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English and Scotch people would feel entire sympathy. In fact, the two races have been shaped in the same school of conflict with nature, frequent warfare, and family life. It is supposed that the Germans have no such aptitude for colonising as the British race has shown. Yet both in the United States and in South America they have proved their worth as citizens of young and growing States. It is true they have not done very well in Africa. But then, judging by present results, neither have we.

. Cape Colony is very hard put to it to make financial ends meet. The Transvaal is in pitiful plight. Rhodesia continues to absorb capital without returning any interest.

Another divergence of character upon which stress is often too heavily laid lies in the British impatience of hard-and-fast rules, and the German inclination to rely upon formula and routine. But we have come to understand that discipline has been too much omitted from our system, while Germany is realising that independence of judgment and readiness to accept responsibility are quite as valuable qualities as obedience and submission to authority. So there is every likelihood of our gradually becoming more like each other in this respect as well.

Beyond question the British and the Germans are the two races most fitted to advance the orderly, competent administration of the world. In fact, if they could only divide up between them the troubled portions of the globe, there would be a good chance of firm, steady government replacing fabbiness and chaos in all the quarters which cause anxiety from time to time. This is, I am afraid, not probable. But even if we are bound to come into rivalry, cannot we conduct ourselves as sensible merchants do whose business interests clash ? Both King Edward and the Kaiser have over and over again expressed their desire for peace, and each gives utterance to the hope and desire of the mass of his subjects. But it is of no use merely to cherish amiable aspirations. If we want peace, we must take steps to preserve it.

Since we are not in the least likely to take the Bismarckian course suggested above, it is to our interest, as well as that of Germany, to postpone the struggle for mastery as long as we

After a few years of friendly relations, we might even arrive at some agreement for lightening the burdens which are imposed by the perpetual augmentation of armaments. There is no hope of these burdens being moderated in any other way. Indeed, there is a danger of our being forced to enter into a costly airship-building competition apart from the progressive increase we are cach bound to make under present conditions in our battleships, cruisers, and torpedo craft. The outlook is


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gloomy for us both, unless we can hit upon some plan that would allow us to cut our expenditure down.

Again, when we have once persuaded ourselves that Germany's desire for expansion is reasonable and not only reasonable, but inevitable, we may see the wisdom of facilitating her movement in certain directions least injurious to our interests. On the other side, we may expect that Germany, having realised that we are not putting obstacles in her way out of mere cussedness, will recognise that the wise course is to work with us, whenever that is possible, instead of biting thumbs and provoking our opposition, even when our interests do not make it essential that we should

oppose. For, after all, there is plenty of room in the world for both of us, at any rate for a great many years to come. Is it quite impossible that both countries should recognise this? Are nations doomed to be always stupider than individuals? Why should not King Edward signalise his reign even still more brightly by taking this much larger step than any taken yet towards a new era of common-sense in international relations? Common-sense has been the guide in our cordial understandings with France and Russia. But still the old idea that “Reason has no place in foreign statesmanship, which must rely entirely on Force," blinds most people to the possibility of a similar Anglo-German Entente.

That the King sincerely desires peace admits of no question. Never does he let slip an opportunity to reiterate his sentiments on this point. He went so far last August at Wilhelmshöhe as to say it was “his greatest wish that only the best and pleasantest relations should exist between Great Britain and Germany. Nor is the German Emperor less emphatic in his protestations. Methinks the gentleman doth protest too much ” will be the thought in many minds. Yet those who have had good opportunities of reading his character are united in testifying to his deep sense of responsibility as regards war. M. Léopold Mabilleau, the most recent witness, has summed up his impressions of many hours' talk with the Kaiser under conditions of unusual intimacy (“dans des conditions d'isolement et de liberté exceptionnelles ”') by asserting that the Emperor hopes to see the great destiny which he firmly believes to be in store for Germany arrived at without any rupture of peace.

Développer la prosperité matérielle, intellectuelle et morale de la nation par le commerce, l'industrie, la science et l'art; c'est à quoi il songe et non pas aux conquêtes.' And then M. Mabilleau quotes from the Emperor's words to him: “Qu'est-ce que

(1) L'Opinion, Paris, June 20th, 1908. VOL. LXXXIV. N.S.



l'Allemagne pourrait gagner à la rupture d'une paix où elle n'a cessé de grandir et de se fortifier depuis trente-sept ans ? Si elle entretient une flotte et une armée aussi puissantes que possible, c'est pour garder sa position dans le monde . . . et pour défendre

... son trafic et son influence sur terre et sur mer. Voilà tout!”

