shall only add one instance from Pope, which has something peculiar in it,

Then sighing thus, " And am I now threescore?

"Ah! why, ye gods! should two and two make four"?"

This, though not in the narrative, but in the dramatic style, is more witty than humorous. The absurdity of the exclamation in the second line is too gross to be natural to any but a madman, and, therefore, hath not humour. Nevertheless, its resemblance to the common complaint of old age, contained in the first, of which it may be called the analysis, renders it at once both an ingenious exhibition of such complaint in its real import, and an argument of its folly. But notwithstanding this example, it holds in general, that when any thing nonsensical in principle is to be assailed by ridicule, the natural ally of reason is wit; when any extravagance or impropriety in conduct, humour seldom fails to be of the confederacy. It may be further observed, that the words banter and raillery are also used to signify ridicule of a certain form, applied, indeed, more commonly to practices than to opinions, and oftener to the little peculiarities of individuals, than to the distinguishing customs or usages of sects and parties. The only difference in meaning, as far as I have remarked, between the two terms, is, that the first generally denotes a coarser, the second a finer sort of ridicule; the former prevails most among the lower classes of the people, the latter only among persons of breeding.

I shall conclude this chapter with observing, that though the gayer and more familiar eloquence, now explained, may often properly, as was remarked before, be admitted into public orations on subjects of consequence, such, for instance, as are delivered in the senate or at the bar, and even sometimes, though more sparingly, on the bench; it is seldom or never of service in those which come from the pulpit. It is true, that an air of ridicule in disproving or dissuading, by rendering opinions or practices contemptible, hath occasionally been

Dunciad.

attempted, with approbation, by preachers of great name. I can only say, that when this airy manner is employed, it requires to be managed with the greatest care and delicacy, that it may not degenerate into a strain but ill adapted to so serious an occupation. For the reverence of the place, the gravity of the function, the solemnity of worship, the severity of the precepts, and the importance of the motives of religion; above all, the awful presence of God, with a sense of which the mind, when occupied in religious exercises, ought eminently to be impressed; all these seem utterly incompatible with the levity of ridicule. They render jesting impertinence, and laughter madness. Therefore, any thing in preaching which might provoke this emotion, would justly be deemed an unpardonable offence against both piety and decorum.

In the two preceding chapters I have considered the nature of oratory in general, its various forms, whether arising from difference in the object, understanding, imagination, passion, will; or in the subject, eminent and severe, light and frivolous, with their respective ends and characters. Under these are included all the primary and characteristical qualities of whatever can pertinently find a place either in writing or in discourse, or can truly be termed fine in the one, or eloquent in the other.

B

CHAP. III.

The Doctrine of the preceding Chapter defended.

EFORE I proceed to another topic, it will perhaps be thought proper to inquire how far the theory, now laid down and explained, coincides with the doctrines on this article to be found in the writing of philosophers and crities. Not that I think such inquiries and discussions always necessary; on the contrary, I imagine they often tend but to embarrass the reader, by distracting his attention to a multiplicity of objects, and so to darken and perplex a plain question. This is particularly the case on these points on which there hath been a variety

of jarring sentiments. The simplest way and the most perspicuous, and generally that which best promotes the discovery of truth, is to give as distinct and methodical a delineation as possible of one's own ideas, together with the grounds on which they are founded, and to leave it to the doubtful reader (who thinks it worth the trouble) to compare the theory with the systems of other writers, and then to judge for himself. I am not, however, so tenacious of this method, as not to allow, that it may sometimes, with advantage, be departed from. This holds especially when the sentiments of an author are opposed by inveterate prejudices in the reader, arising from contrary opinions early imbibed, or from an excessive deference to venerable names and ancient autho rities.

SECTION I.-Aristotle's account of the Ridiculous

explained.

