infer molar from a feeling of molecular motion. The same may be said of acids and other products of decomposition, which, by acting on the almost naked axis-cylinder of the assumed sensitive nerves, probably cause the sense of muscular fatigue. This feeling is, no doubt, clearly correlated with that of innervation, but our judgment of motion or weight, instead of conforming to the curve of fatigue, is, up to a certain limit, scarcely affected by it, while, if the sensitive data were the ratio between processes or products of nutrition and retrograde metamorphosis, then again the psychic verdict in any given case would be either infinitely complex or else fluctuating with every change in its physical basis. So, too, of the more painful and undiscriminating muscular feelings, such as excessive fatigue, cramp, &c. Whether these are located in the tendons, as Wundt believes, or depend upon the extent of grey tissue involved in their conduction, as Burkhardt conjectures, or, as many anatomists suppose, are caused by lesion of tissue or of nervous anastomoses in interstitial tissue itself, or by mere excess of the same causes as in normal activity give us true muscular sensations, it is enough to assert their undisputed psychic independence in kind.

Finally, we may add that, while the latest anatomy of muscular fibres suggests the presence of yet more ultimate nervous elements peculiarly adapted to irritation by tension and pressure, our conclusion is not likely to be affected by any solution of such outstanding questions of myophysics as the preexistence of muscular currents, the presence of a parelectrotonic layer, the number and nature of cross-discs, &c. Gerlach* believes that the fields of Cohnheim, which are light-coloured demarcations of primary bundles of muscular fibrillæ seen by cross-sections, are due to nervous substance which must be conceived as spread over the single sarcous elements as a perfect sheath. Engelmann'st ingenious theory assumes that the anisotropic or doubly refracting substance is the seat of contractile power, and acts by filling itself with fluid to three or four times its former bulk, while he has observed the isotropic. substance to shrink and shorten, sometimes as much as 85 per cent., the former growing bright while the latter is growing dark, thus accounting partially for the homogeneous mid-stadium of Merkel. Such changes are far greater than those which take place in the fibre as a whole, and if these are immediately recorded upon sensitive nervous tissue it must be by pressure and tension as before, but vastly augmented, and still furnishing the required extensive and intensive series.

Muscular sense is thus absolutely unique in that the Berlin. Klin. Wochenschrift, No. 45.

+ Mikroskopische Onderzoekingen, II., 2.

Locke, Shaftesbury, Butler, Hutcheson (pp. 1-30). Next follows the exposition with detailed criticism of Hume's ethics (pp. 31-196). In conclusion, a short survey is taken of the chief ethical theorists after Hume, viz., Smith, Hartley, Mackintosh, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Darwin. The essay appended (pp. 245-357) is only loosely connected with the main treatise. The contents are :-I. Arguments for the Principle of Universal Happiness (1) from the comparative study of morals and moral systems, (2) from the notion of an ultimate scientific principle, (3) from the fundamental constitution of will, (4) from general considerations pertaining to natural philosophy; II. Denomination of the Principle; III. The Nature of Happiness; IV. Why Ethics cannot rest upon the mere feeling of Duty; V. Vindication of the Principle against misunderstandings and objections."

KANT'S Prolegomena, &c. Herausgegeben und historisch erklärt. Von BENNO ERDMANN. Leipzig: Voss, 1878.

"This edition is based on the view that the Prolegomena is composed of two parts essentially different in origin and tendency. Kant first intended a mere extract from the K. d. r. V. This was in great part completed, when he was moved by the Göttingen criticism to make insertions and additions of a historical and polemical cast. The different parts are separated accordingly in this edition. The Introduction (pp. 128), besides justifying the division, gives an outline of Kant's development from 1780 to '82, with a minute investigation of the relation of the Prolegg. to the first edition of the K. d. r. V., resulting in conclusions not a little different from the views hitherto prevalent as to the doctrine of the Ding-an-sich and Kant's relation to Hume. (1) It is shown that Kant in 1781 connects his idealism exclusively with the result of the Esthetic, and employs it in the Dialectic only against the psychological paralogisms and cosmological antinomies. The conclusions of the Analytic are conceived in an empiristic sense only. Owing this to the Göttingen criticism and other attacks, there takes place in the Prolegg. a change of doctrine, the attempt now being made to combine in a new way the assumption of active things-in-themselves, never doubted by Kant, with the conclusions of the Analytic. (2) It is shown, by a reference to Kant's own acount of his development in the Dorpat MSS., that his veering-round in 1769 was not determined by Hume but by the doctrine of the Antinomy, and that the emancipative influence of Hume was not felt till 1772 (after the letter to Herz). Kant regarded himself therefore not as the opponent but as the follower of Hume."

Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik.

Kritische Beiträge.

Von

GEORG ELIAS MÜLLER. Berlin: Grieben, 1878. Pp. 425. "The first section treats of the psychophysical methods of measurement; the author, among other things, trying to show that the method of mean errors' can give no trustworthy results, and also that the method of just observable differences' and the 'method of true and false cases' must be otherwise applied than hitherto. The second section subjects to a detailed consideration and critical sifting the whole series of experiments as yet undertaken in relation to E. H. Weber's law; and the third is occupied with its interpretation. It is shown, against Hering, Langer, Brentano, Delboeuf, and others, that the approximate validity of Fechner's formula of measurement follows as a more or less probable consequence from the facts of Weber's law; but that Fechner's psychophysical conception of the formula is far less probable than a physiological interpretation, and cannot be maintained without modification. The fourth section treats of the practical value of Weber's law."

XII-NEWS.

Mr W. H. S. Monck has been appointed to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Trinity College, Dublin, in succession to Dr. M'Ivor.

Dr. Alexius Meinong, author of the Hume-Studien noticed in the present number, has qualified as Privatdocent in the University of Vienna.

The monument to be erected next year to Giordano Bruno at Rome will be supplemented by another national memorial of the

philosopher. Professor Fiorentino has been charged by the Minister of Public Instruction with the preparation of a complete edition of his works. The Roman Opinione, of May 3rd, contains a description by Prof. Berti of some unedited works of the philosopher existing in autograph MS. in the Library of St. Petersburg.

The rendering of Mr Spencer's 'System of Philosophy' into other languages proceeds apace. Dr E. Cazelles, in France, and Dr B. Vetter, in Germany, have just completed the translations of the Principles of Biology. The series of chapters on Ceremonial Government,' begun in the January number of the Fortnightly Review, will enter into Vol. II. of the Principles of Sociology; the old mode of serial issue of parts to subscribers being now discontinued. These chapters are appearing simultaneously also in an American, a French, a German, an Italian, a Hungarian, and a Russian journal.

JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XII. No. 1.-W. James -Spencer's Definition of Mind'. Hegel-Symbolic Art' (transl.). Th. Gray-The Nation and the Commune'. Rosenkranz- Pedagogics as a System' (paraph.). G. B. Halstead' Boole's Logical Method'. Notes and Discussions. Book Notices.

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.-3me Année. No. IV. Ch. Lévêque-'L'Atomisme grec et la Métaphysique'. J. Sully-Le Pessimisme et la Poésie'. L. Carrau- Moralistes anglais contemporains: M. H. Sidgwick' (fin). Analyses et comptes-rendus (H. Spencer, Principes de biologie; Smiles, Le Caractère, &c.) Notices bibliographiques. Rev. des Périodiques. No. V. H. Marion-John Locke, d'après des documents nouveaux' (H. R. F. Bourne, Life of John Locke). H. Spencer- Etudes de Sociologie' (IV., V.). P. Regnaud Philosophe indienne La Transmigration'. Analyses et comptes-rendus. Rev. des Périod. No. VI. A. Burdeau-Le Tragique comme Loi du Monde, d'après Bahnsen'. A. Espinas- Études nouvelles de Psychologie comparée' (Tissot, De l'Intelligence et de l'Instinct dans l'homme et dans l'animal, 1878; Vignoli, Della legge fondamentale della Intelligenza nel regno animale, 1877). H. Marion-John Locke, d'après des doc. nouv.' (fin). Observations et Documents-Le Sens de l'Espace, d'après M. E. de Cyon'. Analyses et comptes-rendus.

LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE.-VIIme Année, Nos. 7-19. C. Renouvier— A propos de la peine de mort' (7); La question de la certitude' (10,13,18); 'La psychophysique appreciée d'après la doctrine mathématique' (12); 'La

latter below. But in this, there is no detection of the fact that the pedestal supports the statue, and before this idea can be acquired there must be a further exertion of mind; there must be a direct perception to the effect that when the pedestal is slipped from under the statue, the latter, unless otherwise sustained, falls to the ground. We have then before the mind the two lines of immediate perception, positive and negative, out of which is evolved the complex perception that the statue depends for support upon the pedestal; in other words, is so connected with the pedestal (first premiss) as not to be able, without the same, to maintain its position (second premiss). Simple perception enables us merely to ascertain that 2+3 makes 5, and, again, that in the absence of either 2 or 3 the sum 5 ceases to exist. But when simple perception has done so much it has reached its limit. It is by mediate or inductive perception, by comparing together the above data, that we are enabled to get a knowledge of the necessary connexion which subsists between 2 + 3 and 5. By simple perception we know only that two straight lines do not enclose space. It is by inductive perception we know that they cannot do the same.

