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of a notice shall not be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings if it is found that the employer is not "prejudiced in his defense" by such want of notice; consequently the court of appeal has held that the fact that the employer was not able to give the insurance company notice of the accident, thereby losing his right of indemnity against such insurance company, is not relevant upon the question of prejudice, since such failure to give notice to the insurance company does not prejudice the employer in his defense to the action by the employee.70 A contrary decision by the county court judge must be considered as

69 A failure to give notice for four months is unreasonable, and may be found prejudicial to the employer. Stronge v. Hazlett (1910) 44 Ir. Law Times, 10, 3 B. W. C. C.

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3 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 44.

71 A delay in giving notice of a claim to the respondent, whereby he loses his right to indemnity against an insurance company, is prejudicial to him. Barker v. Holmes (1904; C. C.) 117 L. T. Jo. (Eng.) 158, 6 W. C. C. 52.

72 Shearer v. Miller (1899) 2 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 114, 37 Scot. L. R. 80, 7 Scot. L. T. 231; Hancock v. British Westinghouse Electric Co. (1910) 3 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 210; Hughes v. Coed Talon Colliery Co. [1909] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 957, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 539, 100 L. T. N. S. 555; Dalgiesh v. Gartside [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 319, 7 B. W. C. C. 535; Hodgson v. Robins [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 65, [1914] W. N. 47, 7 B. W. C. C. 232; Hunt v. Highley Min. Co. [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 402, 7 B. W. C. C. 716; Murphy v. Shirebrook Colliery [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 184, 6 B. W. C. C. 237; Pimm v. Clement Talbot [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 350, 7 B. W. C. C. 565; Tibbs v. Watts (1909) 2 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 164;

Eydmann V. Premier Accumulator Co. [1915] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 82, 8 B. W. C. C. 121.

The applicant must prove that he gave notice of the claim within six months of the occurrence of the accident, or that his failure to do so was occasioned by mistake, absence from the United Kingdom, or other reasonable cause. Roberts v. Crystal Palace Foot Ball Club (1909) 3 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 51.

Where no notice of the accident was

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overruled, although no mention is made of this case in the court of appeal.71

The onus lies on the workman to show that the employer has not been prejudiced by the former's failure to give due notice of the accident.72 If the arbitrator refuses to find that the employer was not prejudiced, and there is evidence to support his conclusions, the court of ap73 It is not error peal will not interfere."

for the county court judge to omit the words "in his defense" in a finding that the workman had not discharged the onus of proving that the employers "had not been prejudiced."74

given until nearly a month thereafter, the applicant must show affirmative proof that the employer was not prejudiced by failure to give prompt notice. Lacey v. Mowlem [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 63, 7 B. W. C. C. 135.

Where the workman had failed to give notice of the injury within a reasonable time, affirmative evidence must be introduced to show that the employer was not prejudiced because of such failure. Grime v. Fletcher [1915] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 734, 31 Times L. R. 158, 50 L. J. 55, 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 847, [1915] W. N. 43, 59 Sol. Jo. 233, 8 B. W. C. C. 69.

In Hayward v. Westleigh Colliery Co. [1915] A. C. (Eng.) 540, 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 661, 112 L. T. N. S. 1001, 31 Times L. R. 215, [1915] W. N. 67, 59 Sol. Jo. 269, 8 B. W. C. C. 278, reversing, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 21, 7 B. W. C. C. 53, it was held that the arbitrator might hold that the employers were not prejudiced where there was no inherent probability that could be seen that the employers would be prejudiced by the absence of a notice for a few days, and they gave no evidence that they had been prejudiced.

A workman has the burden of showing that the employer has not been prejudiced, or, if the employer has been prejudiced, the workman must prove that the want of notice was occasioned by a mistake or other reasonable cause. Egerton v. Moore [1912] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 308, 81 L. J K. B. N. S. 696, 106 L. T. N. S. 663, [1912] W. C. Rep. 250, [1912] W. N. 89, 5 B. W. C. C. 284.

