astonishing préposterousness, to jealousy or vexation, Some merchants are angry at the loss of a branch of trade; they urge the government to interfere; memorials and remonstrances follow to the state of whom they complain;-and so, by that process of exasperation which is quite natural when people think that high language and a high attitude is politic, the nations soon begin to fight. The merchants applaud the spirit of their rulers, while in one year they lose more by the war than they would have lost by the want of the trade for twenty; and before peace returns, the nation has lost more than it would have lost by the continuance of the evil for twenty centuries. Peace at length arrives, and the government begins to devise means of repairing the mischiefs of the war. Both government and people reflect very complacently on the wisdom of their measures-forgetting that their conduct is only that of a man who wantonly fractures his own leg with a club, and then boasts to his neighbours how dexterously he limps to a surgeon. Such It has been said by a Christian writer, that "the science of politics is but a particular application of that of morals;" and it has been said by a writer who rejected Christianity, that "the morality that Present expedients for present occasions, rather ought to govern the conduct of individuals and of than a wide-embracing and far-seeing policy, is the nations, is in all cases the same." If there be truth great characteristic of European politics. We are in the principles which are advanced in the first of hucksters who cannot resist the temptation of a these Essays, these propositions are indisputably present sixpence, rather than merchants who wait true. It is the chief purpose of the present work to for their profits for the return of a fleet. Si quæris enforce the supremacy of the Moral Law; and to monumentum, circumspice! Look at the condition this supremacy there is no exception in the case of of either of the continental nations, and consider nations. In the conduct of nations this supremacy what it might have been if even a short line of is practically denied, although, perhaps, few of those princes had attended to their proper business-had who make it subservient to other purposes would directed their solicitude to the improvement of the deny it in terms. With their lips they honour the moral, and social, and political condition of the doctrine, but in their works they deny it. people. Who has been more successful in this procedures must be expected to produce much selfhuckster policy than France? and what is France, contradiction, much vacillation between the truth and what are the French people at the present hour? and the wish to disregard it, much vagueness of -Why, as it respects real welfare, they are not notions respecting political rectitude, and, much merely surpassed, they are left at an immeasurable casuistry to educe something like a justification of distance by a people who sprung up but as yesterday what cannot be justified. Let the reader observe an -by a people whose land, within the memory of our illustration :— -A moral philosopher says, "The grandfathers, was almost a wilderness-and which Christian principles of love, and forbearance, and actually was a wilderness long since France boasted kindness, strictly as they are to be observed between of her greatness. Such results have a cause. It is man and man, are to be observed with precisely the not possible that systems of policy can be good, of same strictness between nation and nation." This is which the effects are so bad, I speak not of parti- an unqualified assertion of the truth. But the writer cular measures, or of individual acts of ill policy-thinks it would carry him too far, and so he makes these are not likely to be the result of the condition of man-but of the whole international system; a system of irritability, and haughtiness, and temporary expedients; a system of most unphilosophical principles, and from which Christianity is practically almost excluded. Here is the evidence of fact before us. We know what a sickening detail the history of Europe is; and it is obvious to remark, that the system which has given rise to such a history must be vicious and mistaken in its fundamental principles. The same class of history will continue to after generations unless these principles are changed—unless philosophy and Christianity obtain a greater influence in the practice of government; unless, in a word, governments are content to do their proper business, and to leave that which is not their business undone. When such principles are acted upon, we may reasonably expect a rapid advancement in the whole condition of the world. Domestic measures which are now postponed to the more stirring occupations of legislators, will be found to be of incomparably greater importance than they. A wise code of criminal law, will be found to be of more consequence and interest than the acquisition of a million square miles of territory :-a judicious encouragement of general education, will be of more value than all the glory" that has been acquired from the days of Alfred till now. Of moral legislation, however, it 66 66 exceptions. In reducing to practice the Christian principles of forbearance, &c., it will not be always feasible, nor always safe, to proceed to the same extent as in acting towards an individual." Let the reader exercise his skill in casuistry, by showing the difference between conforming to laws with "precise strictness," and conforming to them in their "full extent. -Thus far Christianity and Expediency are proposed as our joint governors. We must observe the Moral Law, but still we must regulate our observance of it by considerations of what is feasible and safe. Presently afterwards, however, Christianity is quite dethroned, and we are to observe its laws only "so far as national ability and national security will permit."