from the necessity of preparing a shelter for the young: perhaps it would be more exact to say that it has two origins, the other being the procuring of fool Property anses out of industry, but only ou of the two-flod form of in just meatcoed The soccession of the male marks a new phase in the growth of the family. At first he plays a preponderant part, just as in barbarous societies kinship sưng through males is substitored for kinship through females. The paternal affection springs up in the same way as the maternal It is first ob servable in fishes, the males of which fecundate the eggs. They are thus veritably part of his own body, and are cared for as such; paternal love of cispring is also love of a prolonged self. What here wants explanation is the exclusion of the female from the care of the young. Subsequent developments of the paternal instinet (as in birds) M. Espinas explains as due to the desire for domination and the love of property (both specialisations of the instinct of self-preservation), but it is probable that the organic affection to which it owes its origin is never afterwards quite absent. Organised by this instinct the family attains still greater complexity and compactness, and prepares the way for associations of a higher type.

The Tribe has been until lately supposed to be a development of the family. It is not the least of M. Espinas's services to Sociology that he takes away the bottom from this theory. He clearly shows that where the family has acquired a high degree of unity (as among birds) the formation of a tribe rarely happens. On the contrary, hordes usually arise where promiscuity or polygamy prevails, as among the less predatory mammals. The full-grown family and the tribe are mutually hostile. No explanation of this is attempted, but it appears to be a law of nature that instincts have to be developed to excess before they are fitted to play a simply co-ordinate part. The maternal affection at first acts alone, reaches a high pitch, and then disappears for a time; the paternal affection at first alone operates and carries the organisation of the family to a point incompatible with a collectivo existence; then the instinct of sympathy, which had been leading an embryonic life, definitely emerges, and forms the tribe. We cannot follow M. Espinas in his analysis of this affection, but in no part of the work is his psychology more original or more suggestive,

In a closing chapter the author sums up the results of his inquiries in a number of "laws," necessarily of a rather vague character, descriptive of the nature, origin, development, and duration of animal societies. The conclusion that a society is a living organism, which has progressed from a state in which the relations among its members were physiological to one in which they are psychological, may be taken as approximately true, with the qualifications that the terms 'living' and 'organism' have connotations of a somewhat lower order than the facts, and that while the relations are slightly psychical from the outset they remain partly physical to the end. Most instructive applications of this general result to the theories of mind and morals conclude the work.

Even the foregoing rapid analysis may have served to show that M.

individual. How the composite individual subsequently develops in converse with other such individuals activities like those going on within itself is a problem which touches the roots of Social Science.

Animal associations which have nutrition for their object give rise by a slow and gradual transition to associations for the purpose of Reproduction. The connection of parts which is life-long in the earlier forms tends to dissolve; the communication of the individuals is momentary and often renewed instead of being lasting; and the individuals begin to lead independent lives. This separation takes place in close parallelism with the rise of sexual organs, which is again explained as a development of the division of labour. Their tendency to unite is accounted for by the fact that they are the descendants of individuals which were in permanent organic union, and are thus divided halves which are necessary to one another's existence and constitute a whole when united. If we might assume as prevailing among animals nutritively associated something corresponding to the instinct of self-preservation, then the sexual instinct might be explained as a modification of that primitive instinct. But M. Espinas is convinced that the physical explanation accounts only for the origin of the appetite, and that its maintenance depends upon certain psychological bonds". These consist in manifestations of an æsthetic kind addressed by the male to the female, which may be arranged in the order of their decreasing materiality-caresses, odorous emanations, displays of colour and form (or costume), song, and lastly motions, at first simple but becoming more and more combined. Answering to these powers of expression, there must be in the female corresponding faculties of appreciation-more or less subtle senses, which have been at least developed by means of sexual selection. That they were also so originated even M. Espinas (who usually shies at Darwinism) inclines to conclude; but if (as seems to be the case) many of these manifestations are only the more ordered exercise of functions necessary for subsistence, their origin might be better elucidated by an expansion of the theory by which Mr. Spencer has explained the acquisition of the musical faculties.