Now notice that the reasoning involved in these and kindred instances has, in my opinion, no necessary connexion with generalisation. It is induction in single instances, or in the Category of Difference, which, in the order of evolution, as it seems to me, is, with one exception, prior to the Category of Resemblance,* to which generalisation

It seems to me that all thought moves in two Categories, that of Difference, and that of Resemblance.

Two indispensable elements of all intellectual operations are discrimination and identification.

An object, as presented to sense, is cognised by the intellect as a Whole. This Whole is discriminated, the Whole from its parts, these from each other, and the Whole and its parts from other Wholes. This act of the intellect, which is discriminating judgment, I place in the Category of Difference, although in common with every operation of the intellect, in so far as there must be identification of the manifestation of this moment with that of the latest, later, late, past manifestation, it is, indeed, in the Category of Resemblance.

Discriminating judgment I call perception, and hold that it is expressed by the Proposition regarded as singular.

Conception, which is the operation to which we owe general notions and common terms, and which, as a judgment, I hold is expressed by the Proposition regarded as general, I place in the Category of Resemblance.

Now, it seems to me, that in logical order, the order of evolution, Conception presupposes Perception. In time, indeed, they may be contemporaneous; nevertheless, there must be two or more percepts to form a concept. A A A, to Perception, single objects become to Conception, because they resemble each other, one whole. Thus, A A A to Perception become to Conception A's.

Perception, Induction, and Syllogising, in the order of evolution, I look upon as being, in the first place, in the Category of Difference, and, therefore, singular.

When Conception operates in conjunction with these operations, they become plural, general, and move also in the Category of Resemblance, the Whole of Extension.

exclusively belongs; and this mode of reasoning in single instances, which I am inclined to call Singular Induction, seems to be a process taking place in millions of minds that seldom from this foundation attain to universal propositions and laws of Nature, being content simply to reason from the old to the new when the latter presents itself. The burnt child, for example, dreads the fire long before it dreams of launching out of this painful experience into the full stream of universal law. In this sense, I have no doubt, as Macaulay contends, "that the inductive method has been practised ever since the beginning of the world by every human being". Tracing induction, then, farther back than the outlying islands of inference from particulars to particulars, I contend that its mainland consists of single instances, that it has its root in the Category of Difference. According to my thinking, all the operations of the intellect, apart from Conception, the generalising process, are singular. At the root of all thought, especially reasoning, we have nothing but isolated singulars, standing, like so many piers of a bridge, aloof from each other, waiting for the superstructure that is to unite them, singulars which suggest no inference whatever from this instance to that, from these particulars to those. All reasoning from one instance to another involves an effort of conception. When, by Singular Induction, I ascertain that A is necessarily connected with B, and when, by Conception, I note the existence, as mere historical connexions, of other instances of A+ B, namely, similar instances, I extend to them the necessary union that, in the case of the first A+ B, I have inductively proved. Here, however, observe that it is only when we have, as a foundation, an induction proving necessary connexion that we are fully entitled, in every case, to generalise from this to that. According to this view, then, generalisation is not the first, but the second step in inductive reasoning.

Inductive generalisation carried out to its full extent I would call Universalisation. When, either among co-existences, or among antecedents and consequents, necessary connexion is inductively established, the inquiring mind tends to generalise ad infinitum, and express the result in a universal proposition. "Necessity and universality," Hamilton observes, "may be regarded as co-incident. For when a belief is necessary it is eo ipso universal, and that a belief is universal is a certain index that it must be necessary. (See Leibnitz Nouveaur Essais.)" There is much truth in these words, but they seem to me incorrect in stating that necessity and universality are co-incident. Necessity, by which I mean the belief in necessary connexion, originates in the Category of Difference, that is, among single instances, whereas universality, by which I mean the belief in universal connexion, is in the Category of Resemblance, and the latter, I cannot avoid thinking, presupposes the former, except indeed in so far as the conscious identity of every mental operation with itself from time to time is a fundamental law of mind.

It has been stated above that necessity and contingency, as here used, are related terms. This is shown to be the case in the following