accompanies the individual wherever he goes. (1); 3o The personal Status applies to marriage, and the effects of marriage, quant aux personnes, et, pur suite, quant aux biens. (2); 4o That the real property acquired during the marriage is within the rule of the Status as well as the meubles (3) 5° Change of domicile by the husband cannot alter the rights of the parties as established at the time of the marriage. (4); 6o By the domicile of the husband, is to be understood the place where he takes his wife, and settles himself immediately after the marriage; it is the domicile which the husband and wife have intented to choose. (5); 7° Place of residence time of residence and place of death are all presumptive constituents of domicile. A continued residence at a place for ten years establishes domicile. (6); 8° If the domicile at Abbitibbi be rejected as the domicile of Thos. Fraser, then his domicile of origin revives. (7)

port of the rule in p. 127; Paul Voët. De Stat., Sect. 9, ch. II, no 5; Jean Voet ad. ff, tit. de ritu. nupt., n° 85; Bacquet, Droits de Justice, ch. XXI, n's 67 & seq.; Lebrun, Communauté, liv. I, ch. II, no 38 & seq. ; 1 Argou, p. 95; 2 Argou, p. 23; Pothier, Communauté, Art. prélim., nos 1, 19 & 12; Rép. de Jurisp., who Conventions matrimoniales, § 2, 5; vbo Autorisation maritale, ? 10, n° 3 & seq., vbo communauté, § 1, n° 3.

(1) Felix, p. 40, no 30, p. 41; 1 Cochin, pp. 154, 345; 1 Boullenois, Tit. 1, ch. 11, Obз. 9 et 10, p. 152, Obз. 12, p. 172; 4 Toullier, no 102, p. 111, in fine ; 1 Prud'homme, Traité des personnes, p. 82.

(2) Felix, n° 90, p. 137; Bacquet, Droits de Justice, ch. XXI, no 67 et seq., p. 208, 209, 210 et nos 73, 74, p. 211 et 212; Acte de Notoriété of 4th April, 1703; Boullenois, Dissertations, 5 Quest., p. 112, 113; Boullenois, Dissertations, 19 Quest., p. 251; 1 Boullenois, Traité, Tit. 2, ch. v, Obsers. 29, pp. 750, 751; 2 Boullenois, Traité, Ob. 35, pp. 260-1-2-4, 277; Lebrun, Communauté, liv. 1, ch. II, p. 15, par. 37-8-9-41-2-6-8-9-51-52; Boucher d'Argis, Gains nuptiaux, p. 139, no 16, pp. 146, 245-6 et seq.; 1 Argou, p. 95; Basnage, pp. 492-3; Art. 329; Répert. de Jurisp., rbo Autorisation maritale, § 10, no 3, 5 et seq., p. 614-7; Ibid., vbo Convent. matrim., § 2, pp. 829, 830-2; Ibid., cbo communauté de biens, § 1, n° 3, pp. 138-9, 164-5; Pothier, Communauté, Art. prélim., nos 1, 10 et 12; 1 Journal des Audiences, pp. 242-5, Vannelles' Case; 1 Despeisses, part 1, Tit. Marriage, § 5, n° 15; Auzanet, 155, Tit. 10, Art, 220; D'Argentré sur l'Art. 218, G. C., nos 15 et 16; Nouv. Dénizart, vho Domicile matrim., p. 686, no 3, § 2, 1 § 3.

(3) Boucher d'Argis, p. 139;1 Boullenois, Traité, p. 800, Obs. 29; Bacquet, ch. XXI, pp. 709 et seq; Boullenois, Dissertations, p. 112.

(4) Auzanet., p. 156; Bacquet, p. 212; 1 Boullenois, p. 509.

(5) Boucher d'Argis, p. 140; Lebrun, Communauté, liv. 1, ch. 11, no 42, p. 17, Nos 49, 51, p. 19; 2 Despeisses, p. 96, 502, N° 7; Pothier Douaire, Nos 13 & 16; 1 Odier, Contrat de mariage, p. 56, 8, 9, 60, 65; Nouv. Dénizart, vbo Domicile matrim, p. 685, par. 3, 4; Ancien Dénizart, vbo Domicile, p. 164; Bacquet, p. 558, No 10; 2 Domat, p. 109, Nos 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 ; 1 Burge, p. 43. (G) Lebrun, p. 19, no 49; Lacombe, rbo domicile, p. 206, nos 1 & 2 ; 2 Despeisses, p. 502, no 7; D'Argentré, p. 449.

