will that our maxim should be a universal law, for that is impossible for us."1 He seems to have lost some confidence in the truth of his assumption that the rational will is necessarily determined in accordance with universal laws.

1 Theory of Ethics, p. 42.

CHAPTER XV.

7. S. MILL.

1. MILL'S exposition of the utilitarian theory of morals is a somewhat perplexing book to deal with. Though it is written in a seemingly lucid style, and though it treats of familiar things, yet the real meaning and the value of its teaching are not easily discoverable. Together with much that is true it contains some very questionable statements, while the clearness of its language covers a certain amount of confusion of thought and doubtful reasoning.

The theory in question is briefly this. Moral or virtuous conduct is the conduct which in the highest degree conduces to the happiness of all affected by it. The conduct which men recognise as virtue and practise from a sense of duty is nothing more than conduct which experience has shown to be favourable to the promotion of happiness on the whole; it being immaterial, so long as happiness is promoted, upon whom the happiness may fall. Before proceeding to consider what Mill tells us concerning and in defence of this theory, it may be well to recall some conclusions, bearing upon the subject, which we arrived at in Chapter VIII. of this book.

1. It was pointed out that it appears to be natural for man to co-operate to some extent with nature in doing good. We seem to be sometimes under constraint to associate ourselves with nature, regarded as beneficent,

and to do something towards furthering her work of adding to the happiness of men, and to that of others of her creatures. The simple promotion of happiness, without reference to any particular persons or creatures whom for special reasons we may be disposed to make happy, seems to be to some extent a natural end of human action.

2. We saw, too, that it is natural for men to associate together, forming themselves into communities and cooperating for the furtherance of common ends. And we saw that such association, if it is to be maintained, necessitates the observance of certain rules of conduct. Abstinence from all form of aggression, though it was not there mentioned, is of course one such rule. Others are faithfulness to engagements and truthfulness of speech; to which may now be added distributive justice. These rules appear to be more immediately connected with the maintenance of the cohesion of society, than with the promotion of the happiness of its members. Still, if we consider, as no doubt we may, that one of nature's ends in causing men to choose to live together in communities is the increase of their happiness, it follows that whatever rules are essential to the cohesion of society are, in one respect, rules which tend to the promotion of human happiness. And, since rules which are calculated to prevent separation and estrangement are plainly rules the observance of which we expect of one another, we are under some constraint to practise conduct which is conducive to happiness, because the practice of it, being an essential condition of social union, is expected of us by our fellow-men.

3. In the next place, we saw that it is natural for men to exhibit some measure of devotion to the common good, to seek to promote the well-being of the community to

which they belong, without reference to any particular members of it. And we saw that one motive for doing this is constraint to fulfil the expectations of their fellowmen; while another motive is constraint to satisfy disinterested desire. A disposition to promote the general well-being involves, of course, a disposition to obey whatever social regulations are seen to contribute to it.

4. We further saw that it is natural for men to serve and help each other individually in certain circumstances, without direct reference to the general interests of the community, but nevertheless in compliance with the demands which society makes upon them.

We

5. And we saw that it is natural also for men to benefit individuals in the degree which seems to the agent himself to be in accordance with the design of nature. are naturally subject, in the matter of beneficence or kindness to individuals, not only to the rule, Do to others as society expects one man to do to another, but also to the rule, Do to others as it appears to you that you might reasonably ask others to do to you.

We have now before us the several conclusions of Chapter VIII. to which it will be necessary to refer. The recollection of them will be of service in helping us to understand Mill's position.

He opens his argument by explaining what utilitarianism is. He tells us, first, that "the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." And he says, "This" (ie., an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality) "being, according to the utili

"1

1 Utilitarianism, 9th edit., p. 9.

tarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence, such as has been described, might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation."1

From these passages it would seem as if the idea uppermost in Mill's mind was the one first noticed above, namely, the simple promotion of happiness without reference to particular persons or creatures. We find, however, that this idea disappears, and that its place in the exposition of the utilitarian doctrine is taken by the second, third, and fourth of those to which we referred; namely, the observance of rules which are held to be essential to corporate well-being; readiness on the part of the agent to serve the community, without reference to his own particular happiness or that of any other member of it; and affording such measure of help to individuals as public opinion may require. The principle which now seems to be presented to us, and which appears to be the one on which the whole argument is really based, is, not that it is the end of human action simply to promote happiness, but that it is the end of human action to promote happiness by ministering, in the ways pointed out, to the well-being of the community to which men happen to belong. "This conviction" (the deeply-rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being) "is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality." "The multiplication of happiness is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, in other words, to 2 Id., p. 50.

1 Utilitarianism, p. 17.