practical doctrine of Wollaston. His theory is, that moral good and evil consist in a conformity or disagreement with truth" in treating every thing as being what it is." But then he says, that to act by this rule" must be agreeable to the Will of God, and if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it, and, since there must be perfect rectitude in his will, certainly wrong." It is the same with Dr Paley in his far-famed doctrine of Expediency. "It is the utility of any action alone which constitutes the obligation of it;" but this very obligation is deduced from the Divine Benevolence; from which it is attempted to show, that a regard to utility is enforced by the Will of God. Nay, he says expressly, "Every duty is a duty towards God, since it is his will which makes it a duty."+

Now there is much value in these testimonies, direct or indirect, to the truth-that the Will of God is the Standard of Right and Wrong. The indirect testimonies are perhaps the more valuable of the two. He who gives undesigned evidence in favour of a proposition, is less liable to suspicion in his motives.

But, whilst we regard these testimonies, and such as these, as containing satisfactory evidence that the Will of God is our Moral Law, the intelligent enquirer will perceive that many of the proposed Theories are likely to lead to uncertain and unsatisfactory conclusions respecting what that Will requires. They prove that His Will is the Standard, but they do not clearly inform us how we shall bring our actions into juxtaposition with it.

tures in which important decisions must instantly be made, the computation of tendencies to general happiness is wholly impracticable.

Besides these objections which apply to the systems separately, there is one which applies to them all-That they do not refer us directly to the Will of God. They interpose a medium; and it is the inevitable tendency of all such mediums to render the truth uncertain. They depend not indeed upon hearsay evidence, but upon something of which the tendency is the same. They seek the Will of God not from positive evidence but by implication; and we repeat the truth, that every medium that is interposed between the Divine Will and our estimates of it, diminishes the probability that we shall estimate it rightly.

These are considerations which, antecedently to all others, would prompt us to seek the Will of God directly and immediately; and it is evident that this direct and immediate knowledge of the Divine Will, can in no other manner be possessed than by his own Communication of it.

THE COMMUNICATION OF THE WILL OF GOD.

That a direct communication of the Will of the

Deity respecting the conduct which mankind shall pursue, must be very useful to them, can need little proof. It is sufficiently obvious that they who have had no access to the written revelations, have com

and wrong.

A second proposes Sympathy, regulated indeed and restrained, but still Sympathy. However ingenious a philosophical system may be, I believe that good men find, in the practice of life, that these emotions are frequently unsafe, and sometimes erroneous guides of their conduct. Besides, the emotions are to be regulated and restrained; which of itself intimates the necessity of a regulating and restraining, that is, of a superior power.

To say we should act according to the "eternal and necessary differences of things," is to advance a proposition which nine persons out of ten do not understand, and of course cannot adopt in practice; and of those who do understand it, peruaps an equal majority cannot apply it, with even tolerable facility, to the concerns of life. Why indeed should a writer propose these eternal differences, if he acknowledges that the rules of conduct which result from them are "the express will and command of

God?"

To the system of a fourth, which says that virtue consists in a "conformity of our actions with truth," the objection presents itself what is truth? or how, in the complicated affairs of life, and in the moment perhaps of sudden temptation, shall the individual discover what truth is?

Similar difficulties arise in applying the doctrine of Utility in "adjusting our actions so as to promote, in the greatest degree, the happiness of mankind." It is obviously difficult to apply this doctrine in practice. The welfare of mankind depends upon circumstances which, if it were possible, it is not easy to foresee. Indeed in many of those conjuncReligion of Nature Delineated. Moral and Political Philosophy.

