However, a workman who goes into | private property, where the employers dangerous or unauthorized places for cannot follow him, even if they so wish. that purpose does so at his own risk, (Cogdon v. Sunderland Gas Co. (1907; and no compensation is recoverable for C. C.) 1 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 156. injuries received while he is in such unauthorized and dangerous places. Rose v. Morrison (1911) 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 1103, 105 L. T. N. S. 2, 4 B. W. C. C. 277. Particularly, if adequate places have been provided by the employer. Thomson v. Flemington Coal Co. [1911] S. C. 823, 48 Scot. L. R. 740, 4 B. W. C. C. 406; Cook v. Manvers Main Collieries (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 696. So, the employers cannot be held liable for injuries received by a workman where he leaves the sphere of his employment and goes for purposes of his own onto But upon the ground that the county court judge was justified in drawing the inference that the workman went to the unauthorized place as a matter of necessity, and not of his choice, an award of compensation was upheld in the case of a miner, who, after receiving his lamp at the lamp cabin, went to answer a call of nature at a place sometimes used by the miners in case of necessity, and who was killed on a siding over which he was obliged to pass. Lawless v. Wigan Coal & I. Co. (1908) 124 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 532, 1 B. W. C. C. 153. W. M. G. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDI-| Co. 39 Scot. L. R. 762, 4 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th CIAL COURT. EMILY SUNDINE, Employee. F. L. DUNNE & COMPANY, Employer. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT (218 Mass. 1, 105 N. E. 433.) Master and servant workmen's com- Series, 989, 10 Scot. L. T. 204. Sundine was not an employee of the in surer. Dane v. Cochrane Chemical Co. 164 Mass. 453, 41 N. E. 678. The way upon which the injury occurred was not a way over which F. L. Dunne & Company as employers had any control, nor did they owe any duty to their employees to see that its condition was safe, so that an employee of Olsen could claim no greater rights than those of the insured. Hawkes v. Broadwalk Shoe Co. 207 Mass. 117, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 92 N. E. 1017. The ways or means of exit must be provided by the employer, and must be incidental to and a part of the contract of employment. The employee who has stopped his work for the employer, and has become his own master, is no longer acting within scope of his employment, even though he may be on premises in control of the employer. Gooch v. Citizens' Electric Street R. Co. 202 Mass. 254, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 960, 88 N. E. 591; Dickinson v. West End Street R. Co. 177 Mass. 365, 52 L.R.A. 326, 83 Am. St. Rep. 284, 59 N. E. 60, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 293; Doyle v. Fitchburg R. Co. 162 Mass. 66, 25 L.R.A. 157, 44 Am. St. Rep. 325, 37 N. E. 770; Palmer v. Lawrence Mfg. Co. 12 Allen, 69; Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 31 Minn. 351, 47 Am. Rep. 793, 17 N. W. 952; Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. 477; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 33 Md. 542; State use of Abell v. Western Maryland R. Co. 63 Md. 433. Mr. Richard J. Lane, for appellee: The petitioner's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 498, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522; Gill of stairs which, though affording the only means of going to and from her workroom, was yet not under the control either of Olsen, her employer, or of F. L. Dunne & Company, for whose work Olsen was an independent contractor. shannon v. Stony Brook R. Corp. 10 Cush., purpose of getting a lunch, and upon a flight 228; Kilduff v. Boston Elev. R. Co. 195 Mass. 307, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873, 81 N. E. 191; McGuirk v. Shattuck, 160 Mass. 45, 39 Am. St. Rep. 454, 35 N. E. 110; Olsen | v. Andrews, 168 Mass. 261, 47 N. E. 90, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 570; Boyle v. Columbian Fire Proofing Co. 182 Mass. 93, 64 N. E. 726; Dawbarn, Workmen's Compensation Act, 4th ed. 118; Blovelt v. Sawyer [1904] 1 K. B. 271, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 155, 68 J. P. 110, 52 Week. Rep. 503, 89 L. T. N. S. 658, 20 Times L. R. 105; Moore v. Man chester Liners [1910] A. C. 498, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1175, 3 B. W. C. C. 527, 103 L. T. N. S. 226, 26 Times L. R. 618, 54 Sol. Jo. 703; Sharp v. Johnson & Co. [1905] 2 K. B. 139, 74 L. J. K. B. N. S. 566, 53 Week. Rep. 597, 92 L. T. N. S. 675, 21 Times L. R. 482; Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery Co. [1909] 2 K. B. 539, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 921, 2 B. W. C. C. 42, 100 L. T. N. S. 979, 25 Times L. R. 640; Keenan v. Flemington Coal Co. 40 Scot. L. R. 144, 5 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 164, 10 Scot. L. T. 409; MacKenzie v. Coltness Iron Co. 41 Scot. L. R. 6; Cremins v. Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds [1908] 1 K. B. 469, 77 L. J. K. B. N. S. 326, 98 L. T. N. S. 335, 24 Times L. R. 189; Leach v. Oakley Street & Co. [1911] 1 K. B. 523, 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. 313, 103 L. T. N. S. 778, 27 Times L. R. 124, 55 Sol. Jo. 124, 4 B. W. C. C. 91. The first contention, that she was not in the employ of Olsen while she was going to lunch, cannot be sustained. Her employment was by the week. It would be too narrow a construction of the contract to say that it was suspended when she went out for this merely temporary purpose, and was revived only upon her return to the workroom. It was an incident of her employment to go out for this purpose. Boyle v. Columbian Fire Proofing Co. 182 Mass. 93, 102, 64 N. E. 726. The decisions upon similar questions under the English act are to the same effect. Blovelt v. Sawyer [1904] 1 K. B. 271, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 155, 68 J. P. 110, 52 Week. Rep. 503, 89 L. T. N. S. 658, 20 Times L. R. 105, which went on the ground that the dinner hour, though not paid for, was yet included in the time of employment. Moore v. Manchester Liners, 3 B. W. C. C. 527, [1910] A. C. 498, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1175, 103 L. T. N. S. 226, 26 Times L. R. 618, 54 Sol. Jo. 703, where the House of Lords reversed the decision of the court of appeal, reported in [1909] 1 K. B. 417, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 463, 100 L. T. N. S. 164, 25 Times L. R. 202, and held, Sheldon, J., delivered the opinion of the following the dissenting opinion of Moulton, court: It is provided by statute (Stat. 1911, chap. 751, pt. 3, § 17) that "if a subscriber enters into a contract, written or oral, with an independent contractor to do such subscriber's work, . . . and the association would, if such work were executed by employees immediately employed by the subscriber, be liable to pay compensation under this act to those employees, the association shall pay to such employees any compensa tion which would be payable to them under this act," if the independent contractor were a subscriber. By the word "association" is meant the Massachusetts Employees' Insurance Association (part 5, § 2, of the same act); and this insurance company is under the same liability that the association would have been (Stat. 1912, chap. 571, § 17). It follows that the petitioner has the same rights against this insurance company as if it had directly insured her employer Olsen. The insurer does not deny this, but it contends that the petitioner's injury did not arise "out of and in the course of" her employment within the meaning of part 2, § 1, of the act first referred to. This is because she was injured at about noon, after she had left the room in which she worked, for the | L. J., that a temporary absence by permission, though apparently of longer duration than would have been likely in the case before us, did not suspend the employment, and that an injury occurring during such a temporary absence arose "out of and in the course of" the employment. Gane v. Norton Hill Colliery Co. 2 B. W. C. C. 42, [1909] 2 K. B. 539, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 921, 10 L. T. N. S. 979, 25 Times L. R. 640; Keenan v. Flemington Coal Co. 40 Scot. L. R. 144, Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 164, 10 Scot. L. T. 409; McKenzie v. Coltness Iron Co. 41 Scot. L. R. 6. Nor do we regard it as decisive against the petitioner that she was injured while upon stairs of which neither Olsen nor F. L. Dunne & Company had control, though they and their employees had the right to use them. These stairs were the only means available for going to and from the premises where she was employed, the means which she practically was invited by Olsen and by F. L. Dunne & Company to use. In this respect, the case resembles Moore v. Manchester Lines, supra; and that case, decided under the English act before the passage of our statute, must be