66

The union of male and female is the first stage in the constitution of the Family. The second is the association of parents and offspring. Analogous to the fact which we meet with in human societies, that it is the relationship of children to mothers which is alone primitively recognised, it appears that the first form of this association is that of the mother and her offspring: it is only in the higher societies that the male becomes a permanent member of the family. A physical explanation is here, as everywhere, to be given. The offspring are at first but a continuation of the bodies of their parents, as colonies of cells were originally part of the parent cell, but the female remains longer physically attached to her offspring than the male. It is on this basis that M. Espinas explains the origin of the maternal affection; love of offspring is love of an "extended self". By successive developments and specialisations of this instinct the family gains an increasing unity in time and space. Under its auspices industry arises,

from the necessity of preparing a shelter for the young: perhaps it would be more exact to say that it has two origins, the other being the procuring of food. Property arises out of industry, but only out of the two-fold form of it just mentioned. The accession of the male marks a new phase in the growth of the family. At first he plays a preponderant part, just as in barbarous societies kinship solely through males is substituted for kinship through females. The paternal affection springs up in the same way as the maternal. It is first observable in fishes, the males of which fecundate the eggs. They are thus veritably part of his own body, and are cared for as such: paternal love of offspring is also love of a prolonged self. What here wants explanation is the exclusion of the female from the care of the young. Subsequent developments of the paternal instinct (as in birds) M. Espinas explains as due to the desire for domination and the love of property (both specialisations of the instinct of self-preservation), but it is probable that the organic affection to which it owes its origin is never afterwards quite absent. Organised by this instinct the family attains still greater complexity and compactness, and prepares the way for associations of a higher type.

The Tribe has been until lately supposed to be a development of the family. It is not the least of M. Espinas's services to Sociology that he takes away the bottom from this theory. He clearly shows that where the family has acquired a high degree of unity (as among birds) the formation of a tribe rarely happens. On the contrary, hordes usually arise where promiscuity or polygamy prevails, as among the less predatory mammals. The full-grown family and the tribe are mutually hostile. No explanation of this is attempted, but it appears to be a law of nature that instincts have to be developed to excess before they are fitted to play a simply co-ordinate part. The maternal affection at first acts alone, reaches a high pitch, and then disappears for a time; the paternal affection at first alone operates and carries the organisation of the family to a point incompatible with a collective existence; then the instinct of sympathy, which had been leading an embryonic life, definitely emerges, and forms the tribe. We cannot follow M. Espinas in his analysis of this affection, but in no part of the work is his psychology more original or more suggestive,

In a closing chapter the author sums up the results of his inquiries in a number of "laws," necessarily of a rather vague character, descriptive of the nature, origin, development, and duration of animal societies. The conclusion that a society is a living organism, which has progressed from a state in which the relations among its members were physiological to one in which they are psychological, may be taken as approximately true, with the qualifications that the terms 'living' and 'organism' have connotations of a somewhat lower order than the facts, and that while the relations are slightly psychical from the outset they remain partly physical to the end. Most instructive applications of this general result to the theories of mind and morals conclude the work.

Even the foregoing rapid analysis may have served to show that M.

Espinas's volume is one of first-rate importance as a contribution both to social and mental science. Large and original in design, the execution of it may be said to be worthy of the plan. It is not indeed without defects theories are started only to be dropped; hypotheses are laid down in one chapter and thrown over in another; and objections (as for example to Natural Selection) are repeatedly made throughout the work and repeatedly refuted in other parts of it. But these and similar inconsistencies may perhaps be ascribed to the circumstances under which the essay was produced and the restraints of the author's official position.

J. COLLIER.

Logische Studien. Ein Beitrag zur Neubegründung der Formalen Logik und der Erkenntnisstheorie, von F. A. LANGE. Iserlohn: J. Baedeker, 1877.

THIS posthumous fragment is worthy, both in matter and style, of the author of the History of Materialism. The Editor, H. Cohen, tells us that it was completed three weeks before its author's death, but that it was begun before the preparation of the second edition of the History; and he remarks that its main principles are those which permeate Lange's Philosophy, and that accordingly the friends of the History of Materialism may take it as the exponent of the historical critic's systematic views. With these remarks we fully concur. It is an invaluable key to the History, especially to the most interesting part of it which deals with Kant and his influence.

