evidence, declarations of witnesses made to the defendant at a later date to the effect that he did make such admissions cannot be used as evidence against him. (Neb.) Powers v. State, 801.
6. CRIMINAL LAW-Confessions as Evidence.-One cannot be convicted of a felony upon his own unsupported extrajudicial confes- sion that a crime has been committed. Such confession may be suffi- cient to prove the defendant's connection with the criminal act, but there must in all cases be proof aliunde of the essential facts con- stituting the crime. (Neb.) Blacker v. State, 751.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Privilege of not Answering In- criminating Questions is Personal.-That a witness was improperly compelled to answer, and did answer, incriminating questions, against the objection of the defendant in a criminal prosecution, cannot be urged by such defendant in the appellate court. (Ala.) Beauvoir Club v. State, 82.
Criminal Law, trial, applause by spectators at, 511.
trial, applause, failure to warn jury after, 511, 512.
trial, duty of court when spectators applaud or show approval or disapproval, 511, 512.
trial, manifestations of grief or emotion by spectators, 515, 516. trial, misconduct of spectators at as a ground for new trial, 511. trial, misconduct of spectators, new trial because of, 513.
trial, misconduct or applause of spectators, duty to object to, and to call for a reprimand, 512.
trial, prejudice to the defendant, when presumed from miscon- duct or applause of spectators, 513.
trial, remarks of spectators at, when warrant the granting of a new trial, 514, 515.
trial, spectators, improper remarks of at, when sufficient ground for a new trial, 514.
Criminal Trials, discretion of the judge presiding at, 807, 808. judges presiding at, duties of to keep attorneys within the facts, 808.
prejudice presumed from improper arguments to the jury, 809. prosecuting attorneys, arguments by not based on evidence, 807-
prosecuting attorneys, arguments, latitude allowed in, 807, 808. prosecuting attorneys, duties of to be fair and impartial, 806, 807. prosecuting attorneys, prejudice occasioned by in asking questions not admissible, 807.
witnesses, refusal of to testify is not evidence of the guilt of the person on trial, 809, 810.
1. DAMAGES.-For Bodily Pain and Suffering of a Wife endured because of a wrongful act of another she may recover, though no physical violence was done to her person. (Ala.) Engle v. Sim- mons, 59.
2. DAMAGES-Verdict-Computation.-If a statute allows the successful party to recover a sum which is determined by multiplying the actual damages sustained a specified number of times, it is im- material whether the jury return in their verdict the sum which the plaintiff is entitled to recover by virtue of the statute, or whether they return the actual damages, and the court directs the judgment
to be entered in accordance with the statute. (Colo.) Richards v. Sanderson, 167.
1. DEED-Omission of Grantor's Name.-A deed signed by the grantor is operative, though his name is omitted from the body of the instrument. (Ga.) Sterling v. Park, 224.
2. DEED, Delivery of to a Third Person for the Grantee.-A grantor may deliver a deed to a third person to be held until the grantor's death, and then delivered to the grantee, and such original delivery is good and vests title in the grantee, if there is no reserva- tion of the right of the grantor to avoid or resume possession of the instrument. (Ala.) Griswold v. Griswold, 64.
3. DEEDS-Warranty of Existence of Street.-The fact that a deed describes the land as bounded by a certain street or alley raises no implied warranty that such street or alley exists, if the grantor is not the owner of the soil therein. (Tenn.) Fulmer v. Bates, 1059. 4. DEEDS Acknowledgment-Residence.-A statute providing that the place of residence" of the grantor in a deed be stated in the certificate of acknowledgment is directory merely. Hence the acknowledgment is sufficient although the grantor's residence is not stated. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
5. DEEDS Acknowledgment "Free Act and Deed.”—If a cer- tificate of acknowledgment of a deed recites that the grantor "duly acknowledged the execution of the same, the acknowledgment is sufficient, although it does not recite that the deed was executed as the grantor's "free act and deed." The statute relating to the latter clause is directory and not mandatory. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
6. DEEDS-Forged-Effect of Notice and Knowledge.-If a grantee takes a deed for land from a grantor whose title is known to the former to rest in an erased, mutilated and forged deed, the grantee takes no interest in the land, whether the forged deed was recorded or not, or whether it was outside the chain of title or not. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
can acquire no interest in land through a forged deed, whether or not he has notice of the forgery. (Mo.) Gross v. Watts, 662.
