may be said on the one hand, that there seems no reason to suppose that the great majority of pagans are under any obligation to adopt the practice of that charity which St. Paul describes, or that they are capable of finding happiness in it. And it may be said on the other hand, that a benevolence which stops short at loving one's neighbour as oneself, or at doing that which on the whole may be expected to bring satisfaction to oneself, is a benevolence which falls below the true Christian standard. It does not exemplify the degree of self-sacrifice required by the new commandment, "That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another."

CHAPTER XIV.

KANT.

I. We have seen how the teaching of Butler confirms some part of what has been said in this book on the subject of the constraint of happiness, viz., that man is under obligation to satisfy his wish for happiness by doing those things which he knows will lead to happiness. Kant, into whose theory of morals it is the purpose of the present chapter to inquire, entirely dissents from this kind of doctrine. He holds that man is under no direct obligation whatever to consider his own happiness; but that, on the contrary, the practice of virtue may very well be opposed to happiness-to happiness, that is, in the present life. "It can never be an immediate duty to promote our happiness, still less can it be the principle of all duty."1 "There is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of reason, which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose" (a good will), "does in many ways interfere, at least in this life, with the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, happiness."

He admits, indeed, that by a natural necessity every rational being makes his own happiness an end; but he denies that conduct which is directed towards the attain

Theory of Ethics, translated by Mr. Abbott, 3rd edit., p. 187.

2 Id., p. 12.

ment of this end is moral conduct. "Pure practical reason," he says, "does not require that we should renounce all claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness." 1 And he allows that to secure one's own happiness may be a duty indirectly, "partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfilment of our duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g., poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty." 2 That is to say, not only may the wish for happiness legitimately be gratified when gratification does not interfere with duty, but duty may sometimes require that it should be gratified; not, however, because there is any such thing as a direct obligation to gratify this wish, but because its remaining ungratified may interfere with the performance of other actions which are obligatory.

This absolute separation between the pursuit of happiness as an end in itself and the practice of virtue is a very important feature of Kant's theory of morals. For under the head of happiness he includes, not only ends conceived of as sources of pleasurable enjoyment, but all material ends of whatever kind—all objects, that is, of particular desires.

"All material practical principles," he says, "as such are of one and the same kind, and come under the general principle of self-love or private happiness."

"3

According to him, man's moral constitution, including no such thing as what has been spoken of in this book as the constraint of happiness, and having no direct concern with any material or empirical ends of conduct, consists of reason and a will; reason being assigned by nature as the governor of the will. That the happiness of the moral agent

1 Theory of Ethics, p. 186.

2 Id., p. 187.

3 Id., p. 108.

cannot be the object which nature has in view in thus endowing him, seems to Kant to be sufficiently clear from the consideration, that, whatever may be the function of any organ, that organ is the best adapted for the performance of that function. Reason, he argues, is not so well fitted for guiding men to happiness as instinct; and therefore it cannot be the function of reason to attempt such guidance. There must be some purpose, however, in reason being possessed of power to influence the will; and this purpose can be nothing else than to produce a will simply conformable to its directions, or in other words, a good will. A will thus good in itself, "though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other." 1 "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will.” 2

That an action should be willed in accordance with the dictates of reason is the sole condition of its having moral worth. Moral conduct is not the performance of some action pointed out by reason, but the willing it in the way prescribed by reason. It is the determining upon something in obedience to the particular motive which is in accordance with the dictates of reason. It is acting from a sense of duty; duty being defined as "the necessity of acting from respect for the law;" and acting from respect for the law being equivalent to willing in accordance with the dictates of reason.

Reason, it appears, places before the will a moral law, and points to unconditional submission to it. Dissociating itself from all particular ends of human action, it calls upon man to obey a law which is applicable to him simply as a rational being, and which carries with it its own sanction. But it represents the law as applicable to him, not as an 2 Id., p. 9.

1 Theory of Ethics, p. 12

individual rational being, but as a member of a world of rational beings, upon all of whom it is alike binding. It seeks to determine the human will by à priori principles, presenting to it a moral law which, being derived from no empirical source, is necessarily binding upon all rational beings; a law the universal validity of which man as a rational being cannot but recognise, and for which he cannot but feel respect. "The basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but à priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason."1 "Duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all) and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills." 2

Before proceeding to consider what is the moral law which in Kant's view is pointed out by reason, two points may perhaps be usefully noticed. The first of these is, that he no less than Butler is persuaded, that the practice of morality will be promoted by a comprehension of his own view of moral obligation. We saw in the preceding chapter how essential it seemed to Butler that, in order to induce men in general to practise virtue, its coincidence with happiness-producing conduct should be proclaimed. He looks to a cool or enlightened self-love, which sees clearly that true happiness is bound up with virtue, as a powerful auxiliary to conscience; their association being with him not a matter of mere speculative interest, but one of great practical importance. Kant is no less convinced that the publication of an opposite view will tend to the advancement of morality. "The pure conception of duty," he says, "unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral 1 Theory of Ethics, p. 4 2 Id., p. 43.