and naval appointments-it will appear that much of this class of patronage is accidental also. Take away that wickedness and violence in which hostile measures originate, and fleets and armies would no longer be needed; and with their dissolution there would be a prodigious diminution of Patronage and of Influence. So, if we continue the enquiry, how far any given source of influence arising from patronage is necessary to the institution of civil government, we shall find, at last, that the necessary, portion is very small. We are little accustomed to consider how simple a thing civil government is—nor what an unnumbered multiplicity of offices and sources of patronage would be cut off, if it existed in its simple and rightful state. Supposing this state of rectitude to be attained, and the little patronage which remained to be employed rather as an encouragement and reward of public virtue than of subserviency to purposes of party, we should have no reason to complain of the existence of Influence or of its effects. Swift said of our own country, that "while the prerogative of giving all employments continues in the crown, either immediately or by subordination, it is in the power of the prince to make piety and virtue become the fashion of the age, if, at the same time, he would make them necessary qualifications for favour and preferment."* But unhappily, in the existing character of political affairs in all nations, piety and virtue would be very poor recommendations to many of their concerns. "The just man," as Adam Smith says, "the man who, in all private transactions would be the most beloved and the most esteemed, in those public transactions is regarded as a fool and an idiot, who does not understand his business."+ It would be as absurd to think of making "piety and virtue, qualifications" for these offices, as to make idiocy a qualification for understanding the Principia.-But the position of Swift, although it is not true whilst politics remain to be what they are, contains truth if they were what they ought to be. We should have, I say, no reason to complain of the existence of influence or of its effects, if it were reduced to its proper amount, and exerted in its proper direction. It has, I think, been justly observed that one of the principal causes of the separation of America from Britain, consisted in the little influence which the crown possessed over the American States. They had popular assemblies, guided, as such assemblies are wont to be, by impatience of control, as well as by zeal for independence; and the government possessed no patronage that was sufficient to counteract the democratic principles. Occasion of opposition was ministered; and the effect was seen. The American assemblies, and the corresponding temper of the people, were more powerful than the little influence which the crown possessed. What was to be done? It was necessary either to relinquish the government, which could no longer be maintained without force, or to employ force to retain it. The latter was attempted; and, as was to be expected, it failed. I say failure was to be expected; because the state of America, and of England too, was such, that a government of force could not be supposed likely to stand. Henry VIII. and Elizabeth governed England by a species of force. They induced parliamentary compliance by intimidation. This intimidation has given place to influence. But every man will perceive that it would be impossible to return to intimidation again. And it was equally impossible to adopt it permanently in the case of America. • Project for the Advancement of Religion. And here it may be observed, in passing, that the separation from a mother country of extensive and remote dependencies, is always to be eventually expected. As the dependency increases in population, in intelligence, in wealth, and in the various points which enable it to be, and which practically constitute it, a nation of itself-it increases in the tendency to actual separation. This separation may be delayed by the peculiar nature of the parent's government, but it can hardly be in the end prevented. It is not in the constitution of the human species to remain under the supremacy of a foreign power, to which they are under no natural subordination, after the original causes of the supremacy have passed away. Accordingly, there is reason to expect that, in days to come, the possessions of the European powers on the other quarters of the globe will one after another lapse away. Happy will it be for these powers and for the world, if they take counsel of the philosophy of human affairs, and of the experience of times gone by:-if they are willing tranquilly to yield up a superiority of which the reasonableness and the propriety is passed-a superiority which no efforts can eventually maintain -and a superiority which really tends not to the welfare of the governing, of the governed, or of the world. PARTY. The system of forming Parties in governments, is perfectly congruous with the general character of political affairs, but totally incongruous with political rectitude. Of this incongruity considerate men are frequently sensible; and accordingly we find that defences of party are set up, and set up by men of respectable political character.