tue," because "they wanted the light of revelation." Yet these men were inquisitive and acute, and it may be supposed they would have discovered moral truth if sagacity and inquisitiveness had been sufficient for the task. But it is unquestionable, that there are many ploughmen in this country, who possess more accurate knowledge of morality than all the sages of antiquity. We do not indeed sufficiently consider for how much knowledge respecting the Divine Will we are indebted to his own Communication of it. "Many arguments, many truths, both moral and religious, which appear to us the products of our understandings and the fruits of ratiocination, are in reality nothing more than emanations from Scripture; rays of the Gospel imperceptibly transmitted, and as it were conveyed to our minds in a side light." Of Lord Herbert's book, De Veritate, which was designed to disprove the validity of Revelation, it is observed by the editor of his " Life," that it is "a book so strongly embued with the light of revelation relative to the moral virtues and a future life, that no man ignorant of the Scriptures or of the knowledge derived from them, could have written it." A modern system of moral philosophy is founded upon the duty of doing good to man, because it appears, from the benevolence of God himself, that such is his Will. Did those philosophers then, who had no access to the written expression of his will, discover with any distinctness this seem

ingly obvious benevolence of God? No. "The heathens failed of drawing that deduction relating to morality, to which, as we should now judge, the most obvious parts of natural knowledge, and such 2s certainly obtained among them, were sufficient to lead them, namely, the goodness of God." -We are, I say, much more indebted to revelation for moral

and passions of mankind, is more tight than they are willing to bear. Respecting some of these precepts we feel as the rich man of old felt: we hear the injunction and go away, if not with sorrow yet without obedience. Here again is an obvious motive to the writer to endeavour to substitute some less rigid rule of conduct, and an obvious motive to the reader to acquiesce in it as true without a very rigid scrutiny into its foundation. To adhere with fidelity to the expressed Will of Heaven, requires greater confidence in God than most men are willing to repose, or than most moralists are willing to recommend.

But whatever have been the causes, the fact is indisputable, that few or none of the systems of morality which have been offered to the world, have uniformly and consistently applied the communicated Will of God in determination of those questions to which it is applicable. Some insist upon its supreme authority in general terms; others apply it in determining some questions of rectitude: but where is the work that applies it always? Where is the moralist who holds every thing, Ease, Interest, Reputation, Expediency, Honour, "-personal and national,-in subordination to this Moral Law?

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One source of ambiguity and of error in moral philosophy, has consisted in the indeterminate use of the term, "the Will of God." It is used without reference to the mode by which that will is to be discovered-and it is in this mode that the essence of the controversy lies. We are agreed that the Will of God is to be our rule: the question at issue is, What mode of discovering it should be primarily adopted? Now the term, the "Will of God," has been applied, interchangeably, to the precepts of Scripture, and to the deductions which have been made from other principles. The consequence has been that the imposing sanction," the Will of God," has been applied to propositions of very different authority.

To enquire into the validity of all those principles which have been proposed as the standard of rectitude, would be foreign to the purpose of this essay. That principle which appears to be most recommended by its own excellence and beauty, and which obtains the greatest share of approbation in the world, is the principle of directing "every action so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power." The particular forms of defining the doctrine are various, but they may be conveniently included in the one general term—Expediency.

We say that the apparent beauty and excellence of this rule of action are so captivating, its actual acceptance in the world is so great, and the reasonings by which it is supported are so acute, that if it can be shown that this rule is not the ultimate standard of right and wrong, we may safely conclude that none other which philosophy has proposed can make pretensions to such authority. The truth indeed is, that the objections to the doctrine of expediency will generally be found to apply to every doctrine which lays claim to moral supremacy-which application the reader is requested to make for himself as he passes along.

Respecting the principle of Expediency-the doctrine that we should, in every action, endeavour to produce the greatest sum of human happiness-let it always be remembered that the only question is, whether it ought to be the paramount rule of human conduct. No one doubts whether it ought to influence us, or whether it is of great importance in estimating the duties of morality. The sole question is this: When an expression of the Will of God, and our calculations respecting human happiness, lead to different conclusions respecting the rec

titude of an action-whether of the two shall we prefer and obey?

