because the great majority of mankind have access to Scripture only through the medium of translations. But in applying all these limitations to the absolute precepts of Scripture, it is to be remembered that we are not subjecting their authority to inferior principles. We are not violating the principle upon which these essays proceed, that the expression of the Divine Will is our ultimate law. We are only ascertaining what that expression is. If, after just and authorized examination, any precept should still appear to stand imperative in its absolute form, we accept it as obligatory in that form. Many such precepts there are; and being such, we allow no considerations of convenience, nor of expediency, nor considerations of any other kind, to dispense with their authority.

One great use of such enquiries as these, is to vindicate to the apprehensions of men the authority of the precepts themselves. It is very likely to happen, and to some negligent enquirers it does happen, that seeing a precept couched in unconditional language, which yet cannot be unconditionally obeyed, they call in question its general obligation. Their minds fix upon the idea of some consequences which would result from a literal obedience, and feeling assured that those consequences ought not to be undertaken, they set aside the precept itself. They are at little pains to enquire what the proper requisitions of the precept are glad, perhaps, of a specious excuse for not regarding it at all. The careless reader, perceiving that a literal compliance with the precept to give the cloak to him who takes a coat, would be neither proper nor right, rejects the whole precept of which it forms an illustration; and in doing this, rejects one of the most beautiful, and important, and sacred requisitions of the Christian law.*

The

There are two modes in which moral obligations are imposed in Scripture-by particular precepts, and by general rules. The one prescribes a duty upon one subject, the other upon very many. applicability of general rules is nearly similar to that of what is usually called the spirit of the gospel, the spirit of the moral law: which spirit is of very wide embrace in its application to the purposes of life. "In estimating the value of a moral rule, we are to have regard not only to the particular duty, but the general spirit; not only to what it directs us to do, but to the character which a compliance with its direction is likely to form in us." In this manner, some particular precepts become, in fact, general rules; and the duty that results from these rules, from this spirit, is as obligatory as that which is imposed by a specific injunction. Christianity requires us to maintain universal benevolence towards mankind; and he who, in his conduct towards another, disregards this benevolence, is as truly and sometimes as flagrantly a violator of the moral law, as if he had transgressed the command, " Thou shalt not steal." This doctrine is indeed recommended by a degree of utility that makes its adoption almost a necessity; because no number of specific precepts would be sufficient for the purposes of moral instruction: so that, if we were destitute of this species of general rules, we should frequently be destitute, so far as external precepts are concerned, of any. It appears by a note to the work which has just been cited, that in the Mussulman code, which proceeds upon the system of a precise rule for a precise question, there have been promulgated seventy-five thousand precepts. I regard the wide practical applicability of some of the Christian precepts as an argument of great wisdom. They impose many duties

in few words; or rather, they convey a great mass of moral instruction within a sentence that all may remember and that few can mistake. "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them,"* is of greater utility in the practice of life, and is applicable to more circumstances, than a hundred rules which presented the exact degree of kindness or assistance that should be afforded in prescribed cases. The Mosaic law, rightly regarded, conveyed many clear expositions of human duty; yet the quibbling and captious scribes of old found, in the literalities of that law, more plausible grounds for evading its duties, than can be found in the precepts of the Christian Scriptures.

There are a few precepts of which the application is so extensive in human affairs, that I would, in conformity with some of the preceding remarks, briefly enquire into their practical obligation. Of these, that which has just been quoted for another purpose, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them,"† is perhaps cited and recommended more frequently than any other. The difficulty of applying this precept has induced some to reject it as containing a moral maxim which is not sound: but perhaps it will be found, that the deficiency is not in the rule but in the non-applicability of the cases to which it has often been applied. It is not applicable when the act which another would that we should do to him, is in itself unlawful or adverse to some other portion of the Moral Law. If I seize a thief in the act of picking a pocket, he undoubtedly "would" that I should let him go; and I, if our situations were exchanged, should wish it too. But I am not therefore to release him; because, since it is a Christian obligation upon the magistrate to punish offenders, the obligation descends to me to secure them for punishment. Besides, in every such case I must do as I would be done unto with respect to all parties concerned-the public as well as the thief. The precept, again, is not applicable when the desire of the second party is such as a Christian cannot lawfully indulge. An idle and profligate man asks me to give him money. It would be wrong to indulge such a man's desire, and therefore the precept does not apply.