The workman has not discharged the burden of proving that the employers were not prejudiced by delay in giving notice where he claimed to have been ruptured on the 27th of the month, and gave notice on the 30th, when there was no reason given for the delay, and no evidence to show that the employer had not been prejudiced. Nicholls v. Briton Ferry U. D. C. [1915] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 14, 8 B. W. C. C. 42.

73 Miller v. Richarson [1915] 3 K. B. (Eng.) 76, 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1366. 74 Snelling v. Norton Hill Colliery Co. [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 497, 109 L. T. N. S. 81, 6 B. W. C. C. 506.

h. Excuses for not giving notice or making claim in time.

The provision which requires the claim for compensation to be made within six months of the occurrence of the accident causing the injury is not necessarily an absolute bar to proceedings for the assessment of compensation, commenced after six months by an injured workman; and the county court judge or other arbitrator has jurisdiction to inquire whether there are any circumstances in

75 Where a workman met with an accident causing him to bite his tongue, which accident he immediately reported verbally to the foreman of the work, but stated that he was not severely injured, and the accident was also reported to one of the employers, who happened to be present at the time, and four days afterwards the work man was attended by his own doctor, who found that he was suffering from an open, discharging wound in his tongue, and the doctor continued to attend the workman for some time, and the difficulty of taking food increased, but the workman continued to work for about six months, when, after lay ing off for a week, he died of cancer of the tongue, there is no reasonable cause for failing to give notice of the accident as required by § 2 of the act. Potter v. Welch [1914] 3 K. B. (Eng.) 1020, 30 Times L. R. 644, [1914] W. N. 106, 317, 137 L. T. Jo. 290, 83 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1852, 7 B. W. C. C. 738.

Where a workman fell from a loft and injured his head, and was off from duty for about two days and a half, when he returned, and thereafter continued to work for upwards of six months, during all of which time he complained of headaches as result of the fall, and after that time he became insane, he is not entitled to compensation, where no notice was given of the accident until fully a year after it occurred, as his case did not fall within the proviso to § 2. Clapp v. Carter (1914) 110 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 491, 58 Sol. Jo. 232, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 82, 7 B. W. C. C. 28.

A county court judge may find that notice was not given as soon as practical after the accident, where it was not given until one month after, although the claimant had seen his employer twice in the meantime. Leach v. Hickson (1911) 4 B. & W. C. C. (Eng.) 153.

There is no reasonable excuse for failure to give notice of the injury where the workman was injured by a splinter of iron entering his eye, and upon the day of the injury he consulted his own physician, and thereafter for upwards of two weeks, he suffered great pain, and then consulted another doctor, and, sixteen days after the injury, committed suicide. Grime V. Fletcher [1915] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 734, 31 Times L. R. 158, 50 L. J. 55, 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 847, [1915] W. N. 43, 59 Sol. Jo. 233, 8 B. W. C. C. 69.

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the case to debar the employer from raising that defense. Where the serious

character of the injury is apparent, and the workman has had opportunity to give the notice, failure so to do for a

considerable time afterwards will bar compensation.75 But the fact that the consequences of the injuries were not apparent at the time has been held to be a sufficient excuse for not giving notice immediately.76 This is particularly true where a disease caused by the accident subsequently supervened,77 or where

It is error for the county court to ignore the fact that no written notice of the accident was given where the workman had injured his knee by a fall, and no notice of any kind was given for upwards of three weeks, and no medical attendance was had by the workman for that period. Coltman v. Morrison (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. 194, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 44.

It cannot be said that notice was given as soon as practicable after an accident, where the workman had been injured by a blow from a chip off a brick, the notice was not given until three weeks thereafter, and subsequent to the death of the workman. Hunt v. Highley Min. Co. (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 716.