* To defend a custom is to intimate that it is assailed. What does the very nature of party imply? That he who adheres to it speaks and votes not always according to the dictates of his own judgment, but according to the plans of other men. This sacrifice of individual judgment violates one of the first and greatest duties of a legislator-to direct his separate and unbiassed judgment to the welfare of the state. There can be no proper accumulation of individual experience and knowledge amongst those who vote with a party. But, indeed, the justifications which are attempted do not refer to the abstract rectitude of becoming one of a party, but to the unfailing ground of defending political evil-Expediency. An administration, it is said, would not be so likely to stand, or an opposition to prevail, when each man votes as he thinks rectitude requires, as when he ranges himself under a leader. The difference is like that which subsists in war between a body of irregular peasantry and a disciplined army: each man's arm is as strong in the one case as in the other, but each man's is not equally effective. Very well. If we are to be told that it is fitting, or honest, or decent, that senates and cabinets should act upon the principles of conflicting armies, parties may easily be defended, but surely legislators have other business and other duties. It only exhibits the wideness of the general departure from the proper modes of conducting government and legislation, that such arguments are employed. It will be said, that there are no means of expelling a bad administration from office but by a systematic opposition to its measures. If this were true, it would be nothing to the question of rectitude, unless it can be shown that Fox, I believe, was one of them, and the present Lord John Russell, in his Life of Lord Russell, is another. the end sanctions the means. The question is not whether we shall overthrow an administration, but whether we shall do what is right. But, even with respect to the success of political objects, it is not very certain that simple integrity would not be the most efficacious. The man who habitually votes on one side, loses, and he ought to lose, much of the confidence of other members and of the public. At what value ought we to estimate the mental principles of a man, who foregoes the dictates of his own judgment, and acts in opposition to it in order to serve a party? What is the ground upon which we can place confidence in his integrity? Facts may furnish an answer. The speeches, and statements, and arguments, of such persons, are listened to with suspicion; and a habitual and large deduction is made from their weight. This is inevitable. Hearers and the public cannot tell whether the speaker is uttering his own sentiments or those of others: they cannot tell whether he believes his own statements, or is convinced by his own reasoning. So that, even when his cause is good and his advocacy just, he loses half his influence because men are afraid to rely upon him, and because they still do not know whether some illusion is not underneath. The mind is kept so constantly jealous of fallacies, that it excludes one half of the truth. But when the man stands up, of whom it is known that he is sincere, that what he says he thinks, and what he asserts he believes, the mind opens itself to his statements without apprehension of deceit. No deductions are made for the overcolourings of party. Integrity carries with it its proper sanction. Now if, generally, the measures of a party are good, the individual support of upright men would probably more effectually recommend them to a senate and to a nation, than the ranked support of men whose uprightness must always be questionable and questioned. If the measures are not good, it matters not how inefficiently they are supported. Let those who now range themselves under political leaders of whatever party, throw away their unworthy shackles; let them convince the legislature and the public that they are absolutely sincere men; and it is probable that a vicious policy would not be able to stand before them. For other motives to opposition than actual viciousness of measures, 1 have nothing to say. He whose principles allow him to think that other motives justify opposition, may very well vote against his understanding. The principles and the conduct are congenial; but both are bad. MINISTERIAL UNION. tions about expediency—are sophistical and impertinent. "The necessity for the co-operation" (I use political language) results from the general impurity of political systems-systems in which not reason, simply, and principle, direct, but influence also, and the spirit of party-and the love of power. Where influence is to be employed, union amongst a cabinet is likely to urge it in fuller force :-Where the spirit of party is to be employed, this union is necessary to the object-Where the love of power is the guide, consistency and integrity must be sacrificed to its acquisition or retention. But take away this influence which is bad; and this spirit of partywhich is bad; and this love of power-which is bad; and the minister may speak and act like a consistent and a virtuous man. It is with this, as with unnumbered cases in life, that what is called the necessity for a particular vicious course of action is quite adventitious, resulting in no degree from the operation of sound principles, but from the diffused impurity of human institutions. But, indeed, the necessity is not perhaps so obvious as is supposed. The same reasons as those which make the support of a partisan comparatively inefficient, operate upon the ministerial advocate. He is regarded as a party man; and as the exertions of a party man his arguments are received. People say or think, when such arguments are urged, as some men say and think of the labours of the clergy Why "What they say is a matter of course; "—" It is their business; their trade." No one disputes that these feelings have a powerful effect in diminishing the practical effect of the labours of the pulpit; and they have the same effect with respect to the labours of a ministry. We listen to a minister rather as a pleader than as a judge; and every one knows what disproportionate regard is paid to these. should not ministers be judges? Why should not senates confide in their integrity, believe their statements, give candid attention to their reasoningsas we attend to, and believe, and confide in, what is uttered from the bench? And does any man think so ill of mankind as to believe that if an administration acted thus, they would not actually possess a greater