respect, all equal. There are different objects of defire, adapted to thofe different states; nor is the Monarch himself exempted from many, which are infeparable from the throne. ARIST. All men are then equally happy, or unhappy!

THA. I do not affirm that. I only affert, that one ftation is as happy as another; and that it would be to no purpose to place a man in this or that condition of life, in order to make him happy. In our entrance into life, we carry along with us the feeds of our future happiness or mifery, which fpring up, and flourish, in whatever fituation we are placed. If you had been a Pompey, you would have fuftained a war, which fhould decide your own fortune, and that of the univerfe, at the fame time. You would have loft a battle, and taken refuge with a friend, who would have had you affaffinated. Had you been a Socrates, you would have been an indigent Grammarian, have married the devil of a wife, have broached a metaphyfical truth, and been put to death for it. Had you been a prodigal, the moft fplendid patrimony would have been wafted in a fhort time. An Oeconomist, you would have lived at your ease on a very moderate one. There are the rich, who have no more than an hundred pounds a year, and the poor, who have ten thousand. If a man is ambitious, and is a peafant, he naturally wishes to be a Magiftrate; if a Magiftrate, to be a Prince; if a Prince, to be still greater than other Princes; and if fuperior to fome, to be fuperior to all. Thus an ambitious man gets nothing by being a Sovereign; his defires increasing with his promotion; and without ambition, it is exactly the fame to him, whether he be a King or a petty Juftice, a Prince or a Pea

fant.

Our Author quaintly ftiles the chapter containing the above Dialogue, Propos. By which, we fuppofe, he means to infinuate, that it is all mere talk. But, if this were really his meaning, it had been better, perhaps, that he had confidered this fubject in a different manner at least he might have done as well to have left the reader a little lefs in the dark, as to the coincidence of his own fentiments with thofe of his ancient Moralift.

Among the Metaphyficians, our Voyager encountered Campanella, with whom he takes a turn or two, and falls into difcourfe about the fyftems of that celebrated Philofopher; who appeared to be as much tainted with his old notions as when he was alive.

• Well,'

'Well,' fays he, did I prophecy right? At the time I was upon earth mankind began to think: they did not think • deep enough, however, to comprehend, and embrace, the truths I pointed out. But I thought I faw very plainly, they would do fo before it was long. How is it? hath knowlege banished their prejudices? What do they think ⚫ at this time of day, of Thomas Campanella?'-What they always did,' anfwered our Voyager, and what they probably always will, of a man who attributed thought to ftocks and ftones; and fuppofed a lump of iron to reason with a piece of steel that filed it. Do you think the world is more difpofed now than formerly, to believe, that the earth, planets, and ftars, are so many animals? and that the universe itself is only a larger one, containing the reft in its belly?'

You are pleased to rally,' returned Campanella; but, philofophically speaking, my arguments are all reduced to this; that it is actually certain, that Matter is poffeffed of a capacity of thinking. I am fure, I have been told, that this is an opinion adopted at prefent by moft of the learned; and, therefore, I flattered myself, the world had be gun to do me juftice, as the Author of it.

It is true,' replies our Traveller, that many of our modern Philofophers are of that opinion; but the greater part • admit it only under infinite limitations; whereas, you extend it univerfally. They maintain, indeed, that Matter ⚫ thinks; but not all Matter indefinitely. In order for Matter to be capable of thinking, it is neceffary, fay they, ⚫ that it should be arranged in a particular manner, in the formation of organized bodies. Even the followers of Epicurus themselves, who have attributed fo much to Matter, never thought otherwise.'

• Mistaken notions, all thefe,' fays Campanella. Either the primary elements, the atoms themselves, think, or • Matter in any shape cannot think at all. If an organized body hath perceptions, the elements that compofe it, muft have them too. For thofe elements do not change their nature, by their combination; nor will they do it by their • decompofition. They are in every cafe the fame; and are, and will be, capable to think. How do your Philofophers pretend that Matter, in order to perceive, fhould be • organized? What, pray, is Organization, but a particular arrangement of parts? and do fimple unthinking elements become capable of thinking, in proportion as they are difpofed in this, or that, peculiar manner? This is

as much as to fay, that an atom, which cannot think ⚫ while it remains on the left-hand of another, may be ren⚫dered capable of thinking, by being placed on the right. < Believe me, either bodies of no kind whatever are capable to think, or fingle atoms are fo too.'

A great defect in this work, as we have already hinted, is the uncertainty the Reader is frequently left in, as to the Author's real fentiments. By his putting this laft argument into the mouth of Campanella, one would imagine he intended to represent it as ridiculous: but it is, in fact, the principal one he himself makes use of, in his Effay on the Nature of the Soul; in which he appears to be profoundly serious.

Elements, fays he, whether separate or combined, are effentially the fame; and, if they cannot think feparately, they cannot form a thinking Being, in confequence of any combination.