regarded as of great weight. McNichol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 499, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522. It is true that before the passage of Stat. 1911, chap. 751, the petitioner could not have held her employer for this injury. Hawkes v. Broadwalk Shoe Co. 207 Mass. 117, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 92 N. E. 1017. But that now is not a circumstance of much importance, for one of the purposes of our recent legislation was to increase the right of employees to be compensated for injuries growing out of their employment. It was a necessary incident of the employee's employment to use these stairs. We are of opinion that, according to the plain and natural meaning of the words, an injury that occurred to her while she was so using them arose "out of and in the course of" her employment. The decree of the Superior Court must be affirmed. Annotation-Injuries received while procuring refreshment, as arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment. As to application and effect of workmen's compensation acts generally, see annotation ante, 23. The decision in RE SUNDINE is supported by a number of decisions of the English courts which very generally recognize that the procuring of food or other refreshment is essential to the employment of a workman, and the latter does not, as a matter of course, go outside of his employment, when he leaves off active work in order to secure food or drink. Carinduff v. Gilmore (1914) 48 Ir. Law Times, 137, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 247, 7 B. W. C. C. 981 (girl employed on threshing machine entitled to compensation for injuries received while partaking of a lunch furnished by the employer); Low v. General Steam Fishing Co. [1909] A. C. (Eng.) 523, 78 L. J. P. C. N. S. 148, 101 L. T. N. S. 401, 25 Times L. R. 787, 53 Sol. Jo. 763 (watchman on a quay whose watch continued for twenty-five hours, and who was to furnish his own food and drink, not outside scope of duty in leaving place of duty for a short time to get a drink); Martin v. Lovibond [1914] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 227, 83 L. J. K. B. N. S. 806, 110 L. T. N. S. 455, [1914] W. N. 47, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 76, 7 B. W. C. C. 243 (drayman on duty from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening not out of his employment in stopping dray and crossing the street to a public inn to get a glass of beer, and returning within two minutes to his dray); Keenan v. Flemington Coal Co. (1902) 5 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 164, 40 Scot. L. R. 144, 10 Scot. L. T. 409 (employee injured upon returning to his work from procuring a drink of water); Earnshaw v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co. (1903; C. C.) 115 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 89, 5 W. C. C. 28 (employee went, with employer's knowledge, to cabin upon employer's premises for tea, and was in jured while returning from the cabin); Morris v. Lambeth Borough Council (1905) 22 Times L. R. (Eng.) 22 (night watchman injured by falling of a shanty in which he went to cook some food). In M'Laughlan v. Anderson [1911] S. C. 529, 48 Scot. L. R. 349, 4 B. W. C. C. 376, recovery of compensation was allowed where a workman fell from a wagon in which he was riding in the course of his employment, while attempting to recover his pipe, which he had dropped. The court said that a workman of his sort might reasonably smoke, might reasonably drop his pipe, and might reasonably attempt to pick it up again. The mere fact that a workman is paid by the hour does not disentitle him to compensation for injuries received while engaged in eating his lunch. Blovelt v. Sawyer [1904] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 271, 73 L. J. K. B. N. S. 155, 68 J. P. 110, 52 Week Rep. 503, 89 L. T. N. S. 658, 20 Times L. R. 105. But the lunch hour of a law writer is not a part of the time of his employment. McKrill v. Howard (1909) 2 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 460. A decision of the Michigan court is somewhat in conflict with the weight of authority. In Hills v. Blair (1914) 182 Mich. 20, 148 N. W. 243, 7 N. C. C. A. 409, it was held that an employee who, contrary to his usual custom, left his place of employment at the noon hour to go home to his lunch, because, upon this him, as was customary with the crew, occasion, he had failed to bring it with and as he had always done before, was not, while so going to his dinner, in the employment, although at the time of his injury he was still upon the master's premises. The court said he was going upon a mission of his own, merely to please himself. W. M. G. