Vessels, accident, inevitable, collision, when not deemed due to, 40. accident, inevitable, defense of, when not sustainable, 40. accidents must be avoided if possible, 40-42.
anchor, duty of vessels at, 51.
bridges, duties of when approaching, 52.
care to be exercised by persons navigating, 40.
care to be exercised by to avoid imperiling smaller vessels, 53-58.
care to be exercised by when entering the harbor, 51, 52.
care, want of by one party, does not entitle the other to injure him, 41.
care when moving in a fog, 46, 47.
care with respect to lookouts, what exacted, 43-46.
collisions due to fault of both, 41.
collisions due to fault of both, apportionment of loss caused by,
collisions, means and care which must be used to avoid, 41.
duty of to exhibit lights, 50.
duty of to stop when they cannot be steered, 47.
duty of when approaching bridges, 52.
duty of when at anchor, 51.
duty of when entering the harbor, 51, 52.
duty of when leaving slip, 52.
duty of when passing through narrow channels, 52.
duties, reciprocal of vessel overtaking and vessel being over- taken, 49, 50.
fault of one does not relieve the other from the exercise of due care, 41.
ferry-boats, care to be exercised by, 52.
fog, duty of vessels moving in, 46, 47.
larger, duties of to avoid imperiling smaller, 53-58.
liability of owners of for not exercising vigilance, 40.
lights, duties of with respect to maintaining and exhibiting, 50. lookout astern, whether must be kept, 46.
lookout, duty of to keep, 43-46.
lookout must be able to give undivided attention, 44.
lookout, sufficient, what is and what is not, 44-46. lookout, where must be kept, 43, 44.
moving must avoid vessel at anchor, 50.
out of their proper place are not be run into, 41.
overtaking must be kept out of the way of those being overtaken, 48, 49.
rowboats, care which must exercise to avoid injury to and peril. to occupants, 58.
rowboats, duty of to keep out of the way of larger vessels, 58, 59. sailing, duty of to keep their course, 48.
sailing, steam vessels must be kept out of the way of, 48, 49. signals, duty of to answer, 52.
signals, fog, duty of vessels at anchor to give, 51.
speed, care to be exercised respecting the rate of, 42.
speed, lessening of, when becomes a duty, 42, 43.
speed of when moving in a fog, 46, 47.
steam, care required of as to speed, 42.
steamers must keep out of the way of sailing vessels, 48, 49. stopping of to prevent accidents, duty of, 47, 48.
Vessels, stopping to avoid imperiling smaller vessels, 53, 54. swells and waves created by, liability of for injuries due to, 53-58.
Contracts to Furnish Water.
1. CONTRACTS to Furnish Water.-If, under a contract to fur- nish water for irrigation, the irrigation company may itself determine as to when the water shall be furnished and in what quantities, and it is also stipulated that such company shall not be liable for failure to furnish water, when such failure is caused by a deficiency of water at its source of supply, accidents to machinery, injuries to canal, or other failures or accidents over which the company has no control, the control vested in it is accompanied by a corresponding measure of liability, and is exercised at its peril, and an allegation that, hav- ing control of the water, such company failed to furnish it on proper demand, and that plaintiff thereby lost his crop, discloses a legal cause of action which, if sustained by proof, justifies a recovery, un- less the company can by proof bring itself within one of the excep- tions named in the contract exempting it from liability. (La.) Mathieu v. North American etc. Co., 548.
2. CONTRACTS to Furnish Water-Notice.-If a contract to fur- nish water for irrigation stipulates that the irrigation company shall be entitled to written notice for a certain time before water will be required on the premises, no recovery can be had for failure to furnish water, in the absence of allegation and proof that the required notice was given, unless there is an acknowledgment on the part of the com- pany of inability to comply with its obligations to furnish the water. (La.) Mathieu v. North American etc. Co., 548.
3. RIPARIAN RIGHTS Common-law Doctrine.-Under the com-- mon law the title to the bed of all fresh-water rivers, above the ebb and flow of the tide, whether navigable or non-navigable, where the river forms the boundary between adjoining owners, is in the riparian owner to the thread of the stream and this law is in force in Nebraska. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS-Common-law Doctrine. The common law with reference to riparian ownership in navigable streams is not in- consistent with the constitution of the United States, nor with the con- stitution and statutes of Nebraska, and hence the riparian owner takes title to the thread of the stream. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740. Title to Bed of Stream and Accretions.