Notice of the accident is not given as soon as practicable after the happening thereof, where a workman cut his knuckle and burned it on Wednesday, and worked the two following days, and by the morning of Saturday, the injured finger was in such a condition that the workman could not hold his hammer, and at 10 o'clock had to knock off work and go home, and consulted a doctor upon Monday, at which time the finger was in such a septic condition that it had to be amputated. Wassell v. Russell (1915) 112 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 902, [1915] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 88, [1915] W. N. 69, 8 B. W. C. C. 230.

A man who received a serious cut upon his thumb, which, after being properly dressed upon three different occasions, still continued to pain him severely for about a month, was not justified in failing to notify the employer of the injury until over a month after the accident. Dalgiesh v. Gartside [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 319, 7 B. W. C. C. 535.

76 That the consequences of a strain were not apparent at the time is a sufficient excuse for not giving notice of the injury. Tibbs v. Watts (1909) 2 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 164.

The workman may be found justified in not giving notice for a period of nine months, where the effect of the injury was not apparent during that time. Fry v. Cheltenham Corp. [1911] W. N. (Eng.) 199, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 41, 105 L. T. N. S. 495, 28 Times L. R. 16, 56 Sol. Jo. 33, 5 B. W. C. C. 162.

77 That a workman did not know for six months that she had suffered a nervous shock from a fire, which subsequently

the workman's doctor did not know what was the matter with him.78 So, the fact that the injuries were slight, and the workman did not intend to ask compencaused a serious disease, is sufficient reason for failure to give notice of the accident. Hoare v. Arding (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. (Eng.)

36.

Where the applicant received a blow on the right side of her head, and there were no immediate effects, but subsequently traumatic epilepsy supervened, and she gave notice shortly after she knew that the epilepsy was caused by the blow, the county court judge may find that the employers were not prejudiced, although it was about six months after the injury. Eaton v. Evans (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 82.

It is a sufficient excuse for not giving notice of an accident that the workman did not lose any time from his work for several months, and the disease which subsequently supervened was latent in character, and the workman did not know that it was the result of the accident. Thompson v. NorthEastern Marine Engineering Co. (1914) 110 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 441, [1914] W. N. 22, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 13, 7 B. W. C. C.

49.

78 It is a sufficient excuse for failure to give notice for several months, that neither the workman nor his doctors knew what ailed him. Eke v. Hart-Dyke [1910] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 677, 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. 90, 103 L. T. N. S. 174, 26 Times L. R. 613, 3

B. W. C. C. 482, 3 N. C. C. A. 230. CozensHardy, M. R., said: "Neither of the doctors was at the time prepared to say that

there had been an accident within the mean

ing of the act. The wife, of course, knew that her husband was very ill, and ill from a disease from which he died, but it was not present to any of their minds that there had been an accident in respect of which notice should have been given. I think, therefore, that there was 'reasonable cause' for not giving the notice, and although the absence of notice may have, to some extent, prejudiced the employer, in my opinion it does not prevent the applicant from succeeding if she can prove that it was an injury by accident within the meaning of § 1, subsec. 1."

It may be held that a delay in giving notice for about eight months is by mistake where the workman was told by a doctor that the pain which he suffered was due to muscular rheumatism, and not to injury. Ellis v. Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. [1913] S. C. 217, [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 88, 6 B. W. C. C. 308, 50 Scot. L. R. 137, [1912] 2 Scot. L. T. 485.

79 Where an employee did not regard his injury as so serious as his doctor's advice should have led him to suppose, and he did not intend to make any claim under the act if his recovery had been as satisfactory as he expected, he is not barred from obtaining compensation, although he failed to give notice for five months after his injuries, and the employers were preju

sation, may, under all the circumstances of the case, be a sufficient excuse for not giving notice.79 But notice must be given as soon as the dangerous character diced by his failure to give timely notice, since the want of notice was occasioned by mistake for which there was reasonable cause. Rankine v. Alloa Coal Co. (1904) 6 Sc. Sess. Cas. 5th series, 375, 41 Scot. L. R. 306, 11 Scot. L. T. 670.

