No. 104.]

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

ΤΗ

HE public mind has lately been impreffed with the belief that an invafion of this country is not only a poffible, but even a probable event.

I would by no means difcourage the preparations which are making to meet the threatened attack; but I confider it my duty to expose a fa fe impreffion, which has lately tended to destroy the confidence between man and man, that is fo effential to the welfare and profperity of a commercial nation like Britain.

My countrymen ought to feel, that, in order to fucceed in his defign, it is not enough that the CHIEF CONSUL of FRANCE, in the furor of his ambition, hould will, with, or threaten, an invafion of this country! Before he can enable any formidable force to effect a landing, he has great and expensive preparations to make, he hasdifficulties of a phyfical nature to encounter, and he has the vigilance, the power, and the peculiar refources of this country to overcome.

In the first place he must collect together from various ports the numerous veffels and finall craft which are neceffary to tranfport his army; but as the coafts of France and Holland are cover ed with our cruizers, very few of them would efcape; and it may be prefumed, without the hazard of contradiction, that four out of five of thofe veffels moving along the French coat from one port to another, would either be captured or detroyed.

Suppofe this difficulty furmounted, and a multitude of veffels affembled in any port of France, fufficient for the tranfport of an army, what would be the obvious policy of the British Government ?— They wou'd inftantly commit to our brave failors and foldiers the task of entering fuch port, and of burning, fcuttling, and finking the whole of the affembled fleet. The more of them, the more certain would be their deftruction; and there is not a fingle port of France or Holland, (Breft excepted, and that port is not fuited to the purpofe,) that could protect them from the attack of our fuperior and telolute naval forces.

MONTHLY MAG. No. 104.

[No. 1, of VOL. 16.

Should one attack be defeated, it would be renewed again and again, till our efforts were crowned with fuccefs, and the enemy's armament rendered u.elefs, or annihilated.

Until, then, we have totally failed as affailants, the idea of a serious or formidable invafion ought to be treated with utter contempt by every man of common fenfe or prudence. The enemy may perchance vomit on our coats a few hundred troops, the unhappy victims of their ma lice-they may repeat the follies of Fishguard and Killala; but fuch invafions as thole will ferve rather to keep alive our national fpirit, than to excite in us any ferious alarm!

Should it be urged, that the enemy may make preparations in feveral ports at the fame time, with a view to tranfport feveral armies; I apply the same systein of offence to several ports as to one, and with greater certainty of fucce's. They cannot launch a boat, or drive a nail, in any one of their ports, without being teen or heard by our bold and vigilant cruizers: a ftate of matured preparations on their part, and the moment of reiterated and fuccefsful affault on ours, will, therefore, always accompany each other, till the ene my are tired of the expences and useless toil of preparation.

In this view of the tubject, it will scarcely be neceffary to fuppofe that the enemy's armament will ever be able to make their appearance at fea. Should they, however, baffle our assaults, so as to preserve the integrity of their feet, and have the temerity, in the face of our naval forces, to come out of their harbours, the English cruizers, who every day clolely watch their motions, and could be at no lofs to anticipate their precife intentions, will, of course, be affembled in fufficient force to lay all the hopes of the enemy, and the fears of our women and