dant la vente comme susdit." Ceci me semble établir, comme règle, qu'un temps est donné aux parties, qui ont à se plaindre d'irrégularités dans les procédés, pour produire et faire leurs oppos tons, et que dans la vue de les protéger, la loi a imposé au shérif l'obligation d'annoncer qu'après ce temps, aucune opposition ne serait reçue. Elles sont, par là, mises en demeure, et si elles laissent expirer ce terme, elles sont forcloses pour toujours. Rien ne peut être plus précis que l'expression du statut, et si ce n'était pas l'intention de la législature d'établir une règle de cette espèce, il n'en est établi aucune. Nous tenons donc que ce statut, joint à l'ordonnance de 1785, a établi un procédé équipollent au congé d'adjuger, et par lequel une partie ne peut venir réclamer après l'expiration du délai, et que l'informalité, en dernier lieu mentionnée, est couverte par le délai expiré, de même qu'elle l'aurait été en France par le congé d'udjuger. Il faut qu'il y ait un temps limité pour invoquer les irrégularités; dire que la prescription seule peut donner un titre sur adjudication du shérif, serait ouvrir la porte à toutes sortes de difficultés. Mais la cour est disposée à aller plus loin, en disant que, dans la supposition où le statut ne serait pas assez positif, le Demandeur actuel, vu sa présence à la vente et adjudication de ses immeubles, devait se pourvoir en nullité de décret, et ne pas laisser prendre possession de ses biens, et attendre huit ou neuf ans pour venir ensuite, par une simple action pétitoire, sans égard à son expropriation, dont il ne fait pas plus mention que si elle n'eut jamais existé, demander la restitution de sa propriété. Si les principes de l'équité, et la convenance (policy) de maintenir les procédés des cours, autant qu'il est possible, doivent avoir du poids, la demande en cette cause ne peut certainement pas être reçue.

MONDELET, juge: Je concours à ce jugement dans toute son étendue; mais si ces objections avaient été faites avant la vente, j'aurais été disposé à les accueillir, même celle qui regarde l'élection de domicile, considérant qu'elle est nécessaire, l'huissier,sur une saisie immobilière,n'ayant pas autorité de recevoir paiement.

SMITH, juge: J'aurais renvoyé la réponse du Demandeur sur un demurrer.

Le jugement est motivé comme suit: "The court, considering that the land and premises, in the Plaintiff's declaration described, were seized under a writ of execution, issued upon a judgment rendered in favor of John Boston, against the said Antoine Boyer, the now Plaintiff, and after having been advertised and published according to law, to be sold, as appears by the return of the late Honorable Roch de St. Ours, then sheriff, upon the said writ of execution, were, on

the 13th day of April, 1839, by the said sheriff, sold and adjudged to the said John Boston, in the manner alleged and set forth in the exception by the Defendants, in the said cause, plaided; and, considering that the pretended informalities and nullities by the Plaintiff in his special answer in the said cause filed, assigned and alleged to have occurred in the said seizure, in so far as the same are shewn to exist, occurred in proceedings had and taken previously to the fifteen days next before the day fixed for the said sale and adjudication, and that the said Antoine Boyer, the now Plaintiff, notwithstanding the advertissements and publication of sale aforesaid, whereby he was duly notified and put en demeure, failed to make and file any opposition à fin d'annuler, at any time previous to the said fifteen days next before the day fixed for the said sale and adjudication, or any petition en nullité de décret, or to take any other proceeding for causing the said seizure, sale and adjudication to be annulled and set aside, by reason of the said pretended informalities and nullities, and that by reason thereof and by law, he cannot now set up and oppose the said pretented informalities and nullities, and have the benefit thereof in manner and form as he has sought to do by his said special answers, doth dismiss the said special answers; and the court declaring, that by reason of the said seizure, and adjudication, the said Antoine Boyer, the now Plaintiff, was dispossessed of and lost his title, right and property, in and to the said land and premises, and that the said John Boston, became by virtue thereof, the owner and possessor of the said land and premises, doth maintain the said exception of the Defendants, and dismisses the action of the Plaintiff. (2 D. T. B. C., p. 53.)