This plea our Author makes ufe of to prove the immateriality of the Soul; and that no capacity of thinking can be fuperadded to Matter, as our great English Philofopher, Mr. Locke, had fuppofed. His method of argumentation, however, is extreamly fallacious. In the first place, he takes for granted, what will not be allowed him, in previoufly fuppofing, that "If material elements do think, motion must neceffari. "ly accompany their thought; for thinking is an action in "the thinking Being, and we cannot conceive that any body *can act without being in fome kind of motion."

But, perhaps, Thinking is not more an action than a paffion in the thinking Being. Is our Author very certain, that the thinking Being is not fometimes entirely paffive in the operation of thought? It is pretty plain, that fimple ideas depend immediately on the action of external objects, or the impreffions made by them, and the intervening medium, on the fenfes. In its capacity of perception, then, the thinking Being appears to be paffive, and if whatever be capable of perceiving objects, be allowed to poffefs ideas of thofe objects, the perceiving Being may, for any thing we can fee to the contrary, be quite paffive in the operation of thinking: unless, indeed, perception, and the capacity of entertaining ideas are not allowed to amount to, what is called Thinking.

Befides this, the term Action is here very indiftinctly and improperly applied by our Author. Action, in a mechanical fenfe, as applicable to material bodies, is very different from what we understand by Action in a metaphyfical one. By

Action,

Action, in the latter fenfe, is meant indefinitely the effort of any cause producing an allowed effect, or the means whereby fuch effect was produced by its caufe: the caufe being faid to act in fuch production. Now this action is, in every cafe, confeffedly indefinite and uninveftigable, and is very different from that which our Author fays, is inconceivable without motion. This latter is mechanical, being univerfally allowed to be the confequence of fome prior action; fo that, metaphyfically speaking, fimple Matter never can be faid to act at all, but rather to be acted on, by the cause that puts it in

motion.

It is true, compound mechanical machines, whofe several parts are primarily acted on by fome general firft mover, are commonly faid to act: but, in this cafe, the action of the whole is always known to be the confequence of the motion of the parts, which are confeffedly paffive.

Had our Author, indeed, firft proved thinking to be th action of the thinking Being, it is certain, that if material bodies did really think, their thought must be attended with fome kind of motion: but, while that point is in difpute, the motion of material bodies does not neceffarily follow their being admitted to think: nor doth motion enter into the idea of the action of a thinking Being, unless fuch Being be firft allowed to be a material one.

We will readily grant, however, that the indivifible elements do not think. On which we proceed to examine our Author's above mentioned affertion, viz. That because material Elements do not think separately, no thought can refult from their combination.

This Propofition he takes much pains to prove, and obviates several objections that might be made against it. Among other things, he fuppofes it might be plaufibly faid, that elements are not in themfelves alive, and yet, by combination, they form a living animal. But, in answer to this, he fays, life is nothing more than the conftant action and re-action of the parts compofing an animal body: Material Elements may conftitute fuch a body, because they are effentially moveable, and capable of fuch action and re-action; but they cannot form a thinking body, because they are not in themfelves capable to think.

With due deference to this Logician, however, his answer is not fatisfactory.

It

3

It will be obferved, that by the term Common Author does not confine himself, with Campania te pople modification, or local difpofition, of the compuntang elements; he admits of the motion of the comm which being premiled, we fhall endeavour to potXAT DES denciency of his reafoning.

He tells us what is Life; it is pity he did not

fetion of Thought alfo, in like manner. Per

nothing more than the action and re-action of me a JI

the object perceived, and the object perceiving.

Pi

; a

ainul

That the Mind of man is an immaterial principe, fopher can call in queftion; but the human mind came ot much more than receiving and retaining fim capacity which, however fubordinate to the intellettua, mpacity of man, is with us fufficient to denominate porelled of it, a thinking animal: and that this capac may not arise from the organization of material bodies, or the me chanical action of unthinking elements, is, perhaps, not o vory vary to demontirate. At least, for the argument's fike, at may be worth while to fhew, that in this point our Asthe revoning is inconclufive. To this end, we fhall proeval to ask farther, What is the principal criterion by which any object is judged to be capable or incapable of thinking? Poubeles its mode or action. If it be apparently inert or pudives having only tuch a motion, cither totally or in part, dxwe conceive to be mechanical, we harbour no fufpicion of ** entertaining any ideas. But if, on the other hand, it moves in a manner apparently spontaneous and arbitrary, it is called an animal, and is tupposed to have fome capacity of thinkings What we term Spontaniety may, however, in tome calos, de nothing else than mere mechanical neceffity; tho' we are ignorant of the moving caufes: and, if this may be true in any one cate, it may be fo in a great many others. This criterion, the beft we have, therefore, fails us; and it is dishcult to determine, while we labour under our prefent ignorance of phytical caufes, what apparentlypontaneous woving object is, or is not, really poffeffed of the capacity of thinking.

At the fame time, and for the fame reafon alfo, the like difficulty attends our deciding whether, what we call the effect of thought, in tome animals, be not the effect of the mechanical motion of material elements. Their amazing Inftinct, in the generation and prefervation of their fpecies, can never be confidered as the fagacious refult of profound

reafoning,