influence upon the minds of men, than they do now? Even now, when men are so habituated to the operation of influence and party, I believe that a minister is listened to with much greater confidence and satisfaction when he dissents from his colleagues, than when he makes common cause. We then insensibly reflect, that he is no longer the pleader but the judge. The independence of his judgment is unquestioned; and we regard it therefore as thè judgment of an honest man.. Uniformity of opinion or more properly, unity of exertion-is not at all necessary to the stability of a cabinet. Several recent administrations in our own country have been divided in sentiment upon great questions of national policy, and their mem The unanimous support or opposition which ordinarily is given to a measure by the members of an administration, whatever be their private opinions, is a species of party. Like other modes of party, it results from the impure condition of political affairs; like them, it is incongruous with sound poli-bers have opposed one another in parliament. With tical rectitude and, like them, it is defended upon pleas of expediency. The immorality of this custom is easily shown; because it sacrifices private judgment, involves a species of hypocrisy, and defrauds the community of that uninfluenced judgment respecting public affairs for which all public men are appointed. "Ministers have been known, publicly and in unqualified terms, to applaud those very measures of a coadjutor which they have freely condemned in private." Is this manly? Is it honest? Is it Christian? If it is not, it is vicious and criminal; and all arguments in its defence-all disquisi-public measures which is likely to illustrate their Gisborne: Duties of Men what ill effects? Nay, has not that very contrariety recommended the reasonings of all, as those of sincere integrity? It is usual with some politicians to declaim vehemently against "unnatural coalitions in cabinets." As to individuals, they, no doubt, may be censurable for political tergiversation; but as to cabinets being composed of men of different sentiments of sentiments so different as their respective judgments may occasion-it is both allowable and expedient. It is just what a wise community would wish, because it affords a security for that canvass of character and tendencies. But it is a sorrowful and a sickening sight, to contemplate a number of per sons frankly urging their various and disagreeing opinions at a council board, and as soon as some resolution is come to, all proceeding to a senate, and one half urging the very arguments against which they have just been contending, and by which they are not yet convinced. Is freedom of canvass for any reasons useful and right at the council board? Is it not, for the very same reasons, useful and right in a senate? The answer would be, yes, if public measures were regarded as the measures of the community, and not of the administration; because then the desire and judgment of the community would be sought by the public and independent discussion of the question. Here, then, at last is one great cause of the evil that a large proportion of public acts are the measures of administrations; and, being such, administrations unitedly support them whatever be the individual opinions of their members. These things ought not so to be. I would not indeed say that, from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, there is no soundness in the system-but the evil is mingled deplorably with the good. It is sometimes in practice almost forgotten, that an administration is an Executive rather than a Legislative body that their original and natural business is rather to do what the legislature and constitution directs, than to direct the legislature themselves. I say the original and natural business; for, how congenial soever the great influence of administrations in public affairs may be with the present tenor of policy, and especially of international policy, it is not at all congenial with the original purpose and simple and proper objects of civil government-the welfare of the community, as determined by an enlightened survey of the national mind. Of the want of advertence to these simple and proper objects, one effect has been that, in this country, administrations have frequently given up their offices when the senate has rejected their measures. This is an unequivocal indication of the wrong station in which cabinets are placed in the legislature -because it indicates, that if a cabinet cannot carry its point, it is supposed to be unfit for its office. All this is natural enough upon the present system, but it is very unnatural when cabinets are regarded, either in their ministerial capacity, as executive officers, or in their legislative capacity, as ordinary members of the senate. Executive officers are to do what the constitution and the legislature directs :members of a senate are to assist that legislature in directing aright: in all which, no necessity is involved for ministers to resign their offices because the measures which they think best are not thought best by the majority. That a ministry should sometimes judge amiss is to be expected, because it is to be expected of all men: but surely in a sound state of political institutions, their fallibility would not be a necessary argument of unfitness for their offices, nor would the rejection of some of their opinions be a necessary evidence of a loss of the confidence of the public. is satisfactorily indicated by its effects. Without indulging in the ordinary gratulations of our Own country being the first country in the world," it is unquestionably, in almost every respect, amongst the first amongst the first in liberty, in intellectual and moral excellence, and in whatever dignifies and adorns mankind. A country which thus surpasses other nations, and which has, with little interruption, possessed a nearly uniform constitution for