We are concerned only with Christian writers. Now, when we come to analyze the principles of the Christian advocates of Expediency, we find precisely the result which we should expect a perpetual vacillation between two irreconcilable doctrines. As Christians, they necessarily acknowledge the authority, and, in words at least, the supreme authority of the Divine Law: as advocates of the universal application of the law of Expediency, they necessarily sometimes set aside the Divine Law, because they sometimes cannot deduce, from both laws, the same rule of action. Thus there is induced a continual fluctuation and uncertainty both in principles and in practical rules: a continual endeavour to serve two masters."

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Of these fluctuations an example is given in the article, "Moral Philosophy," in Rees's Encyclopædia-an article in which the principles of Hartley are in a considerable degree adopted. "The Scripture precepts," says the writer, "are in themselves the rule of life."- "The supposed tendency of actions can never be put against the law of God as delivered to us by revelation, and should not therefore be made our chief guide." This is very explicit. Yet the same article says, that the first great rule is, that we should aim to direct every action so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power." This rule, however, is somewhat difficult of application, and therefore "instead of this most general rule we must substitute others, less general, and subordinate to it:" of which subordinate rules, to "obey the Scripture precepts" is one !— I do not venture to presume that these writers do really mean what their words appear to meanthat the law of God is supreme and yet that it is subordinate; but one thing is perfectly clear, that either they make the vain attempt "to serve two masters," or that they employ language very laxly and very dangerously.

The high language of Dr Paley respecting Expediency as a paramount law, is well known :"Whatever is expedient is right." *- "The obligation of every law depends upon its ultimate utility."+"It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it." Perjury, Robbery, and Murder, "are not useful, and for that reason, and that reason only, are not right."§ It is obvious that this language affirms that utility is a higher authority than the expressed Will of God. If the utility of a moral rule alone constitutes the obligation of it, then is its obligation not constituted by the divine command. If murder is wrong only because it is not useful, it is not wrong because God has said, "Thou shalt not kill."

But Paley was a Christian, and therefore could neither formally displace the Scripture precepts from their station of supremacy, nor avoid formally acknowledging that they were supreme. Accordingly he says, "There are two methods of coming at the Will of God on any point: First-By his express declarations, when they are to be had, and which must be sought for in Scripture." || Secondly-By Expediency. And again, When Scripture precepts

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are clear and positive, there is an end to all further deliberation." This makes the expressed Will of God the final standard of right and wrong. And here is the vacillation, the attempt to serve two masters of which we speak: for this elevation of the express declarations of God to the supremacy, is abso

lutely incompatible with the doctrines that are quoted in the preceding paragraph.

*

These incongruities of principle are sometimes brought into operation in framing practical rules. In the chapter on Suicide it is shown that Scripture disallows the act. Here then we might conclude that there was "an end to all further deliberation;" and yet, in the same chapter, we are told that suicide would nevertheless be justifiable if it were expedient. Respecting Civil Obedience he says, the Scriptures "inculcate the duty" and "enforce the obligation;" but notwithstanding this, he pronounces that the "only ground of the subjects' obligation" consists in Expediency. If it consists only in expediency, the divine law upon the subject is a dead letter. In one chapter he says that murder would be right if it was useful; † in another, that "one word" of prohibition "from Christ is final." The words of Christ cannot be final, if we are afterwards to enquire whether murder is "useful" or not. One other illustration will suffice. In laying down the rights of the magistrate, as to making laws respecting religion, he makes Utility the ultimate standard; so that whatever the magistrate thinks it useful to ordain, that he has a right to ordain. But in stating the subjects' duties as to obeying laws respecting religion, he makes the commands of God the ultimate standard.$ The consequence is inevitable, that it is right for the magistrate to command an act, and right for the subject to refuse to obey it. In a sound system of morality such contradictions would be impossible. There is a contradiction even in terms. In one place he says, "Wherever there is a right in one person there is a corresponding obligation upon others."||| In another place, "The right of the magistrate to ordain and the obligation of the subject to obey, in matters of religion, may be very different."P

Perhaps the reader will say that these inconsistencies, however they may impeach the skilfulness of the writer, do not prove that his system is unsound, or that Utility is not still the ultimate standard of rectitude. We answer, that to a Christian writer such inconsistencies are unavoidable. He is obliged, in conformity with the principles of his religion, to acknowledge the divine, and therefore the supreme authority of Scripture; and if, in addition to this, he assumes that any other is supreme, inconsistency must ensue. For the same consequence follows the adoption of any other ultimate standard-whether sympathy, or right reason, or eternal fitness, or nature.