See Covenants; Executors and Administrators, 7-9; Wills, 4, 5. Note.
Definition of betting, 694.
of forcible detainer, 372.
of forcible entry, 371, 372.
of gaming or gambling, 694.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-Estoppel Against Heirs.- Brothers and sisters, by renouncing the succession of a deceased brother in favor of their mother, do not thereby estop themselves from contesting the right of the children of such brother to share in the mother's estate. (La.) Succession of Gabisso, 529.
DIVORCE-Adultery-Identification of Accomplice.-If a peti- tion for divorce charges adultery between the defendant and a named
accomplice as the sole ground therefor, and the judgment of final divorce recites that it was rendered after due proof, although the evi- dence is not preserved, the identification of the accomplice is suffi. cient for the purposes of a statute prohibiting and declaring null marriage between a person divorced for adultery and his or her ac- complice therein. (La.) Succession of Gabisso, 529.
2. DIVORCE-Appeal-Desertion.-A decree of divorce granted upon the ground of desertion is properly reversed where the record fails to show that the desertion was willful, or without reasonable cause, as required by the statute. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
3. DIVORCE-Appeal by Writ of Error-Laches.-Upon a writ of error to review a decree of divorce, the defense or doctrine of laches does not apply, as the statute fixes the period within which the writ may be sued out. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
DIVORCE-Jurisdiction-Division of Real Estate.-Courts have no power or jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding to divide or apportion the real estate of the parties, unless given such power by statute, and if they attempt to act in excess of the powers therein granted, their action is void and subject to collateral attack. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall, 767.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-Right of Husband to Wife's Choses. The fact that a husband reduces to his possession a note belonging to his wife gives him no property rights in it, and the fact that he disposes of it before she obtains a divorce does not pre- vent her from thereafter recovering it or its equivalent from him. (Ky.) Johnson v. Johnson's Committee, 449.
6. CONTRACT-Transaction to Facilitate Divorce.-An agree- ment by a wife to confirm a gift of a note to her husband if he will not oppose her action for a divorce is void, and does not affect her right to recover the note or the amount of it. (Ky.) Johnson v. Johnson's Committee, 449.
7. DIVORCE-Custody of Children.-In awarding the custody of a child to one of the parents in a divorce proceeding, the good of the child is the primary object, and due regard must be had as to the character and conduct of the parties in awarding the custody of the child. (Ill.) Cohn v. Scott, 342.
8. DIVORCE Custody of Children-Discretion. In awarding the custody of a child in divorce proceedings a very large discretion must be permitted to the chancellor; but it must be a judicial discretion, and is subject to review on the evidence heard in open court. (Ill.) Cohn v. Scott, 342.
DIVORCE-Custody of Children-Evidence Out of Court.-On the question of awarding the custody of a child to one of the parents in a divorce proceeding, the interests of the child cannot be bound by an agreement between counsel, that in addition to the evidence taken in open court, the chancellor may make a personal investiga- tion of the character and home surroundings of one of the parties. (Ill.) Cohn v. Scott, 342.
Death of Party After Appeal.
10. DIVORCE-Appeal After Death of Party Divorced.-The death of the plaintiff in a divorce suit before writ of review is sued out by the defendant does not destroy the marriage status so that there is no subject matter of which a court of review can assume jurisdic- tion. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
11. DIVORCE-Death of Party Divorced Prior to Appeal.-If the successful party to a divorce suit dies before appeal, it is not essen- tial to the right to review the decree by writ of error that it appear from the record of the suit that the deceased left property in which the surviving husband or wife will take an interest upon the de- cree being reversed. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
12. DIVORCE-Appeal After Death of Party Divorced-Practice. Upon a writ of error to review a decree of divorce after the death of the successful party, it is proper to file in the appellate court an affidavit showing to whom the property of the deceased will pass un- der her or his will, and to make such persons defendants in error. (Ill.) Chatterton v. Chatterton, 339.
See Husband and Wife, 3-6.
