the other, by receiving instructions from those whom his father commissions to teach him. The parent may appoint a governor, and enjoin, that upon all questions of a certain kind the son shall conform to his instructions; and if the son does this, he as truly and really performs his father's will, and as strictly makes that will the guide of his conduct, as if he received the instructions immediately from his parent. But if the father have laid down certain general rules for his son's observance, as that he shall devote ten hours a-day to study, and not lessalthough the governor should recommend or even command him to devote fewer hours, he may not comply; for if he does, the governor, and not his father, is his supreme guide. The subordination is destroyed.

This case illustrates, perhaps, with sufficient precision, the situation of mankind with respect to moral rules. Our Creator has given direct laws, some general and some specific. These are of final authority. But he has also sanctioned, or permitted an application to, other rules; and in conforming to these, so long as we hold them in subordination to his laws, we perform his will.

Of these subordinate rules it were possible to enumerate many. Perhaps, indeed, few principles have been proposed as "The fundamental Rules of Virtue," which may not rightly be brought into use by the Christian in regulating his conduct in life: for the objection to many of these principles is, not so much that they are useless, as that they are unwarranted as paramount laws. Sympathy" may be of use, and " Nature " may be of use, and "Selflove," and "Benevolence ;" and to those who know what it means, "Eternal fitnesses too."

Some of the subordinate rules of conduct it will be proper hereafter to notice, in order to discover, if we can, how far their authority extends, and where it ceases. The observations that we shall have to offer upon them may conveniently be made under these heads: The Law of the Land, The Law of Nature, The Promotion of Human Happiness or Expediency, The Law of Nations, The Law of Honour.

These observations will, however, necessarily be preceded by an enquiry into the great principles of human duty as they are delivered in Scripture, and into the reality of that communication of the Divine Will to the mind, which the reader has been requested to allow us to assume.

CHAPTER IV.

COLLATERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The reader is requested to regard the present chapter as parenthetical. The parenthesis is inserted here, because the writer does not know where more appropriately to place it.

IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS.

Identical authority of moral and religious obligations-The Divine attributes-Of deducing rules of human duty from a consideration of the attributes of God-Virtue: "Virtue is conformity with the standard of rectitude"-Motives of action.

THIS identity is a truth to which we do not sufficiently advert either in our habitual sentiments or in our practice. There are many persons who speak of religious duties, as if there was something

sacred or imperative in their obligation that does not belong to duties of morality-many, who would perhaps offer up their lives rather than profess a belief in a false religious dogma, but who would scarcely sacrifice an hour's gratification rather than violate the moral law of love. It is therefore of importance to remember that the authority which imposes moral obligations and religious obligations is one and the same-1 -the Will of God. Fidelity to God is just as truly violated by a neglect of his moral laws, as by a compromise of religious principles. Religion and Morality are abstract terms, employed to indicate different classes of those duties which the Deity has imposed upon mankind; but they are all imposed by Him, and all are enforced by equal authority. Not indeed that the violation of every particular portion of the Divine Will involves equal guilt, but that each violation is equally a disregard of the Divine Authority. Whether, therefore, fidelity be required to a point of doctrine or of practice, to theology or to morals, the obligation is the same. It is the Divine requisition which constitutes this obligation, and not the nature of the duty required; so that, whilst I think a Protestant does no more than his duty when he prefers death to a profession of the Roman Catholic faith, I think also that every Christian who believes that Christ has prohibited swearing, does no more than his duty when he prefers death to taking an oath.

I would especially solicit the reader to bear in mind this principle of the identity of the authority of moral and religious obligations, because he may otherwise imagine that, in some of the subsequent pages, the obligation of a moral law is too strenuously insisted on, and that fidelity to it is to be purchased at "too great a sacrifice" of ease and enjoyment.