*-So that our rule of political conduct stands at length thus: obey Christianity with precise strictness-when it suits your interests. The reasoning by which such doctrines are supported, is such as it might be expected to be. We are told of the "caution requisite in affairs of such magnitude-the great uncertainty of the future conduct of the other nation,"-and of "patriotism.". So that, because the affairs are of great magnitude, the laws of the Deity are not to be observed! It is all very well, it seems, to observe them in little matters, but for our more important concerns we want rules commensurate with their dignity-we cannot * Gisborne's Moral Philosophy. then be bound by the laws of God! The next reason is, that we cannot foresee "the future conduct" of a nation. Neither can we that of an individual. Besides this, inability to foresee inculcates the very lesson that we ought to observe the laws of Him who can foresee. It is a strange thing to urge the limitation of our powers of judgment, as a reason for substituting it for the judgment of Him whose powers are perfect. Then "patriotism" is a reason: and we are to be patriotic to our country at the expense of treason to our religion! "In war The principles upon which these reasonings are founded, lead to their legitimate results: and negotiation," says Adam Smith, "the laws of justice are very seldom observed. Truth and fair dealing are almost totally disregarded. Treaties are violated, and the violation, if some advantage is gained by it, sheds scarce any dishonour upon the violator. The ambassador who dupes the minister of a foreign nation, is admired and applauded. The just man, the man who in all private transactions would be the most beloved and the most esteemed, in those public transactions is regarded as a fool and an idiot, who does not understand his business; and he incurs always the contempt, and sometimes even the detestation, of his fellow citizens."* Now, against all such principles-against all endeavours to defend the rejection of the Moral Law in political affairs, we would with all emphasis protest. The reader sees that it is absurd:-can he need to be convinced that it is unchristian ? Christianity is of paramount authority, or another authority is superior. He who holds another authority as superior, rejects Christianity; and the fair and candid step would be avowedly to reject it. He should say, in distinct terms-Christianity throws some light on political principles; but its laws are to be held subservient to our interests. This were far more satisfactory than the trimming system, the perpetual vacillation of obedience to two masters, and the perpetual endeavour to do that which never can be done-serve both. Jesus Christ legislated for man-not for individuals only, not for families only, not for Christian churches only, but for man in all his relationships and in all his circumstances. He legislated for states. In his moral law we discover no indications that states were exempted from its application, or that any rule which bound social did not bind political communities. If any exemption were designed, the onus probandi rests upon those who assert it: unless they can show that the Christian precepts are not intended to apply to nations, the conclusion must be admitted that they are. But in reality, to except nations from the obligations is impossible; for nations are composed of individuals, and if no individual may reject the Christian morality, a nation may not. Unless, indeed, it can be shown that when you are an agent for others you may do what neither yourself nor any of them might do separately a proposition of which certainly the proof must be required to be very clear and strong. But the truth is that those who justify a suspension of Christian morality in political affairs, are often unwilling to reason distinctly and candidly upon the subject. They satisfy themselves with a jest, or a sneer, or a shrug; being unwilling either to contemn morality in politics, or to practise it: and it is to little purpose to offer arguments to him who does not need conviction, but virtue. Expediency is the rock upon which we splitupon which, strange as it appears, not only our principles but our interests suffer continual shipwreck. Theory of Moral Sentiments, It has been upon Expediency that European politics have so long been founded, with such lamentably inexpedient effects. We consult our interests so anxiously that we ruin them. But we consult them blindly: we do not know our interests, nor shall we ever know them whilst we continue to imagine that we know them better than He who legislated for the world. Here is the perpetual folly as well as the perpetual crime. Esteeming ourselves wise, we have, emphatically, been fools-of which no other evidence is necessary than the present political condition of the Christian world. If ever it was true of any human being, that by his deviations from rectitude he had provided scourges for himself, it is true at this hour of every nation in Europe. Let us attend to this declaration of a man who, whatever may have been the value of his general politics, was certainly, a great statesman here: "I am one of those who firmly believe, as much indeed as a man can believe any thing, that the greatest resource a nation can possess, the surest principle of power, is strict attention to the principles of justice. I firmly believe that the common proverb of honesty being the best policy, is