5. RIPARIAN RIGHTS-Accretions.-The rights of riparian own- ers upon a navigable river to land formed by accretion are the same as if the river were not navigable, and the rules of the common law apply in full force. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
6. RIPARIAN RIGHTS Title to Bed of Navigable Stream.—A riparian owner of lands on a navigable stream above the ebb and flow of the tide takes title to the thread of the stream, and if such river suddenly changes its channel and leaves its old bed, he still holds to the thread of the channel where the waters flowed. (Neb.) Kin- kead v. Turgeon, 740.
7. RIPARIAN RIGHTS Title to Bed of Navigable Stream.-A riparian owner upon the bank of a navigable stream, though he takes title to the thread thereof, cannot exercise dominion over its waters or bed in any manner inconsistent with or opposed to the public easement of passage; but when by reason of natural changes the stream abandons its old bed and seeks a new one, the right of passage over the old bed is abandoned and such bed reverts to the riparian owner to the thread of the channel where the waters flowed. (Neb.) Kinkead v. Turgeon, 740.
8. WATERS, SURFACE-Rights of Dominant Estate.-A land owner has the right to have the surface water which flows from his farm follow its natural course. If that takes it across the lands of an adjoining owner, the latter has no right to interrupt this flow of the water in its natural course or direction. (Mich.) Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
9. WATERS, SURFACE-Prescriptive Right.-An easement may be acquired by prescription by which the water collected upon the lands of the upper proprietor may be allowed to overflow the lands of an adjacent proprietor. (Mich.) Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
10. WATERS, SURFACE-Right to Fill Sag Holes on Dominant Estate. The owner of the dominant estate may, in the interests of good husbandry, and in the good faith improvement and tillage of his land, fill up sag holes thereon, so that no water will accumulate or stay in them, even if the water arising from rainfall or melting snows should thereby, in natural processes, find its way upon the servient estate and incidentally increase the flow thereon. (Mich.) Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
11. WATERS, SURFACE-Artificial Drains.-The owner of the dominant estate cannot, by artificial drains or ditches, collect the water of stagnant pools, sag holes, basins or ponds upon his premises, and cast them in a body upon the proprietor below, to his injury. (Mich.) Launstein v. Launstein, 635.
12. WATERS, SURFACE-Right of Dominant Owner-Enlarge- ment of Culvert.-The enlargement of a culvert across a highway, to carry off surface water from the dominant estate, does not injuriously affect the adjacent proprietor, if, in times of high water, the water coming from the dominant estate, which does not find its way through such culvert, will in any event force its way across the highway and upon the lands of the servient estate. (Mich.) Launstein v. Laun- stein, 635.
WEAPONS Offense of Carrying.-A Hack-driver who, with the intent of going armed, carries a pistol in a box under his seat on the hack, is guilty of unlawfully carrying weapons under the statutes of Tennessee. To constitute the offense, it is not necessary that the weapon, unless it is a razor, should be carried concealed about the person. (Tenn.) Kendall v. State, 994.
1. WILL Subscription by Mark.-A will may be duly executed by the testator making his mark between the words of his name which were subscribed to the will by the draftsman out of the testator's presence. (Ky.) Garnett v. Foston, 456.
2. A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL in Which Some of the Figures Com- posing the Date are printed is not wholly in the handwriting of the testator, and is therefore void. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
3. WILLS Revocation-Revival by Oral Declarations.-A will revoked by express declaration contained in a will of later date can- not be revived or vitalized by the destruction of the later will, and oral declarations of the testator before witnesses expressing a desire that the prior will shall stand and that it is the one which he wants executed. (Mich.) Danley v. Jefferson, 640.
Deed and Will Distinguished.
4. WILLS AND CONVEYANCES, Distinguishing Differences of.- If an instrument cannot be revoked, defeated nor impaired by the act of the grantor, it is a deed, but if the title of the estate is de- pendent on his death, he retaining an unqualified power of revoca- tion, it is a will. (Ala.) Griswold v. Griswold, 64.