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDI CIAL COURT. RE EMMA L. BRIGHTMAN, Widow of Ira B. Brightman, Deceased, Dependent. J. C. TERRY, Employer. The employee was acting in the course of the employment. Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737, 4 N. C. C. A. 516; Bentley's Case, 217 Mass. 79, 104 N. E. 432, 4 N. C. C. A. 559; Diaz's Case, 217 Mass. 36, 104 N. E. 384, 5 N. C. C. A. 609; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, ante, 306, 102 ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522; Sundine's Insurer, Appt. 2. The death from heart disease of a cook upon a lighter, where he is required to live, due to exertions in saving his personal effects when the vessel begins to sink, arises out of and in the course of his employment within the operation of the workmen's compensation act. Case, 218 Mass. 1, ante, 318, 105 N. E. 433, 5 N. C. C. A. 616; M'Lauchlin v. Anderson [1911] S. C. 529, 48 Scot. L. R. 349, 4 B. W. C. C. 376; Cokolon v. The Kentra, 5 B. W. C. C. 658. The death of the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment. M'Lauchlin v. Anderson [1911] S. C. 529, 48 Scot. L. R. 349, 4 B. W. C. C. 376; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C. A. 522; Moore v. Manchester Liners [1910] A. C. 498, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1175, 103 L. T. N. S. 226, 26 Times L. R. 618, 54 Sol. Jo. 703, 3 B. W. C. C. 527; Canavan v. The Universal, 3 B. W. C. C. 355; Clover, C. & Co. v. Hughes [1910] A. C. 242, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 470, 102 L. T. N. S. 340, 26 Times L. R. 359, 54 Sol. Jo. 375, 47 Scot. L. R. 885, 3 B. W. C. C. 275; Yates v. South Kirby, F. & H. Collieries [1910] 2 K. B. 538, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1035, 103 L. T. N. S. 170, 26 Times L. R. 596, 3 B. W. C. C. 418, 3 N. For other cases, see Master and Servant, C. C. A. 225; M'Innes v. Dunsmuir [1908] II. a, 1, in Dig. 1-52 N. 8. A (December 31, 1914.) PPEAL by the insurer from the decision of the Industrial Accident Board in favor of the widow in a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act to recover compensation for the death of her husband. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. John T. Swift for appellant. Messrs. Richard P. Borden and James H. Kenyon, Jr., for dependent: There is no question for the determination of the court. Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51, 102 N. E. 932, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 737, 4 N. C. C. A. 516; Donovan's Case, 217 Mass. 76, 104 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 778, 4 N. C. C. A. 549; Herrick's Case, 217 Mass. 111, 104 N. E. 432, 7 N. C. C. A. 554; Diaz's Case, 217 Mass. 36, 104 N. E. 384, 5 N. C. C. A. 609; Bentley's Case, 217 Mass. 79, 104 N. E. 432, 4 N. C. C. C. A. 559. S. C. 1021, 45 Scot. L. R. 804, 1 B. W. C. C. 226; Wicks v. Dowell & Co. [1905] 2 K. B. 225, 74 L. J. K. B. N. S. 572, 53 Week. Rep. 515, 92 L. T. N. S. 677, 21 Times L. R. 487, 2 Ann. Cas. 732, 7 W. C. C. 14; Hurle's Case, 217 Mass. 223, ante, 279, 104 N. E. 336, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 919, 4 N. C. C. A. 527. Rugg, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: On this appeal from a decree made under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, it is contended by the dependent that the question whether the findings are supported by the evidence is not open. By Stat. 1911, chap. 751, pt. III., § 7, as amended by Stat. 1912, chap. 571, § 12, the arbitration committee is required to file with the Industrial Accident Board its decision, "together with a statement of the evidence submitted before it, its findings of fact, rulings of law and any other matters pertinent to questions arising before it.” No party is entitled to a second hearing as matter of right before the Industrial Accident Board upon any question of fact. Section 10 of part III. It seems from the record and the course of the argument in this court that no evidence was received by the Industrial Accident Board, but that its hearing was confined in this respect to the rather than to the excitement of the occasion. Under these circumstances the calm and wisdom of quiet and safety cannot be expected. Much must be excused to the surrounding commotion. The deceased did not abandon the service of his employer and embark on a venture of his own when