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

The purpose for which a reference is here made to these sacred subjects, is to remark upon the unfitness of attempting to deduce human duties from the attributes of God. It is not indeed to be affirmed that no illustration of those duties can be derived from them, but that they are too imperfectly cognizable by our perceptions to enable us to refer to them for specific moral rules. The truth indeed is, that we do not accurately and distinctly know what the Divine Attributes are. We say that God is merciful; but if we attempt to define, with strictness, what the term merciful means, we shall find it a difficult, perhaps an impracticable task; and especially we shall have a difficult task if, after the definition, we attempt to reconcile every appearance which presents itself in the world, with our notions of the attribute of mercy. I would speak with reverence when I say that we cannot always perceive the mercifulness of the Deity in his administrations, either towards his rational or his irrational creation. So, again, in respect of the attribute of Justice, who can determinately define in what this attribute consists? Who, especially, can prove that the Almighty designs that we should always be able to trace his justice in his government? We believe that he is unchangeable; but what is the sense in which we understand the term? Do we mean that the attribute involves the necessity of an unchangeing system of moral government, or that the Deity cannot make alterations in, or additions to, his laws for mankind? We cannot mean this, for the evidence of revelation disproves it.

Now, if it be true that the Divine Attributes, and the uniform accordancy of the divine dispensations with our notions of those attributes, are not suffi

dressed peculiarly to a selected people. In the third, Jesus Christ and his commissioned ministers, delivered precepts, of which the general character was that of greater purity or perfection, and of which the obligation was universal upon mankind.

That the records of all these dispensations contain declarations of the Will of God, is certain : that their moral requisitions are not always coincident, is also certain; and hence the conclusion becomes inevitable, that to us, one is of primary authority; that when all do not coincide, one is paramount to the others. That a coincidence does not always exist, may easily be shown. It is manifest, not only by a comparison of precepts and of the general tenor of the respective records, but from the express declarations of Christianity itself.

One example, referring to the Christian and Jewish dispensations, may be found in the extension of the law of Love. Christianity, in extending the application of this law, requires us to abstain from that which the law of Moses permitted us to do. Thus it is in the instance of duties to our 66 neighbour," as they are illustrated in the parable of the Samaritan. * Thus, too, in the sermon on the mount: "It hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy: but I say nnto you, Love your enemies," + It is indeed sometimes urged that the words "hate thine enemy," were only a gloss of the expounders of the law: but Grotius writes thus-" What is there repeated as said to those of old, are not the words of the teachers of the law, but of Moses; either literally or in their meaning. They are cited by our Saviour as his express words, not as interpretations of them."‡ If the authority of Grotius should not satisfy the reader, let him consider such passages as this: "An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord. Because they met you not with bread and with water in the way, when ye came forth out of Egypt. Thou shalt not seek their peace nor their prosperity all thy days for ever."§ This is not coincident with, "Love your enemies; or with, "Do good to them that hate you;' or with that temper which is recommended by the words, "to him that smiteth thee on one cheek, turn the other also."||

"Pour out thy fury upon the heathen that know thee not, and upon the families that call not on thy name," T-is not coincident with the reproof of Christ to those who, upon similar grounds, would have called down fire from heaven. ** "The Lord look upon it and require it,”†t-is not coincident with, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge."‡‡ "Let me see thy vengeance on them,"§§-" Bring upon them the day of evil, and destroy them with double destruction," -is not coincident with, "Forgive them, for they know not what they do."PP

Similar observations applying to Swearing, to Polygamy, to Retaliation, to the motives of murder and adultery.

And as to the express assertion of the want of coincidence:- "The law made nothing perfect, but the bringing in of a better hope did.' "There is verily a disannulling of the commandment going before, for the weakness and unprofitableness thereof."+tt If the commandment now existing is not weak and unprofitable, it must be because it is superior to that which existed before.

But although this appears to be thus clear with

respect to the Jewish dispensation, there are some who regard the moral precepts which were delivered before the period of that dispensation, as imposing permanent obligations: they were delivered, it is said, not to one peculiar people, but to individuals of many; and, in the persons of the immediate survivors of the deluge, to the whole human race. This argument assumes a ground paramount to all questions of subsequent abrogation. Now it would appear a sufficient answer to say-If the precepts of the Patriarchal and Christian dispensations are coincident, no question needs to be discussed; if they are not, we must make an election; and surely the Christian cannot doubt what election he should make. Could

a Jew have justified himself for violating the Mosaic law, by urging the precepts delivered to the patriarchs? No. Neither then can we justify ourselves for violating the Christian law, by urging the precepts delivered to Moses.