Is there any reason to believe the Emperor a disciple of Machiavelli? On the contrary, there is every ground for regarding him as a monarch of unusual sincerity, though not particularly stable in his judgments. No prince of Machiavellian cunning and dishonesty would have made trouble as William the Second has done so frequently by indiscreet blurting out of whatever at critical moments happened to be in his mind. He may have his bellicose moods; he does have them, we know; but throughout his reign he has set before himself always in his temperate hours the ideal of a peaceful development of Germany's greatness. He would listen with sympathy to any proposal tending that way.

If we neither break Germany's naval power, nor agree to be friendly rivals, we are in for a long period of alarums and excursions, as well as of back-breaking taxation. Doesn't the situation demand an effort to switch our foreign policy on to more sensible lines?




RECENTLY the British Atlantic Fleet has been on a visit to Quebec in connection with the Tercentenary Celebrations, the American Atlantic Fleet of sixteen battleships has been welcomed by the Australians, and Rear-Admiral Sir Percy Scott is about to take the Second Cruiser Squadron to South Africa on the occasion of the Federation Conference. In these conditions the three great Colonial groups of the Empire will have had under their eyes illustrations of the vast scale upon which effective naval power is now organised, while the voyages undertaken by these ships, and particularly the passage of the Indomitable from land to land at upwards of 25 knots, have enforced the truth that steam has made the seas all one. The turbine and the watertube boiler in the big ship of war have brought every section of . the Empire within the range of action of the great fleets of rival nations; but they have at the same time assisted, even in greater degree, the task of defence of all the King's Dominions by one fleet of overpowering strength, one in control, one in spirit, and one in purpose. To-day that fleet is in danger. What will the Colonies do-what part will they take in the coming naval struggle?

An unfortunate misunderstanding has arisen between successive Boards of Admiralty and our self-governing Colonies with reference to the requirements of the Fleet and the manner in which they can co-operate in the task of Imperial naval defence. It has become a settled belief in the colonial mind that England stands specially in need of more naval ratings-seamen, stokers, engine-room hands, signalmen, and others—than she can herself provide. In this belief the colonists have gradually reached the conviction that in providing raw material which can be trained to naval purposes-as reservists--they are assisting the Mother Country in a spirit of patriotism. There are also indications, particularly in the Commonwealth and Canada, of an ambition to form small fleets for local purposes. This plan is also put forward as being strictly in sympathy with the Imperial idea.

In view of the crisis which has arisen owing to the activity of Germany and other Powers, it is advisable to set down honestly the views which are very generally held in the Mother Country, but seldom expressed, as to the attitude of the colonists towards the question of Imperial defence. The British Navy exists not only for the defence of the United Kingdom, but for

the protection of the territory and trade of the whole of the British Empire. This is a point of special importance, because it is usually forgotten that the United Kingdom has no part or lot with about one-quarter of the total trade of the Empire; the colonists themselves have become great traders, and apart from their intercourse with foreign nations there is a large commerce which is inter-colonial, and requires protection.

At this moment, when our supremacy afloat is seriously menaced by the renewed and unprecedented efforts of rival Powers, it is not merely the safety of the United Kingdom which is threatened, but the freedom of the seas, which the Colonies as integral parts of the Empire have enjoyed in the past without molestation, owing to the influence which the British Fleet has exerted. Naval defence for the whole Empire is provided almost exclusively by the taxpayers of the United Kingdom. Our naval expenditure must soon reach forty millions sterling unless the trident is to pass from our hands. Will the Colonies stand by impassive spectators of the life and death struggle, or will they come to the aid of the Mother Country?

In Germany, the chief cause of uneasiness, the view has been frequently expressed that the British Colonies will refrain from effective assistance, while the United Kingdom, from vaunting pride in her sea traditions, will continue to dissipate her naval power over the world's seas so as to afford local protection to colonial interests. Pan-Germans are calculating upon these conditions as an aid to the realisation of their naval ambitions. It is intended to keep the German Fleet concentrated in the Baltic in the hope that at no moment can Great Britain mass her whole strength in northern waters owing to her obligations elsewhere. In these circumstances, Germany, it is thought, can count on achieving her ends with a navy considerably smaller than the whole British resources. A considerable proportion of the war material and trained personnel under the White Ensign will be distributed in far distant waters, and Germany will have to measure her strength at a moment chosen by her rulers against only the balance of British power which remains in home waters. Germany might thus conceivably become the supreme naval Power in northern waters in the near future-in other words, deal with the British Navy in detail. Will the Mother Country throw over her Colonies and concentrate the Navy still further in northern waters for the supreme end, or will the Colonies come to the aid of the Mother Country?

We are confronted with a situation which fills calm observers with grave anxiety. For three years past Germany has laid down almost as much armoured shipping as Great Britain, and

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