given by the act from the moment he left | either directly or indirectly, in the interest the ship until he got back onto the ship." of his employer, then, however harmless See also Lowe v. Pearson [1899] 1 Q. B. such an act may be, he loses the protection 261, 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 122, 47 Week. Rep. of the act whilst he is so engaged." 193, 79 L. T. N. S. 654, 15 Times L. R. 124; Reed v. Great Western R. Co. [1909] A. C. 31, 2 B. W. C. C. 109, 99 L. T. N. S. 781, 78 L. J. K. B. N. S. 31, 25 Times L. R. 36, 46 Scot. L. R. 700, 53 Sol. Jo. 31. Of this case Mr. Ruegg says [p. 353]. "It is a decision of the House of Lords, and may be said to establish finally the principle propounded in the first decision given on the words, viz.: Smith v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co. supra. This principle is that where the workman is doing an act entirely for his own purposes, and in no way, Many other cases might be cited to the same effect. We are of opinion that there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the injury arose out of and in the course of Spooner's employment, and for that reason appellant is under no liability to the claimant in this case. This conclusion renders it unnecessary for us to consider the third proposition. The decision of the Industrial Accident Board is therefore reversed. This case was originally assigned to the late Chief Justice McAlvay. MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT. LIDA RAYNER V. wick, 2 B. W. C. C. 103, 43 Ir. Law Times, 126; Morrison v. Clyde Nav. Co. [1909] S. C. 59, 2 B. W. C. C. 99, 46 Scot. L. R. 38. Messrs. Norris, McPherson, & Har SLIGH FURNITURE COMPANY, Plff. in rington, for defendant in certiorari: Certiorari. The facts are stated in the opinion. The accident to Adelbert Rayner did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. Smith v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co. [1899] 1 Q. B. 141, 1 W. C. C. 1, 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 51, 47 Week. Rep. 146, 79 L. T. N. S. 633, 15 Times L. R. 64; Shaw v. Wigan Coal & I. Co. 3 B. W. C. C. 81; Murphy v. Ber The injury arose out of and in the course of Rayner's employment. V. Fitzgerald v. Clarke [1908] 2 K. B. 796, Kuhn, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This case is brought here by certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board. Adelbert Rayner, the applicant's husband, was injured while in respondent's factory in the city of Grand Rapids. About 100 carvers and cabinet workers were employed on the third floor of the factory, and, on the blowing of the noon whistle, each workman was required to proceed to the end of the room and punch the time clock before leaving for dinner. Mr. Rayner, who was working on this floor, about 150 feet from the time clock, on November 5, 1912, when the whistle blew at noon, started on a from his bench to the clock to punch it. After proceeding about 30 feet, he collided with Martin De Vos, a fellow employee, whom he could not see because of drawers which were piled up on the floor. This resulted in Rayner fracturing or injuring one run or more of his ribs. The injury to his side and ribs affected the pleura of his lungs, and from the inflammation or irritation which followed the lungs became affected, resulting in Mr. Rayner's death. There had been no general notice printed or posted of a rule against running to the time clock, but, about a year previous to the accident, Rayner had been told by his foreman, Hicks, not to run to the clock. There was testimony that the rule against running had not been enforced, and no employee had been discharged because of doing so. An award to claimant, who was left as his dependent, was made by a committee on arbitration, and upon review was affirmed by the Industrial Accident Board. It is the contention of the respondent and appellant that the facts indicate that the accident and the resulting injury arose out of an act independent of the employment, in direct violation of a rule of the company, and solely for his own pleasure or convenience. With reference to the rule, the Commission made a finding that such a rule had not been enforced, and its general violation had been acquiesced in by the employer. There being evidence to support this finding of fact, by the terms of the act (part 3, § 12, Act No. 10, P. A., Extra Session 1912) 2 How. Stat. 2d ed. §§ 3939 et seq., it becomes conclusive, and as a result eliminates the consideration of the question as to whether the injury arose by reason of the intentional and wilful misconduct of Rayner. Rumboll v. Nunnery Colliery Co. 80 L. T. N. S. 42, 1 W. C. C. 28, 63 J. P. 132. of this duty, if not the proximate cause, was a concurring cause of his injury. In Fitzgerald v. Clarke (1908) 99 L. T. N. S. 101, 1 B. W. C. C. 197, Buckley, L. J., stated the rule as follows: "The words 'out of and in the course of the employment' are used conjunctively, not disjunctively, and, upon ordinary principles of construction, are not to be read as meaning 'out of,' that is to say, 'in the course of." The former words must mean something different from the latter words. The workman must satisfy both the one and the other. The words 'out of' point, I think, to the origin or cause of the accident; the words 'in the course of' to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. former words are descriptive of the character or quality of the accident. The latter words relate to the circumstances under which an accident of that character or quality takes place. The character or quality of the accident as conveyed by the words 'out of' involves, I think, the idea that the accident is in some sense due to the employment." We are well satisfied that the accident was an industrial accident within the meaning of the compensation act, and arose "out of and in the course of his employment." Whitehead v. Reader [1901] 2 K. B. 48, 70 L. J. K. B. N. S. 546, 65 J. P. 403, 49 Week. Rep. 562, 84 L. T. N. S. 514, 17 Times L. R. 387. The The judgment and decision of the Industrial Accident Board is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Ostrander, Brooke, Stone, Bird, At the time of the accident, Rayner was McAlvay, Ch. J., dissenting: I do not think that this was an industrial Annotation-On workmen's compensation acts. Part A. Introductory. 1. Introduction and scope of note, 27. Part B. English and Colonial decisions. II. In general, 28. III. Application of the statute generally (§ 1). a. Text of § 1, 29. b. "Injury by accident" (§ 1, subsec. 1), 29. c. "Arising out of and in the course of the employment" ($ 1, subsec. 1), 40. d. Disabled "from earning full wages" (§ 1, subsec. 2 (a)), 72. IV. Notice of the accident and | IX.-continued. means of a scaf- J. When workmen employed XXIV. Introduction to American de- XXV. Constitutionality of Ameri- XXVII. Extra-territorial effect of XXVIII. Limitation of application of XXX. Election to come in under d. Rights and remedies XXXII. "Accident" and "personal XXXIII. Injuries “arising out of and XXXIV. "Serious or wilful miscon- |