state liquor through the police power, and that it intended to, and did, keep in existence any other impediment to state interference with interstate commerce in original packages.

"But we are of opinion that this section of the ordinance was clearly an exercise of the police power of the state, and, as such, authorized by the act of Congress. The fact that the city derives more or less revenue from the ordinance in question does not tend to prove that this section was not adopted in the exercise of the police power, even though it might also be an exercise of the power to tax. The police power is a very extensive one, and is frequently exercised where it also results in raising a revenue. The police powers of a state form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a state not surrendered to the general government; all which may be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for the regulating the internal commerce of a state, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of this mass: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; New York City v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. ed. 648; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, 28 L. ed. 923.

"The sale of liquors is confessedly a subject of police regulation. Such sale may be absolutely prohibited, or the business may be controlled and regulated by the imposition of license taxes, by which those only who obtain licenses are permitted to engage in it. Taxation is frequently the very best and most practical means of regulating this kind of business. The higher the license, it is sometimes said, the better the regulation, as the effect of a high license is to keep out from the business those who are undesirable, and to keep within reasonable limits the number of those who may engage in it. We regard the question in this case as covered in substance by prior decisions of this court: See Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674, 42 L. ed. 1100; Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201, 45 L. ed. 269; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552, 49 L. ed. 925; Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 447, 51 L. ed. 724. Even where the subject of transportation is not intoxicating liquor, this court has held that goods brought in the original packages from another state, having arrived at their destination, and being at rest there, may be taxed, without discrimination, like other property within the state, even while in the original packages in which they were brought from another state: American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365, 48 L. ed. 538.

"This license tax is exacted without reference to the question as to where the beer was manufactured, whether within or without the state, and hence there is no discrimination in the case.

"It is unnecessary to continue the discussion. As we have said, the cases above cited are conclusive in favor of the correctness of the judgment of the supreme court of Alabama.

"Judgment affirmed': Phillips v. City of Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, L. ed.

WARE v. MOBILE COUNTY.

[146 Ala, 163, 41 South. 153.]

INTERSTATE COMMERCE, Business Which is not.—The business of brokers of making contracts to buy and sell future cot ton for customers is not interstate commerce. Such contracts are not articles of commerce. (p. 23.)

INTERSTATE COMMERCE-License Exacted for Dealing in Futures.-A license exacted of brokers who are engaged in buying and selling grain and cotton for future delivery, taking orders in Alabama, to be executed on the exchanges in New York or New Orleans, is not imposed on interstate commerce, where the contracts in which brokers deal do not contain any stipulation requiring the seller to ship the cotton or grain to any point without the state, though, as a matter of fact, such shipments are sometimes made by the seller. The subsequent shipment cannot become interstate com merce until the articles commence to be transported. (p. 24.)

Action to recover of the defendants a license tax for the year 1903 for engaging in the business of buying and selling futures on commission in the city of Mobile, Alabama. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, with a stipulation that, if the business done by the defendant was interstate commerce and the license a tax thereupon, it constituted an unlawful interference, and the defendants were entitled to a verdict.

B. B. Boone, for the appellant.

R. H. and N. R. Clarke, for the appellee.

168 TYSON, J. Subdivision 40 of the act "to better provide for the revenue of the state" (Gen. Acts 1903, p. 207) reads as follows: "For each person engaged in the business of buying and selling futures for speculation or on a commission either for themselves or for other persons, and each place of business commonly known as cotton exchanges, or stock exchanges and sometimes called 'bucket shops' in towns and cities of twenty thousand inhabitants or more,

