Vessels, accident, inevitable, collision, when not deemed due to, 40.
accident, inevitable, defense of, when not sustainable, 40.
accidents must be avoided if possible, 40-42.
anchor, duty of vessels at, 51.
bridges, duties of when approaching, 52.
care to be exercised by persons navigating, 40.
care to be exercised by to avoid imperiling smaller vessels, 53-58.
care to be exercised by when entering the harbor, 51, 52.
care, want of by one party, does not entitle the other to injure
him, 41.
care when moving in a fog, 46, 47.
care with respect to lookouts, what exacted, 43-46.
collisions due to fault of both, 41.
collisions due to fault of both, apportionment of loss caused by,
collisions, means and care which must be used to avoid, 41.
duty of to exhibit lights, 50.
duty of to stop when they cannot be steered, 47.
duty of when approaching bridges, 52.
duty of when at anchor, 51.
duty of when entering the harbor, 51, 52.
duty of when leaving slip, 52.
duty of when passing through narrow channels, 52.
duties, reciprocal of vessel overtaking and vessel being over-
taken, 49, 50.
fault of one does not relieve the other from the exercise of due
care, 41.
ferry-boats, care to be exercised by, 52.
fog, duty of vessels moving in, 46, 47.
larger, duties of to avoid imperiling smaller, 53-58.
liability of owners of for not exercising vigilance, 40.
lights, duties of with respect to maintaining and exhibiting, 50.
lookout astern, whether must be kept, 46.
lookout, duty of to keep, 43-46.
lookout must be able to give undivided attention, 44.
lookout, sufficient, what is and what is not, 44-46.
lookout, where must be kept, 43, 44.
moving must avoid vessel at anchor, 50.
out of their proper place are not be run into, 41.
overtaking must be kept out of the way of those being overtaken,
48, 49.
rowboats, care which must exercise to avoid injury to and peril.
to occupants, 58.
rowboats, duty of to keep out of the way of larger vessels, 58, 59.
sailing, duty of to keep their course, 48.
sailing, steam vessels must be kept out of the way of, 48, 49.
signals, duty of to answer, 52.
signals, fog, duty of vessels at anchor to give, 51.
speed, care to be exercised respecting the rate of, 42.
speed, lessening of, when becomes a duty, 42, 43.
speed of when moving in a fog, 46, 47.
steam, care required of as to speed, 42.
steamers must keep out of the way of sailing vessels, 48, 49.
stopping of to prevent accidents, duty of, 47, 48.
Vessels, stopping to avoid imperiling smaller vessels, 53, 54.
swells and waves created by, liability of for injuries due to,
53-58.
Contracts to Furnish Water.
1. CONTRACTS to Furnish Water.-If, under a contract to fur-
nish water for irrigation, the irrigation company may itself determine
as to when the water shall be furnished and in what quantities, and
it is also stipulated that such company shall not be liable for failure
to furnish water, when such failure is caused by a deficiency of water
at its source of supply, accidents to machinery, injuries to canal, or
other failures or accidents over which the company has no control,
the control vested in it is accompanied by a corresponding measure
of liability, and is exercised at its peril, and an allegation that, hav-
ing control of the water, such company failed to furnish it on proper
demand, and that plaintiff thereby lost his crop, discloses a legal
cause of action which, if sustained by proof, justifies a recovery, un-
less the company can by proof bring itself within one of the excep-
tions named in the contract exempting it from liability. (La.)
Mathieu v. North American etc. Co., 548.
2. CONTRACTS to Furnish Water-Notice.-If a contract to fur-
nish water for irrigation stipulates that the irrigation company shall
be entitled to written notice for a certain time before water will be
required on the premises, no recovery can be had for failure to furnish
water, in the absence of allegation and proof that the required notice
was given, unless there is an acknowledgment on the part of the com-
pany of inability to comply with its obligations to furnish the water.
(La.) Mathieu v. North American etc. Co., 548.
3. RIPARIAN RIGHTS Common-law Doctrine.-Under the com--
mon law the title to the bed of all fresh-water rivers, above the ebb
and flow of the tide, whether navigable or non-navigable, where the
river forms the boundary between adjoining owners, is in the riparian
owner to the thread of the stream and this law is in force in Nebraska.
(Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS-Common-law Doctrine. The common law
with reference to riparian ownership in navigable streams is not in-
consistent with the constitution of the United States, nor with the con-
stitution and statutes of Nebraska, and hence the riparian owner takes
title to the thread of the stream. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
Title to Bed of Stream and Accretions.
5. RIPARIAN RIGHTS-Accretions.-The rights of riparian own-
ers upon a navigable river to land formed by accretion are the same as
if the river were not navigable, and the rules of the common law apply
in full force. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
6. RIPARIAN RIGHTS Title to Bed of Navigable Stream.—A
riparian owner of lands on a navigable stream above the ebb and flow
of the tide takes title to the thread of the stream, and if such river
suddenly changes its channel and leaves its old bed, he still holds
to the thread of the channel where the waters flowed. (Neb.) Kin-
kead v. Turgeon, 740.
7. RIPARIAN RIGHTS—Title to Bed of Navigable Stream.—A
riparian owner upon the bank of a navigable stream, though he takes
title to the thread thereof, cannot exercise dominion over its waters
or bed in any manner inconsistent with or opposed to the public
easement of passage; but when by reason of natural changes the
stream abandons its old bed and seeks a new one, the right of passage
over the old bed is abandoned and such bed reverts to the riparian
owner to the thread of the channel where the waters flowed. (Neb.)
Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
8. WATERS, SURFACE-Rights of Dominant Estate.-A land
owner has the right to have the surface water which flows from his
farm follow its natural course. If that takes it across the lands of
an adjoining owner, the latter has no right to interrupt this flow of
the water in its natural course or direction. (Mich.) Launstein v.
Launstein, 635.
9. WATERS, SURFACE-Prescriptive Right.-An easement may
be acquired by prescription by which the water collected upon the
lands of the upper proprietor may be allowed to overflow the lands
of an adjacent proprietor. (Mich.) Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
10. WATERS, SURFACE-Right to Fill Sag Holes on Dominant
Estate. The owner of the dominant estate may, in the interests of
good husbandry, and in the good faith improvement and tillage of
his land, fill up sag holes thereon, so that no water will accumulate
or stay in them, even if the water arising from rainfall or melting
snows should thereby, in natural processes, find its way upon the
servient estate and incidentally increase the flow thereon. (Mich.)
Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
11. WATERS, SURFACE—Artificial Drains.-The owner of the
dominant estate cannot, by artificial drains or ditches, collect the
water of stagnant pools, sag holes, basins or ponds upon his premises,
and cast them in a body upon the proprietor below, to his injury.
(Mich.) Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
12. WATERS, SURFACE-Right of Dominant Owner-Enlarge-
ment of Culvert.—The enlargement of a culvert across a highway, to
carry off surface water from the dominant estate, does not injuriously
affect the adjacent proprietor, if, in times of high water, the water
coming from the dominant estate, which does not find its way through
such culvert, will in any event force its way across the highway and
upon the lands of the servient estate. (Mich.) Launstein v. Laun-
stein, 635.
WEAPONS Offense of Carrying.-A Hack-driver who, with
the intent of going armed, carries a pistol in a box under his seat on
the hack, is guilty of unlawfully carrying weapons under the statutes
of Tennessee. To constitute the offense, it is not necessary that the
weapon, unless it is a razor, should be carried concealed about the
person. (Tenn.) Kendall v. State, 994.
1. WILL Subscription by Mark.-A will may be duly executed
by the testator making his mark between the words of his name which
were subscribed to the will by the draftsman out of the testator's
presence. (Ky.) Garnett v. Foston, 456.
2. A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL in Which Some of the Figures Com-
posing the Date are printed is not wholly in the handwriting of the
testator, and is therefore void. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
3. WILLS Revocation-Revival by Oral Declarations.-A will
revoked by express declaration contained in a will of later date can-
not be revived or vitalized by the destruction of the later will, and
oral declarations of the testator before witnesses expressing a desire
that the prior will shall stand and that it is the one which he wants
executed. (Mich.) Danley v. Jefferson, 640.
Deed and Will Distinguished.
4. WILLS AND CONVEYANCES, Distinguishing Differences of.-
If an instrument cannot be revoked, defeated nor impaired by the
act of the grantor, it is a deed, but if the title of the estate is de-
pendent on his death, he retaining an unqualified power of revoca-
tion, it is a will. (Ala.) Griswold v. Griswold, 64.