The reader will perhaps say; that a person's duties in such cases are sufficiently obvious without the gravity of illustration. Well-but are the principles upon which the duties are ascertained "thus obvious? This is the important point. In the affairs of life, many cases arise in which a person has to refer to such principles as these, and in which, if he does not apply the right principles, he will transgress the Christian law. The law appears to be in effect this, Do as you would be done unto, except in those instances in which to act otherwise is permitted by Christianity. Inferior grounds of limitation are often applied; and they are always wrong; because they always subject the Moral Law to suspension by inferior authorities. To do this, is to reject the authority of the Divine Will, and to place this beautiful expression of that Will at the mercy of every man's inclination.

"Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." I have heard of the members of some dinner club who had been recommended to consider this precept, and who, in their discussions over the bottle, thought perhaps that they were arguing soundly when they held language like this: "Am I, in lifting this glass to my mouth, to do it for the purpose of bringing glory to God!

one another. He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore Love is the fulfilling of the law." It is not therefore surprising that after an enumeration, in another place, of various duties, the same dignified apostle says, "Above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness." The inculcation of this Benevolence is as frequent in the Christian Scriptures as its practical utility is great. He who will look through the volume will find that no topic is so frequently introduced, no obligation so emphatically enforced, no virtue to which the approbation of God is so specially promised. It is the theme of all the "apostolic exhortations, that with which their morality begins and ends, from which all their details and enumerations set out and into which they return." § "He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him."|| More emphatical language cannot be employed. It exalts to the utmost the character of the virtue, and, in effect, promises its possessor the utmost favour and felicity. If then, of Faith, Hope, and Love, Love be the greatest; if it be by the test of love that our pretensions to Christianity are to be tried; if all the relative duties of morality are embraced in one word, and that word is Love; it is obviously needful that, in a book like this, the requisitions of Benevolence should be habitually regarded in the prosecution of its enquiries. And accordingly the reader will sometimes be invited to sacrifice inferior considerations to these requisitions, and to give to the law of Love that paramount station in which it has been placed by the authority of God.

It is certain that almost every offence against the relative duties, has its origin, if not in the malevolent propensities, at least in those propensities which are incongruous with love. I know not whether it is possible to disregard any one obligation that espects the intercourse of man with man, without violating this great Christian law. This universal applicability may easily be illustrated by referring to the obligations of Justice, obligations which, in civilized communities, are called into operation more frequently than almost any other. He who estimates the obligations of justice by a reference to that Benevolence which Christianity prescribes, will form to himself a much more pure and perfect standard than he who refers to the law of the land, to the apprehension of exposure, or to the desire of reputation. There are many ways in which a man can be unjust without censure from the public, and without violating the laws; but there is no way in which he can be unjust without disregarding Christian Benevolence. It is an universal and very sensitive test. He Rom. xiii. 9.

John xiii. 35. Col. iii. 14. 1 John iv. 16.

Evid. Christianity, p. 2, c. 2.

who does regard it, who uniformly considers whether his conduct towards another is consonant with pure good-will, cannot be voluntarily unjust; nor can he who commits injustice do it without the consciousness, if he will reflect, that he is violating the law of Love. That integrity which is founded upon Love, when compared with that which has any other basis, is recommended by its honour and dignity as well as by its rectitude. It is more worthy the man as well as the Christian, more beautiful in the eye of infidelity as well as of religior.

It were easy, if it were necessary, to show in what manner the law of Benevolence applies to other relative duties, and in what manner, when applied, it purifies and exalts the fulfilment of them. But our present business is with principles rather than with their specific application.

