before starting, and if, after the train is started, such person alights
and, in doing so, is injured, his act of alighting is not contributory
negligence, and the carrier is answerable for the damages suffered.
(Ala.) Southern Railway Co. v. Patterson, 30.
5. RAILWAYS-Notice to Conductor of Purpose of Person Assist-
ing a Passenger, What Sufficient.—If a person boards a railway train
for the purpose of assisting an old lady who is nearly blind, and,
before doing so, tells the conductor of her condition and need of as-
sistance to get upon the train and to secure a seat, and is requested
by the conductor to assist her, the company is chargeable with notice
of the purpose of such person, that he did not intend to become a
passenger, and would seek to alight from the train. (Ala.) South-
ern Ry. Co. v. Patterson, 30.
6. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS, Agents of are not Exclusive
Judges of Identification.-Under a ticket signed by a passenger and
specifying that the purchaser will sign her name and otherwise
identify herself as such passenger when called upon to do so by any
conductor or agent or agents of the carrier, they are not made abso-
lute arbiters. The utmost they can require is reasonably satisfactory
evidence of identification, and the carrier may therefore be held an-
swerable if they wrongfully eject a passenger from a train. (Cal.)
Marlow v. Southern Pacific Co., 127.
7. DAMAGES, When not Excessive for Ejecting a Passenger from
a Train.-Five hundred dollars is not an excessive sum to award for
the wrongful ejection of a married woman, traveling with her infant,
from a train, in the night-time, at a station far from home, and
without baggage or money. (Cal.) Marlow v. Southern Pac. Co., 127.
Contract to Furnish Cars.
8. RAILWAYS-Livestock Contract, When does not Merge Pre-
vious Negotiations for the Furnishing of a Car.-If, on application
to a railway company, it agrees to furnish cars at a date specified
for the shipping of livestock, but, failing to do so, it furnishes such
cars at a subsequent date and exacts from the shipper what is known
as a livestock contract, such contract does not relate to nor merge
the prior contract to furnish cars, nor prevent the recovery of dam-
ages for not complying with it. (N. Y.) Clark v. Ulster etc. R. R.
Co., 848.
9. RAILWAYS, Contract of to Furnish Cars, When Mutual.-If
an intending shipper applies to an agent of a railway company for a
car in which to make a shipment and the company agrees to furnish
it, there arises by implication of law an agreement on the part of
such shipper to use the car if furnished, and, in case of not using, to
pay whatever loss may have accrued to the company. (N. Y.) Clark
v. Ulster etc. R. R. Co., 848.
10. RAILWAYS Contract to Furnish Cars, When Arises and
Effect of. A shipper's orders calling for a specified number of cars
for a specified date will, when accepted by the carrier, constitute a
contract binding on it to furnish the cars and on him to furnish the
goods with which to load them. (N. Y.) Clark v. Ulster etc. R. R.
Co., 848.
11. RAILWAYS, Station Agents of, Implied Authority to Contract
for the Furnishing of Cars.-If an intending shipper applies to the
station agent of a railway company for a car to be furnished at a
time and for a purpose specified, and the agent answers that the
shipper can have the car, a contract is thereby created between the
carrier and the shipper upon which the former is answerable in dam-
ages on failing to furnish the car as promised. The authority to make
the contract is implied, as within such agent's employment. (N. Y.)
Clark v. Ulster etc. R. R. Co., 848.
Ownership of Consigned Property.
12. CARRIERS—Ownership of Property Consigned-Right to Sue.
If a shipper delivers his property to a carrier, marked and addressed
to another person as consignee, and gives the carrier no other or
further notice than that to be presumed and inferred from the act
of consignment, the law will presume the contract for transportation
to have been made for and on behalf of the consignee, and that he
is the owner of the property and entitled to its possession and to
sue therefor. (Idaho) Pratt v. Northern Pac. Ex. Co., 268.
13. CARRIERS-Ownership of Goods Consigned.-If a shipper de-
livers his property to a carrier without special instructions as to its
ownership or its delivery on any condition, the consignee becomes
immediately entitled to the possession of the property, and may de-
mand and lawfully receive it forthwith from the carrier, and the
latter is justified in delivering it to the consignee at any point on its
line of transportation. (Idaho) Pratt v. Northern Pacific Exp.
Co., 268.
14. CARRIERS-Express Companies Ownership of Property Con-
signed-Right to Sue.-If a consignor intrusts money to an express
company with general directions to deliver it to a consignee named,
he thereby vests the right to the possession of the money in the
consignee, and in the absence of any different or contrary instruc-
tions, or any demand for the money, prior to the consignee's de-
mand therefor, the latter is entitled to recover it, upon the failure
and refusal of the express company to deliver the money to him.