5. WILL-Instrument in the Form of a Conveyance. If an in-
strument was intended as a will and not as a deed, it must first be
proved and admitted to probate before it can have any operation.
(Ala.) Griswold v. Griswold, 164.
Incorporation of Other Writings.
6. WILLS Referring to and Incorporating Therein Other Docu-
ments. A will executed in accordance with the requirements of the
statute may by appropriate reference incorporate within itself a docu-
ment or paper not so executed. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
7. WILLS.-To Incorporate Another Paper in a Will, such paper
must be in existence at the execution of the will, and must be referred
to therein as an existing paper, so as to be capable of identification.
(Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
8. CODICIL, When Refers to a Will so as to Cure Defects in the
Execution of the Latter.-Where a paper is written on the reverse
side of a holographic will, not effectively executed, and is styled "cod-
icil," this word imports a reference to some prior paper as a will, and
if executed with the formalities requisite for a will, makes good an
invalidly executed holographic will written on such reverse side.
(Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
9. WILL AND CODICIL, Connection of the One with the Other.
Where a paper purporting to be a codicil is executed with the formali-
ties required of a will or imports a reference to some already existing
document regarded by the testator as his will, to identify that
instrument and to interpret that reference as applying to it, all the
surrounding circumstances may be shown. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel,
100.
10. WILLS.-The Standard or Test of Testamentary Capacity is a
matter of law to be defined by the court for the guidance of the jury
in reaching a decision in a given case; whether the evidence in the
case measures up to that standard is, as a general rule, a matter of
fact to be decided by the jury. (Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
11. WILLS-Insane Delusion.-To Avoid a Will because the tes-
tator entertained a delusion, the delusion must be an insane delusion,
and the will must be the product thereof. (Md.)
son, 570.
12. WILLS.-An Insane Delusion is a Belief in things impossible
or, though possible, so improbable under the surrounding cireum-
stances that no man of sound mind could give them credence. (Md.)
Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
13. WILLS-Insane Delusion as to Illegitimacy of Children.—
Where a man wills his entire estate to his children of a former mar-
riage because he believes that his present wife is unfaithful and
his children by her illegitimate, which belief has no evidence to
support it, the will may be avoided as the product of an insane de-
lusion. (Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
14. WILLS-Insane Delusion-Evidence of Hostility.-To prove
that a will was the product of an insane delusion on the part of the
testator that his wife was unfaithful and their children illegitimate,
it is competent to show that he had instituted divorce proceedings.
(Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
Probate and Contest of Will.
15. PROBATE OF WILL, Attack upon, When Collateral.—When,
in response to a petition for distribution, persons appear claiming to be
heirs of the decedent and seek to attack the probate of the will on
the ground that it is a forgery and that its probate was procured by
perjured testimony, praying to have such probate set aside, though the
time to appeal therefrom has long passed, this is a collateral and not
a direct attack. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
16. PROBATE OF WILL-Failure to Enter Continuance. If no-
tice is given of the time and place of hearing of an application for the
probate of a will, the failure to adjourn the hearing from the time
fixed to a later day, on which the matter was in fact taken up and
disposed of, is at most an irregularity occurring after jurisdiction has
been acquired. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
THE PROBATE OF A WILL cannot be Collaterally Attacked
on the ground that after due notice was given of the time and place
when the application for probate would be heard, it was not then
heard, but was taken up and disposed of at a subsequent time without
giving a new notice and without having adjourned the hearing to
such subsequent date. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
18. PROBATE OF WILL-Adjournment of the Hearing of an Ap-
plication for, When must be Presumed. If it appears that due no-
tice was given of the time and place for hearing an application for
the probate of a will, and, at a time long subsequent to that so fixed,
the court entered an order reciting that the petition came on regularly
for hearing, and that it had been proved that notice had been given
as prescribed by law, and admitting the will to probate, it must be
presumed that orders were made for due adjournment of the hearing
to the time when it took place. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
19. PROBATE OF A WILL—Statute Respecting, When not Uncon-
stitutional as to Nonresidents.-A statute fixing the time for giving
notice of application for the probate of a will will not be declared
unconstitutional in its operation against a nonresident on the ground
that by existing means of communication between the place of his
residence and the place where the notice is given and the application
is to be heard, he could not have seen the published notice in time
to enable him to appear and oppose the probate on the day set for
the hearing, when by the statute he is further given one year from
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