as applicable to nations as to individuals." "In all interference with foreign nations justice is the best foundation of policy, and moderation is the surest pledge of peace." therefore we have been deficient in justice towards other states, we have been deficient in wisdom." "If Here, then, is the great truth for which we would contend to be unjust is to be unwise. And since justice is not imposed upon nations more really than other branches of the Moral Law, the universal maxim is equally true-to deviate from purity of rectitude is impolitic as well as wrong. When will this truth be learnt and be acted upon? When shall we cast away the contrivances of a low and unworthy policy, and dare the venture of the consequences of virtue? When shall we, in political affairs, exercise a little of that confidence in the knowledge and protection of God, which we are ready to admire in individual life?-Not that it is to be assumed as certain that such fidelity would cost nothing. Christianity makes no such promise. But whatever it might cost it would be worth the purchase. And neither reason nor experience allows the doubt that a faithful adherence to the Moral Law would more effectually serve national interests, than they have ever yet been served by the utmost sagacity whilst violating that law. The contrivances of expediency have become so habitual to measures of state, that it may probably be thought the dreamings of a visionary to suppose it possible that they should be substituted by purity of rectitude. And yet I believe it will eventually be done-not perhaps by the resolution of a few cabinets -it is not from them that reformation is to be expected-but by the gradual advance of sound principles upon the minds of men ;-principles which will assume more and more their rightful influence in the world, until at length the low contrivances of a fluctuating and immoral policy will be substituted by firm, and consistent, and invariable integrity. The convention of what is called the Holy Alliance, was an extraordinary event; and little as the contracting parties may have acted in conformity with it, and little as they or their people were prepared for such a change of principles, it is a subject of satisfaction that such a state paper exists. It contains a testimony at least to virtue and to rectitude; and even if we should suppose it to be utterly hypocritical, the testimony is just as real. Hypocrisy commonly affects a character which it ought Fell's Memoirs of the Public Life of C J. Fox. to maintain: and the act of hypocrisy is homage to the character. In this view, I say, it is subject of some satisfaction that a document exists which declares that these powerful princes have come to a "fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respective states, and in their political relations with every other government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Christian religion--the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace:" and which declares that these principles, "far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, as being the only means of consolidating human institutions, and remedying their imperfections." The time, it may be hoped, will arrive when such a declaration will be the congenial and natural result of principles that are actually governing the Christian world. Meantime, let the philosopher and the statesman keep that period in their view, and endeavour to accelerate its approach. He who does this, will secure a fame for himself that will increase and still increase as the virtue of man holds its onward course, while multitudes of the great both of past ages and of the present, will become beacons to warn, rather than examples to stimulate us. CHAPTER II. CIVIL LIBERTY. Loss of Liberty-War-Useless laws. Or personal liberty we say nothing, because its full possession is incompatible with the existence of society. All government supposes the relinquishment of a portion of personal liberty. It Civil Liberty may, however, be fully enjoyed. is enjoyed, where the principles of political truth and rectitude are applied in practice, because there the people are deprived of that portion only of liberty which it would be pernicious to themselves to possess. If political power is possessed by consent of the community; if it is exercised only for their good; and if this welfare is consulted by Christian means, the people are free. No man can define the particular enjoyments or exemptions which constitute civil liberty, because they are contingent upon the circumstances of the respective nations. A degree of restraint may be necessary for the general welfare of one community, which would be wholly unnecessary in another. Yet the first would have no reason to complain of their want of civil liberty. The complaint, if any be made, should be of the evils which make the restraint necessary. The single question is, whether any given degree of restraint is necessary or not. If it is, though the restraint may be painful, the civil liberty of the community may be said to be complete. It is useless to say that it is less complete than that of another nation; for complete civil liberty is a relative and not a positive enjoyment. Were it otherwise, no people enjoy, or are likely for ages to enjoy, full civil liberty; because none enjoy so much that they could not, in a more virtuous state of mankind, enjoy more. is not the rigour, but the inexpediency of laws and acts of authority, which makes them tyrannical." Civil liberty (so far as its present enjoyment goes) does not necessarily depend upon forms of govern * Paley: Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 6 c. 5. "It ment. All