(Idaho) Pratt v. Northern Pacific Exp. Co., 268.
15. CARRIERS-Ownership of Property Consigned.-If property
is received by a carrier on an unconditional and unrestricted consign-
ment, the carrier not only may, but must, treat the consignee as the
absolute owner until it receives notice to the contrary. (Idaho)
Pratt v. Northern Pac. Exp. Co., 268.
Loss of Goods-Act of God.
16. NEGLIGENCE, Loss Resulting Partly from and Partly from
Other Causes.-If a carrier is guilty of negligence not in itself harm-
ful, but wrongful only because of injurious consequences which may
follow, and a new cause intervenes between such negligence and the
injury complained of, which new cause is not a consequence of the
original negligence, which reasonable prudence on the part of the
original wrongdoer could not have anticipated, and but for which
the injury could not have happened, the new cause is the proximate
cause, and the original negligence is disregarded as not affecting
the result. (Kan.) Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 416.
17. CARRIERS do not Assume the Risk of Loss Caused by the Act
of God. (Kan.) Rodgers v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 416.
18. CARRIER'S NEGLECT, Liability for When Followed by an
Act of God.-If a carrier negligently delays the transportation of
goods, so that they are subsequently exposed to, and destroyed or
injured by, an act of God, such as storm or flood, to which they
would not have been exposed had they been transported with reason-
able diligence, the proximate cause of the injury is the act of God
and not the negligence, and the carrier is not answerable for damages.
(Kan.) Rodgers v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 416.
Adjustment of Claims for Loss.
19. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Railroads-Adjustment of Claims
for Loss to Freight.-A statute providing that common carriers shall
adjust freight charges and claims for loss or damage to freight within
a named time, and that if this is not done they shall be liable to a
penalty, is not unconstitutional as violative of the equality clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, or of
a similar provision in a state constitution. (S. C.) Seegers Brothers
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 921.
20. APPELLATE PRACTICE.-Findings of a Magistrate as to the
amount of damages by loss to freight caused by a common carrier,
if affirmed by the circuit court, cannot be reviewed by the supreme
court if there is any evidence to support them. (S. C.) Seegers
Brothers v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 921.
CODICIL.
See Wills, 8, 9.
1. PLEADING-What not Sufficient to Charge Defendant with
Knowledge. An averment that the defendant's servants were guilty
of negligence in failing to stop the paddle-wheels to prevent the
creation of a succession of large waves when a small boat with occu-
pants was plainly visible to such servants is defective, in not further
stating that such boat and its contents were actually seen by them.
(Ala.) Daniels v. Carney, 34.
2. PLEADING-Necessity of Averring Knowledge of Danger.—A
complaint charging negligence in not stopping the revolutions of a
propeller or paddle-wheel of a steamboat when a small boat and its
occupants were seen by the defendant's servants is defective, in not
showing that the peril of such occupants was an obvious one, or was
known to the servants. (Ala.) Daniels v. Carney, 34.
3. NAVIGABLE WATERS -Respective Rights of Large and
Small Boats.-The exercise of the right of navigation is as much
guaranteed to small craft as to a great steamer. Each owes the other
the duty of observance of due care so as to avoid inflicting wrong and
injury upon the other. The injury resulting from a violation of this
duty, whether intentional or through negligence, carries with it the
legal responsibility of answering in damages. (Ala.) Daniels v.
Carney, 34.
4. NAVIGABLE WATERS-Duty of Steamers to Stop the Revo-
lution of Paddle-wheels to Prevent Injury to Occupants of Small
Boats. If a steamer and a small boat are being navigated in a river,
and the small boat is in such a position that the continued revolution
of the steamer's paddle-wheel or propeller will create large waves
sufficient to capsize or swamp the small boat in passing, thereby en-
dangering the lives of its occupants, the steamer and its owners owe
the duty to such occupants of avoiding the danger by ceasing the
normal operation of the steamer and stopping the revolution of its
wheels or propeller until the small boat has passed without the zone
of danger of waves from the larger boat, and if, by failing to do so,
any of such occupants loses his life, such owners are answerable.
(Ala.) Daniels v. Carney, 34.
5. NAVIGABLE WATERS-Contributory Negligence-Occupants
of Small Boats, When not Prosumed Guilty of.-Where persons in a
small boat in a navigable stream are safe in the absence of an
unusual disturbance in the water, and the water at the time the
steamer approaches is smooth, they cannot be adjudged guilty of con-
tributory negligence when the boat is capsized by waves due to the
continuous revolution of the propeller or wheels of the steamer. Such
persons had the right to assume that the navigators of large crafts
would observe their duty under the law toward a small boat to avoid
the infliction of injury. (Ala.) Daniels v. Carney, 34.
