with what sort of things the conduct has to do which is productive of human happiness. He finds that the function of man, as distinguished from that of plants and of the lower animals, is "the exercise of his faculties and action of various kinds with reason." He thence concludes that human happiness consists in exercising the faculties in a certain way, this way being "in accordance with excellence or virtue." He holds, in addition, that some degree of material prosperity is essential to happiness, and also some length of time for happiness to be enjoyed. And he accordingly gives as his definition of the happy man, that he is "one who exercises his faculties in accordance with perfect excellence, being duly furnished with external goods, not for any chance time, but for a full term of years;" to which, perhaps, we should add (he says), "and who shall continue to live so, and shall die as he lived." 1 He subsequently divides virtue into intellectual and moral virtue, and in discussing the latter speaks of it simply as virtue. The meaning of the term excellence or virtue, as applied by him to conduct, has yet to be explained.

1 Nicomachean Ethics, i. 10.

CHAPTER II.

THE PRINCIPLE OF order.

I. In the preceding chapter we reached the conclusion, that we have ground for supposing that the happiness which is dependent upon conduct may be attainable through observance of directions given by nature, or, in other words, by the practice of such conduct as is natural. An endeavour will now be made to show that there is such a thing as natural conduct; to show that, on every occasion of voluntary action, whether or no happiness is dependent upon the choice we make, there is some one course which it is the intention of nature that we should pursue.

If we look upon the world around us, we see that every cause or combination of causes has its one necessary immediate consequence. The forces of nature produce each its own appointed effect, varying with the intensity and duration of their application, and dependent upon properties inherent in themselves and in whatsoever it is upon which they act. And if several forces act together, each produces its own effect; the resulting consequence being the one composite product of them all. When we sow a seed in the ground, though we may be quite uncertain what exact kind of plant will spring up from it, yet we know, if we think about it, that it will be no chance plant, but that in every particular of size, and form, and colour, it will be the one possible consequence of the matter of which it is com

posed having been acted on by the various forces that have acted on it; that it will be the one composite result of the particular seed having been placed in the particular soil and affected by the particular amounts that have fallen to its lot of sunshine and rain, and any other agents that have contributed either to promote or to mar its growth. So, again, the effect of applying a given mechanical force to a stationary body depends upon certain properties of matter; and if several known forces are simultaneously applied, the one possible effect of their combined action can be determined. The result is the one necessary outcome of the several component forces being brought to bear upon the given body. And further, we seem to have reason to believe that the relations between cause and consequence throughout the universe are not only necessary, but also fitting; that they are so arranged that all natural movements fit in together, and form one interdependent and harmonious whole of life and action. The necessary and fitting relation between cause and consequence is what we understand by the order of nature.

If, now, we think of man as a constituent portion of the universe, and therefore reckon the motives which prompt him to take action, through their operation upon his will, as among the forces of the universe, we are at once led to the conclusion, that every motive or combination of motives by which his will is at any time excited has its one necessary immediate consequence. This consequence, however, as regards its necessity, must be limited to the pressure of the motives on the will. It does not always extend to what actually results from this pressure, because to a certain extent the will appears to have the power of resisting and overcoming it. We cannot say that the will is moved, but only that it is urged in a given direction with a given force. And a modification of statement consequently called for

a modification consisting in the substitution of natural for necessary consequence-seems to be desirable on another ground, viz., because in the sphere of voluntary conduct motives have to be interpreted by each individual for himself, and his interpretation of them is perhaps better described as natural than necessary. Let us say, then, that every motive or combination of motives has its one natural immediate consequence.

Confining our attention for the present to the action of the motives on the will, we may apparently take it to be the case that, by whatever motives and in whatever degree a man is at any time urged, there is always some one particular direction in which they are judged to urge him, that is to say, in which they do urge him, as interpreted by the individual's judging powers of reason and perception; and they urge him in this direction with a certain force dependent upon the strength which they are severally exerting. Sometimes the very action to which they point seems to be unmistakably defined, and to be itself the object of the motives; as when a man feels it incumbent on him to pay a debt or to speak the truth. Sometimes only the kind of action is indicated: it must be the expression of such and such motives acting with such and such strength. In the latter kind of case there is need of perception or of reason, or of both combined, to determine according to the circumstances of the moment what particular action will most accurately represent the motives which are to be indulged. When this is done, the motives point to the action which is thus determined; and the force with which they urge the will to the performance of this action is so far their one natural immediate consequence.

What has been said must not of course be taken to imply that we are always capable of fully analysing our motives and reasonably assessing their relative authority;

but, to however small an extent it may be in our power to do this, we seem sooner or later to become aware of some one course of conduct which they, interpreted as a whole by reason and perception, in connection with the circumstances of any case, incite us to adopt.

Before proceeding further, we must not omit to notice an apparent exception to this general rule. It seems at times to happen, with reference to unimportant matters, that perception and reason are at a loss to find valid ground for pointing to one particular action rather than to another; and it appears to be then natural for the matter to be decided by the choice of the will. Thus, for example, our motives may clearly incite us to take a holiday, but it may be a matter of indifference to us in which of several equally obvious and equally pleasant ways we find occupation for it; and it may eventually fall to the will to exercise a free choice. Thus the one action that results can scarcely be said to be the one action to which the motives urge us. The operation of the motives in forming conduct has here ceased when they have offered us several alternatives from which to choose. But this inciting us to one or another of several alternatives may perhaps be not improperly regarded as itself their one natural consequence; and with this understanding our general rule holds good without exceptions.

We now proceed to consider what follows upon the one natural consequence that we have thus far noticed. The particular action to which the motives are judged to point would in all cases result, if it rested with them, as interpreted by reason and perception, to perform it. Their function, however, seems to be merely to put pressure upon the will, urging it with a certain force to take action of a certain kind, thus producing through its agency whatever further effect they do produce. The first part of their