five hundred dollars; in all other towns and cities, two hundred and fifty dollars; but this shall not be held to legalize any contract which would otherwise be invalid." It appears from the agreed statement of facts, upon which the case was tried, that during the whole of the year 1903 defendants conducted the business in the city of Mobile, a city of more than twenty thousand inhabitants, of buying and selling cotton for future delivery on commission, for the public generally and for special customers. The local agent in the city would take the order of those desiring to buy or sell future cotton contracts, which would be executed by defendants upon the New York or New Orleans cotton exchange; the customer at the time of giving the order, depositing with the local agent a sum of money as margin to protect the defendants against loss in the event the course of the market was adverse to the side of the customer. When the order was given, it was not usual to say anything about an actual delivery of the cotton; but defendants furnished the customer with a memorandum reserving the right to close the transaction when the margin deposited was about exhausted and to settle the contract in accordance with the rules and customs of the exchange on which the order was placed. This 169 memorandum also contained the stipulation that "in all trades actual delivery is contemplated," and the further stipulation that "all purchases and sales made by us for you are made in accordance with and subject to the rules, regulations and contracts of the exchange on which the order is placed," etc. The order of the customer was then transmitted by wire by defendants to their office in the city of New York or New Orleans, where it was executed. The contract thus purchased or sold, as the case may be, was held by defendants for the buyer or seller, their customer, until the same was ordered closed out, which was done by buying or selling another contract against it, as might be necessary to cover or close it out, or receive or deliver cotton on the contract. If a profit was made in the transaction, it was remitted by defendants from their office where made to the Mobile office and there paid over to the customer. If a loss was incurred, it was taken by the Mobile office out of the customer's margin, and if that was insufficient to pay the loss, the customer was called on for the balance. No actual delivery of cotton was ever made on such contracts, except in a few instances, and then at the place of its execution, to

wit, New York or New Orleans. When the cotton was delivered on a contract of purchase, it was held by defendants for the purchaser, as his agents, until they were ordered to sell it. When the delivery was made upon a contract of sale, the seller would ship the cotton from Alabama to New York or New Orleans, the place of delivery, and the defendants, as his agents, would there deliver it to the buyer.

The only question presented for our consideration is whether the business thus shown to have been engaged in by defendants was interstate commerce, and therefore not subject to the license tax sought to be collected of them; for clearly, if the business is not subject to be taxed, although the one for which defendants are here sought to be made liable may be characterized as an occupation tax, there can be no recovery in this case: Stratford v. City Council of Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619, 20 South. 127. But the defendants' business of making contracts of buying and selling future cotton for their customers is not interstate commerce. Indeed, these 170 contracts are not articles of commerce at all: 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 61. As was said by the supreme court of the United States in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357, in speaking of policies of insurance: "These contracts are not contracts of commerce in any proper meaning of the word. They are not subjects of trade and barter, offered in the market as something having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one state to another and then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between parties which are completed by their signatures and the transfer of the consideration. Such contracts are not interstate transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in different states': See, also, Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207, 39 L. ed. 297; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962, 44 L. ed. 1116. This principle, we think, clearly controls in this case, and its application to the facts makes the defendants liable. The contracts entered into by defendants for their customers, if discharged by the payment of differences in the market values, though executed in another state by and through their agents, the defendants, are clearly not articles of commerce; and the transaction was not different from one that the customer himself in person executed the order on the

exchange in New York or New Orleans. Nor is it of consequence, in so far as the question here is involved, that the contracts were sometimes discharged by the delivery of the cotton. While it is true the cotton may have become an article of interstate commerce, it never became an article of trade from one state to another until it began to move, and this movement did not begin until the cotton was shipped or was started for transportation from one state to the other: Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6, 32 L. ed. 346.

There was no stipulation shown in the agreed statement of facts which required the seller to ship cotton from any point. He was at liberty to acquire the cotton in the market of delivery or elsewhere; hence a shipment from one state. to another for delivery under the contract would not be interstate commerce by virtue 171 of the contract, but by subsequent and independent act of the seller, and the shipment in that event would not become interstate commerce until the cotton had commenced to be transported. The case of Stratford v. City Council, 110 Ala. 619, 20 South. 127, relied upon by appellants, clearly has no application. In that case Stratford was a broker, representing several nonresident wholesale dealers in grain and provisions who lived and carried on their business in other states, and every order for goods from local merchants received or obtained by him was forwarded to his principal, subject to the approval of such principal; and if the order was accepted by the nonresident dealer, he shipped the goods from his place of business to the purchaser, who did business in the city of Montgomery.

Affirmed.

Weakley, C. J., Simpson and Anderson, JJ., concur.

This Case and Another were Taken to the Supreme Court of the United States on writs of error, wherein the judgments were affirmed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Day, as follows:

"These cases were submitted together, and are in all respects similar, and involve the constitutional validity of subdivision 40 of an act of the legislature of Alabama imposing license taxes, 'to better provide for the revenue of the state'; General Acts, 1903, page 207, which reads as follows:

"For each person engaged in the business of buying and selling futures for speculation or on commission, either for themselves or for other persons, and each place of business commonly known as cotton exchanges, or stock exchanges, and sometimes called "bucket