It is obvious that the obligations of this Benevolence are not merely prohibitory-directing us to avoid "working ill" to another, but mandatoryrequiring us to do him good. That benevolence which is manifested only by doing no evil, is indeed of a very questionable kind. To abstain from injustice, to abstain from violence, to abstain from slander, is compatible with an extreme deficiency of love. There are many who are neither slanderous, nor ferocious, nor unjust, who have yet very little regard for the benevolence of the gospel. In the illustra tions therefore of the obligations of morality, whether private or political, it will sometimes become our business to state, what this Benevolence requires as well as what it forbids. The legislator whose laws are contrived only for the detection and punishment of offenders, fulfils but half his duty: if he would conform to the Christian standard, he must provide also for their reformation.

CHAPTER VI.

THE IMMEDIATE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

Conscience-Its nature-Its authority-Review of opinions respecting a moral sense-Bishop Butler-Lord BaconLord Shaftesbury -Watts- Voltaire - Locke - SoutheyAdam Smith-Paley-Rousseau - Milton- Judge HaleMarcus Antoninus-Epictetus-Seneca-Paul-That every human being possesses a moral law-Pagans-Gradations of light-Prophecy-The immediate communication of the Divine Will perpetual-Of national vices: Infanticide: Duelling-Of savage life.

THE reader is solicited to approach this subject with that mental seriousness which its nature requires. Whatever be his opinions upon the subject, whether he believes in the reality of such communication or not, he ought not even to think respecting it but with feelings of seriousness.

In endeavouring to investigate this reality, it becomes especially needful to distinguish the communication of the Will of God from those mental phenomena with which it has very commonly been intermingled and confounded. The want of this distinction has occasioned a confusion which has been

greatly injurious to the cause of truth. It has occasioned great obscurity of opinion respecting divine instruction; and by associating error with truth, has frequently induced scepticism respecting the truth itself. When an intelligent person perceives that infallible truth or divine authority is described as belonging to the dictates of "Conscience," and when he perceives, as he must perceive, that these dictates are various and sometimes contradictory; he is in danger of concluding that no unerring and no divine guidance is accorded to man.

Upon this serious si bject it is therefore peculiarly

necessary to endeavour to attain distinct ideas, and to employ those words only which convey distinct ideas to other men. The first section of the present chapter will accordingly be devoted to some brief observations respecting the Conscience, its nature, and its authority; by which it is hoped the reader will see sufficient reason to distinguish its dictates from that higher guidance, respecting which it is the object of the present chapter to enquire.

For a kindred purpose, it appears requisite to offer a short review of popular and philosophical opinions respecting a Moral Sense. These opinions will be found to have been frequently expressed in great indistinctness and ambiguity of language. The purpose of the writer in referring to these opinions, is to enquire whether they do not generally involve a recognition-obscurely perhaps, but still a recognition-of the principle, that God communicates his will to the mind. If they do this, and if they do it without design or consciousness, no trifling testimony is afforded to the truth of the principle: for how should this principle thus secretly recommend itself to the minds of men, except by the influence of its own evidence?

SECTION I.

CONSCIENCE, ITS NATURE AND AUTHORITY.

In the attempt to attach distinct notions to the term "Conscience," we have to request the reader not to estimate the accuracy of our observations by the notions which he may have habitually connected with the word. Our disquisition is not about terms but truths. If the observations are in themselves just, our principal object is attained. The secondary object, that of connecting truth with appropriate terms, is only so far attainable by a writer, as shall be attained by an uniform employment of words in determinate senses in his own practice.

Men possess notions of right and wrong; they possess a belief that, under given circumstances, they ought to do one thing or to forbear another. This belief I would call a conscientious belief. And when such a belief exists in a man's mind in reference to a number of actions, I would call the sum or aggregate of his notions respecting what is right and wrong, his Conscience.

To possess notions of right and wrong in human conduct-to be convinced that we ought to do or to forbear an action-implies and supposes a sense of obligation existent in the mind. A man who feels that it is wrong for him to do a thing, possesses a sonse of obligation to refrain. Into the origin of this sense of obligation, or how it is induced into the mind, we do not enquire: it is sufficient for our purpose that it exists; and there is no reason to doubt that its existence is consequent of the will of God.

and wrong, that that judgment should be in strict accordance with the Moral Law. Some men's consciences dictate that which the Moral Law does not enjoin; and this law enjoins some points which are not enforced by every man's conscience. This is precisely the result which, from the nature of the case, it is reasonable to expect. Of these judgments respecting what is right, with which the sense of obligation becomes from time to time connected, some are induced by the instructions or example of others; some by our own reflection or enquiry; some perhaps from the written law of revelation; and some, as we have cause to conclude, from the direct intimations of the Divine Will.