Some, on a superficial view, may imagine, that the doctrine above expounded is opposed by no less authority than that of Aristotle. If it were, I should not think that equivalent to a demonstration of its falsity. But let us hear; Aristotle hath observed, that "the ridicu "lous implies something deformed, and consists in those "smaller faults, which are neither painful nor pernicious, “but unbeseeming: thus a face excites laughter wherein "there is deformity and distortion without pain." For my part, nothing can appear more coincident than this, as far as it goes, with the principles which I have endeavoured to establish. The Stagyrite here speaks of ridicule, not of laughter in general, and not of every sort of ridicule, but solely of the ridiculous in manners, of which he hath in few words given a very apposite description. To take notice of any other laughable object, would have been foreign to his purpose. Laughter is not his theme, but comedy, and laughter only so far as comedy is concerned with it. Now the concern of comedy reaches no farther than that kind of ridicule which, as I said, relates to manners. The very words with which

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the above quotation is introduced, evince the truth of this, 66 Comedy," says he, " is, as we remarked, an imi"tation of things that are amiss; yet it does not level at every vice*." He had remarked in the preceding chapter, that its means of correction are "not reproach, "but ridicule.t" Nor does the clause in the end of the sentence, concerning a countenance which raises laughter, in the least invalidate which I have now affirmed; for it is plain, that this is suggested in the way of similitude, to illustrate what he had advanced, and not as a particular instance of the position he had laid down. For we can never suppose tha the would have called distorted features" a certain fault or slip‡," and still less that he would have specified this, as what might be corrected by the art of the comedian. As an instance, therefore, it would have confuted his definition, and shewn that his account of the object of laughter must be erroneous, since this emotion may be excited, as appears from the example produced by himself, where there is nothing faulty or vicious in any kind or degree. As an illustration it was extremely pertinent. It shewed that the ridiculous in manners (which was all that his definition regarded) was, as far as the different nature of the things would permit, analogous to the laughable in other subjects, and that it supposed an incongruous combination, where there is nothing either calamitous or destructive. But that in other objects unconnected with either character or conduct, with either the body or the soul, there might not be images or exhibitions presented to the mind, which would naturally provoke laughter, the philosopher hath nowhere, as far as I know, so much as insinuated.

SECTION II.-Hobbes's account of laughter examined.

From the founder of the peripatetic school, let us de

The whole passage runs thus, Η δε κωμωδία εσιν, ώσπερ ειπομεν, μίμησις φαυλότερων μεν, ο μείζοι κατα πασαν κακίαν, αλλά σε αισχρά και το γελοιον μόριον το γαρ γελοιον εσιν ἅμαρτημα τι και αίσχος ανώδυνον και ο φθαρτικόν διον ευθυς το γελοίον πρόσωπο αισχρον τι και διετραμμένον ανευ ἔδυνης. Poet. 5.

* Ου ψόγον αλλα το γέλοιον δραματο ποιήσας.

Αμάρτημα τιν

scend to the philosopher of Malmesbury, who hath defined laughter" a sudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison " with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly*." This account is, I acknowledge, incompatible with that given in the preceding pages, and, in my judgment, results entirely from a view of the subject, which is, in some respect partial, and in some respect false. It is in some respect partial. When laughter is produced by ridicule, it is, doubtless, accompanied with some degree of contempt. Ridicule, as hath been observed already, has a double operation, first on the fancy, by presenting to it such a group as constitutes a laughable object; secondly, on the passion mentioned, by exhibiting absurdity in human character, in principles or in conduct: and contempt always implies a sense of superiority.

No wonder then that one likes not to be ridiculed or laughed at. Now it is this union which is the great source of this author's error, and of his attributing to one of the associated principles, from an imperfect view of the subject, what is purely the effect of the other.

For that the emotion called laughter, doth not result from the contempt, but solely from the perception of oddity with which the passion is occasionally, not necessarily, combined, is manifest from the following considerations. First, contempt may be raised in a very high degree, both suddenly and unexpectedly, without producing the least tendency to laugh. Of this, instances have been given already from Bolingbroke and Swift, and innumerable others will occur to those who are con versant in the writings of those authors. Secondly, laughter may be, and is daily produced by the perception of incongruous association, when there is no contempt. And this shews that Hobbes's view of the matter is false as well as partial. Men," says he," laugh "at jests, the wit whereof always consisteth in the ele"gant discovering and conveying to our minds, some ab

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Human Nature, Chap. IX. § 13