at the disposal, of this military captain. He required that every eye should be bent on him, as the supreme director of all affairs, civil, political, military, and ecclesiastical. He wished to train the very thoughts and subdue the wills of men, that every public good expected from the present, or hoped from the future, should be identified with his name and fortunes; as the destinies of the continent were already attached to the Imperial car. His system of espionage was co-extensive with his power: Every word was registered, every action recorded, every look observed: not a literary work could appear but on his approval: not a newspaper could be published, but under the direction of his police. With the continent at his feet, the destruction of England was the object of his unceasing attention: Foiled in his hopes of a navy, he aimed at destroying her commerce, and thus sapping the foundation of her strength, by means of his famous continental system;-a system directly opposed to the interests, the feelings, and the wishes of the people of the continent;-a system which was never carried into complete operation, even with his vast power, and whose requisitions could only be enforced, at the point of the bayonet. But Napoleon was as regardless of the rights and interests, as of the feelings of others: he trampled on all, without scruple or hesitation. He would recognize no neutral powers: whoever was not for him was against him: and, although never at war with America, we experienced more severe and heavy losses from his friendship, than we could possibly have suffered from open hostility ;-for, notwithstanding the millions that were confiscated, whatever once entered into the imperial treasury, no matter by what means obtained, or to whom belonging, never again returned to its injured owners. With him, the end always justified the means: Every thing must be subdued by force, nothing won by persuasion. Possessing a thorough knowledge of human nature, he used it to his advantage: He held mankind in utter contempt, employing them only as the instruments of his ambition, and profiting alike by their weakness and their fears. It is a remark worthy of Madame de Stael, that 'If tyranny had 'only its direct partizans on its side, it could never maintain it'self. The astonishing thing-and which proves human misery 'more than all-is, that the greater part of mediocre people * enlist themselves in the service of events; they have not the 'strength to think deeper than a fact; and, when an oppressor has triumphed, and a victim been destroyed, they hasten to 'justify, not exactly the tyrant, but the destiny whose instru'ment he is.'

As a statesman and politician, the abilities of Napoleon have VOL. IV.

15

been generally admitted; although it will be recollected, that a victory, if one did not precede his negotiations, was generally the prelude to his treaties. His conduct, however, in regard to Spain, was impolitic in the extreme: nor can we reconcile, with the idea of great talent and skill as a negotiator, his failure to prevail on Austria to espouse his cause, rather than league with the allies, during the armistice at Dresden, in 1813, when her co-operation would have been so all-important to him: nor the fatality that impelled him to prolong his negotiation in such a climate as that of Russia, whose previous conduct might have convinced him that no peace could be obtained: nor the madness that induced him to refuse a peace at Chatillon, at a time when his country was overrun by the enemies' troops, superior in number to his own, and when his resources were almost entirely exhausted. When he could not dictate, he was rarely successful; and when he wanted the argument of force, his skill as a negotiator was by no means conspicuous. In the selection of his ministerial agents-an unqualified submission to his will, and an entire devotion to his interests, were the first and indispensable requisites; abilities being an after consideration; while integrity and moral honesty were, in his estimation, by no means essential ingredients in the formation of character.

Napoleon, however, is chargeable with no personal vices, although he cannot be said to have given evidence of the possession of any private virtues: And if his court was given to licentiousness, it was not that he set the example, but because he tolerated its existence. He displayed, on most occasions, the caution of a designing politician, but never gave evidence of a warm or generous feeling, or discovered traits of possessing a noble or a manly spirit. If there were occasions on which he relaxed from his habitual reserve, to give way to the dictates of common benevolence, these appeared rather as the acts of a cold and calculating policy, than as the impulses of a generous or feeling heart. Those principles of independence of spirit, which a noble mind, possessed of his unlimited power, should have been proud to inculcate, and might with safety have tolerated, he suffered not to exist within the scope of his authority: those sentiments, which aroused a regard for the rights of others, or a respect for the honest prejudices of our nature, he scorned to entertain and in all the heroic qualities which never fail to win the applause, and subdue the affections of mankind, Napoleon was unquestionably deficient.

But his surest titles to fame, are founded on his military achievements; for he was beyond dispute the greatest captain of his age. His victories, however, have often been ascribed

to his total disregard for human life; and that when his numbers were so overpowering, he would necessarily succeed. While his resources in men were so ample, though the sacrifice of his brave followers may prove a want of feeling as a soldier and a monarch, it furnishes no argument against his military skill. But, in many of his battles, his forces were not superior: The action at Lutzen, in 1813, after the loss of his army in Russia, gave decided evidence of the superiority of his tactics, fought as it was, with an army composed principally of new levies, and so deficient in cavalry, that he dared not charge the enemy when they were in complete retreat: And when, in 1814, he defended France against such superior forces, it will be recollected how long he kept the allies in check, occasionally obtaining the most decided advantages. Napoleon's great fault was in never providing against defeat. He attacked with confidence, and appeared never to expect a reverse. In Russia, no provision was made for a retreat: At Leipsic his retreat became a perfect rout: and at Waterloo, when the enemy charged in their turn, his corps were nearly annihilated. Another, and a very important error in the military conduct of Napoleon, was, that he acted under the influence of the character of Emperor, as well as in the capacity of General. Not a Marshal of his army would have hesitated on the necessity of an immediate retreat from Russia, after the destruction of Moscow; but Napoleon risked the safety of his army upon the chance of peace After the armistice in 1813, he still hoped to regain all that he had lost during the preceding campaign: He kept the whole line of the Elbe, from Hamburg to Dresden, while the troops in its fortresses, including Dantzic, amounted to nearly 120,000 men: The country in his rear, was entirely occupied by the enemies' light troops,-his dispatches were interrupted, and his communications with France almost entirely cut off. He was advised by his ablest generals-and Ney was of this opinion-that the line he occupied was not a military occupation, and that if he remained, he would soon be compelled to retire, and fight a general battle under every disadvantage; whereas, if he withdrew the troops from the garrisons, and retired to the Rhine, he might bid defiance to all Europe, He was afterwards compelled to fall back, from Dresden to the plains of Liepsic-where he experienced a complete defeat.*