It is manifest that if the sense of obligation is sometimes connected with subjects that are proposed to us merely by the instruction of others, or if the connexion results from the power of association and habit, or from the fallible investigations of our own minds-that sense of obligation will be connected, in different individuals, with different subjects. So that it may sometimes happen that a man can say, I conscientiously think I ought to do a certain action, and yet that his neighbour can say, I conscientiously think the contrary. "With respect to particular actions, opinion determines whether they are good or ill; and Conscience approves or disapproves, in consequence of this determination, whether it be in favour of truth or falsehood."

Such considerations enable us to account for the diversity of the dictates of the conscience in individuals respectively. A person is brought up amongst Catholics, and is taught from his childhood that flesh ought not to be eaten in Lent. The arguments of those around him, or perhaps their authority, satisfy him that what he is taught is truth. The sense of obligation thus becomes connected with a refusal to eat flesh in Lent; and thenceforth he says that the abstinence is dictated by his conscience. A Protestant youth is taught the contrary. Argument or authority satisfies him that flesh may lawfully be eaten every day in the year. His sense of obligation therefore is not connected with the abstinence; and thenceforth he says that eating flesh in Lent does not violate his conscience. And so of a multitude of other questions.

When therefore a person says, my conscience dictates to me that I ought to perform such an action, he means-or in the use of such language he ought to mean-that the sense of obligation which subsists in his mind, is connected with that action; that, so far as his judgment is enlightened, it is a requisition of the law of God.

But not all our opinions respecting morality and religion are derived from education or reasoning. He who finds in Scripture the precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," derives an opinion respecting the duty of loving others from the discovery of this expression of the Will of God. sense of obligation is connected with benevolence towards others in consequence of this discovery; or, in other words, his understanding has been informed

His

It is found that this sense of obligation is sometimes connected, in the minds of separate individuals, with different actions. One man thinks he ought to do a thing from which another thinks he ought to forbear. Upon the great questions of morality there is indeed, in general, a congruity of human judgment; yet subjects do arise respecting which one man's conscience dictates an act different from that which is dictated by another's. It is not therefore essential to a conscientious judgment of right

which are dictated by his conscience. Thus it is that Scripture, by informing the judgment, extends the jurisdiction of conscience; and it is hence, in part, that in those who seriously study the Scriptures, the conscience appears so much more vigilant and operative than in many who do not possess, or do not regard them. Many of the mistakes which education introduces, many of the fallacies to which our own speculations lead us, are corrected by this law. In the case of our Catholic, if a reference to

Adventurer; No. 91.

Scripture should convince him that the judgment he has formed respecting abstinence from flesh is not founded on the Law of God, the sense of obligation becomes detached from its subject; and thenceforth his conscience ceases to dictate that he should abstain from flesh in Lent. Yet Scripture does not decide every question respecting human duty, and in some instances individuals judge differently of the decisions which Scripture gives. This, again, occasions some diversity in the dictates of the Conscience; it occasions the sense of obligation to become connected with dissimilar, and possibly incompatible, actions.

But another portion of men's judgments respecting moral affairs is derived from immediate intimations of the Divine Will. (This we must be allowed for the present to assume.) These intimations inform sometimes the judgment; correct its mistakes; and increase and give distinctness to our knowledge -thus operating, as the Scriptures operate, to connect the sense of obligation more accurately with those actions which are conformable with the Will of God. It does not, however, follow, by any sort of necessity, that this higher instruction must correct all the mistakes of the judgment; that because it imparts some light, that light must be perfect day; that because it communicates some moral or religious truth, it must communicate all the truths of religion and morality. Nor, again, does it follow that individuals must each receive the same access of knowledge. It is evidently as possible that it should be communicated in different degrees to different individuals, as that it should be communicated at all. For which plain reasons we are still to expect, what in fact we find, that although the judgment receives light from a superhuman intelligence, the degree of that light varies in individuals; and that the sense of obligation is connected with fewer subjects, and attended with less accuracy, in the minds of some men than of others.