(7) I Barge., p. 34; Felix, p. 38, no 23; 2 Ferrière, G. Commentaire, Art. 173, p. 1295; 2 Domat, p, 109, Nos 1 & 4.

The Court of Queen's Bench, gave the following judgment: Considering that Appellant, from and since the death of her husband, has been and now is solely possessed of all and every the estates, real and personal, whereof her husband died seized and possessed, and that it was competent to her, at any time before the institution of this action, without any action, judgment or authority whatever, in this behalf, and, as being in possession of said estates, it was her duty to cause an inventory of said estates to be made in due course of law, and that this action, in so far as Appellant seeks, by it, a judgment of a court of law to compel the making of such an inventory, is wholly unnecessary and uncalled for; and considering also that the appointment of James Pyke to be tutor ad hoc is vague and uncertain, as respects the action which he is thereby authorized to defend, and confers no power whatever on him to make or join in the making of a partition, or a licitation as prayed for, and is wholly insufficient to make him a competent party to any such partition or licitation; it is adjudged that the judgment of the court below, for the reasons aforesaid, and not for the reasons, in the said judgment assigned, be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Hon. Justice ROLLAND, dissentiente: I cannot concur in this decision, as I conceive the action rightly brought, on the refusal of the subrogé tuteur (one of the Defendants) to join in the inventory. The only course, in such a case, was to appoint a tutor to the minors regularly and specifically named to defend the action, the object of which was to have the question of the existence of a communauté set at rest; a proper issue has been joined on the merits, and the court, in my opinion, ought to pronounce on the rights of the parties, instead of avoiding to do so, which I regret, having taken a different view of the case from my honorable confrères, as under no better circumstances, that I can perceive, could the question en litige be determined; nor can I see how the inventory could be made without a légitime contradicteur. The sub-tutor refusing to act and having probably been advised to do so. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 101.)

.ROSE and MONK, for Appellants.

BADGLEY and ABBOTT, for Respondent.

AVOCAT.-RESPONSABILITE.-TEMOIN.

COUR DE CIRCUIT, Québec, 28 février 1853.

Juge: Qu'un procureur ad lites n'est pas responsable des salaires des témoins qu'il a fait assigner à la requête de son client.

Le Demandeur alléguait que les Défendeurs, agissant comme avocats et procureurs dans une cause, l'avait fait assigner comme témoin, au moyen d'un subpoena certifié par eux, et l'avaient interrogé comme tel de la part de leur client, et qu'en conséquence ils étaient responsables envers lui de ses frais de voyage et autres: pourquoi il concluait à une condamnation personnelle contre eux. Il fondait sa prétention sur ce qu'un procureur, qui a fait assigner des témoins à la requête de sa partie, doit être tenu en son nom payer les salaires de ces témoins, parcequ'il a dû, avant de les assigner, se faire donner, par son client, les fonds nécessaires pour cet objet.

Les Défendeurs opposèrent une défense en droit, par laquelle ils prétendaient que, comme procureurs ad lites, ils n'étaient pas personnellement responsables.

La cour maintint la défense en droit, et débouta l'action. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 109.)

LELIEVRE et ANGERS, Procureurs du Demandeur.

HOLT et IRVINE, Procureurs du Défendeur.

CERTIORARI.-COMPETENCE.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 16 novembre 1852.

Before DAY and MONDELET, Justices.

Ex parte CUMMING, for certiorari.

Jugé: Que la Cour Supérieure, siégeant à Montréal, n'a pas juridiction, et ne peut accorder un writ de certiorari, pour prendre connaissance d'une sentence prononcée par un juge de paix dans le district des TroisRivières.