DRUMMOND et LORANGER, pour le Demandeur.
BETHUNE et DUNKIN, pour les Défendeurs.

SUCCESSION VACANTE.-CURATEUR.

COUR SUPÉRIEURE, Québec, 12 mars 1850.

Présents: BOWEN, Juge en Chef, et DUVAL, Juge.

TESSIER VS. TESSIER.

Jugé: Qu'un curateur à une succession vacante ne peut pas être poursuivi par un tiers auquel il aurait transport' sa créance contre telle succession; le curateur ne pouvant se poursuivre lui-même ou se faire poursuivre par son propre cessionnaire."

Le Défendeur avait été nommé curateur à la succession vacante du nommé Blais. Il était lui-même créancier de cette

succession; ne pouvant se poursuivre lui-même, il céda sa créance au Demandeur, qui intenta contre lui,en sa qualité de curateur,une action pour recouvrer la créance cédée. Le Défendeur fit défaut.

Cette action fut déboutée, sur le principe, que la cession ayant eu lieu depuis la nomination du curateur, c'était de sa part se poursuivre lui-même ; que, dans ce cas, son seul remède était de renoncer à la curatelle, et de nommer un autre curateur. Ce jugement n'est pas motivé. (1) (2 D. T. B. C., p. 63.) TESSIER, pour le Demandeur.

APPEL.

QUEEN'S BENCH, APPEAL SIDE, Quebec, 17 janvier 1852. Before ROLLAND, PANET and AYLWIN, Justices.

WURTELE, Appellant, and THE BISHOP OF QUEBEC, Respondent.

Jugé Qu'un jugement de la Cour Supérieure, refusant l'émanation d'un rit de mandamus, sur requête exposant que l'évêque de Québec a refusé de lire le service funèbre sur le corps d'un défunt, est un jugement final, dont il y a appel, aux termes de la 12e Vic., ch. XLI, s. 20. (2)

The Appellant had presented a petition in the court below, complaining that the Right Reverend G. J. Mountain, Lord Bishop of Quebec, had refused, though duly requested so to do, to read the funeral service over the body of his deceased infant child, and prayed that a writ of mandamus should issue. The prayer of the petition was rejected by the judgement rendered, on the 18th September, 1851,by BOWEN, Chief Justice, BACQUET and MEREDITH, Justices.

That judgement is as follows:

The court, having heard the Petitioner, Christian Wurtele, and the Right Reverend George Jehosaphat Mountain, Lord Bishop of the diocese of Quebec and Rector of the parish of Quebec in the same diocese, upon the petition of the said Christian Wurtele, in this cause filed, praying that a writ of mandamus do issue in the said cause, and having seen the affidavit of the said Christian Wurtele, in this cause filed, by which it appears, that the said Christian Wurtele, on the twenty-sixth day of July last past, notified and required the said George Jehosaphat Mountain, as such Rector of the said parish of Quebec, to open the parish church of the said parish, at the hour of eight of the

(1) 12 V., ch. XXXVIII, s. 36.

(2) V. la cause de Wurtele, requérant mandamus, supra p. 66.

clock in the forenoon, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of the said month of July, or at such hour as the said George Jehosaphat Mountain might, at the time of the making of the said requisition, indicate, and there read, over the deceased infant child of him the said Christian Wurtele, the funeral service, as prescribed by the book of common prayer of the Church of England. And, considering that the said George Jehosaphat Mountain was not, and is not, bound to comply with the said request, on the part of the said Christian Wurtele. It is ordered, that the prayer of the said petition be, and the same is hereby dismissed.