With respect to the authority which properly belongs to Conscience as a director of individual conduct, it appears manifest, alike from reason and from Scripture, that it is great. When a man believes, upon due deliberation, that a certain action is right, that action is right to him. And this is true, whether the action be or be not required of mankind by the Moral Law.* The fact that in his mind the sense of obligation attaches to the act, and that he has duly deliberated upon the accuracy of his judgment, makes the dictate of his Conscience upon that subject an authoritative dictate. The individual is to be held guilty if he violates his Conscience-if he does one thing, whilst his sense of obligation is directed to its contrary. Nor, if his judgment should not be accurately informed, if his sense of obligation should not be connected with a proper subject, is the guilt of violating his Conscience taken away. Were it otherwise, a person might be held virtuous for acting in opposition to his apprehensions of duty; or guilty, for doing what he believed to be right. "It is happy for us that our title to the character of virtuous beings, depends not upon the justness of our opinions or the constant objective rectitude of all we do, but upon the conformity of our actions to the sincere convictions of our minds.'t Dr Furneaux says, "To secure the favour of God and the rewards of true religion, we must follow our own consciences and judgments according to the best light we can attain." And I am especially disposed to add the testimony of Sir William Temple, because

"By Conscience all men are restrained from intentional ill-it infallibly directs us to avoid guilt, but is not intended to secure us from error."-Advent. No. 91. + Dr Price. Essay on Toleration, p. 8.

he recognizes the doctrine which has just been advanced, that our judgments are enlightened by superhuman agency. "The way to our future happiness must be left, at last, to the impressions made upon every man's belief and conscience either by natural or supernatural arguments and means."*-Accordingly there appears no reason to doubt that some will stand convicted in the sight of the Omniscient Judge, for actions which his Moral Law has not forbidden; and that some may be uncondemned for actions which that law does not allow. The distinction here is the same as that to which we have before had occasion to allude, between the desert of the agent and the quality of the act. Of this distinction an illustration is contained in Isaiah x. It was the divine will that a certain specific course of action should be pursued in punishing the Israelites. For the performance of this, the king of Assyria was employed:-" I will give him a charge to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets." This charge the Assyrian monarch fulfilled; he did the will of God; but then his intention was criminal; he "meant not so:" and therefore, when the "whole work" is performed, "I will punish," says the Almighty, "the fruit of the stout heart of the king of Assyria, and the glory of his high looks."

One

But it was said that these principles respecting the authority of Conscience were recognized in Scripture. One believeth that he may eat all things: another who is weak eateth herbs. man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike." Here, then, are differences, nay, contrarieties of conscientious judgments. And what are the parties directed severally to do?" Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" that is, let the full persuasion of his own mind be every man's rule of action. The situation of these parties was, that one perceived the truth upon the subject, and the other did not; that in one the sense of obligation was connected with an accurate, in the other with an inaccurate, opinion. Thus, again:-" I know, and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself;" therefore, absolutely speaking, it is lawful to eat all things; "but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean." The question is not, whether his judgment was correct, but what that judgment actually was. To the doubter, the uncleanness, that is, the sin of eating, was certain, though the act was right. Again: "All things indeed are pure; but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence." And, again, as a general rule: "He that doubteth is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin."+

And here we possess a sufficient answer to those who affect to make light of the authority of Conscience, and exclaim, "Every man pleads his conscientious opinions, and that he is bound in conscience to do this or that; and yet his neighbour makes the same plea and urges the same obligation to do just the contrary. But what then? These persons' judgments differed: that we might expect, for they are fallible; but their sense of obligation was, in each case, really attached to its subject, and was in each case authoritative.

One observation remains; that although a man ought to make his conduct conform to his conscience, yet he may sometimes justly be held criminal for the errors of his opinion. Men often judge amiss respecting their duties in consequence of their own faults: some take little pains to ascertain the truth;