Where an injured workman intentionally did not give notice of his accident at the time, believing that his injuries would not keep him from work, but after going to the hospital realized that his injuries were serious, and gave written notice of the accident to his employers about three months after the accident, his delay in giving notice is due to mistake or other reasonable cause within the meaning of § 2. Brown v. Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. [1907] S. C. (Scot.) 198.

There is reasonable cause for failing to give a formal notice of the injury, where the claimant believes that his injuries are not serious, and a day after the accident, and again a month after, he gives a verbal notice of it. Refuge Assur. Co. v. Millar (1911) 49 Scot. L. R. 67.

The failure of a collier to give notice within six months that he was suffering from nystagmus is excusable where he had received medical advice that the disease could be cured by spending a short time above ground, and, there being at that time a strike at his mine, he hoped during the continuance thereof to live in the open air, and, by adopting the course recommended by the doctor, to cure the disease, and not put in a claim. Moore v. Naval Colliery Co. [1912] 1 K. B. (Eng.) 28, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 149, 105 L. T. N. S. 838, 5 B. W. C. C. 87, [1912] W. C. Rep. 81.

Where an injured workman failed to give notice of the accident because he thought his injuries were only slight, and did give actual notice only eighteen weeks after the injury, the excuse is reasonable. Millar v. Refuge Assur. Co. [1912] S. C. 37, 49 Scot. L. R. 67, 5 B. W. C. C. 522.

Delay may be found to be due to reasonable cause where the workman was aged and crippled, and feared that if he applied for compensation the insurance company would not permit the employers to retain him, and he did give notice shortly after he found that he would never be able to work again. Breakwell v. Clee Hill Granite Co. (1911) 5 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 133.

A county court judge is justified in finding that a workman had reasonable cause for failing to give notice of an injury which resulted in a rupture, where, although he was aware at the time that he had received some form of an injury, did not think that it was serious, and, as a matter of fact, did not lose an hour's time for months after receiving such injury, and did give notice as soon as he realized that the injury was of Zillwood v. Winch a serious character.

of the injury appears,80 and the mere hope on the part of the injured workman that he would get better and would not have to make any claim has been held not sufficient to justify him in delaying the making of the claim for over two months, where he suffered severely all of the time.81 So, the fact that a workman thought that an injury to his knuckle was trivial is not sufficient reason to justify his failure to give notice of the accident, where, two days after the accident, the finger pained him so that he could not hold his hammer, and'

[1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 87, 7 B. W. C. C. 60.

Failure to give notice of injury for upwards of two years may be found to be excusable where the injury was caused by a strain, and the workman did not know that he was severely injured, and, after resting for an hour, was able to go on with his work, and the injury did not trouble him during the interval except on one occasion, and then but slightly, and notice was given shortly after he became incapacitated. Coulson v. South Moor Colliery Co. (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 508, 112 L. T. N. S. 901, 31 Times L. R. 207, [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 161, [1915] W. N. 83, 8 B. W. C. C. 253.

The county court judge may find that notice was given as soon as practical after the injury, where the workman was injured by the slipping of his bicycle, but did not believe that his injuries were serious, and gave notice about two months thereafter, as soon as he learned that a cancer had developed from the injury. Haward v. Rowsell [1914] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 314, 7 B. W. C. C. 552.

80 Where a workman was injured by a blow on the breast, which in a few days did not appear to be at all dangerous, and was latent for six months, when a swelling came on his breast, and he failed for nearly six months thereafter from giving notice to the employers in respect to the injury, he cannot obtain the benefit of the proviso of § 2, subsec. 1. Egerton v. Moore [1912] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 308, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 696, 106 L. T. N. S. 663, [1912] W. C. Rep. 250, [1912] W. N. 89, 5 B. W. C. C. 284.