communities enjoy it who are properly governed. It may be enjoyed under an absolute monarch; as we know it may not be enjoyed under a republic. Actual, existing liberty, depends upon the actual, existing administration. One great cause of diminutions of civil liberty is War; and if no other motive induced a people jealously to scrutinize the grounds of a war, this might be sufficient. The increased loss of personal freedom to a military man is manifest;-and it is considerable to other men. The man who now pays, twenty pounds a-year in taxes, would probably have paid but two if there had been no war during the past century. If he now gets a hundred and fifty pounds a-year by his exertions, he is obliged to labour six weeks out of the fifty-two, to pay the taxes which war has entailed. That is to say, he is compelled to work two hours every day longer than he himself wishes, or than is needful for his support. This is a material deduction from personal liberty and a man would feel it as such, if the coercion were directly applied-if an officer came to his house every afternoon at four o'clock, when he had finished his business, and obliged him, under penalty of a distraint, to work till six. It is some loss of liberty, again, to a man to be unable to open as many windows in his house as he pleases-or to be forbidden to acknowledge the receipt of a debt without going to the next town for a stamp-or to be obliged to ride in an uneasy carriage unless he will pay for springs. It were to no purpose to say he may pay for windows and springs if he will, and if he can.-A slave may, by the same reasoning, be shown to be free; because, if he will and if he can, he may purchase his freedom. There is a loss of liberty in being obliged to submit to the alternative; and we should feel it as a loss if such things were not habitual, and if we had not receded so considerably from the liberty of nature. A housewife on the Ohio would think it a strange invasion of her liberty, if she were told that henceforth the police would be sent to her house to seize her goods if she made any more soap to wash her clothes. Now, indeed, that war has created a large public debt, it is necessary to the general good that its interest should be paid: and in this view a man's civil liberty is not encroached upon, though his personal liberty is diminished. The public welfare is consulted by the diminution. I may deplore the cause without complaining of the law. It may, upon emergency, be for the public good to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act. I should lament that such a state of things existed, but I should not complain that civil liberty was invaded. The lesson which such considerations teach, is, jealous watchfulness against wars for the future. There are many other acts of governments by which civil liberty is needlessly curtailed-among which may be reckoned the number of laws. Every law implies restriction. To be destitute of laws is to be absolutely free: to multiply laws is to multiply restrictions, or, which is the same thing, to diminish liberty. A great number of penal statutes lately existed in this country, by which the reasonable proceedings of a prosecutor were cramped, and impeded, and thwarted. A statesman to whom England is much indebted, has supplied their place by one which is more rational and more simple; and prosecutors now find that they are so much more able to consult their own understandings in their proceedings, that it may, without extravagance, be said that our civil liberty is increased. "A law being found to produce no sensible good effects, is a sufficient reason for repealing it."* It Paley: Mor. and Pol. Phil. p. 3, b. 6, c. 5. is not, therefore, sufficient to ask in reply, what harm does the law occasion? for you must prove that it does good: because all laws which do no good, do harm. They encroach upon or restrain the liberty of the community, without that reason which only can make the deduction of any portion of liberty right-the public good. If this rule were sufficiently attended to, perhaps more than a few of the laws of England would quickly be repealed. CHAPTER III. POLITICAL LIBERTY. Political Liberty the right of a community-Public satisfaction. THIS is, in strictness, a branch of civil liberty. Political liberty implies the existence of such political institutions as secure, with the greatest practicable certainty, the future possession of freedom-the existence of which institutions is one of the requisites, in a general sense, of Civil liberty; because it is as necessary to proper government that securities for freedom should be framed, as that present freedom should be permitted. The possession of political liberty is of great importance. A Russian may enjoy as great a share of personal freedom as an Englishman; that is, he may find as few restrictions upon the exercise of his own will; but he has no security for the continuance of this. For aught that he knows, he may be arbitrarily thrown into prison to-morrow; and therefore, though he may live and die without molestation, he is politically enslaved. When it is considered how much human happiness depends upon the security of enjoying happiness in future, such institutions as those of Russia are great grievances; and Englishmen, though they may regret the curtailment of some items of civil liberty, have much comparative reason to think themselves politically free. The possession of political liberty is unquestionably a right of a community. They may, with perfect reason, require it even of governments which actually govern well. It is not enough for a government to say, none but beneficial laws and acts of authority are adopted. It must, if it would fulfil the duties of a government, accumulate, to the utmost, securities for beneficial measures hereafter. In this view, it may be feared that no government in Europe fulfils all its duty to the people. It And here considerations are suggested respecting the representation of a people-a point which, if some political writers were to be listened to, was a sine qua non of political liberty. "To talk of an abstract right of equal representation is absurd. is to arrogate a right to one form of government, whereas Providence has accommodated the different forms of government to the different states of society in which they subsist."