of order, than could have been ours while we continued to place dependence upon our own knowledge, that the desire for happiness comes to the support of the constraint of order. That is to say, we may practise virtue, not alone for virtue's sake, but also because we believe it to be a means to happiness.

The conduct, then, which is prescribed by the constraints of happiness and order respectively, if both should be present to the consciousness at the same time, is in all cases the same conduct; there is no conflict between the two constraints. If the constraint of happiness bids us perform some action which we know will make us happy, the constraint of order can only impose this upon us as the one thing fitting to be done. If the constraint of order bids us perform some action as being the natural consequence of inciting motives, the constraint of happiness, if it then urges us to anything, can only urge us to the performance of this action as the natural means of attaining happiness.

CHAPTER III.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBORDINAted life.

I. WE have seen that on every occasion of voluntary action there is one only course of conduct required by nature of the individual agent, but as yet we have learned nothing, beyond its supposed general tendency to make for happiness, of the characteristics by which this course of conduct is distinguished. In what respect a virtuous action is essentially different from an action that is not virtuous is the question which now comes before us for investigation. Passing on from the fact that there is always one thing which nature bids man do, we have to inquire what it is that nature bids him do. We have to seek to ascertain why in every case he is required to do one particular thing and no other; or, in other words, what manner of fulfilment of nature's purposes is brought about by that conduct which constitutes personal virtue. There will remain for consideration in a future chapter the further question, how it is that the practice of this conduct promotes the happiness of the individual agent.

If we again turn our attention to the world around us, we seem to have assurance of the fact, that everything in nature stands in some given relation to other things around it. Nothing is isolated, existing for itself alone. Each portion of the universe, whether it be organic or inorganic, affects in some way those other portions of the universe

with which it is brought into any kind of contact, and by affecting them in the way it does, it performs its part in the orderly progress and life of nature. A mountain, for example, exists with reference in some degree to the cloud which it attracts; a plant, with reference to the water which it sucks up; a grain of wheat, with reference to the animal life which it sustains. Nothing could be annihilated, and nothing could act in any other way than that in which, according to the laws of nature, it does act, without some disarrangement of the orderly course of nature. seem to have full warrant for believing, that everything that exists fulfils some office outside itself in the design of nature, however insignificant and undiscoverable by human intelligence the purpose for which it exists may be.

We

If, now, we take a single organism, say a tree, we seem to see that in every movement that it makes, whether internally of its parts among themselves or externally in relation to other objects which come in contact with it, while it is preparing to influence, or is directly influencing, the condition of things around it, it is at the same time fulfilling a definite purpose of nature in relation to itself. This purpose is the maintenance and development of its own individual life. The rising of the sap, the unfolding of the leaves, the ripening of the fruit, are incidents in the maintenance and development of the tree's own life. And it seems undoubtedly to be the case, that the life-force which is in it seeks and finds the fullest expression which the circumstances of its environment render possible. If its fruit is plucked when only half ripe, the life-force which would have gone to perfect that fruit finds, if it is possible to find it, compensating expression in some other way. If, however, some portion of its vitality should be destroyed, then that which remains to it finds a way to manifest itself in the fullest measure that it can. And both with the

life-force which is taken away and with that which still remains to it, it fulfils its part in the orderly design of nature. To be a sacrifice for the furtherance of the general purposes of nature must be held to be no less truly a natural end of organic life than is the manifestation and development of all the power that is in it. It does not by any means appear to be nature's purpose, that every organism should develop its vitality without let or hindrance and under completely favourable conditions, but rather that each should maintain and develop its vitality to the fullest extent compatible with the requirements, according to nature's scheme, of other portions of the universe.

And now, regarding man as an organism, we seem to be in a position to ascertain something of the meaning and tendency of the kind of actions which nature urges him to perform. Each individual has to maintain and develop his own life to the fullest extent consistent with the discharge of such other offices as nature requires of him. This, from the point of view of natural morals, is the end for which he exists on earth. And the highest development, of which his life is in any way capable under the circumstances in which he is placed, appears to be that which he attains while complying with the demands for service which nature makes upon him. It seems to be the case that the developing to the fullest practicable extent his own life, and the ministering duly to the orderly course of nature, are promoted by one and the same course of conduct. That is to say, there is in all probability no higher development within his reach than that which is attainable through obedience to the commands of nature. For we can scarcely suppose that, if he directed all his efforts towards the development of his own life, without reference to the position. which nature intends him to occupy in the lives of others,

he would be successful in augmenting his own vitality. If nature, in working out her plans, checks his energies and bids him turn them in some new direction, or if she requires him to yield up some portion of his vitality, then, by implicitly obeying her commands, he is likely to make the most of the life that lies before him. It seems almost impossible to suppose that, if nature requires of him a sacrifice, she will not in some way exact it, however he himself may disobey her orders. While a tree cannot refuse to part with its half-ripened fruit, if nature, acting through man or bird, bids it to do so, man, having within certain limits a power of free-will, may determine to develop his own life in his own way, and may decline to regulate his actions or part with his vitality at nature's bidding. But in the result we can scarcely suppose that nature permits him to succeed. If life, regarded as a possession, and as consisting in movements in harmony with one another. and with things around, represents, as apparently it does in effect represent, the sum total of nature's gifts to an individual man, it does not appear to be in his power by any thwarting of nature's purposes with regard to him to enhance the value of this endowment. While in the exercise of his free-will he may obtain undue satisfaction for this or that desire, thus making some part of life more filled with movement and more replete with gratification, we seem to have no reason to suppose that his power of free-will extends to the frustration of nature's general purposes with reference to himself by enabling him to seize upon a life at all fuller on the whole than that which is in accordance with her designs. If, in contravention of her commands imparted to himself individually, he indulges appetite or declines to labour, we cannot suppose that on the whole the maintenance and development of his life are promoted by this conduct. For the reason that a certain