verted to the disproportionate increase of foreign expenditure in consequence of the course of exchange.

Earl Grey, in a long speech, supported the statements and reasoning of the marquis, and deviated to other charges against the ministry.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that of all the motions which he had heard in that house, the present rested on the slightest grounds, nor did he ever hear a case for inquiry more weakly made out. He asserted that the campaign, instead of being a failure, was the most brilliant achieved by the British arms during a century. He asked what would have satisfied us in January 1812, as the result of the impending campaign? and was it not more successful than could have been expected by the most sanguine? He then adverted to the particulars which had before been touched upon; and added, that the great object to which they had been looking was, that the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of one individual, who should be the British chief commander, which had been accomplished by the events of this campaign. He denied the possibility of sending out the force required by the noble lord at the time when he stated it to be necessary; and affirmed that we had upon the Peninsula a larger force than could ever have been expected, and that a greater would only have been an incumbrance, unless the means of supplying it were at hand; and that they were not, was no fault of the ministers.

The Earl of Darnley spoke in favour of the motion; after which a division took place, in which

there were, Contents, 39; Notcontents, 115; majority against the motion, 76.

Connected with the preceding discussion in subject, as relating to a part of the conduct of the war, was an inquiry into the naval administration, particularly with reference to the war in which the country is involved with the United States of America.

On May 14th, the order of the day being read in the House of Lords, the Earl of Darnley rose to call the attention of their lordships to our naval disasters. He had hoped that during the interval between giving his notice and bringing forward his motion, something would have occurred to compensate the past disasters; but, on the contrary, another unfortunate event had been reported, attended with circumstances still more melancholy than the former ones. He alluded to the action between the British sloop of war Peacock, and the American brig Hornet, of equal force. He should not now enter upon any question concerning the course or policy of the war, but it could not be disputed that ministers must have been long aware that war, sooner or later, must take place. This being the case, how were we prepared to meet it? With respect to Canada, the events there had greatly added to our military reputation, but they were events entirely unexpected. It was, however, with regard to our naval force that he should confine his inquiries. It appeared that from April to July in the last year, there were on the Halifax station, under adm. Sawyer, exclusive of smaller vessels, one ship of the line and five frigates. That such a force only should have been stationed

there, when a timely reinforcement might have achieved the most important objects, loudly called for inquiry. He was well informed that with five ships of the line, 17 frigates, and an adequate number of smaller vessels, on that station, the whole coast of the United States might have been blockaded. It had been said that a sufficient force could not be spared for that purpose; but by sending to sea vessels which were lying useless, and taking one ship from each of the blockading squadrons, this might have been effected. It might be asserted that the force already on the Halifax station was equal to that of the American navy; but it had long been a matter of notoriety, that the American frigates were greatly superior to ours in size and weight of metal. If the war was inevitable, it was very extraordinary that government did not give orders for the construction of vessels able to cope with our antagonists. It would only be necessary to refer to dates to prove the criminal negligence of ministers. War was declared on the 18th of June, and it was not till October 13th that letters of marque and reprisal were issued; and more than two months longer elapsed before the Chesapeake and Delaware were declared to be blockaded. Certain other ports were declared to be blockaded on the 13th of March last, but Rhode Island and Newport remained open, and in the last the American frigate was refitted that took the Macedonian. In all the unfortunate cases, the cause was the same; the superior height of the enemy,and their greater weight of metal, by which our ships were crippled and dismasted early in the

action, were circumstances surely deserving of inquiry. His lordship then called the attention of the house to the manner in which our trade had been left exposed to the depredations of the enemy; and he strongly reprobated the licences given by government for the importation of American cotton, thereby favouring their commerce to the detriment of our colonies. He then touched upon the mismanagement in our dock-yards; and upon the whole he contended that a case had been made out loudly demanding investigation. He concluded by moving, "That a select committee be appointed to inquire into the circumstances of the war with the United States, and more particularly into the state, conduct, and management of our naval affairs, as connected with it.

The motion was seconded by earl Stanhope.

Lord Melville then rose and said, that though the conduct, and not the grounds of the war was the matter now to be considered, yet there was one circumstance connected with the declaration of it on which it was necessary to say a few words. Although the government of the United States had for some time before been in such a frame of mind as ultimately led to hostilities, yet a general opinion prevailed that the revocation of the orders in council would have pacified it. He protested against the noble earl's proposition, that it was the duty of ministers always to have kept there a fleet sufficient to blockade all the ports in America.