ages, may well rest assured that its constitution is good. To say that it is good, is however very different from saying that it is theoretically perfect, or practically as good as its theory will allow. Under a King, Lords, and Commons, we have prospered; but it does not therefore follow that under a King, Lords, and Commons, we might not have prospered more. Whatever may be the future allotment of our country as to the form of its government, whether at any period, or at what, the progressive advancement of the human species will occasion an alteration, we are not at present concerned to enquire. Of one thing, indeed, we may be assured, that if it should be the good pleasure of Providence that this advancement in excellence shall take place, the practical principles of the government and its constitutional form, will be gradually moulded and modified into a state of adaptation to the then condition of mankind. I. Of the regal part of the British Constitution I would say little. The sovereign is, in a great degree, identified with an administration; and into the principles which would regulate ministerial conduct, the preceding chapters have attempted some enquiry. Yet it may be observed that, supposing ministerial influence to be "necessary" to the constitution, there appears considerable reason to think that its amount may be safely and rightly diminished. As this influence becomes needless in proportion to the actual rectitude of political measures; as there is some reason to hope that this rectitude is increasing; and as the public capacity to judge soundly of political measures is manifestly increasing also; it is probable that some portion of the influence of the crown might be given up, without any danger to the constitution or the public weal. And, waiving all reference to the essential moral character of influence, it is to be remembered, that no degree of it is defensible, even by the politician, but that which apparently subserves the reasonable purposes of government. It is recorded that in 1741, in Scotland, "sixteen peers were chosen literally according to the list transmitted from court."* Such a fact would convince a man, without further enquiry, that there must have been something very unsound in the ministerial politics of the day; or at any rate, (which is nearly the same thing,) something very discordant with the general mind. In 1793, and whilst, of course, the Irish Parliament existed, a bill was brought into that parlia ment to repeal some of the Catholic disabilities. This bill the "parliament loudly, indignantly, and resolutely rejected." A few months afterwards, a similar bill was introduced under the auspices of the government. Pitt had taken counsel of Burke, and wished to grant the Catholics relief: and when the viceroy's secretary accordingly brought in a bill, two members only opposed it; and at the second reading, it was opposed but by one vote. Now, whatever may be said of the "necessity" of ministerial influence for the purposes of state, nothing can be Smollett: Hist. England, v. 3, p. 71. said in favour of such influence as this. Every argument which would show its expediency, would show even more powerfully the impurity of the system which could require it. It is common to hear complaints of ministerial influence in parliament. "That kind of influence which the noble lord alludes to," said Fox in one of his speeches, "I shall ever deem unconstitutional; for by the influence of the crown, he means the influence of the crown in parliament." But, if it is concluded that influence is " necessary," it seems idle to complain of its exercise in the senate. Where should it be exerted with effect? Whether it be constitutional it is difficult to say, because it is difficult to define where constitutional acts end and unconstitutional acts begin. But, it may safely be concluded that, in such matters, questions of constitutional rectitude are little relevant. Influence you❘ say-and in a certain sense you say it truly-is necessary. To what purpose, then, can it be to complain of the exercise of that influence in those places in which only or principally it is effectual? It would be impossible for persons, with our views of political rectitude, to execute the office of minister upon any system that approached, in its character, to the present; but were it otherwise, I would advise a minister openly to avow the exercise of influence and to defend it. This were the frank, and I think the rational course. Why should a man affect secrecy or concealment about an act "politically necessary." I would not talk about disinterestedness and independence; but tell the world that influence was needful, and that I exerted it. Not that such an avowal would stop, or ought to stop, the complaints of virtuous men. The morality of politics is not so obscure but that thousands will always perceive that the exertion of influence and the submission to it, is morally vicious. This conflict will continue. Artifice and deception are "necessary" to a swindler, but all honest men know and feel that the artifice and deception are wrong. II. It appears to have been discovered, or assumed, in most free states, that it is expedient that there should be two deliberative assemblies, of which one shall, from its constitution, possess less of a democratical tendency than the other. Not that, in a purer state of society, two such assemblies would be necessary; but because, while separate individuals or separate classes of men pursue their peculiar interests, and are swayed by their peculiar prejudices, it is found needful to obstruct one class of interests and tendencies by another. Such a purpose is answered by the British House of Lords. The privileges of the members of this house are such as to offer considerable temptation to their political virtue. A body of men, whose eminence consists in artificial distinctions between them and the rest of the community, are likely to desire to make