The gist of the book is to show that the intuition of Space is the source of the apodeictic not in Mathematics only, as Kant held, but in Logic also. This is shown, first, by an appeal in detail to what we are conscious of in our own minds when we engage in the processes of Formal Logic; and, afterwards, by entering into what we may call the metaphysic of Space. The elegance with which these two portions of the present work are connected is very characteristic of Lange, in whom metaphysic always holds its legitimate place of style in relation to matter.

The work begins with a criticism of the apodeictic in the ordinary Metaphysic. The fact that metaphysicians are not agreed, proves that we must not look for the apodeietic in their various systems, for the apodeictic is self-evident and beyond dispute. The metaphysicians have had it so much their own way since Aristotle's time that the mere form of deduction has come to be identified with the apodeictic, however disputed in each system the principles may be and the conclusions derived from them. The professor of a systematic metaphysic thus elevates himself above the man of science to whom he denies the apodeictic. It is the object of Lange in the present work to vindicate against this professorial apodeictic that of μanμatin akpißología. He might, we think, have made out even a stronger case than he has done against the systematic metaphysicians. He accuses them of holding Aristotle's theory of emoτýjun in an age when

it is no longer merely naïf to do so. But it is surely true that they have perverted the theory by giving an extended sense to morÝμN, which Aristotle practically limits to mathematics. We do not wish to be thought ungrateful to a book so full of suggestions as the present; but we cannot help expressing our regret that it does not go into the subject of Aristotle's theory of the method of geometry. His theory, which has not received the attention which it deserves from his commentators, interesting independently, seems to us to gain a special interest when viewed in connection with Lange's remarks on Formal Logic, of which Aristotle is the author. But before attempting to supply this omission, we must state Lange's view of the nature of the apodeictic in Formal Logic, and his criticism of Aristotle's view on the subject.

Kant showed that mathematical judgments are synthetic à priori, but maintained that logical propositions are analytic, implying the Principle of Contradiction. But all apodeictic truths are synthetic. Mathematical truths are syntheses à priori by means of the intuition or perception of Space. Logical truths are syntheses à priori by means of the same intuition (pp. 8, 9). As the necessary deductions of mathematics are derived by the way of self-evident sight from the immediate perception of the simplest geometrical shapes, into which the less simple diagrams are broken up-these simplest shapes being, as Kant expressed it, perceived in pure intuition; as Dugald Stewart expressed it, hypotheses; as Lange expresses it, variable in imagination within the limits of a notion (pp. 22, 28, 47),-so, too, the processes of Formal Logic derive their necessity from the perception of figures in Space which are immediately seen to include totally or partially or to exclude other figures. This immediate perception is the only ground of the apodeictic. Even the Principle of Contradiction itself reposes on this ground, and its mechanical employment in Reduction must not be allowed to mislead us as to the ultimate ground of the apodeictic in that process (pp. 26, 27). Similarly we can manipulate numbers mechanically in counting (p. 21); but the small numbers which are our apxaí in arithmetic are originally given in space-intuition (p. 141). Aristotle's logic is, however, essentially one of intension—τὸ Α κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ B. But this comes from his metaphysic. A is of the essence of B. The modern friends of the Aristotelian metaphysic who regard it as the 'apodeictic science' par excellence, attempt to exhibit it as the ground of the apodeictic in his logic also. But although doubtless in Aristotle metaphysical forms enter largely into logic, yet there is a marked difference, ignored by his modern followers, between his Technik and his Erkenntnisstheorie. Although the metaphysical theories of essence and of divus and évépreia play an important part in his analytic, and although his logic may be therefore styled one of intension, yet he does not ground its necessity on metaphysical principles but on the exhibition of the extent of notions-i.e., on the intuition of Space. Hence his logic has a value quite independent of that of his metaphysic (pp. 10, 17).