1. HOMICIDE—Manslaughter-Neglect of Duty.-Under some
circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to an-
other, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom
the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter,
but the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral
obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and
the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct
cause of death. (Mich.) People v. Beardsley, 617.
2. HOMICIDE-Manslaughter-Neglect of Duty.-If a woman
with ample experience in such affairs goes on a drunken debauch with
a man not her husband, and during such debauch attempts to commit,
and succeeds in committing, suicide, the doctrine of legal duty can-
not be invoked to hold the man criminally liable for omitting to
make an effort to save her life. (Mich.) People v. Beardsley, 617.
Liability for Necessaries.
1. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Liability of Husband for Necessaries
Furnished Wife on Her Credit.-Primarily the husband is liable for
the necessaries of life of his wife, including board and lodging, and
the fact that the debt was contracted by her and the credit was ex-
tended to her alone does not relieve him of the liability cast upon him
by operation of law and independent of the contract of his wife, and
any personal liability she may have incurred in order to secure the
credit. (Idaho) Edminston v. Smith, 294.
2. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Special Promise of Wife to Pay for
Necessaries. If necessaries are furnished to a wife for her use and
benefit, and upon credit extended on the faith of her special promise
to pay therefor, and upon her personal responsibility, she is liable for
the debt and may be sued as a feme sole. (Idaho) Edminston v.
Smith, 294.
Interest of Wife in Husband's Lands-Fraudulent Conveyance.
3. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Interest of Nonresident Wife in Hus-
band's Land. As to lands of a married man, his wife, whether
resident or nonresident, has a present interest, under a statute
declaring that, on the death of a husband, one-half of any lands
in which he has an interest shall, under the direction of the probate
court, be set aside by the executor as her property in fee simple,
provided that she shall not be entitled to any interest in any land
which he has conveyed, when she was not, and never has been, a
resident of the state, and the wife may protect such interest by ap-
propriate action during the life of the husband as against his wrong-
ful acts. (Kan.) McKelvey v. McKelvey, 435.
4. HUSBAND AND WIFE, Recovery by Her of Lands Which He
Fraudulently Disposed of.-As the interest of a wife in her husband's
lands does not come to her by inheritance, it is not a bar to her
recovery that he parted with his title in such a fraudulent manner
that neither he nor his heirs can recover it. (Kan.) McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 435.
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Fraudulent Execution Sales, Effect
of upon Her Interest.-Though the statute provides that the wife has
no interest in lands of her husband which had been sold at execution
or judicial sale, it contemplates such execution or judicial sales as
become necessary to pay his debts, and not fraudulent or collusive
sales having no other object than to fraudulently defeat her title.
(Kan.) McKelvey v. McKelvey, 435.
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE, Her Right to Maintain an Action for
Her Interest in His Lands.-Notwithstanding the interest which the
wife has in the lands of her husband, she cannot, in his lifetime, main-
tain ejectment or partition for such interest. (Kan.) McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 435.
7. ESTATE BY ENTIRETIES.—A Judgment Against a Husband
is not a lien on land held by him and his wife as tenants by the
entireties. (Md.) Jordan v. Reynolds, 578.
8. ESTATE BY ENTIRETIES.-A Husband and Wife can Con-
vey, clear from a judgment outstanding against him, land held by
them as tenants by entireties. (Md.) Jordan v. Reynolds, 578.
Actions by and Against Married Women.
9. MARRIED WOMAN, Action, When Proper in the Name of.-
If, through the wrongful act of the defendant, a wife is thrown into
a state of excitement, bringing on labor pains and resulting in mis-
carriage, an action is properly brought in her name. (Ala.) Engle
v. Simmons, 59.
10. MARRIED WOMAN, Trespass Committed at Residence of,
Leading to Injury to.-If a trespass is committed at the residence of
a married woman and her husband, on account of which she suffers
personal injury, it is not material whether the title to the property
where she was residing was in her or in him. Whether it was in
him or her, she may maintain an action for the injuries suffered by
her. (Ala.) Engle v. Simmons, 59.
11. MARRIED WOMEN-Right to Contract, Sue and be Sued as
Feme Sole-Conflict of Laws.-A married woman having the right
under the law of her domicile to enter into a contract as a feme sole
and to sue and be sued without her husband being joined as a party,
her status, as to contracting and suing and being sued, accompanies
her to another state, especially when no community rights or obliga-
tions are involved. (La.) Freret v. Taylor, 522.