We indeed have, if it be possible, still stronger motives. The moral law of Christianity binds us, not merely because it is the present expression of the Will of God, but because it is a portion of his last dispensation to man-of that which is avowedly not only the last, but the highest and the best. We do not find in the records of Christianity that which we find in the other Scriptures, a reference to a greater and purer dispensation yet to come. It is as true of the Patriarchal as of the Mosaic institution, that "it made nothing perfect," and that it referred us from the first, to "the bringing in of that better hope which did." If then the question of supremacy is between a perfect and an imperfect system, who will hesitate in his decision?

There are motives of gratitude, too, and of affection, as well as of reason. The clearer exhibition which Christianity gives of the attributes of God; its distinct disclosure of our immortal destinies; and above all, its wonderful discovery of the love of our Universal Father, may well give to the moral law with which they are connected, an authority which may supersede every other.

These considerations are of practical importance; for it may be observed of those who do not advert to them, that they sometimes refer indiscriminately to the Old Testament or the New, without any other guide than the apparent greater applicability of a precept in the one or the other, to their present need: and thus it happens that a rule is sometimes acted upon, less perfect than that by which it is the good pleasure of God we should now regulate our conduct.—It is a fact which the reader should especially notice, that an appeal to the Hebrew Scriptures is frequently made when the precepts of Christianity would be too rigid for our purpose. He who insists upon a pure morality, applies to the New Testament: he who desires a little more indulgence, defends himself by arguments from the Old.

Of this indiscriminate reference to all the dispensations, there is an extraordinary example in the newly discovered work of Milton. He appeals, I believe, almost uniformly to the precepts of all, as of equal present obligation. The consequence is what might be expected-his moral system is not consistent. Nor is it to be forgotten, that in defending what may be regarded as less pure doctrines, he refers mostly, or exclusively, to the Hebrew Scriptures. In all his disquisitions to prove the lawfulness of untruths, he does not once refer to the New Testament.* Those who have observed the prodigious multiplicity of texts which he cites in this work, will peculiarly appreciate the importance of the fact.-Again: "Hatred," he says, "is in some cases a religious duty."+ A proposition at which + P. 641

Christian Doctrine, p. 660.

the Christian may reasonably wonder. And how does Milton prove its truth? He cites from Scripture ten passages; of which eight are from the Old Testament and two from the New. The reader will be curious to know what these two are:--" If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother -he cannot be my disciple." ""* And the rebuke to Peter; "Get thee behind me, Satan." The citation of such passages shows that no passages to the purpose could be found.

It may be regarded therefore as a general rule, that none of the injunctions or permissions which formed a part of the former dispensations, can be referred to as of authority to us, except so far as they are coincident with the Christian law. To our own Master we stand or fall; and our Master is Christ. And in estimating this coincidence, it is not requisite to show that a given rule or permission of the former dispensations is specifically superseded in the New Testament. It is sufficient if it is not accordant with the general spirit; and this consideration assumes greater weight when it is connected with another which is hereafter to be noticed—that it is by the general spirit of the Christian morality that many of the duties of man are to be discovered.

Yet it is always to be remembered, that the laws which are thus superseded were, nevertheless, the laws of God. Let not the reader suppose that we would speak or feel respecting them otherwise than with that reverence which their origin demandsor that we would take any thing from their present obligation but that which is taken by the Lawgiver himself. It may indeed be observed, that in all his dispensations there is a harmony, a one pervading principle, which, without other evidence, indicates that they proceeded from the same authority. The variations are circumstantial rather than fundamental; and, after all, the great principles in which they accord, far outweigh the particular applications in which they differ. The Mosaic Dispensation was a schoolmaster" to bring us, not merely through the medium of types and prophecies, but through its moral law, to Christ. Both the one and the other were designed as preparatives; and it was probably as true of these moral laws as of the prophecies, that the Jews did not perceive their relationship to Christianity as it was actually introduced into the world.

