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from confusion of thought, accompanied with intricacy of expression, or from an excessive aim at excellence in the style and manner.

So much for the explication of the first rhetorical quality of style, perspicuity, with the three ways of expressing one's self by which it may be injured; the obscure, the double meaning, and the unintelligible.

CHAP. VII.

What is the Cause that Nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the Writer and by the Reader ?

SECTION I.

The nature and power of signs, both in speaking and in thinking.

Before quitting the subject of perspicuity, it will not be amiss to inquire into the cause of this strange phenomenon; that even a man of discernment should write without meaning, and not be sensible that he hath no meaning; and that judicious people should read what hath been written in this way, and not discover the defect. Both are surprising, but the first much more than the last. A certain remissness will at times seize the most attentive reader; whereas an author of discernment is supposed to have carefully digested all that he writes. It is reported of Lopez de Vaga, a famous Spanish poet, that the Bishop of Beller, being in Spain, asked him to explain one of his sonnets, which he said he had often read, but never understood. Lopez took up the sonnet, and after reading it several times, frankly acknowledged that he did not understand it himself; a discovery which the poet probably never made before.

But though the general fact hath been frequently observed, I do not find that any attempt hath been yet made to account for it. Berkeley, indeed in his Principles of Human Knowledge, hath suggested a theory concerning language, though not with this view, which, if

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well-founded, will go far to remove the principal difficulty" It is a received opinion," says that author, "that language has no other end, but the communica"ting our ideas, and that every significant name stands "for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain, that names, which are yet not thought altogether insignificant, do not always mark out particular con"ceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded, that they "stand for abstract notions. That there are many "names in use amongst speculative men, which do not "always suggest to others determinate particular ideas, "is what nobody will deny. And a little attention "will discover, that it is not necessary (even in the "strictest reasonings) significant names which stand for "ideas, should, every time they are used, excite in the "understanding, the ideas they are made to stand for. "In reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used, as letters are in algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right, it is not requisite, that in every step "each letter suggest to your thoughts, that particular "quantity it was appointed to stand for *." The same principles have been adopted by the author of a Treatise of Human Nature, who, speaking of abstract ideas, has the following words: "I believe every one, who ex"amines the situation of his mind in reasoning, will

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agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and "complete ideas to every term we make use of, and that "in talking of government, church, negociation, conquest, "we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple "ideas of which these complex ones are composed. "Tis, however, observable that notwithstanding this imperfection, we may avoid talking nonsense on these "subjects, and may perceive any repugnance among "the ideas, as well as if we had a full comprehension of "them. Thus if, instead of saying that in war the "weaker have always recourse to negociation, we should (1 say, that they have always recourse to conquest; the

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• Introd. Sect, 19.

"custom which we have acquired of attributing certain "relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes "us immediately perceive the absurdity of that propo"sition +." Some excellent observations to the same purpose have also been made by the elegant Inquirer into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and beautiful 1.

Now that the notions on this subject maintained by these ingenious writers, however strange they may appear on a superficial view, are well founded, is at least presumable from this consideration; that if, agreeably to the common hypothesis, we could understand nothing that is said, but by actually comparing in our minds all the ideas signified, it would be impossible that nonsense should ever escape undiscovered, at least that we should so far impose upon ourselves, as to think we understand what in reality is not to be understood. We should in that case find ourselves in the same situation, when an unmeaning sentence is introduced into a discourse, wherein we find ourselves when a sentence is quoted in a language of which we are entirely ignorant: we are never in the smallest danger of imagining that we apprehend the meaning of the quotation.

But though a very curious fact hath been taken notice of by those expert metaphysicians, and such a fact as will perhaps account for the deception we are now considering; yet the fact itself, in my apprehension, hath not been sufficiently accounted for. That mere sounds, which are used only as signs, and have no natural connection with the things whereof they are signs, should convey knowledge to the mind, even when they excite no idea of the things signified, must appear at first extremely mysterious. It is, therefore, worth while to consider the matter more closely; and in order to this, it will be proper to attend a little to the three following connexions: first that which subsisteth among things; secondly, that which subsisteth between words

+ Vol. I. Book i: Part 2. Sect. 7.

+ Part V.

and things; thirdly, that which subsisteth among words, or the different terms used in the same language.

As to the first of these connexions; namely, that which subsisteth among things; it is evident that this is original and natural. There is a variety of relations to be found in things, by which they are connected. Such are, among several others, resemblance, identity *, equality, contrariety, cause and effect, concomitancy, vicinity in time or place. These we become acquainted with by experience: and they prove, by means of association, the source of various combinations of ideas, and abstractions, as they are commonly denominated. Hence mixt modes and distinctions into genera and species; of the origin of which I have had occasion to speak already †.

As to the second connexion, or that which subsisteth between words and things, it is obvious, as it hath been hinted formerly, that this is not a natural and necessary, but an artificial and arbitrary connexion. Nevertheless, though this connection hath not its foundation in the nature of things, but in the conventions of men, its effect upon the mind is much the same. For, having often had occasion to observe particular words used as signs of particular things, we hence contract a habit of associating the sign with the thing signified, insomuch that either being presented to the mind, frequently introduces, or occasions, the apprehension of the other. Custom, in this instance, operates precisely in the same manner as in the formation of experience formerly explained. Thus, certain sounds, and the ideas of things not naturally related to them, come to be as strongly linked in our conceptions, as the ideas of things naturally related to one another.

As to the third connexion, or that which subsisteth

It may be thought improper to mention identity as a relation by which different things are connected; but it must be observed, that I only mean so far different, as to constitute distinct objects to the mind. Thus the consideration of the same person, when a child and when a man, is the consideration of different objects, between which there subsists the relation of identity.

Book I. Chap. V. Sect. II. Part 2. On the formation of experience.

among words, I would not be understood to mean any connexion among the words considered as sounds, such as that which results from resemblance in pronunciation, equality in the number of syilables, sameness of measure or cadence; I mean solely that connexion of relation which comes gradually to subsist among the different words of a language, in the minds of those who speak it, and which is merely consequent on this, that those words are employed as signs of connected or related things. It is an axiom in geometry, that things equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. It may, in like manner, be admitted as an axiom in psychology, that ideas associated by the same idea will associate with one another. Hence it will happen, that if from experiencing the connexion of two things, there results, as infallibly there will result, an association between the ideas or notions annexed to them, as each idea will moreover be associated by its signs, there will likewise be an association between the ideas of the signs. Hence the sounds considered as signs, will be conceived to have a connexion analogous to that which subsisteth among the things signified; I say, the sounds considered as signs: for this way of considering them constantly attends us in speaking, writing, hearing, and reading. When we purposely abstract from it, and regard them merely as sounds, we are instantly sensible, that they are quite unconnected, and have no other relation than what ariseth from similitude of tone or accent. But to consider them in this manner commonly results from previous design, and requires a kind of effort which is not exerted in the ordinary use of speech. In ordinary use they are regarded solely as signs, or rather they are confounded with the things they signify; the consequence of which is, that, in the manner just now explained, we come insensibly to conceive a connexion among them, of a very different sort from that of which sounds are naturally susceptible.

Now this conception, habit, or tendency of the mind, call it which you please, is considerably strengthened

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