he tried to save his clothing. It was an implied term of such service as this that the employee might use reasonable effort to this end in an exigency like that which arose. This is not an instance where the discipline of a ship was violated or a higher duty neglected. It was in the course of his matters reported by the arbitration committee. The finding and decision of the Industrial Accident Board are not explicit in this respect. It would be desirable to have the fact stated definitely in order that occasion for doubt may be removed in future cases. But we feel warranted in making that assumption in the case at bar for the reasons stated. In any event, it is an assumption in favor of the appealing party. It must be assumed that the arbitration committee performed its duty and reported al! the material evidence. The procedure in this respect differs from that on exceptions from the superior court, where, if the suf-employment to live upon the lighter. Whatficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or finding is raised, it must appear that the material evidence is set forth. And the procedure also differs from that on find ings and decision of the Industrial Accident Board. Stickley's Case, 219 Mass. 513, 107 N. E. 350. The positive duty resting on the arbitration committee to report all material evidence supplies the absence of the express statement required in a bill of exceptions. It follows that it is open to the insurer to argue that the findings are not supported by the evidence reported. ever it was reasonable for anyone to do leaving a sinking vessel, which was his temporary home, was within the scope of his employment. The standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the master, but that which the ordinary man, required to act in such an emergency, might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty. The cases relied upon by the insurer, collected in 25 Harvard L. Rev. 420, | 421, are distinguishable. They all are instances of conduct by the employee quite outside the scope of the employment, resting upon intelligent abandonment for the moment of duty to the employer. In the case at bar there may be found to be apparent to the rational mind a causal connection between the employment and the thing done by the employee at the time of the sinking of the lighter. McNichol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, ante, 306, 102 N. E. 697, 4 N. C. C A. 522. The deceased employee was a cook upon a lighter, where his employment required him to live and be a large part of the time. The craft began to sink and he then made several trips to and from the deck in an attempt to save some of his clothes and a surveying instrument. With these he hastened to the pier of a dock, where he died soon after. He had suffered from valvular disease of the heart, and his exertions in the effort to save his belongings and the excitement incident to the loss of Acceleration of previously existing heart the vessel so aggravated the heart weak-disease to a mortal end sooner than otherness as to cause his death. The perils of the sea were risks arising out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased. The sinking of the boat obviously was one of these perils. It is impossible to say as matter of law that it is not one of the instincts of humanity to try to save from a sinking vessel all of one's possessions that reasonably can be secured. The deceased perhaps exerted himself too much for this purpose, although it would be difficult on the evidence to determine to how great an extent the fatal result was due to that cause wise it would have come is an injury within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act. Wiemert v. Boston Elev. R. Co. 216 Mass. 598, 104 N. E. 360; Clover, C. & Co. v. Hughes [1910] A. C. 242, 79 L. J. K. B. N. S. 470, 102 L. T. N. S. 340, 26 Times L. R. 359, 54 Sol. Jo. 375, 47 Scot. L. R. 885, 3B. W. C. C. 275. The finding of the Industrial Accident Board that the death of the employee arose out of and in the course of his employment was warranted by the evidence. Decree affirmed. Annotation-Recovery of compensation for injuries received while trying to save personal belongings from loss. As to application and effect of workmen's compensation acts generally, see annotation, ante, 23. There appears to be no other case where compensation was sought for in juries received while the workman was attempting to save his personal effects, but the decision in RE BRIGHTMAN finds. support in a number of decisions in which compensation was allowed where the in |