mine, or any other created mind, it still exists in the mind of the Author of Nature.* Hence, Berkeley's bold position, which has startled many a student, "that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth,-in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world,- have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known†," shrinks, on a close inspection, to a needless flourish of insecurity and precariousness to alarm the imagination, inasmuch as when they are not perceived by any created being (or to be sure whether they are or are not), they are perceived by the Omniscient Creator; and thus their permanent existence, as Berkeley himself indeed points out, is secure.

Such is a brief statement or sketch of the Berkeleian idea. Without troubling you by pointing out particular instances, I will content myself with observing that, where the delineation at all differs from what can be said of an external object, it is imaginary or conjectural.

*Vol. 1. p. 183.

† p. 26.

LETTER XVI.

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION, CONTINUED.-BERKELEY.

THE discussion, I fear, has already become wearisome, but for the full comprehension of Berkeley's theory, it is necessary to take into view, not only the relation in which it stands to the common opinion of men, but also his own account of that relation; the latter of which is by no means precise and luminous.

When he started on his wild metaphysical enterprise, he very justly considered himself as engaged in proving that mankind were involved in a strange error; that what they mistook for an external, material, independent world, was merely an ideal one, dependent on being perceived; that there was a radical difference between himself and them regarding it.

Accordingly, he at first describes them, in a passage before quoted, as being strangely pervaded with the opinion that mountains and rivers have a natural or real existence, distinct from their being perceived. In the progress of his speculations, however, he veers round, and claims the majority of his fellow-creatures-the vulgar-as concurring in their views with himself.

Thus, in answer to the charge of Hylas, that Philonous is for changing all things into ideas, he makes the latter say:

"You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves."*

The same speaker afterwards says:-"We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms; but herein we differ, you will have them to be empty appearances, I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do."

Again, he asks his opponent, "Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures and substances, admit, with the vulgar, those for real things which are perceived by the senses."†

In all this, however, there is something scarcely ingenuous. It wears at least that appearance of disingenuousness which is frequently the result of being thoroughly possessed by some favourite theory.

The truth is, that Berkeley's ranging himself with the vulgar in opinion, contrary to his antecedent declarations, is in reference not to the great question "whether there is an independent external world, but to certain subordinate inquiries confined almost † p. 203.

* Works, vol. 1. p. 201.

altogether to philosophers, one of which is, whether, besides the qualities we perceive through our organs of sense, there is an occult substratum,—a problem about which the vulgar, I imagine, seldom concern themselves, and may be considered as virtually, or by implication, siding with him.

But, although a Berkeleian must deny a substratum of this kind, his antagonist, so far from being bound to maintain it, may consistently unite with him in the denial.

In the same way Berkeley claims the multitude for his supporters, when he is arguing against the opinion that what we perceive by the senses, are only images or copies of real things. But on this point, again, any one may agree with him (as I myself do), and still wholly dissent from his peculiar theory.

The tendency of claiming, in this manner, the concurrence of mankind at large, which he knew was only on minor points, without distinctly keeping the questions apart, was to engender confusion; although after all he is obliged, before he closes the discussion, to confess a radical difference between himself and others on the paramount question at issue.

"In common talk," he says, "the objects of our senses are not termed ideas but things. Call them so still, provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word."

Now it is just this absolute external existence, which is firmly held by the vulgar, or, rather, which they never think of questioning. The "common talk" referred to implies it, and Berkeley, being cognisant of the fact, should not have attempted to range the multitude on his side.

"Well, then," you will be disposed to ask, "what, after all these distinctions and disputes, is really the difference, stated in plain, unequivocal language, between Berkeley and other philosophers, or, rather, between him and mankind in general? What is the great peculiarity in the system about which all this controversy is raised, on which he has lavished such inexhaustible ingenuity, and to which men still turn with bewildered understandings and perplexed looks?

The difference between him and others may be stated, I think, in a few simple propositions. 1. He maintains that the objects we perceive (which he chooses to call ideas) are, equally with representative ideas, mental, or in the mind: other people maintain that they are non-mental, or out of the mind.

2. He maintains that these objects, being mental,

do not, and cannot, exist unperceived: other people maintain, that the fact of objects (which they deny to be mental) being perceived or unperceived can make no difference to the existence of such objects.

3. He maintains that the Author of "Nature"