for removing parties who had intruded themselves into a public office or franchise: all that it was necessary to do then was to look to the requête libellée, to see if an intrusion had been alleged within the terms of the statute. In this case, the court thought that there was, and that the Plaintiffs had sufficiently complied with the first section of the act.

The parties were afterwards heard on the défense en droit, and, on the 16th April, VANFELSON, Justice, gave judgment, discharging the délibéré, on the ground that the interest exposed by the Petitioners was not a legal interest. On looking at the requête, the court saw that the parties applicant merely styled themselves citoyens notables of Sorel, without taking the quality of fabriciens, or paroissiens, which was necessary. The court was of opinion that, in cases of this kind, the quality of citoyens notables was not recognised by law if it were otherwise, persons of a different religious denomination, not belonging to the fabrique, might mix themselves up with others to bring actions against the fabrique. This clearly could not be allowed; to have this right, they must be paroissiens and of the same religious denomination: the mere fact of residence or being citoyens notables was not sufficient. The délibéré, therefore, would be discharged, to enable the parties to take such course as they might be advised. (1 D. T. B. C., p. 247.)

PELLETIER and PAPIN, for Petitioners.
CARTIER and CARTIER, for Defendant.

NOVATION.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 16 April, 1851.

Before DAY, VANFELSON, and MONDELET, Justices.

ANDREW MACFARLANE vs. THOMAS PATTON.

Jugé Que s'il n'y a pas mention expresse dans un acte qu'il y a novation, le créancier peut fonder son action sur la créance originaire, s'il le juge à propos. (1)

Action of assumpsit, for £90-1-1, for the price and value of goods and merchandise sold and delivered. The indebtedness was alleged to be on the 17th May, 1850.

The Defendant pleaded: 1° That, by a certain deed executed by and between the Plaintiff and himself before notaries, on the 17th May, 1850, he had acknowledged himself to be

(1) V. art. 1171 C. C,

indebted to the Plaintiff, in the sum of £80 currency, for the value of merchandise sold to him by the Plaintiff, which sum he bound himself to pay, on demand, three months after the date and for the due payment thereof, hypothecated certain immoveables belonging to him; that he was not indebted to Plaintiff in any sum of money, or for any cause of action, or debt, other than that mentioned in the said deed, and for which no action had been brought; that the goods and merchandise for which the presentaction was brought, were sold and delivered by Plaintiff to Defendant, on, or before the 17th May, 1850, and that the said deed, acknowledging the said debt of £80, and giving a mortgage therefore, was granted by Defendant, to Plaintiff, in satisfaction and payment of the same, by reason of which the claim of Plaintiff had been novated.

Plaintiff replied specially that the said sum of £80 did not constitute the full amount of indebtedness of Defendant to Plaintiff, on the 17th May, when the deed referred to was executed, but, on the contrary, the said sum of £80 currency, formed part merely of the sum of £90 - 1 - 1 mentioned in Plaintiff's declaration; that the said deed was not executed, to novate, said debt of £90 - 1 - 1, but was merely executed for the purpose, of giving Plaintiff collateral security for faithful payment of said debt, to the extent of the amount of £80 currency.

STUART H., for Defendant: The principle of the French law is, that it is unnecessary that there should by any special expression of the will of the parties to produce novation: it is sufficient that such will should be plainly and indubitably apparent. In all cases, when additional obligations and securities are taken without producing novation, they must be collateral, and cease, and be extinguished upon the payment of the original debt. In this case, the obligation mentioned in the plea was an independent, not a collateral obligation, having for its cause the purchase of merchandise, and entirely extinguished the existence of any supposed open account. Indeed, it is scarcely probable that any action upon an open account, would be instituted upon the day on which an obligation for the amount of such account had been consented and given the written engagement superseding the verbal one. (1)

:

DUNKIN, for Plaintiff: Novation is not to be presumed, but must always be expressly declared. In this case, the deed was a mere collateral security, and could not operate as a novation of the debt.

(1) Toullier, vol. VII, no 272 et seq.; Poth., Oblig., no 581 et seq.; Trop., I vol., no 199; Merlin, Rép., verbo novation; Dénizart, vol. III, p. 463.

The court decided that, without express mention of novation in the deed, the presumption was in favor of the creditor that no novation had taken place, and his right to sue upon the original claim, if he saw fit, remained to him. Judgment for the Plaintiff. (1 D. T. B. C., p. 250.)

BETHUNE and DUNKIN, for Plaintiff.
NYE and FLEMING, for Defendant.

LOUAGE.-PROCEDURE.-DECLARATION.

SUPERIOR COURT, Quebec, 13 mai 1851.

Before BOWEN, Chief Justice, DUVAL, and MEREDITH,
Justices.

PIRRIE vs. MCHUGH and PURCELL.

Une demande pour une somme d'argent due pour loyers en vertu d'un bail notarié est suffisante, sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'alléguer que le locataire s'est mis en possession et a eu la jouissance des lieux loués, ou que le Demandeur a rempli les obligations qui lui étaient imposées par le bail.

The declaration alleged that, on the 19th March, 1850, by notarial deed, Plaintiff leased, for the term of one year, from the 1st May then next, and to end on the 30th April, 1851, to one McGolrick, certain premises situate in the city of Quebec; in consideration whereof, McGolrick promised to pay Plaintiff £230, in the manner and at the times specified in the lease; that the Defendants were parties to the deed, and became severally the sureties of McGolrick, for the payment of the rent; and that the sum demanded was due to the Plaintiff by McGolrick for rent, under the lease.

