CHAPTER XVI. MR. SIDGWICK. I. MR. SIDGWICK, of whose moral creed utilitarianism forms a very essential part, differs from Mill in his exposition of the theory. Although he may perhaps be said to indicate sufficiently the claim of the utilitarian rule to some observance, yet he seems to be scarcely more successful than Mill in establishing its supremacy over other moral rules. Before proceeding to examine his argument in support of the rule, we may notice some points in which his view of the rule itself differs from that of Mill. First, he appears to have consistently in mind the idea of promoting universal happiness, not confounding this with the idea of promoting the happiness of the community. There is a distinct difference between the two ideas, even if we exclude the notion of caring for the happiness of other sentient beings besides man, and confine our attention to the matter of human happiness. In the case of the former idea, the happiness in question seems to be that of persons who, including ourselves, merely stand all in the same relation to nature. The persons other than ourselves may be persons who are joined to us by no other tie than this, who know nothing of what we do, and by whose conduct and opinions we are entirely uninfluenced. In the case of the latter idea, the happiness is that of the body of which we conceive ourselves as members, and with whose happiness our own happiness is in some measure bound up. The persons other than ourselves who compose it are persons in whose happiness we are interested, and by whose conduct and opinions our own are largely fashioned. The promotion of the happiness of this body, as it at any given time is constituted, is the end in view. Mr. Sidgwick, adopting the former, understood to include the happiness of all sentient beings, as the utilitarian idea, holds that the happiness of living men may properly be reduced by stimulating the increase of population, if by this means a larger total of general happiness can be secured. Strictly conceived, the point up to which, on utilitarian principles, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that at which average happiness is the greatest possible, but that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living into the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum." 1 " Secondly, he does not hold that there is a limit, determined by society, to the degree in which it is a duty to have regard to the public good. He appears to exhibit the utilitarian rule, that it is reasonable to make universal happiness the ultimate end of conduct, as a rule which covers the whole of conduct, in so far as what an agent does may be regarded as affecting others besides himself. Regard for universal happiness is not, however, by any means put forward as the sole reasonable motive to the practice of conduct which is seen to promote this end. Nor is universal happiness represented as an end which it is reasonable for men to have always consciously before them. "From the universal point of view, no less than from that of the individual, it seems true that Happi1 The Methods of Ethics, 3rd edit., p. 411. ness is likely to be better attained if the extent to which we set ourselves consciously to aim at it be carefully restricted. And this not only because action is likely to be more effective if our effort is temporarily concentrated on the realisation of more limited ends-though this is no doubt an important reason-but also because the fullest development of happy life for each individual seems to require that he should have other external objects of interest besides the happiness of other conscious beings. And thus we may conclude that the pursuit of the ideal objects before mentioned, Truth, Freedom, Beauty, &c., for their own sakes, is indirectly and secondarily, though not primarily and absolutely, rational; on account not only of the happiness that will result from their attainment, but also of that which springs from their disinterested pursuit. While yet, if we ask for a final criterion of the comparative value of the different objects of men's enthusiastic pursuit, and of the limits within which each may legitimately engross the attention of mankind, we shall none the less conceive it to depend upon the degree in which they respectively conduce to Happiness." Thirdly, he is not specially concerned to maintain that men have in practice been utilitarians in the past. Rather, it seems to be his aim to show the reasonableness of observing the utilitarian rule in the future. "It is not as the mode of regulating conduct with which mankind began, but rather as that to which we can now see that human development has been always tending, as the adult and not the germinal form of morality, that Utilitarianism may most plausibly claim the acceptance of Common Sense." 2 Let us now see on what fundamental principle Mr. Sidgwick considers that the utilitarian rule is based. 1 The Methods of Ethics, p. 403. 2 Id., p. 454. In the chapter of this book devoted to an exposition of the principle of law, it was pointed out that sameness is a characteristic of natural actions in the case of two or more being regarded as performed under like conditions. If an action performed under certain circumstances is known to be natural, a similar action must be the natural outcome of similar circumstances. Or, if an action is known to be unnatural, a similar action performed in like circumstances cannot be natural. Further, it was pointed out that distributive justice is based upon the principle of sameness. It consists in treating persons who stand to us in the same relation in the same way, whatever that way may be. These are illustrations of the application to conduct of the natural principle, that similar causes produce similar consequences. Other applications of it are to speech, regarded, first, as a communication of facts, and secondly, as a representation of what the agent intends to do. By thus applying it we may see, as was shown in Chapter VII., that veracity and faithfulness to engagements are objectively natural modes of conduct, derivable, though doubtless not quite so obviously, from the same principle as justice-from the principle, that is, of law or sameness applied to conduct. The rules of conduct first noticed in the preceding paragraph-sameness in actions performed under like conditions and sameness or impartiality in distribution-are treated by Mr. Sidgwick as altogether dissociated from the other two-veracity and faithfulness to engagements. To the former he assigns the rank of self-evident fundamental principles; while, as we shall presently see, he considers that the latter require some further justification. With regard to sameness in actions performed under like conditions, he remarks, speaking of mutual treatment in the case of persons similarly situated, "The self-evident principle strictly stated must take some such negative form as this, 'It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reason able ground for difference of treatment.' Such a principle manifestly does not give complete guidance—indeed, its effect, strictly speaking, is merely to throw a definite onus probandi on the man who applies to another a treatment of which he would complain if applied to himself; but Common Sense has amply recognised the practical importance of the maxim; and its truth, so far as it goes, is certainly self-evident." And then of the sameness that belongs to justice he goes on to say, "A somewhat different application of the same fundamental principle that individuals in similar conditions should be treated similarly finds its sphere in the ordinary administration of Law, or (as we say) of 'Justice.' Accordingly, in § 2 of Chapter V. of this book, I drew attention to 'impartiality in the application of general rules,' as an important element in the common notion of Justice; indeed, there ultimately appeared to be no other element which could be intuitively known with perfect clearness and certainty. Here again it must be plain that this precept of impartiality is insufficient for the complete determination of just conduct, as it does not help us to decide what kind of rules should be thus impartially applied; though all admit the importance of excluding from government, and human conduct generally, all conscious partiality and 'respect of persons.'" 1 Mr. Sidgwick now introduces, as companions to those just noticed, two other rules of conduct, which he considers 1 The Methods of Ethics, p. 379. |