12. MARRIED WOMEN, Actions Against Joinder of Husband-
Conflict of Laws.-Laws enacted by certain states for the protection
of married women by requiring the authorization of their husbands
to their contracts and to be joined with them in suits thereon are
personal statutes, and if in the state where the parties have their
domicile such protective laws are not deemed necessary, it is not the
duty of other states in which such parties may chance to temporarily
sojourn to safeguard their rights or restrict their actions in a manner
or to an extent other and different from what is provided in the state
of their domicile. (La.) Freret v. Taylor, 522.
13. MARRIED WOMEN-Suits Against Joinder of Husband—
Conflict of Laws. If a married woman having the right under the
law of her domicile to contract, sue and be sued as a feme sole is
sued upon a contract made by her personally and alone in another
state, and she applies for and obtains authority to file an answer in
such suit, she thereby joins issue with the plaintiff on his demand
upon filing her answer, and has full power to present all her defenses.
The authority to file such answer carries with it, as a legal conse
quence, the right to make good, if she can, independently of her
husband, all the allegations of such answer. (La.) Freret v. Tay-
lor, 522.
See Adverse Possession; Witness, 1.
INDICTMENT—Omission of a Syllable.—An information charg-
ing the bringing of cattle into the state without an inspection by the
livestock sanitary "commission," when the word "commissioner”
should have been used, is not fatally defective when it also charges
the want of any inspection whatever. (Kan.) State v. Asbell, 345.
1. INFANTS.-The Next Friend of an Infant has No Authority to
receive payment or to enter satisfaction of a judgment in favor of
an infant. (Ala.) Collins v. Gillespy, 81.
2. INFANTS-Repudiation of Contract to Convey.-Where an
infant makes an executory contract to convey land, and expends
the money in obtaining a professional education, he is not required
to make any tender as a condition to repudiating the contract on his
arrival at majority. (Ga.) White v. Sikes, 228.
3. INFANCY-Capacity to Commit Negligence.-A child about
eight years old is prima facie presumed to be incapable of commit-
ing contributory negligence. (S. C.) Tucker v. Buffalo Cotton Mills,
957.
4. INFANCY-Capacity to Commit Trespass.-A child about
eight years old is prima facie presumed to be incapable of committing
trespass. (S. C.) Tucker v. Buffalo Cotton Mills, 957.
See Master and Servant, 8-11; Parent and Child.
1. AN INNKEEPER has a Lien on Personal Property in the Pos-
session of a Guest, and held by him under a contract for the condi-
tional sale and purchase thereof, reserving title in the vendor until
payment of the purchase price, if the innkeeper, when such prop-
erty came into his possession, did not know that the guest was not
the complete owner thereof. (N. Y.) Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 886.
2. AN INNKEEPER has, by the Common Law, a Lien on the
Goods of His Guest, although they are the property of a third person.
(N. Y.) Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 886.
3. INNKEEPER'S LIEN, When not Extended by Statute.-A
statute of New York giving a lien to an innkeeper on the goods of
his guest, brought to the inn, whether they belong to him or not, is
but a declaration of the common law, and therefore does not extend
the innkeeper's lien. (N. Y.) Waters & Co. v. Gerard, 886.
4. INNKEEPERS, Constitutionality of Statute Purporting to
Give Lien to.-A statute purporting to give innkeepers a lien on the
goods of their guest cannot be held unconstitutional when such
statute does not extend beyond the rule established by the common
law, nor beyond the requirements of public policy. (N. Y.) Waters
& Co. v. Gerard, 886.
INSANE DELUSIONS.
See Wills, 11-14.
1. INSURANCE.-Temporary Increase in Risk forbidden by a
policy of fire insurance does not avoid it when the increase of hazard
has come to an end without loss, and the loss occurs from another
cause. (S. C.) Sumter Tobacco etc. Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 941.
2. FIDELITY BOND-Failure to Disclose Defaults.-Where
general agent of an insurance company requires of a subagent a bond
for the prompt accounting of moneys collected by him, but fails to
disclose to the sureties, they making no inquiries, that the subagent
is already indebted to him on account of known embezzlement, the
sureties are relieved from liability, although the bond obligates them
for prior as well as existing debts. The rule is otherwise, however,
if the acts of the subagent do not involve moral turpitude, but are
such as are consistent with honesty, and tend only to show him negli-
gent, dilatory, or unskillful. In such case the law does not impose
the duty on the obligee, unasked, to give the sureties information of
such facts. (Tenn.) Hebert v. Lee, 989.