these distinctions needlessly great; and for that purpose to postpone the public welfare to the interests of an order. We all know that there is a collective as well as an individual ambition. It is a truth which a peer should habitually inculcate upon himself, that however rank and title may be conferred for the gratification of the possessor, the legislative privileges of a peer are to be held exclusively subservient to the general good. I use the word "exclusively " inits strictest sense: so that, if even the question should come, whether any part or the whole of the privileges of the peerage should be withdrawn, or the general good should be sacrificed, I should say that no reasonable question could exist respecting the proper alternative. Were I a peer, I should not think my Fell's Public Life of C. J. Fox. self at liberty to urge the privileges of my order in opposition to the public weal; for this were evidently to postpone the greater interests to the less. If rulers of all kinds, if civil government itself, are simply the officers of the nation, surely no one class of rulers is at liberty to put its pretensions in opposition to the national advantage. The love of title and of rank constitutes one of the great temptations of the political man. He can obtain them only from the crown; and it is not usual to bestow them except upon those who support the administration of the day. The intensity of the desire which some men feel for these distinctions, has a correspondently intense effect. Lord Chatham said, "that he had known men of great ambition for power and dominion, many whose characters were tarnished by glaring defects, some with many vices-who, nevertheless, could be prevailed upon to join in the best public measures; but the moment he found any man who had set himself down as a candidate for a peerage, he despaired of his ever being a friend to his country?"* This displays a curious political phenomenon. Can the reader give a better solution than the supposition that, in the love itself of title, there is something little and low, and that the minds which can be so anxious for it, are commonly too little and too low to sacrifice their hopes to friendship for their country?-Many who are not candidates for peerages, nevertheless look upon them with a wishing eye; and some who have attained to the lower honours of the order, are equally solicitous for advancement to the higher. So that even upon those on whom the temptation is not so powerful as that of which Chatham speaks-some temptation is laid;—a temptation of which it were idle to dispute that the aggregate effect is great. If, without reference to the existing state of Britain, a man should ask whether the legislators of a nation ought to be subjected to such temptationwhether it were a judicious political institution, I should answer, No; because I should judge that a legislative assembly ought to have no inducements or motives foreign to the general good. This appears to be so obviously true, that the necessity, if there be a necessity, for an assembly so constituted, only evinces how imperfect the political character of a people is. There would be no need for having recourse to an objectionable species of assembly, if it were not wanted to counteract or to effect purposes which a purely constituted assembly could not attain. In estimating the relative worthiness of objects of human pursuit, a peerage does not appear to rank high. I know not, indeed, how it happens that men contemplate it with so much complacency; and that so few are found who appear to doubt whether it is one of the most reasonable and worthy objects of human desire. A title! Only think what a title is, and what it is not. It is a thing which philosophy may reasonably hold cheap; a thing which partakes of the character of the tinsel watch, for which the new-breeched urchin looks with anxious eyes, and by which, when he has got it, he thinks he is made a greater man than before. If such be the character of title when brought into comparison with the dignity of man, what is it when it is compared with the dignity of the Christian? Nothing. It may be affirmed, without any apprehension of error, that the greater the degree in which any man is a Christian, the less will be his wish to be called a lord; and that when he attains to the "fulness of the stature" of a Christian man, no wish will remain.-If additional motives can be urged to reduce our ambition of title, • Quoted by Fox.-Fell's Memoirs. some, perhaps, may be found in considering the grounds upon which it has too frequently been conferred. Queen Anne, when once the ministry could not carry a measure in the upper house, made twelve new peers at once. These, of course, voted for the measure. What honourable and elevated mind would have purchased one of these titles at the expense of the caustic question which a member put when they were going to give their first vote-" Are you going to vote by your foreman ?" Whether the heads of a Christian church should possess seats in the legislature, is a question that has often been discussed-If a Christian bishop can attend to legislative affairs without infringing upon the time and attention which is due to his peculiar office, there appears nothing in that office which disqualifies him for legislative functions. The better a man is, the more, as a general rule, he is fit for a legislator; so that, assuming that bishops are peculiarly Christian men, it is not unfit that they should assist in the councils of the nation. Nevertheless, it must be conceded, that there is no peculiar congruity between the office of the Christian overseer and that of an agent in political affairs. They are not incompatible, indeed, but the connexion is not natural. Politics do not form the proper business of a Christian shepherd. They are wholly foreign to his proper business; and that retirement from the things of the world which Christianity requires of her