Notice of the accident cannot be held to have been given within a reasonable time, where a man suffered a slight injury, and the wound thereafter healed, but septic poisoning supervened, and no notice was given for nearly a month after the workman knew that his condition was serious. Eydmann v. Premier Accumulator Co. (1915) 8 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 121.

81 Webster v. Cohen Bros. (1913) 108 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 197, 29 Times L. R. 217, [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 268, 57 Sol. Jo. 244, 6 B. W. C. C. 92.

82 Wassel v. Russell (1915) 112 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 902 [1915] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 88, [1915] W. N. 69, 8 B. W. C. C. 230.

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was obliged to knock off work, and two days thereafter the finger was in such a septic condition that amputation was necessary.82 And the fact that a miner's doctor did not think that his injury would turn out seriously does not justify him in regarding it as trivial, where, as a matter of fact, it prevented him from doing his ordinary work.83

The mistake referred to in § 2 is a mistake of fact, and not a mistake of law,84 and ignorance of the existence of the compensation act does not excuse failure to give the notice.85 The unful

83 Fox

v. Barrow Hematite Steel Co. (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. N. S. (Eng.) 1327, Pickford, L. J., said: "The only cause that is suggested here is that the workman honestly thought, and had reason to think, that the injury was trivial. Now, in a sense I think he had. That he thought and had reason to think that the injury would very soon get better in the ordinary course of things I think was the case; but I do not think that that concludes the matter. If, at the time, the injury was of a nature, although trivial from the point of view which I have already indicated, to interfere with the man's ordinary avocation, it could not, I think, within the cases which have been referred to and other similar cases, which are many, be considered as trivial. Of course, whether this be so or not depends upon the view taken of the evidence, and I confess I take the view that the learned county court judge took of the evidence, namely, that, although the man thought that this injury would in all probability get better in a very short time, and turn out as, in ordinary language, nothing serious, and although the doctor's evidence shows he was justified in so thinking, still, while the injury existed in the condition in which it was immediately after the accident and before it got worse, the man was not able to work. He did not work in the evening the accident happened,-I mean, at, his ordinary work. He only helped to push a tub, and he did not work at his ordinary work because of the injury to his eye, which prevented him from so doing,-perhaps not absolutely made it impossible for him to work, but prevented him in the ordinary sense from working. that an injury which incapacitates a man or hinders a man seriously from doing his ordinary work cannot be considered so trivial as to make it reasonable for him not to give notice of it, simply because the man thinks, and has reason to think, that it will in all probability get better within a short time."

It seems to me

84 Egerton v. Moore [1912] 2 K. B. (Eng.) 308, 81 L. J. K. B. N. S. 696, 106 L. T. N. S. 663, [1912] W. C. Rep. 250, [1912] W. N. 89, 5 B. W. C. C. 284; Bruno v. International Coal & Coke Co. (1913; Alberta) 7 B. W. C. C. 1033.

85 Roles v. Pascall [1911] 1 K. B. (Eng.)

filled expectation of a workman employed by a subcontractor that the latter will notify the chief contractor of an accident to the workman of which the latter notified the subcontractor is not a statutory mistake.86

982, 80 L. J. K. B. N. S. 728, 104 L. T. N. S. 298, 4 B. W. C. C. 148; Melville v. M'Carthy (Ir.) [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. 353, cited in Law Reports Current Dig. 1913, col. 725; Judd v. Metropolitan Asylums Board [1912] W. C. Rep. (Eng.) 220, 5 B. W. C. C. 420; Bruno v. International Coal & Coke Co. (1913; Alberta) 7 B. W. C. C. 1033.

86 Where a workman merely tells the subcontractor who employs him of his injury, in the expectation that the subcontractor will tell the employer, and does not give written notice for five months, there is no mistake which will excuse the failure to give notice. Griffiths v. Atkinson (1912) 106 L. T. N. S. (Eng.) 852, [1912] D. C. Rep. 277, 5 B. W. C. C. 345.