To this declaration, Defendant, Purcell, demurred: alleging that the same was insufficient in law, because, although the alleged contract declared upon, was a contrat synallagmatique, imposing obligations upon either party, and after the alleged passing thereof became exécutoire on the part of the Plaintiff, when the period should arrive at which the lease was to commence; yet that it was not alleged that McGolrick had ever made any entry on, or into the premises, or that he had ever used or occupied them; and that no action ex locato could be maintained, unless use and occupation were alleged, by virtue of which alone rent could become due; that it would have been competent to the Plaintiff to sue the Defendants in an action ex contractu without alleging an entry, or use and occupation; but the Plaintiff having sued in an action locati, had shewn no cause of action

for the recovery of any sum due as rent. In support of his position, the Defendant, Purcell, referred to Poth., Louage, n° 1, 6, 53, 54, 133, 142; 1 Chitty, on Pleadings, p. 197, 293, 294, 296, 320, 321, 323.

The Plaintiff argued that the use and occupation was a matter of proof; and that the action was brought on the contract between the parties.

Judgment the 13th May, 1851, declaring the allegations of the declaration sufficient in law, and overruling the demurrer, with costs. (1 D. T. B. C., p. 271.)

CANNON L. A., for Plaintiff.
POPE, for Defendant, Purcell.

APPEL AU CONSEIL PRIVE.

BANC DE LA REINE, EN APPEL, Montréal,16 janvier 1851.

Présents: Sir J. STUART, Juge en Chef, ROLLAND,
PANET, et AYLWIN, Juges.

GUGY, Appelant, et GUGY, Intimée.

Jugé Que le droit d'appel à Sa Majesté, en son conseil privé, sur une opposition faite par le Défendeur à l'exécution d'un jugement, est réglé par la nature et par la qualité de la demande, et non par les matières invoquées en l'opposition du dit Défendeur. (1)

Le jugement dont est question fut rendu sur une motion faite par l'Appelant, pour permission d'appeler à Sa Majesté, en son conseil privé, du jugement rendu par la Cour du Banc de la Reine (en appel), en juillet 1850, sur une opposition, par l'Appelant, à l'exécution d'un jugement obtenu contre lui par l'Intimée pour la somme de £944. Le 9 février 1849, l'Intimée fit émaner un bref d'exécution pour la somme de £200, avec intérêt, étant la balance du jugement. Les meubles de l'Appelant furent saisis, et ce dernier fit opposition à la saisie, alléguant que la créance de l'Intimée était compensée et éteinte, l'Appelant ayant contre elle, tant en son propre nom que comme légataire universelle, trois jugements au montant d'environ £10,000.

L'Appelant prétendait que, vu que les sommes en litige, mentionnées en son opposition, excédaient £500, la loi lui accordait un appel à Sa Majesté.

Sir J. STUART, juge en chef, en rendant jugement sur cette demande, observa que le statut de la 34 Geo. III, n'accordait ce recours que dans deux cas, savoir, lorsque la matière en

(1) V. art. 1178 C. P. C.

dispute excède la somme de £500 sterling, ou a rapport à quelque honoraire d'office, droit, rente, revenu ou aucune somme due à Sa Majesté, titre à quelqu'immeuble, rentes annuelles ou autres matières ou choses de nature à lier les droits à l'avenir des parties. Dans la présente cause, le jugement fut rendu pour une somme de £200, pour laquelle l'Intimée fit émaner un bref (writ) d'exécution, et c'est sur une opposition faite à cette exécution par l'Appelant, qu'appel a été interjeté. L'exécution ici est la demande, et l'opposition n'est qu'une exception à cette demande ; c'est donc l'exécution qui doit régler le recours de l'Appelant, et comme elle ne peut être rangée dans aucune des catégories pour lesquelles la loi accorde un appel à Sa Majesté, la motion de l'Appelant ne peut être accordée. (1)

JUDAH THOS., pour l'Appelant.

CHERRIER et DORION, pour l'Intimée.

PROMESSE DE VENTE.

BANC DE LA REINE, EN APPEL, Montréal, 15 janvier 1851.

:

Présents Sir JAMES STUART, Juge en Chef, ROLLAND,
PANET, et AYLWIN, Juges.

KERR, Appelant, et LIVINGSTON, Intimé.

Juge: Qu'un acte portant être une promesse de vente, mais contenant saisine en faveur de l'acquéreur, et dépossession du vendeur, est une véritable vente nonobstant la condition de passer titre après paiement du premier installement.

La demande était portée par l'Appelant contre l'Intimé pour le recouvrement de la somme de £60, montant de deux termes de paiement, en vertu d'une promesse de vente, par l'Appelant au Défendeur, Intimé, d'un immeuble, dans lequel acte on remarque les clauses suivantes :

"To have, use and enjoy the aforesaid bargained premises, "with their rights, members and appurtenances, unto the said purchaser, his heirs and assigns, as his and their own proper freehold, for ever, by virtue of these presents, and to enter

(1) Dans la cause de LESPÉRANCE, Appelant, et ALLARD, Intimé, jugée au même terme de la Cour d'Appel devant les mêmes juges, une question analogue s'est présentée sur appel d'un jugement déboutant une opposition à fin d'annuler, faite par le Défendeur, à la saisie et vente de ses immeubles.

Le jugement ayant été confirmé, l'Appelant demanda la permission d'appeler à Sa Majesté en son conseil privé.

Cette demande fut rejetée, Sir JAMES STUART, juge en chef, remarquant que cette opposition ne contenait aucune matière pécuniaire, et ne tombait dans aucune des catégories mentionnées dans le statut.