3. INSURANCE, ACCIDENT-Loss of Hand-What is.-It is a
proper question for the jury to determine whether a total loss of three
fingers with injury to the remaining finger and thumb, and the re-
moval of nearly half of the palm of the hand, constitute a total loss
of the hand within the meaning of a by-law of a mutual benefit
society providing insurance for "any member in good standing
suffering, by means of physical separation, the loss of a hand at or
above the wrist joint." (Neb.) Beber v. Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen, 782.
4. LIFE INSURANCE-Lack of Insurable Interest.-Where, in ac-
cordance with a previous arrangement between the parties, one takes
out a policy of insurance on his life payable to his estate, and as-
signs it to the other, who has no insurable interest, but who pays
the insured a consideration therefor and also pays all premiums,
the policy is unenforceable as a wagering contract. (Ky.) Brom-
ley v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 467.
5. LIFE INSURANCE-Incontestable Clause.-A policy of life
insurance which is opposed to public policy is not rendered enforceable
by an incontestable clause. (Ky.) Bromley v. Washington Life Ins.
Co., 467.
6. INSURANCE, LIFE—Forfeiture, Construction of Clauses for.-
A by-law adopted after the issuing of a certificate of insurance pro-
viding for a forfeiture will be strictly construed most strongly against
the association, and if passed in contravention of the provisions
either of the articles of association, the constitution and by-laws of
the society, or the statute governing it, is void. (Neb.) Lange v.
Royal Highlanders, 786.
7. INSURANCE, LIFE-Warranty as to Health-Knowledge of
Agent. The knowledge of a soliciting insurance agent, who is under
no duty to discover the facts, and whose authority does not extend
to receiving applications for life insurance or to receiving any com-
munications upon the subject, that an application for insurance con-
tains a false statement as to the condition of the applicant's health,
cannot be imputed to the insurer, nor is he bound thereby. (Mich.)
Haapa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 627.
8. INSURANCE LIFE-Warranty as to Health-Knowledge of
Agent Estoppel.--If a soliciting insurance agent who is under no
obligation to discover the facts, and who has no authority to receive
applications for insurance, has knowledge of a false statement in an
application for life insurance as to the state of the applicant's health,
his mere silence in regard thereto does not estop the insurer from
taking advantage of such false statement, afterward made by the in-
sured to another agent of the insurer charged with the duty of re-
ceiving the application upon which the insurer acted in issuing the
policy. (Mich.) Haapa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 627.
INSURANCE, LIFE—Breach of Warranty.—If life insurance
is procured through a false statement in the application as to the
state of the health of the applicant, the insurer, who was ignorant
of the real facts at the time of issuing the policy, is not estopped
to assert a breach of warranty in the application, by reason of com-
munications as to the state of health of the applicant made by the
insured to the insurer's agent, who had no duty resting upon him to
discover the facts, and whose authority did not extend to receiving
applications, or communications upon the subject. (Mich.) Haapa
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 627.
10. INSURANCE, LIFE—Breach of Warranty-Direction of Ver-
dict. If the insured, while being examined for life insurance and
knowing that she had heart disease, falsely stated that she was in
good health, and though she could not read the application it was
explained to her and the questions asked through an interpreter, and
the application like the policy contained a provision that no liability
should be incurred unless the policy was delivered while the insured
was in good health, the court properly directed a verdict for the in-
surer, though a witness who was present at the examination testified
that the insured was not asked whether she had heart disease.
(Mich.) Haapa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 627.
11. INSURANCE LIFE.-Proofs of Death being in the nature of
admissions, are competent evidence in an action on a life insurance
policy. (Mich.) Haapa v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 627.
12. LIFE INSURANCE.—The Killing by a Husband of His Wife's
Paramour, although under such circumstances that the law pro-
nounces it justifiable homicide, is not at the hands of justice, either
punitive or preventive,'
," within the meaning of a statute which de-
clares that death "by the hands of justice, either punitive or pre-
ventive, releases the insurer from the obligation of his contract."
(Ga.) Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Crenshaw, 216.
13. LIFE INSURANCE.-The Death of an Adulterer, at the hands
of the husband, either while attempting intercourse with the wife or
immediately after the completion of intercourse, is not within the
condition of a policy of life insurance that "if death is caused or
superinduced at the hands of justice, or in violation of or attempt to
violate any criminal law," the insurer shall not be liable for the
full amount of the policy. (Ga.) Supreme Lodge K. of P. v. Cren-
shaw, 216.
14. LIFE INSURANCE—Good Standing of Assured-Pleading.—
If the plaintiff in an action on a life insurance policy makes a gen-
eral allegation that the insured was a member of the defendant or-
der in good standing at the time of his death, but does not allege
the facts constituting good standing, the defendant has a right to
interpose a denial to the allegation as made, and impose upon the
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