87 Failure to give notice for over two years may be found to be excusable where the workman was sick during that period. and was in a foreign country, spending most of the time in hospitals. Dight v. Craster Hall [1913] 3 K. B. (Eng.) 700, 82 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1307, 109 L. T. N. S. 200, 29 Times L. R. 676, [1913] W. N. 259, 6 B. W. C. C. 674.

The failure to give prompt notice of the accident is excusable where the applicant was absent from the United Kingdom at the time, and the delay after her return, which was accomplished as soon as practicable, was occasioned by legal advice to the effect that her time to give notice had expired. Smith v. Pearson (1909; C. C.) 2 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 468.

The finding of the county court judge that a workman's failure to make a claim within six months was "due to" his absence from the United Kingdom, instead of finding that it was "occasioned by," does not invalidate his finding. Dight v. Craster Hall (Eng.) supra.

88 The fact that the applicant had been eight weeks in the hospital is a reasonable excuse for not giving notice within six weeks. Ex parte Dunn (1911) 28 W. N. New So. Wales, 9.

89 An agreement arrived at between the parties shortly after the accident, that there is a statutory liability on the employer to pay compensation, the amount of compensation being left open for future settlement, is evidence upon which the judge or arbitrator may properly find that the employer is estopped from setting up the defense that the request for arbitration was not filed within six months of the accident. Having allowed the six months to expire while the negotiations were still proceeding, the employer cannot then turn round and say that the time for claiming compensation has gone by. Wright v. Bagnall [1900]

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Absence from the United Kingdom has been held a sufficient excuse in a few cases,87 as has serious sickness immediately following the injury.88

The conduct of the employer may be such that he will be held to have waived the giving of the notice,89 or any defects

2 Q. B. (Eng.) 240, 82 L. T. N. S. 346, 69 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 551, 64 J. P. 420, 48 Week. Rep. 533, 16 Times L. R. 327.

Where a workman engaged in lifting heavy cases felt a severe strain internally, and informed his foreman that an old rupture had come down, and that he would consult a doctor, and having been informed by the doctor that he would have to undergo an operation, he so informed his employer, who agreed to make weekly payments of half wages, the county court judge may find that the employer had been informed of the accident as soon as possible, and was not prejudiced by want of or any defect or inaccuracy in the notice, although he had not been given a written notice. Ralph v. Mitchell [1913] W. C. & Ins. Rep. (Eng.) 501, 6 B. W. C. C. 678.

Employers who have paid full compensation for more than four months are thereafter estopped from claiming that notice of the accident was not given as soon as possible, and that they were prejudiced thereby. Turnbull v. Vickers (1914) 7 B. W. C. C. (Eng.) 396.

The

In Luckie v. Merry (1915) 31 Times L. R. (Eng.) 466, [1915] W. N. 243, 59 Sol. Jo. 544, it was held that the county court judge may find that there was reasonable excuse for failure to give notice of an accident, where the injured workman had been for seventeen years in the employment of the respondent as a horse keeper, and, upon crushing his fingers, went to the employer, who told him to potter in the factory until he was better, which he did, and for more than six months remained in the employment, doing his old work and receiving his old wages, when he was discharged for reasons not connected with the accident. The master of the rolls distinguished two Irish cases which were cited by the county court judge as authority for holding that there was no reasonable excuse shown. first of these cases was Healy v. Galloway, 41 Ir. Law Times, 5, which was a case under the old law, which did not provide for a plea of reasonable excuse. The decision of the court in this case was that the mere fact that the employer had paid wages after the accident was not such a circumstance as amounted to a waiver by the employer of the necessity of making a claim, or, to put it in another way, was not a foundation for an estoppel to prevent the master from asserting that no claim had been made. The Healy Case was cited in the second case mentioned, Lynch v. Lansdowne, 48 Ir. Law Times, 89, as authority for the proposition that mere payment of wages from an employer to an injured workman after the latter has been injured, is not

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