The Petitioner carried this judgment into appeal; upon which, the Respondent moved that the appeal should be dismissed, on the ground that the judgment was not, by its nature, final and appealable.

On behalf of the Respondent, it was said that the judgment was not appealable; that it was a judgment rendered as upon a rule, the petition required by our statute being nothing but the motion made in similar cases in England; that the writ of mandamus was not issuable as a matter of right, but left to the discretion of the judges of the court applied to; that the Appellant had complained that the Respondent had refused to read the funeral service over the body of his infant child, and and had not shewn a legal obligation in the Respondent to do so; that the mode of burial was a matter purely of ecclesiastical cognizance, and not within the jurisdiction of civil courts; (1) that as to the plea to the petition, spoken of in the Prov. Stat: it meant what is called in England the return to the writ of mandamus, after it has issued; that this enactment of the statute was a mere blunder, a piece of unskilful machinery, notwithstanding which, the proceedings must necessarily continue to be regulated by English rules; that the Appellant having altogether failed to show, in the Respondent, the omission to fulfil a civil duty, the writ had been properly refused.

It was contended, on the behalf of the Appellant, that the judgment was made appealable by 12 Vict., ch. XLI, Sec. 20; that the court below had decided the case upon its merits, and rendered a final judgment; that the Prov. Stat. had altogether changed the mode of obtaining the remedy by writ of mundamus, and that, by the 11th sec., the writ must issue, de plano, upon petition showing a prima facie case; that the obligation to read the funeral service is a civil obligation (2); that the court below had taken the merits of the case into considera

(1) 2 B & A., p. 806. King vs Coleridge; 1 B. & A., p. 122, Ex parte Blackmore.

(2) Répertoire, verbo sépulture.

tion, without plea and answer, and upon a motion decided the whole case; that a writ ought to have been granted, and the Respondent compelled to plead to the allegations contained in the petition; that the matter of civil obligation and duty spoken of, was a matter of proof to be hereafter established in various ways, as by the production of the letters patent appointing the Respondent; that, in England, there was no appeal in the case of a writ of mandamus being refused, but not so by the Pro. Statute; that there was in Canada a church temporalities law concerning the Church of England, imposing several civil obligations.

ROLLAND, Justice: The statute 12 Vict., ch. XLI, has altered the remedy given in England, and used up to the period of its being passed in Canada, by means of the prerogative writ of mandamus, by directing how the matter shall be proceeded with in all cases, as it is said, in a writ of mandamus will lie and might be legally issued in England. This must be considered as indicating cases in which no other remedy could be looked for; and the statute expressly provides, that every application shall be made by a declaration or petition (requête Libellée) supported by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court or judges to whom the application is made, setting forth the facts of the case whereupon it would be lawful for the said court or judges to issue the writ of mandamus, and it directs that the Defendant shall not be allowed to shew cause otherwise than by answering or pleading to such declaration or petition, etc., etc.

That there cannot be two interpretations given to the Statute, is evident.

Then, by the 20th clause, it is said that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Queen's Bench, from all final judgments in such matters. (1)

The application here appears to have been made in the form directed, and the regularity of the proceedings was the only question to be the subject of consideration. Yet, the court, on the first presentation of the petition, refused the allowance of the writ, and that upon grounds evidently touching the merits of the application; and now, on an appeal brought, a motion is made to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment rendered is not appealable.

(1) La section 20 du ch. XLI, des Statuts du Canada de 1849, 12 Victoria, intitulé: "Acte pour définir le mode des procédures à adopter dans les cours de justice du Bas-Canada dans les matières relatives à la protection et à la régie des droits de corporation et aux writs de prérogative, et pour d'autres fins y mentionnées" decrétait : "qu'il pourra être interjeté appel à la Cour du Banc de la Reine siégeant en cour d'appel, de tout jugement final rendu par la Cour Supérieure, dans les cas auxquels il est pourvu par le présent acte, excepté dans les cas de certiorari.