ministers, and which she must be supposed peculiarly to require of her more elevated ministers, indicates the propriety of meddling but little in affairs of state. But, when it comes to be proposed that all the heads of a Christian church shall be selected for legislators, because they are heads of the church -the impropriety becomes manifest and great. To make a high religious office the qualification for a political office, is manifestly wrong. It may be found now and then that a good bishop is fit for a useful legislator-but because you have elevated a man to a more onerous and responsible office in the church, forthwith to superadd an onerous and responsible office in the state, is surely not to consult the dictates of Christianity or of reason. Nor is it rational or Christian forthwith to add a temporal peerage. If there be any one thing, not absolutely vicious, which is incongruous with the proper temper and character of an exalted shepherd of the flock, it is temporal splendour. Such splendour accords very well with the political character of the Romish church-but with Protestantism, with Christianity, it has no accordance. The splendours of title are utterly dissimilar in their character to the character of the heads of the church, as that character is indicated in the New Testament. How preposterous is the association in idea of "My Lord" with a Paul or a Barnabas!-The truth, indeed, is, that this species of fornication did not originate in religion nor in religious motives. It sprung up with the corruptions of the papacy; and in this, as in some other instances, we, who have purified the vicious doctrine, have clung to the vicious practice. To these considerations is to be added another: that the extent of jurisdiction which is assigned to the bishops of this country, is such as to occupy, if the office be rightly executed, a large portion of a bishop's time-a portion so large, that if he be exemplary as a bishop, he can hardly be exemplary as a legislator. If, as will perhaps be admitted, the diligent and conscientious pastor of an ordinary parish has a sufficient employment for his time, it cannot be supposed that a bishop has less. He who presides over hundreds of parishes and hundreds of pastors, and rightly presides over them, can surely find little time for attendance in the senate; espe cially when that attendance takes him, as it necessarily does, far away from the inferior shepherds and from the flocks.. But, when it comes to be considered that our bishops are the heads of an established church, we are presented with a very different field of enquiry. That which is not congruous with Christianity may be congruous with a religious establishment. Nor, in a religious establishment like that which obtains in England, would there, perhaps, be any propriety in dismissing bishops from the house of Lords. They have to watch over other interests than those of religion-political interests; and where shall they efficiently watch over them if they have no voice in political affairs? Bishops in this country have not merely to "feed the flock of God which is among them," but to take care that that flock and their shepherds retain their privileges and their supremacy: so that if I were asked, whether bishops ought to have a seat in the legislature, I should answerIf you mean by a bishop a head of a Christian church, he has other and better business :-if, by a bishop you mean the head of an established church, the question must be determined by the question of the rectitude of an established church itself. Without stopping to decide this question, it may be observed, that some serious mischiefs result from the institution as it exists. A bishop should be not only of unimpeachable, but, as far as may be, of untempted virtue. His office as a peer subjects him to great temptations. Bishops are more dependent upon the crown than any other class of peers, because vacancies for elevation in the church are continually occurring; and for these vacancies a bishop hopes. Since he cannot generally expect to obtain them by an opposition, however conscientious, to the minister of the day, he is placed in a situation which no good man ought to desire for himself; that of a powerful temptation to sacrifice his integrity to his interests. How frequently, or how far, that temptation prevails, I presume not to determine; but it is plain, whatever be the cause, that the minister can count upon the support of the bishops more confidently than upon any other class of peers. This is not the experience of one minister, or of two, but, in general language, of all. History states informally, and as an unquestioned circumstance, that "from the bench of bishops the court usually expects the greatest complaisance and submission."* I perceive nothing in the nature of the Christian office to induce this support of the minister of the day. I do not see why a Christian pastor should do this rather than a legislator of another station; for it will hardly be contended that there is so much goodness and purity in ministerial transactions, that a Christian pastor must support them because they are so pure and so good. What conclusion then remains, but that temptation is presented, and that it prevails? That this, simply regarded, is an evil no man can doubt; but let him remember that the evil is not necessarily incidental even to the legislating bishop. There may be bishops without solicitude for translations, for there may be a church without dependence on the Crown, or connexion with the state. Whilst this connexion and this dependence remains, I do not say that ecclesiastical pcers cannot be exempt from unworthy influence, but there is no hope of exemption in the present condition of mankind. The system which obtains in the House of Lords, of accepting proxies in divisions, appears strangely inconsistent with propriety and reason. It intimates utter contempt of the debates of the house, because Hume's England. |