If the writer is a Christian he cannot, without falling into inconsistencies, assert the supremacy of any of these principles: that is to say, when the precepts of Scripture dictate one action, and a reasoning from his principle dictates another, he must make his election: If he prefers his principle, Christianity is abandoned: if he prefers Scripture, his principle is subordinate: if he alternately prefers the one and the other, he falls into the vacillation and inconsistency of which we speak.

Bearing still in mind that the rule "to endeavour to produce the greatest happiness in our power," is objectionable only when it is made an ultimate rule, the reader is invited to attend to these short considerations.

I. In computing human happiness, the advocate of Expediency does not sufficiently take into the account our happiness in futurity. Nor indeed does he always take it into account at all. One definition says, "The test of the morality of an act is its tendency to promote the temporal advantage of the greatest number in the society to which we belong."

Now many things may be very expedient if death were annihilation, which may be very inexpedient now and therefore it is not unreasonable to expect, nor an unreasonable exercise of humility to act upon the expectation, that the divine laws may sometimes impose obligations of which we do not perceive the expediency or the use. "It may so fall out," says Hooker, "that the reason why some laws of God were given, is neither opened nor possible to be gathered by the wit of man."* And Pearson says, "There are many parts of morality, as taught by revelation, which are entirely independent of an accurate knowledge of nature."† And Gisborne, "Our experience of God's dispensations by no means permits us to affirm, that he always thinks fit to act in such a manner as is productive of particular expediency; much less to conclude that he wills us always to act in such a manner as we suppose would be productive of it."‡ All this sufficiently indicates that Expediency is wholly inadmissible as an ultimate rule.

II. The doctrine is altogether unconnected with the Christian revelation, or with any revelation from heaven. It was just as true, and the deductions from it just as obligatory, two or five thousand years ago as now. The alleged supreme law of morality"Whatever is expedient is right"-might have been taught by Epictetus as well as by a modern Christian. But are we then to be told that the revelations from the Deity have conveyed no moral knowledge to man? that they make no act obligatory which was not obligatory before? that he who had the fortune to discover that "whatever is expedient is right," possessed a moral law just as perfect as that which God has ushered into the world, and much more comprehensive?

III. If some subordinate rule of conduct were proposed-some principle which served as an auxiliary moral guide-I should not think it a valid objection to its truth, to be told that no sanction of the principle was to be found in the written revelation: but if some rule of conduct were proposed as being of universal obligation, some moral principle which was paramount to every other-and I discovered that this principle was unsanctioned by the written revelation, I should think this want of sanction was conclusive evidence against it: because it is not credible that a revelation from God, of which one great object was to teach mankind the moral law of God, would have been silent respecting a rule of conduct which was to be an universal guide to man. We apply these considerations to the doctrine of Expediency: Scripture contains not a word upon the subject.

IV. The principles of Expediency necessarily proceed upon the supposition that we are to investigate the future, and this investigation is, as every one knows, peculiarly without the limits of human sagacity: an objection which derives additional force from the circumstance that an action, in order to be expedient, "must be expedient on the whole, at the long run, in all its effects, collateral and remote."§ I do not knew whether, if a man should sit down expressly to devise a moral principle which should be uncertain and difficult in its application, he could devise one that would be more difficult and uncertain than this. So that, as Dr Paley himself acknowledges, "It is impossible to ascertain every duty by an immediate reference to public utility." The reader may therefore conclude with Dr Johnson, that "by presuming to determine what is fit and what is beneficial, they presuppose more knowledge