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pretensions prevail in the choice of them; but it is believed that they are chosen on wide and popular principles likely to conduce in the highest degree to the general and equally distributed well-being of the whole community, and to the suppression of personal self-seeking, the form of Government is sometimes said by those who share this belief to be a Republic. CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONAL.-All the Laws and all the customary practices which, taken together, determine the person or persons who shall constitute the Supreme Political Authority of a State, and which ascertain the modes of Legislation, and the method of appointing and restricting the Executive Authority, are compendiously styled the Constitution of that State. According as a newly-suggested measure is or is not believed to conform to the spirit of those laws and practices, it is said to be Constitutional or Unconstitutional.

RIGHT. (1) A Right is a measure of power delegated by the State to persons said to be thereby invested with the right, over the acts of other persons said to be thereby made liable to the performance of a duty. This is the strict legal sense of the term, though the term has important moral and popular uses from which the above use has to be carefully distinguished. For instance, the term right is often used in political discussions to signify a moral claim which it is iniquitous, or, at the least, highly inexpedient, not to recognise; as in the phrases, “a slave has a right to his freedom," and "every one has a right, by himself or by his representatives, to assent to or dissent from, the imposition of taxes, which he is called upon to pay.” In the strict use, every right pre-supposes a duty, though every legal duty does not pre-suppose a legal right. The State, which is the source of all legal rights and duties, cannot be strictly said to have legal rights itself, though it may confer on all the official persons who are engaged in its administration such rights as are needed for the purposes of their work.

THE

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT

OF ENGLAND.

THE Constitution of England is the resulting product of all the institutions, the customary practices, and the laws which together determine what persons take part in the government of the country; how these persons are related to one another; how laws are made, and how and by whom they are executed; and what securities the people of the country have against misgovernment. Thus it is a characteristic of the English Constitution that the "Supreme Political Authority" consists of a King or Queen and two Houses of Parliament; that the King or Queen is a particular member of a particular family; and that the two Houses or Assemblies are composed in certain definite ways, as by hereditary succession in special families, or by popular election; that no law can be enacted without the joint consent of the King or Queen and the two Houses of Parliament; that the King or Queen appoints, through the agency of Ministers directly responsible to the two Houses of Parliament, officials engaged in securing obedience to the laws, in collecting the taxes, in preserving the public peace, and in administering the Army and Navy; and lastly, that by Jury Trial, by the Habeas Corpus Acts, and by special provisions

B

for the independence of Judges, the people of England are protected against abuses on the part of the Executive.

There are parts of the Constitution which seem to be far more solid and indestructible than other parts; so much so, that they could not be suddenly removed or even changed without the permanence of the State itself seeming to be endangered. Such parts are, the institution of Monarchy in its limited or constitutional form; the distribution of the Legislature into three branches; the Representative system of Government with its attendant control of Taxation; the independence of Judges, and the securities afforded against unfair trials and tyrannical imprisonment; and the subjection of all State officials to the Common Law of the Land.

Some of these more important elements of the Constitution are very ancient; others are the offspring of modern Acts of Parliament, passed, as it were, in a day. Others, again, have slowly and gradually emerged into being after the struggle of centuries.

There are, again, parts of the Constitution which are made up of enduring and of fragile elements conjointly. The former either undergo no change, or change so insensibly that the effects can only be observed at long intervals of time; the latter are readily and constantly modified as occasion dictates. The changeable and the unchangeable elements are, however, so closely blended together that they cannot easily be severed, and much of the difficulty that attends proposed changes is due to this fact. Examples of such composite parts are the rules which determine the qualifications of members of the two Houses, and of electors of members of the House of Commons; which fix the exact line of succession to the Crown; and which determine the judicial or other special privileges of the two Houses and of the members of each House.

It is notorious that certain alterations are made from time to time in all these matters with very general acquiescence, or, at least, without anything of the nature of a shock

to a genuine national sentiment. Other alterations in the same matters are sometimes contemplated or attempted which are instantly and generally resented as "unconstitutional." This means that they threaten changes in those parts of the Constitution which by common, though tacit, consent it is understood should be treated as immoveable, except under circumstances of a very peculiar and pressing kind. If the desire to make the alteration is still persisted in, it is usually argued on behalf of it that either such peculiar and pressing circumstances do actually exist, or else that the proposed alteration does not touch the confessedly permanent parts of the Constitution. In other words, it is said either that the time has come to modify some of the essential characteristics of the Constitution, or that the proposed change is not concerned with any one of these characteristics.

It is difficult and generally impossible to draw a clear line between what are held at any particular time to be the unchangeable elements of the Constitution and what are not held to be such. The making of a practical distinction must depend for its success upon the cultivated instinct of statesmen, and upon the way in which the popular mind is balanced between a lazy disposition to adhere to antiquated and obsolete practices, and a restless inclination to be captivated by novelties without consideration of the risk of exchanging a certain measure of known and attainable good for evils which only experience can bring to light.

Besides a careful study of existing and immemorial institutions, the Constitution of England can be known only by reference to the following classes of authorities.

I. Written documents of the nature of solemn engagements made at great national crises between persons representing opposed political forces. Such are the Great Charter and its several Confirmations and Amended Editions, the Petition of Right, and the Declaration of Rights.

II. Statutes, such as the Habeas Corpus Act and its