5. WILL-Instrument in the Form of a Conveyance. If an in- strument was intended as a will and not as a deed, it must first be proved and admitted to probate before it can have any operation. (Ala.) Griswold v. Griswold, 164.
Incorporation of Other Writings.
6. WILLS Referring to and Incorporating Therein Other Docu- ments. A will executed in accordance with the requirements of the statute may by appropriate reference incorporate within itself a docu- ment or paper not so executed. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
7. WILLS.-To Incorporate Another Paper in a Will, such paper must be in existence at the execution of the will, and must be referred to therein as an existing paper, so as to be capable of identification. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
8. CODICIL, When Refers to a Will so as to Cure Defects in the Execution of the Latter.-Where a paper is written on the reverse side of a holographic will, not effectively executed, and is styled "cod- icil," this word imports a reference to some prior paper as a will, and if executed with the formalities requisite for a will, makes good an invalidly executed holographic will written on such reverse side. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
9. WILL AND CODICIL, Connection of the One with the Other. Where a paper purporting to be a codicil is executed with the formali- ties required of a will or imports a reference to some already existing document regarded by the testator as his will, to identify that instrument and to interpret that reference as applying to it, all the surrounding circumstances may be shown. (Cal.) Estate of Plumel, 100.
10. WILLS.-The Standard or Test of Testamentary Capacity is a matter of law to be defined by the court for the guidance of the jury in reaching a decision in a given case; whether the evidence in the case measures up to that standard is, as a general rule, a matter of fact to be decided by the jury. (Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
11. WILLS-Insane Delusion.-To Avoid a Will because the tes- tator entertained a delusion, the delusion must be an insane delusion,
and the will must be the product thereof. (Md.) son, 570.
12. WILLS.-An Insane Delusion is a Belief in things impossible or, though possible, so improbable under the surrounding cireum- stances that no man of sound mind could give them credence. (Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
13. WILLS-Insane Delusion as to Illegitimacy of Children.— Where a man wills his entire estate to his children of a former mar- riage because he believes that his present wife is unfaithful and his children by her illegitimate, which belief has no evidence to support it, the will may be avoided as the product of an insane de- lusion. (Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
14. WILLS-Insane Delusion-Evidence of Hostility.-To prove that a will was the product of an insane delusion on the part of the testator that his wife was unfaithful and their children illegitimate, it is competent to show that he had instituted divorce proceedings. (Md.) Johnson v. Johnson, 570.
Probate and Contest of Will.
15. PROBATE OF WILL, Attack upon, When Collateral.—When, in response to a petition for distribution, persons appear claiming to be heirs of the decedent and seek to attack the probate of the will on the ground that it is a forgery and that its probate was procured by perjured testimony, praying to have such probate set aside, though the time to appeal therefrom has long passed, this is a collateral and not a direct attack. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
16. PROBATE OF WILL-Failure to Enter Continuance. If no- tice is given of the time and place of hearing of an application for the probate of a will, the failure to adjourn the hearing from the time fixed to a later day, on which the matter was in fact taken up and disposed of, is at most an irregularity occurring after jurisdiction has been acquired. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
THE PROBATE OF A WILL cannot be Collaterally Attacked on the ground that after due notice was given of the time and place when the application for probate would be heard, it was not then heard, but was taken up and disposed of at a subsequent time without giving a new notice and without having adjourned the hearing to such subsequent date. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
18. PROBATE OF WILL-Adjournment of the Hearing of an Ap- plication for, When must be Presumed. If it appears that due no- tice was given of the time and place for hearing an application for the probate of a will, and, at a time long subsequent to that so fixed, the court entered an order reciting that the petition came on regularly for hearing, and that it had been proved that notice had been given as prescribed by law, and admitting the will to probate, it must be presumed that orders were made for due adjournment of the hearing to the time when it took place. (Cal.) Estate of Davis, 105.
19. PROBATE OF A WILL—Statute Respecting, When not Uncon- stitutional as to Nonresidents.-A statute fixing the time for giving notice of application for the probate of a will will not be declared unconstitutional in its operation against a nonresident on the ground that by existing means of communication between the place of his residence and the place where the notice is given and the application is to be heard, he could not have seen the published notice in time to enable him to appear and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing, when by the statute he is further given one year from
« السابقةمتابعة » |