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Respecting the variations of the moral law, some persons greatly and very needlessly perplex themselves by indulging in such questions as these.— "If," say they," God be perfect, and if all the dispensations are communications of his will, how happens it that they are not uniform in their requisitions? How happens it that that which was required by Infinite Knowledge at one time, was not required by Infinite Knowledge at another?" I answer-I cannot tell. And what then? Does the enquirer think this a sufficient reason for rejecting the authority of the Christian law? If inability to discover the reasons of the moral government of God be a good motive to doubt its authority, we may involve ourselves in doubts without end.-Why does a Being who is infinitely pure permit moral evil in the world? Why does he who is perfectly benevolent permit physical suffering? Why did he suffer our first parents to fall? Why, after they had fallen, did he not immediately repair the loss? Why was the Messiah's appearance deferred for four thousand years? Why is not the religion of the Messiah universally known and universally operative at the present day? To all these questions, and to many others, no answer can be given: and the difficulty + Mark viii. 33.

Luke xiv. 26.

arising from them is as great, if we choose to make difficulties for ourselves, as that which arises from variations in his moral laws. Even in infidelity we shall find no rest: the objections lead us onward to atheism. He who will not believe in a Deity unless he can reconcile all the facts before his eyes with his notions of the divine attributes, must deny that a Deity exists. I talked of rest :-Alas! there is no rest in infidelity or in atheism. To disbelieve in revelation or in God, is not to escape from a belief in things which you do not comprehend, but to transfer your belief to a new class of such things. Unbelief is credulity. The infidel is more credulous than the Christian, and the atheist is the most credulous of mankind: that is, he believes important propositions upon less evidence than any other man, and in opposition to greater.

It is curious to observe the anxiety of some writers to reconcile some of the facts before us with the "moral perfections" of the Deity; and it is instructive to observe into what doctrines they are led. They tell us that all the evil and all the pain in the world, are parts of a great system of Benevolence. "The moral and physical evil observable in the system, according to men's limited views of it, are necessary parts of the great plan; all tending ultimately to produce the greatest sum of happiness upon the whole, not only with respect to the system in general, but to each individual, according to the station he occupies in it."* They affirm that God is an "allwise Being, who directs all the movements of nature, and who is determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to maintain in it at all times, the greatest possible quantity of happiness."+ The Creator found, therefore, that to inflict the misery which now exists, was the best means of promoting this happiness-that to have abated the evil, the suffering, or the misery, would be to have diminished the sum of felicity-and that men could not have been better or more at ease than they are, without making them on the whole more vicious or unhappy!-These things are beacons which should warn us. The speculations show that not only religion, but reason, dictates the propriety of acquiescing in that degree of ignorance in which it has pleased God to leave us; because they show, that attempts to acquire knowledge may conduct us to folly. These are subjects upon which he acts most rationally, who says to his reason-be still.

MODE OF APPLYING THE PRECEPTS OF SCRIPTURE TO QUESTIONS OF DUTY.

It is remarkable that many of these precepts, and especially those of the Christian Scriptures, are delivered, not systematically but occasionally. They are distributed through occasional discourses and occasional letters. Except in the instance of the law of Moses, the speaker or writer rarely set about a formal exposition of moral truth. The precepts were delivered as circumstances called them forth or made them needful. There is nothing like a system of morality; nor, consequently, does there exist that completeness, that distinctness in defining and accuracy in limiting, which, in a system of morality, we expect to find. Many rules are advanced in short absolute prohibitions or injunctions, without assigning any of those exceptions to their practical application, which the majority of such rules require.The enquiry, in passing, may be permitted-Why * This is given as the belief of Dr Priestly. See Memoirs: Ap. No. 5.

+Adam Smith: Theory of Moral Sentiments. See also T. Southwood Smith's Illustrations of the Divine Government, in which unbridled license of speculation has led the writer into some instructive absurdities.