6. MASTER AND SERVANT-Steamboat, Failure to Allege that
Persons Operating Were Acting in the Line of Their Authority.-In
an action against the owners of a steamboat to recover for the death
of a human being averred to have occurred from the negligence of
servants who were operating such boat in failing to discontinue such
operation and to stop the propeller or wheels of such steamer, and
thereby prevent large waves by which the small boat was capsized,
the complaint must allege that such servants acted at the time in the
scope and line of their authority. (Ala.) Daniels v. Carney, 34.
1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-A license may be exacted from
a person selling beer by the barrel, half barrel, or quarter barrel,
though he purchases it in another state, whence it is shipped to him
into this state and it remains in the kegs in which he receives it.
(Ala.) City of Mobile v. Phillips, 17.
2. INTERSTATE COMMERCE, Business Which is not.-The
business of brokers of making contracts to buy and sell future cot-
ton for customers is not interstate commerce. Such contracts are not
articles of commerce. (Ala.) Ware v. Mobile County, 21.
3. INTERSTATE COMMERCE License Exacted for Dealing in
Futures.-A license exacted of brokers who are engaged in buying
and selling grain and cotton for future delivery, taking orders in
Alabama, to be executed on the exchanges in New York or New
Orleans, is not imposed on interstate commerce, where the contracts
in which brokers deal do not contain any stipulation requiring the
seller to ship the cotton or grain to any point without the state,
though, as a matter of fact, such shipments are sometimes made by
the seller. The subsequent shipment cannot become interstate com-
merce until the articles commence to be transported. (Ala.) Ware
v. Mobile County, 21.
4. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-Termination of Interstate Trans-
portation-Taxing Power of State. If goods consisting of small
packages are packed in one large box and shipped from one state,
consigned to the shippers in another, and there received by them
from the carrier at their destination, where the large box is broken
open, and the small packages are delivered to purchasers in accordance
with previous orders, the goods, after the large box is broken open
and delivery begins, cease to be the subject of interstate transporta-
tion, and become a part and parcel of the property of the state, sub-
ject to taxation under its revenue laws. (Idaho) Parks Bros. & Co.
v. Nez Perce, 261.
5. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-End of Interstate Transporta-
tion-Original Package-Taxing Power.-If goods consisting of small
packages are packed in one large box and consigned to the shipper
in another state, the original package is the large box in which the
goods imported are shipped, and when such box is opened at the
point of destination for the sale and delivery of the separate parcels
contained in it, each parcel of the goods loses its distinctive charac-
ter as an import or subject of interstate commerce, and becomes
property subject to taxation by the state as other like property situ
ated within its limits. (Idaho) Parks Bros. & Co. v. Nez Perce, 261.
6. INTERSTATE COMMERCE-End of Interstate Transporta-
tion-Original Package-Taxing Power.-If goods consisting of small
packages are packed in one large box consigned to the shipper in
another state, the original package is the large box in which the
imported goods are shipped, and after it is received by the owners
at its destination and opened and the smaller packages removed
therefrom for delivery to customers it ceases to be an article of in-
terstate commerce, and is subject to the taxing power of the state
where found. (Idaho) Parks Bros. & Co. v. Nez Perce, 201.
1. COMMON LAW-Adoption of.—By statute so much of the com-
mon law as is applicable to our conditions and not inconsistent with
the constitution of the United States, or of the state, is in force in
Nebraska. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
2. COMMON LAW, Adoption of, in the United States.-The
principles and rules of the common law, so far as applicable to our
conditions, became and continue in force unless abrogated or modified
by express statutory or constitutional enactments. (N. Y.) Waters
& Co. v. Gerard, 886.
3. COMMON LAW, Construction of Statutes and Constitutions
by. Constitutions and statutes should be construed with reference
to the doctrines of the common law, and the constitutional and stat-
utory provisions providing that a person shall not be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law should not be
held to have been intended to forbid or affect the right to a lien
which had been recognized and sustained by the common law. (N.
Y.) Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 886.
4. COMMON LAW, Evidence of.-Where the recognized printed
reports of the English courts prior to 1775 show that the common law
on any particular subject was by such cases established and deter-
mined as therein stated, such reports are the best and highest evi-
dence of such common law. (N. Y.) Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 886.
CONCEALED WEAPONS.
See Weapons.
CONFESSIONS.
See Criminal Law, 6.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-Transfer of Title.-The transfer of
title to real estate within the limits of a state is entirely subject to
the laws of that state, and no interference with it can be permitted
by other states. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall, 767.
See Sunday; Telegraphs and Telephones, 2.
CONSIGNED GOODS.
See Carriers, 12-15.
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