* If an inhabitant of Birmingham should come and tell me that he and his neighbours were debarred of political liberty because they sent no representatives to parliament, I should say that the justness of his complaint was problematical. It does not follow because a man is not represented, that he is not politically free. The question is, whether as good securities for liberty exist, without permitting him to vote, as with it. If it can be shown that the present legislative government affords as good a security for the future free • William Pitt: Gifford's Life, vol. 3. dom of the people as any other that might be devised, the inhabitant of Birmingham enjoys, at present, political liberty. It is a very common mistake amongst writers to assume some particular privilege or institution as a test of this liberty-as something without which it cannot be enjoyed; and yet I suppose there is no one of their institutions or privileges under which it would not be possible to enslave a people. Simple republicanism, universal suffrage, and frequent elections, might afford no better security for civil liberty than absolute monarchy. In fine, political liberty is not a matter that admits of certain conclusions from theoretical reasoning; it is a question of facts; a question to be decided, like questions of philosophy, by reasoning founded upon experience. If the inhabitant of Birmingham can show, from relevant experience, good ground to conclude that greater security for liberty would be derived from extending the representation, he has reason to complain of an undue privation of political liberty if it is not extended. But, then, it is always incumbent upon the legislature to prove the probable superiority of the existing institutions when any considerable portion of the people desire an alteration. That desire constitutes a claim to investigation; and to an alteration, too, unless the existing institutions appear to be superior to those which are desired. It is not enough to show that they are as good; for though in other respects the two plans were equally balanced, the present are not so good as the others if they give less satisfaction to the community. To be satisfied is one great ingredient in the welfare of a people; and in whatever degree a people are not satisfied, in the same degree civil government does not perfectly effect its proper ends. To deny satisfaction to a people without showing a reason, is to withhold from them the due portion of civil liberty. Upon which grounds those advocates of religious liberty appear to assert too much, who assert, as a fundamental principle, that a government never has, nor can have, any just concern, with religious opinions. Unless these persons can show that no advertence to them is allowed by Christianity, and that none can contribute to the public good, circumstances may arise in which an advertence would be right. No one perhaps will deny that a government may lawfully provide for the education of the people, and endeavour to diffuse just notions and principles, moral and religious, into the public mind. A government, therefore, may endeavour to discountenance unsound notions and principles. It may as reasonably discourage what is wrong, as cherish what is right. But by what means? By influencing opinions, not by punishing persons who hold them. When a man publishes a book or delivers a lecture for the purpose of enlightening the public mind, he does well. A government may take kindred measures for the same purpose, and it does well. But this is all. If our author or lecturer, finding his opinions were not accepted, should proceed to injure those who rejected them, he would act, not only irrationally but immorally. If a government, finding its measures do not influence or alter the views of the people, injures those who reject its sentiments, it acts immorally too. A man's opinions are not alterable at his own will; and it is not right to injure a man for doing that which he cannot avoid. Besides, in religious matters especially, it is the Christian duty of a man, first, to seek truth; and next, to adhere to those opinions which truth, as he believes, teaches. And so again, it is not right to injure a man for doing that which it is his duty to do. When, therefore, it is affirmed, at the head of this chapter, that the magistrate may advert to subjects connected with religion, nothing more is to be understood than that he may endeavour to diffuse just sentiments, and to expose the contrary. To do more than this, although he may think his measures may promote the public welfare, would be to endeavour to promote it " by means which the Moral Law forbids." To inflict civil disabilities is "to do more than this "it is to injure a man for doing that which he cannot avoid," and "that which it is his duty to do." Here, indeed, a sophism has been resorted to, in order to show that disabilities are not injuries. It is said of the Dissenters of this country, that no penalty is inflicted upon them by excluding them from offices that the state confers certain offices upon certain conditions, with which conditions a dissenter does not comply. And it is said that this is no more a penalty or a hardship than, when the law defines what pecuniary qualifications capacitate a man for a seat in parliament, it inflicts a penalty upon those who not do possess them. I answer, Both are penalties and hardships—and that the argument only attempts to justify one ill practice by the existence of another. It will be said that such regulations are necessary to the public good.