judges being present, Justices Rolland, Panet, and Aylwin, and an opinion, adverse to that expressed by this court, was rendered; Mr. Justice Rolland dissenting. We have thus the opinion of six judges in the other courts on the one side, and that of the two judges in appeal on the other. Under these circumstances, the court feels justified is not adopting the decision in Copps and Copps, as governing the case, until the full majority of the Court of Appeals shall have expressed their opinion, when I shall feel it my duty to yield.

MONDELET, Justice, concurring in the judgment, expressed his opinion, that a single judgment of the Court of Appeals should not establish a rule for this court. (2 D. T, B. C., p. 150.) G. and A. ROBERTSON, for Plaintiff.

DUMAS and CHERRIER, for Defendant.

(1) McGregor vs. MacKenzie et al: Judgment 16th April, 1851. These were actions against the maker and endorser of two promissory notes; plea that the notes had been obtained fraudulently and without consideration, and had come into Plaintiff's hands through collusion with the payee; to this plea, Plaintiff filed; 1. a demurrer; 2. general answer; 3. replication. The parties having been heard on the demurrer, were ordered to proceed to proof, arant faire droit, At the enquête, Plaintiff established the material allegations of his declaration: The Defendants produced no evidence, but at the hearing contended that, inasmuch as the Plaintiff had not expressly denied the truth of the allegations contained in their plea, those allegations must, under the 85th section of the Judicature Act, be held to be admitted. The court (composed of Day, Vanfelson and Mondelet) rejected the Defendant's pretensions. Day, Justice, observing the court finds no difficulty in the construction of the statute. The argument turns on the word "expressly," which the Defendants contend means severally." We are against them on this view; 'expressly" means an express denial it has no technical meaning apart from its ordinary colloquial one. The object of the legislature seems to have been to put an end to the doubts existing as to the effect of the areu judiciaire, and whether it can be divided. We are of opinion the Plaintiff has sufficiently denied the allegations of the Defendant's plea. Judgment accordingly. GRIFFIN, for Plaintiff; MCIVER, for Defendants.

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:

QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, Quebec, 17 janvier 1852.

Before: ROLLAND, PANET and AYLWIN, Justices.

JONES (Plaintiff), Appellant, and ANDERSON (Defendant), Respondent, and CARR (Intervening Party).

Le Demandeur en cette cause avait poursuivi le Défendeur pour le loyer d'un quai, et saisi-gagé, sur le dit quai, une certaine quantité de briques à feu et de foyers; le Défendeur avait, entre autres choses, plaidé paiement; un tiers était intervenu dans la cause pour réclamer les dites briques et les dits foyers comme sa propriété ; la Cour Inférieure avait été d'opinion, que le paiement était prouvé, avait débouté l'action du Demandeur, et maintenu l'intervention :

Jugé, en appel: 1. Qu'il n'y avait pas preuve du paiement; 2. que les briques et foyers, déposés sur le dit quai et saisis sur le Défendeur pour le loyer d'icelui, avaient été légalement saisis-gagés, pour garantir le paiement des loyers dus pour l'usage du dit quai; et que les briques et foyers étaient sujets par la loi au privilège du locateur, super invectis et illatis, comme marchandises, emmagasinées, déposées et mises en vente sur le quai, par l'agent et facteur du propriétaire, lequel en vertu du statut de la 10o et 11e Vic., chap. x, avait le pouvoir de mettre en gage les effets de son commettant : En conséquence, les jugements rendus en cour inférieure sont infirmés, l'action du Demaudeur est maintenue, la saisie-gagerie déclarée bonne et valable, et l'intervention déboutée. (1)

This was an appeal instituted from a judgment, rendered in the Superior Court, sitting in the district of Quebec, on the 21st July, 1851, dismissing the Appellant's action.

The action, in the court below, was upon a lease made and executed before Hossack and another, public notaries, on the 12th of May, 1849, whereby Appellant leased, for the term of one year, to commence on the first day of May, and to terminate on the like day of May 1850, “unto Patrick Anderson, merchant, of Quebec, and represented thereto by Thomas Anderson, his brother, thereunto present and accepting thereof, for and on behalf of said Patrick Anderson, as his attorney," a wharf and premises in the Lower Town, of the city de Quebec, the whole as occupied by the lessee, in consideration of the rent of £125 which the lessee, represented by Thomas Anderson), bound himself to pay to the lessor in and by quarterly payments of £31 5s. on the last day of each quarter during the term. The lease also provided that the premises should be furnished with effects, as customary, to guarantee the payment of this rent.

The declaration, proceeds to aver that Defendant was in possession of the premises, and that, on the last day of the quarter, ending on the 31st of January, 1850, the sum of £68 158. was due and payable from Defendant to Plaintiff.

(1) V. art. 1619 et 1740 C. C.

Plaintiff obtained the usual process of saisie-gagerie, under which the sheriff seized and attached, upon the wharf in question, 28,096 fire bricks, and 2 hearth stones.

Upon the return of this process, there was filed a demand in intervention, in the name of "Thomas Carr, of New-Castleupon-Tyne, in England, merchant," alleging that he was the lawful owner of the fire bricks and hearth stones which had been so seized, and praying that the same might be restored to him.

There was filed, on the part of the Defendant, Patrick Anderson, a plea of peremptory exception, in which, he alleges:

1. "That, subsequently to the passing of the lease, to wit, about the month of June (1850) at Quebec, John Jones did verbally lease the premises described in the declaration unto Thomas Anderson, for the year ending on the first day of May, 1850, and Thomas Anderson did thereupon enter in and upon the said wharf and premises, and did use and enjoy the same up to the first day of May (1850), and John Jones did receive, of and from Thomas Anderson, the rent of the said wharf for the year ending on the 1st day of May instant, and hath been wholly satisfied for the said rent by the said Thomas Anderson, to wit, by bricks delivered to the said John Jones and to his order."

2. "That the rent of the said wharf and premises, demanded in and by the Plaintiff's declaration, hath been well and truly paid and satisfied to the said John Jones."

To this plea Plaintiff filed a demurrer, and, on the 9th of September, 1850, the court below pronounced the following judgment:

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The court, doth order, avant faire droit, that the parties do proceed to adduce proof of their several allegations upon the issue of fact raised upon the said pleadings."

To this interlocutory judgment an exception was filed by the Plaintiff, and it was one of the judgments now appealed from.

To the demand in intervention of Thomas Carr, Plaintiff pleaded: 1st the general issue; and 2ndly a plea of peremptory exception.

In the latter pleading, he alleged: "That the Defendant, Patrick Anderson, represented by Thomas Anderson, his brother and agent, had taken a lease from Plaintiff of said wharf for the purpose of having a place to deposit Carr's fire bricks, and where he could sell and dispose of the same; that by said lease said Thomas Anderson, as the agent of Patrick Anderson, had undertaken to have said wharf furnished with effects to guarantee the payment of the rent; that, until the