There were other important branches of the service to which their attention was called, and our force on other stations was no more

than sufficient, the blockading force in many places being less than the force blockaded. He had never met with a naval officer who entertained the opinion of the noble mover respecting the possibility of completely blockading the American ports. As to what he had said relative to the ships which had been opposed to the Americans, lord M. observed, that we were not to alter the classes of ships in the British navy merely because there were three American ships of unusual dimensions. All naval officers agreed in the opinion that it was not proper to multiply the classes of vessels; and it was far better to send out 74's than to set about building ships only fit to cope with the American navy. The advice to diminish the number of small vessels was one in which no experienced person could concur, since these were peculiarly requisite to protect our trade against the enemy's privateers. The balance of capture was so far from being in favour of the Americans, that it was the reverse. With respect to not sooner issuing letters of marque, the delay was for the purpose of knowing the reception given by the Americans to our proposals of accommodation. As to the charge of mismanagement in the dock-yards, measures had been taken to remedy defects. Some of our ships, it was true, had undergone a rapid decay, through haste in the building; but it was necessary that our exertions should keep pace with those of the enemy. For all these reasons he should give his vote against the motion.

Earl Stanhope made a speech chiefly relative to his own plans for the improvement of naval architecture. The most remarkable

part was his reference to the contrivances of Mr. Fulton for blowing up ships under water, whose offers, he said, had been rejected by Bonaparte, but had been accepted by Mr. Pitt and lord Melville, who after his failure at Boulogne, made a compromise with him for a considerable sum, with which he went to America. Earl S. said, he had given a plan to the admiralty for preventing the effect of his inventions, which he thought of a formidable nature.

The Earl of Galloway entered into some professional remarks respecting the naval disasters of the American war, which he attributed very much to the power of the enemy to man their few large frigates with prime sailors; whereas the great demand for men in our navy had rendered it necessary to admit a large proportion of an inferior class. He touched upon the propensity of our seamen to desert, which he thought might be best obviated by an increase of petty officers made from the best among them, and by more liberal remuneration. He was also of opinion, in opposition to lord Melville, that ships of precisely the same kind with those of the Americans should be built, in order to contend with them. He asserted that he should have approved of the motion had its objects been, not censure, but inquiry.

Earl Grey began with adverting to the contract of the admiralty with Mr. Fulton, and the compromise which he himself had negociated, in the conviction that his invention would not prove of the smallest utility. He confessed, however, that such was his dislike to this mode of warfare, that he had passed many uneasy nights

from the idea of its practicability. He then made a number of remarks relative to the expediency of an inquiry on the present occasion, not only on account of our naval disasters, but the whole management of the American war. He dwelt particularly on the neglect in protecting the trade of the West Indies and of the coast of South America, and on the superiority of force which the Americans had been suffered to construct on the Canadian lakes.

Earl Bathurst defended the conduct of ministers upon similar grounds with those taken by lord Melville.

Lord Grenville said, that the doctrine advanced by lord Galloway, that inquiry implied censure, would lead to the abdication of all the functions of parliament; for no inquiry could be instituted, in that case, without incurring the guilt of condemning the parties unheard. He recapitulated some of the charges against ministry which had been already urged by the supporters of the motion.

After the earl of Liverpool had spoken in defence of the ministers, and the noble mover had briefly replied, the House divided, for the motion, 59; against it, 125. Majority, 66.

CHAPTER

TH

THE prodigious increase of the public expenditure, and the diminution of several sources of revenue, in consequence of the war, had occasioned a general opinion, towards the close of the last session of parliament, that some new financial measures were become necessary; and the order of the day standing on March 3, for the House of Commons to resolve itself into a committee of the whole House to consider of the finances of Great Britain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Vansittart) rose to open the subject. He first adverted to two measures which he had formerly mentioned; the adop. tion of some more efficacious plan for the redemption of the land-tax, and the provision of an increased proportion of sinking fund for so much of the loan of each year as might exceed the sum applicable to the redemption of the debt. With respect to the former, he chiefly relied upon a simplification of the mode of the redemption of the land-tax, and freeing it from troublesome formalities. As to the latter, he meant to recommend that the proportion of increase in the sinking fund should be one half of the interest of the excess in the loan. In addition to these measures he should propose to the

House one which belonged more immediately to the extensive system with which he wished to combine them. It would involve the repeal of so much of the sinking fund act of 1802 as directs that the whole sinking fund then existing shall continue to accumulate at compound interest till the total redemption of the whole funded debt then remaining unredeemed. The right hon. gentleman then made some remarks on the bad effects that would arise from an accumulation of the sinking fund to 30 or 40 millions, which would be the case on adhering to this plan, and from its sudden reduction when the effect was produced. He showed that the fund had already redeemed 240 millions, the sum of the whole debt at the time when it was established, besides which, the public had paid upwards of 200 millions in war taxes; whence he inferred that it had now a claim for some relief. This might be given without the smallest infringement of the provisions of the act of 1792, the terms of which were, that provision should be made for the repayment of all debts subsequently contracted, within 45 years from their creation. He then proceeded to explain how this might be done,