--Bring the proof. Here is a certain restraint: "The proof of the advantage of a restraint," says Dr Paley, "lies upon the legislature." Unless, therefore, you can show -what to me is extremely problematical-that the public is benefited by a law that excludes a poor man from the legislature-the argument wholly fails. Consider for what purpose men unite in society"in order," says Grotius," to enjoy common rights and advantages "--of which rights and advantages, eligibility to a representative body is one. Those principles of political rectitude which determine that a law which needlessly restrains natural liberty is wrong, determine that a law which needlessly restrains the enjoyment of the privileges of society, is wrong also. It is therefore not true that a dissenter suffers no hardship or penalty on account of his opinions. The only difference between disabilities and ordinary penalties is this, that one inflicts evil, and the other withholds good; and both are, to all intents and purposes, penalties. But even if the legislator thought he could show that the public were benefited by this penalty, upon conscientious dissidents, it would not be sufficientfor the penalty itself is wrong--it is not Christian; and it is vain to argue that an unchristian act can be made lawful by prospects of advantage. Here, as every where else, we must maintain the supremacy of the Moral Law. All these reasonings proceed upon the supposi tion that a man does not, in consequence of his opinions, disturb the peace of society by any species of violence. If he does, he is doubtless to be restrained. It may not be more necessary for the magistrate to enquire what are a man's opinions of religion, than for a rider to enquire what are the cogitations of his horse. So long as my horse carries me well, it matters nothing to me whether he be thinking of safe paces, or of meadows and corn chests. So long as the welfare of the public is secured, it matters nothing to the magistrate what notion of Christianity a citizen accepts. But if my horse, in his anxiety to get into a meadow, leaps over a hedge, and impedes me in my journey, it is needful that I employ the whip and bridle: and if the citizen, in his zeal for opinions, violates the general good, it is needful that he should be punished or restrained. And even then, he is not restrained for his opinions but for his conduct; just as I do not apply the whip to my horse because he loves a meadow, but because he goes out of the road. And even in the case of conduct, it is needful to discriminate, accurately, what is a proper subject of animadversion, and what is not. I perceive no truth in the ingenious argument, "that a man may entertain opinions however pernicious, but he may not be allowed to disseminate them; as a man may keep poison in his house, but may not be allowed to give it to others as wholesome medicine." To support this argument you must have recourse to a petitio principii. How do you know that an opinion is pernicious? By reasoning and examination, if at all; and that is the very end which the dissemination of an opinion attains. If the truth or falsehood of an opinion were demonstrable to the senses, as the mischief of poison is, there would be some justness in the argument; but it is not: except, indeed, that there may be opinions so monstrous, that they immediately manifest their unsoundness by their effects on the conduct; and, if they do this, these effects and not the dissemination of the opinion, are the proper subject of animadversion. The doctrine, that a man ought not to be punished for disseminating whatever opinions he pleases, upon whatever subject, will receive some illustration in a future chapter, Meantime, the reader will, I hope, be prepared to admit, at least, that the religious opinions which obtain amongst Christian churches, are not such as to warrant the magistrate in visiting those who disseminate them with any kind of penalty.-What the magistrate may punish, and what an individual ought to do, are very different considerations: and though there is reason to think that no man should be punished by human laws for disseminating vicious notions, it is to be believed that those who consciously do it will be held far other than innocent at the bar of God. All reference to creeds in framing laws for a general society is wrong. And it is somewhat humiliating that, in the present age, and in our country, it is necessary to establish this proposition by formal proof. It is humiliating, because it shows us how slow is the progress of sound principles upon the human mind, even when they are not only recommended by reason, but enforced by experience. It is now nearly a century and a half since one of our own colonies adopted a system of religious liberty, which far surpassed that of the parent state at the present hour. And this system was successful, not negatively, in that it produced no evil, but positively, in that it produced much good. One hundred and fifty years is a long time for a nation to be learning a short and plain lesson. In Pennsylvania, in addition to a complete toleration of "Jews, Turks, Catholics, and people of all persuasions in reli |