The conviction which it was sought to quash had taken place before a Justice of the Peace, in the District of ThreeRivers. Both the magistrate and Defendant resided in the district of Montreal, and the writ of summons bore date at Upton, in the district of Montreal, but cited Defendant to

appear in the district of Three-Rivers, where the conviction itself took place.

On a motion for a writ of certiorari, the court held that it had no jurisdiction. The record on its face showed that the judgment complained of was rendered in the district of ThreeRivers, and this court had consequently no jurisdiction. Motion rejected. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 110.)

TORRANCE and BANCROFT, for Petitioner.

CEETIORARI.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 16 décembre 1852.

Before DAY and MONDELET, Justices.

Ex parte GIBEAULT, for certiorari.

Jugé Que dans le cas où un jugement de la Cour des Commissaires est vicieux quant à la forme, la Cour Supérieure ne peut accorder un writ de certiorari, à moins qu'il n'apparaisse qu'il y a excès de juridiction.

Motion to quash the judgment of a Commissioners' Court, condemning Defendant to pay the sum of fifteen shillings, subscription towards the support of a school. The judgment ordered" that Defendant do pay the sum subscribed for, and costs."

DAY, Justice: The judgment is evidently faulty, inasmuch as it is not made in favor of any particular party. The Applicant has taken the ground that this is a nullity, and that the same rule applies here which applies in convictions before Justices of the Peace. This is a mistake. The proceedings before Justices are quasi criminal proceedings, and we cannot extend the rules which govern them to courts of petty civil jurisdiction. If we did, we should soon have this a court of appeals for all the Commissioners' Courts in the district. All that can be said of the conviction is that it is bad in form, but there is nothing to show excess of jurisdiction. If there were, the court would interfere. Motion to quash rejected. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 111.)

CANTWELL, for Applicant.

DEVLIN, for Prosecutor.

PRESCRIPTION. BILLET PROMISSOIRE.

BANC DE LA REINE, EN APPEL, Montréal, 12 octobre 1852.

Présents: SIR JAMES STUART, Bart., Juge en Chef, ROLLAND, PANET et AYLWIN Juges.

HAYS, Appelant, et DAVID, Intimé.

Jugé: Que le faiseur d'un billet promisoire payable à demande peut opposer, en compensation au créancier et porteur de ce billet, un autre billet fait par ce créancier et porteur plus de cinq ans avant, mais endossé et transporté au débiteur du premier billet avant l'expiration du temps de la prescription du premier billet, et après la signature du second. (1)

2. Que dans ce cas la prescription ne peut être invoquée.

3. Que la compensation en question a lieu sans qu'il soit besoin au porteur de signifier l'endossement et transport à lui fait du billet qu'il oppose en compensation.

4. En l'absence de dénégation spéciale et de preuve contraire, la date de l'endossement d'un billet fait foi.

L'action était portée pour le recouvrement d'un billet promissoire fait par l'Appelant en faveur de l'Intimé, le 4 octobre 1849, pour £100 payable à demande). L'Appelant opposa, en compensation partielle, un billet de £46 13 7, portant intérêt de sa date, fait par l'Intimé,en faveur de M. J. Hays, le 22 août 1845 et par ce dernier endossé en faveur de l'Intimé, le 1 novembre 1849, par un endossement en plein et paiement pour le surplus. L'Intimé rencontra ce plaidoyer par une réponse alléguant l'écoulement de plus de cinq ans entre l'échéance du billet offert en compensation et l'enfilure du plaidoyer, que le billet était conséquemment prescrit et présumé payé.

La Cour Supérieure, le 25 mai 1852, rendit jugement en faveur de l'Intimé, comme suit :

"Considering that Plaintiff hath proved the material allegations of his declaration, and that Defendant hath failed to establish, by evidence, that the promissory note in his exception set forth, and alleged to have been endorsed by Moses Judah Hays, in said exception mentioned, on the first day of November, 1841, was endorsed on the said last mentioned day, or on any other day before the expiration of five years from the time the same became due and payable; and, considering that no suit at law hath been brought for the recovery of the said last mentioned promissory note, within five years from the time the same became due and payable, doth maintain the special answer of Plaintiff, and hold the same to be paid, and, dismissing the exception of compensation pleaded by Defen(1) V. art. 1188 C. C.