* Napoleon was subject to violent bursts of passion on the receipt of very unfavourable news, or when any thing greatly displeased him. An anecdote of Marshal Ney, whose bravery was proverbial, deserves to be recorded.On some occasion the Emperor became enraged with him, and offered a personal indignity: Ney instantly grasped his sword, but hesitated, and observed

Napoleon carried with him to the field of battle none of the chivalric spirit of a hero ; he rarely manifested even the gallant feelings of a soldier; and evinced but little concern or anxiety for the fate of men, who were devoted to his service. If he had an object to obtain, his choicest troops must advance, however fool-hardy the attempt-his most daring officers must lead to the attack, however desperate the chance, or forlorn the hope of success. At the battle of Essling, where he had made two unsuccessful attempts to force the centre of the Austrian army commanded by the Archduke Charles, Lasnes, who had led the attack, represented to him the utter impossibility of succeeding; and that to renew the attempt, was only to lead the men to certain destruction :-Napoleon's reply was still,"To the charge :"-the French troops were again repulsed, and retreated to concentrate their forces,'-but the gallant Lasnes fell, a sacrifice to this implicit devotion to his chief. On the retreat from Russia, when the first effects of the climate had been experienced, he left his Marshals and his troops to manage for themselves; and, providing only for his personal safety, made the best of his way to France; although ignorant of the fate of a large portion of that army-which had been sacrificed to his obstinacy, and offered up as a victim to his ambition. After his defeat at Liepsic, he left 30,000 men to defend that place to the last extremity, in order the better to secure his retreat: but, more effectually to prevent the rapid approach of the victorious enemy, the bridge over the stream, that separated him from his pursuers, was blown up,-and his unfortunate soldiers were thus left in Liepsic, to be destroyed by an infuriated foe.

But the most decisive evidence that could be furnished of the deficiency of his character, in this respect, was reserved for the memorable field of Waterloo. When the gallant veterans, composing the Guard, that made the last and unsuccessful charge, saw that their commander was not to lead them to the foe, a murmur of discontent was heard from rank to rank-although soon drowned by the acclamations in favour of the Emperor, that were still echoed along their extended line. Where was now that spirit of a soldier, which should have kindled at the enthusiasm manifested by his faithful guards? The concerns of an empire no longer required the exercise of prudence, to preserve a life necessary to his country. Napoleon was indeed Emperor of the French; but he now held that

to Napoleon-"This sword, which has been drawn only in defence of my country, should be plunged to its hilt in your bosom, did I not think France still had need of your services."

title as connected only with the preservation of his army. He knew the precarious tenure by which he held the throne, and that victory alone could secure its possession. He knew that he had risked on the issue of that battle, all the disposable military resources of France; and that unless he won the field, he lost his crown. He had seen his best combined attacks, uniting skill and valour in their highest character, unexpectedly resisted by the firmness and perseverance of a foe, with whom he now, for the first time, joined in conflict;-many of his troops began to be discouraged at their repeated failures-and the veterans of France were seen wavering in the field. Already had the enemy received strong reinforcements-and the sound of the cannon which it was hoped announced the expected succours from Marshal Grouchy, was found to proceed from a powerful body of fresh troops of the enemy, attacking his right, and threatening to outflank him. There was now no room for doubt-it was no longer a time for hesitation. Napoleon should have seconded the ardour of his soldiers; and, heading in person his devoted guards, should have resolved to lead them to victory, or fall by their side. Had Napoleon had thus died, his name would have gone down to future ages with a lustre that might, in some measure, have served to dissipate the remembrance of many of his darker deeds. To him would have been ascribed the merit, of nobly consecrating his life to the service of his country-and sealing, with his death, the destiny of France.

But the character of this extraordinary man must now be left with the future historian. Let those who have enjoyed the gifts of fortune, without misapplying them-who have possessed power without abusing it-who have dispensed patronage without partiality-who, with ample means, and full opportunities, have never gratified their vengeance, nor indulged their evil passion,-let such decide on the degree of obloquy that should attach to the conduct, and be connected with the name of one, who acknowledged no authority-knew no control-and whose word was law. But, while we rejoice in the reflection, that his fall from the giddy height of power which he had attained, will be a never failing source of congratulation to every friend to freedom and to man, we still think that when we pass in review the events of such a life, and reflect on the intensity of interest they so lately excited, the feelings they were calculated to arouse, and the fears they so naturally awakened, we must be constrained to admit, that posterity alone will be competent to sit in judgment upon Napoleon.

England bore so conspicuous a part in the great struggle that terminated with his reign, that when we review the eventful