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and employing: much less could they be taught to perform those complicated operations which result from their employment.

But, it may perhaps be said, it is the mind, the intellectual power of man, which enables him to produce the effects in question. His mind indeed enables him to conceive the plan of those operations which he executes, but it does no more: and were his form deficient by one of the smallest of its present members, he would be rendered nearly helpless. Take from his hand but one of the fingers, and he could do nothing. It is the human hand which gives the power of execution to the human mind; and it is the relative position of one of the fingers to the other four, which principally stamps the character of the hand; for the thumb, by its capability of being brought into opposition with each of the other fingers, enables the hand to adapt itself to every shape; and gives it that complete dominion which it possesses over the various forms of matter.*

Give all the intelligence therefore that you please to the horse, or to the elephant, yet with hoofs instead of hands it is physically impossible that they could construct the simplest instrument: nor could the organs even of the beaver, were that animal gifted with the highest intellectual powers, enable it to effect much more than it is capable of effecting at present.

Man then is in every sense superior, in organization as well as in intellectual powers, to all other animals; and the degree of resemblance to him, as thus superior, is the main principle of classification adopted at the present day: and upon the whole it will be found that, in proportion as the powers and relations of animals are extensive, their structure resembles that of man. And, with respect to the degrees of this resemblance, it may be observed that

The term poltroon, if not of fancied etymology, (pollice truncatus,) verifies this statement; the Roman soldier who had been deprived of his thumb, being deemed unfit for service.

occasionally it is so strong, as to constitute all but identity of form, as in some of the quadrumanous animals, or apes; while in others it is so faint, as to render it questionable whether we are viewing an animate or inanimate body, as in several varieties of sponge. It is evident that the stability of the principle of classification, now described, depends on the permanency of the specific form of animals: and it will be found that nature has guarded this point in so sacred a manner, that after the lapse of thousands of years, the identity of the species may be not only traced, but demonstrated, when nothing but the almost mouldering bones of the individual remain. But this subject will be considered more at large hereafter.

As then, in estimating the moral or intellectual characters of particular men, we are not influenced by the consideration of insulated defects or excellences, but of the aggregate powers and qualities of the individual; so, in comparing other animals with man, we ought not to affirm that they approach nearer to the standard of his perfection in proportion as they approach nearer to him in the structure of this or that part, or in the developement of particular powers or qualities; but in proportion to that approximation which results from the balance of their structure and powers considered collectively. And on this principle, however nearly a few of them may resemble him, they never can approach even the confines of an equality of nature; whatever some speculative individuals have presumptuously supposed, or others in their simplicity have feared. Thus the resemblance to the human form, as well internally as externally, is so remarkable in particular species of the ape, that while some philosophers (who however proceeded without a knowledge or a due consideration of the true principles of the science concerned in their reasonings) have maintained that the ape and man are but varieties of the same species, or at most but different species of the same genus; others, with

an unnecessary anxiety, have laboured to vindicate the supposed insult thus offered to the dignity of human nature, by searching for some fixed and invariable difference in the structure of corresponding parts of each.

But the question is puerile: for let us even suppose that the whole and every part of the structure of the ape were the same as that of man; let every bone, and every muscle, and every fibre of the one correspond exactly with those of the other, not only in form and situation, but also in size and proportion; let the brain itself, that tangible instrument of the intellectual powers, be in structure the counterpart of the human; yet, unless in its functions it resembled that of man, in other words, unless there were associated with it his intellectual peculiarities and the moral and religious sense, to what dreaded conclusion would the closest resemblances lead? However near the approximation in their form, in their nature there must ever be an immeasurable distance between the two. The ape, compared with man, may indeed be among other animals "proximus huic:" still however it must be added, "longo sed proximus intervallo."

SECTION IV.

Early and gradual Developement of the intellectual Faculties of Man.

THE helplessness of infancy then is but temporary: and a new scene soon opens to the contemplation of those who have sufficient opportunities of watching the developement of the human character: for, long as is the period, compared with the natural term of his own life, and longer still, compared with the corresponding period in the life of other animals, before man attains the full stature of his mind as well as of his body; he at a very early season begins to manifest the superiority of his intellectual nature: he very soon begins to collect those materials for future

use, which, though he will never hereafter be able to call to mind the moment or the circumstances of their accession, he will use as effectually as if he had originally acquired them by industrious and direct

attention.

It does not fall within the intention of this treatise to attempt to ascertain the period when the first dawn of intelligence enlightens the countenance of the infant; but, undoubtedly, among its earliest beams are those expressive smiles, which, although they are occasioned by the aspect of the mother, and are perhaps only connected with the expectation of an animal pleasure, namely the simple enjoyment of nourishment, yet are soon elicited by other individuals also, who may understand how to win the attention, and amuse the faculties of the infant mind.

It seems as if there were implanted in the young of all animals, of the higher orders, an instinctive propensity to those actions which are naturally determined by their specific form when fully developed; in order perhaps, among other purposes, to give occasion for that exercise of the limbs which is necessary to the health of the individual. Hence the young ram couches his head, and tilts at his adversary, long before his horns have appeared; and the young pheasant assails his antagonist with his projected legs, long before his spurs have begun to bud. And, following this analogy, may we not reasonably suppose that the sports of childhood have a natural tendency to prefigure the occupations of manhood; and that by the extension of the same principle, independently of the impulse given by systematic education, or spontaneous imitation of their parents and others, there are instinctive differences in the amusements of children of different temperaments, connected with their future destinations in life? Thus while the boy is engaged in the mimicry of military parade or equestrian exercises, the girl devotes her time to more feminine occupations, and busies herself in acting the various duties which her nursery or house

hold will hereafter require. The recorded attempt to conceal Achilles in female attire, whether founded in fact, or, as is probable, merely a fictitious anecdote, will serve to illustrate the present point; inasmuch as the use of the means, said to have been employed by Ulysses to detect the hero, was evidently suggested by the principle just now advanced.

At this early period of life then, the judgment being not sufficiently matured for deeper observation, the mind is satisfied with a view of the form and surface of objects presented to it; with their anatomy, as it were, rather than with their physiology: but, in the mean time, it is thus acquainting itself undistractedly with those sensible qualities, with which it must necessarily be familiar before it can proceed to reason on causes and relations. And although it may appear at first view that a very disproportionately long period of our life is devoted to the mere exercise of the senses, it is yet highly probable that important mental operations may be simultaneously going on, though we are at the time unconscious of them: for something analogous is observable throughout the whole course of our existence. How few there are, for instance, who, at any period of life, can call to mind a tenth part of what they have even recently heard or observed. And if this may be correctly affirmed of the adult age of life, and of those individuals whose original powers of mind are great, how much more strongly will it apply to those whose original powers of mind are not above the common standard, or not yet matured by age. So that there can be very little doubt that the general principles and rules, which regulate the reasoning and conduct of men on ordinary occasions, have been originally deduced by each individual from much of what has been long forgotten.

It has been asserted by persons, whose intellectual

*Lord chief justice Hale; (see Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. ii. p. 511, 4to. London, 1791;) not to mention living authorities.

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