1. LEASE-Easement of Light and Air.-In the lease of a dwell- ing there is an implied grant of the right to light and air from ad- joining land of the lessor, if the situation and habitual use of the tenement are such that the air and light are essential to its enjoy. ment. (Ga.) Darnell v. Columbus Showcase Co., 206.
LEASE-Easement of Light and Air.-If a lessor cannot use his adjoining land in such a manner as to shut out necessary light and air from a dwelling which he has leased, then one to whom he thereafter rents the adjoining land cannot do so. (Ga.) Darnell v. Columbus Showcase Co., 206.
3. LEASE-Damages for Injury to Tenement.-Where one of the tenants of a common landlord piles lumber on his part of the leased premises so as to obstruct the light and air of the other tenant, and so as to cast water into his tenement in order to cause him to aban- don the lease, the injured tenant may recover punitive damages in ad- dition to compensatory damages for the depreciated rental value of the tenement. (Ga.) Darnell v. Columbus Showcase Co., 206.
EJECTMENT.-A Tenant in Common is Entitled to Recover Possession of the Whole Premises against a defendant who is in pos- session of the land, but has no title thereto other than liens for taxes paid. (Kan.) Horner v. Ellis, 446.
1. ELECTION to Change County Seat-Majority of Voters Voting on the Question is Sufficient.-Under a constitution providing that no courthouse or county seat shall be removed except by a majority vote of the qualified electors of the county voting at an election held for such purpose, it is not necessary that there be a majority of the electors of the county voting in favor of the removal. All that is required is a majority of the persons voting at the election. (Ala.) Ex parte Owens, 67.
2. ELECTION-Secrecy is not Essential to a Ballot.-An elec- tion by ballot is not necessarily secret. (Ala.) Ex parte Owens,
3. ELECTIONS.-A Ballot is a little ball or a printed or writ- ten ticket used in voting. (Ala.) Ex parte Owens, 67.
4. ELECTION-Secrecy of Ballots-Numbering of Ballots.-A statute providing for the numbering of ballots to correspond with the numbers on the poll lists is not unconstitutional as invading the secrecy of elections under a constitution providing for elections by ballot. (Ala.) Ex parte Owens, 67.
5. ELECTIONS-Class Legislation.-A statute taking the city of Memphis out of the operation of the general election statute and placing it in a class by itself, whereby in the use of the elective fran- chise it is relieved from burdens imposed upon other communities, and its people deprived of safeguards vouchsafed to other commun- ities, is unconstitutional. (Tenn.) Malone v. Williams, 1002.
Statute Allowing Recanvass.
6. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE Requiring the Recan- vassing of Votes.-A statute authorizing a proceeding to recanvass the votes cast at a prior election for the office of mayor of a city or a judicial hearing and determination of the title of the respective candidates at that election contravenes the section of the state con- stitution declaring that all laws creating, regulating or affecting boards or officers charged with the duty of receiving, recording or counting votes at elections shall secure an equal representation of the two political parties, or of that section providing that trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been used shall remain inviolate forever. (N. Y.) Matter of Metz v. Maddox, 909.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Power to Create a Tribunal and Authorize the Recounting of Votes.--Where the results of an election have been canvassed and determined under the provisions of law then existing, and a certificate of election given conferring a prima facie title to the office, possession of which has been held thereunder, the legislature has no power to create a new tribunal to authorize it to recanvass the election and award the possession of the office to an- other claimant should be found entitled thereto. (N. Y.) Matter of Metz v. Maddox, 909.
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY.
See Master and Servant.
See Husband and Wife, 7, 8.
1. EQUITY JURISDICTION.-If a court of equity has, by its decree, ordered and directed persons properly within its jurisdiction to do, or refrain from doing, a certain act, it may compel obedience to this decree by appropriate proceedings, and any action taken by reason of such compulsion is valid and effectual wherever it may be assailed. (Neb.) Fall v. Fall, 767.
2. BILL IN EQUITY-Combining Legal and Equitable Matters.- A Demurrer to a bill on the ground that it combines matters triable by a court of equity with matters triable at law should specify what is alleged to be triable only at law. (Md.) Murphy v. Penniman,
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