has a great influence on the mental effects of size; but let us attend to the consequences. As a general rule, all the parts of the same brain have the same constitution, and if size be a measure of power, then in each head the large organs will be more powerful than the small ones. This enables us to judge of the strong and the weak points in each head. But if we compare two separate brains, then we must recollect that the size of the two may be equal; and, nevertheless, the one from possessing the finest texture, and most vigorous constitution, may be exceedingly active, while another, from being inferior in quality, may be naturally inert. The consequence will be, that the best constituted brain will manifest the mind with most vigor. That size is nevertheless the measure of power, may be proved by contrasting the manifestations of a small and of a large brain, possessing the same combination of organs, and equally well constituted; the power or energy will then be found greatest in the latter. This is what is meant by other natural conditions being equal. As the temperaments are distinguishable by the countenance, and the general make of the body, and as the brain partakes of the general constitution, we possess an index to its natural qualities. I repeat that these remarks apply only to the case of comparing one brain with another. The same brain has in general the same constitution, and on the principle that size is a measure of power, the largest organs in each individual will be naturally the most vigorous. If the temperament be lymphatic, all the organs will act slowly, but the largest will be most powerful and most active, on account of their superior size. If the temperament be active, all will be active, but the largest will still take the lead. It is on this account that a student of Phrenology in search of evidence, should not compare the same organ in different brains.

Further, the brain must possess a healthy constitution, and that degree of activity which is the usual accompaniment of health. Now, the brain, like other parts of the body, may be affected with certain diseases which do not diminish or increase its magnitude, and yet impair its functions. The Phrenologist ascertains the health by inquiry. In cases of disease, great size may be present,

and very imperfect manifestations appear; or it may be attacked with other diseases, such as inflammation, or any of those particular affections whose nature is unknown, but to which the name of Mania is given in nosology, and which greatly exalt its action; and then very forcible manifestations may proceed from a brain comparatively small; but it is no less true, that when a larger brain is excited to the same degree by the same causes, the manifestations become increased in energy, in proportion to the increase of size. These cases, therefore, form no valid objection to Phrenology; for the phrenologist ascertains, by previous inquiry, that the brain is in a state of health. If it is not, he makes the necessary limitations in drawing his conclusions.

Let us turn our attention to the point of the argument at which we are now arrived. We have seen that the brain is the organ of the mind, that it is not a single organ, but that the analogy of all the other organs, the successive developement of the faculties,—the phenomena of partial genius,-partial insanity,-monomania,— dreaming, and partial injuries of the brain, indicate that it is a congeries of organs manifesting a plurality of faculties; we have seen also, that, in the case of the bones, muscles, nerves of motion, nerves of sensation, and nerves of the five senses, size has an influence on vigor of functions; and from the analogy of these organs, and also from direct facts and physiological authorities, we have come to the same conclusion regarding the brain, that vigor of function bears a relation, other circumstances being equal, to size in the organ. From these premises, it follows as a necessary conclusion, that, in the manifestation of the mental faculties, it will not be indifferent in what direction the brain is most or least developed; for example, if different parts of the brain possess different functions, and if the strength of function be in proportion to the size of the part, the vigor of the faculties connected with a brain in which the frontal region predominates in size, must necessarily be different from that which would proceed from a brain in which the predominance of size was in the posterior portion; and a difference would hold also in cases of preponderance in the superior or inferior portions.

Here we have a representation of the skull of Raphael, and of the skull of a native of New Holland; both taken from casts in the collection of the Phrenological Society. The difference in the forehead is very conspicuous. If the part of the brain lying in that region have any function connected with intellect, and if size be a measure of power, the two beings should form a strong contrast of power and weakness in that department. And, accordingly, the case is so. Raphael died at thirty-three years of age, and has left an imperishable memory on account of his genius in art. Sir Walter Scott describes the other as follows:-"The natives of New Holland are, even at present, in the very lowest scale of humanity, and ignorant of every art which can add comfort or decency to human life. These unfortunate savages use no clothes, construct no cabins or huts, and are ignorant even of the manner of chasing animals, or catching fish, unless such of the latter as are left by the tide, or which are found on the rocks; they feed upon the most disgusting substances, snakes, worms, maggots, and whatever trash falls in their way. They know, indeed, how to kindle a fire; in that respect only they have stepped beyond the deepest ignorance to which man can be subjected; but they have not learned how to boil water; and when they see Europeans perform this ordinary operation, they have been known to run away in great terror."

We have now arrived, by a fair and legitimate induction, at strong presumptive proof in favor of the grand principles of Phrenology, viz. that the brain is the organ of the mind, that different parts of it are connected with different faculties, and that the size of the organ, other conditions being equal, exerts an influence on the power of manifestation. Here, then, the inquiry presents

itself, What faculties and what parts of the brain are mutually connected? This is the grand question remaining to be solved, in order to render our knowledge of the functions of the brain and the organs of the mind precise and practically useful. Let us inquire what progress the metaphysician and anatomist have made in elucidating this point. It is of importance to take a view of the past efforts of philosophers in the science of mind on this subject, that we may be able correctly to appreciate both what remains to be accomplished, and how far Phrenology presents means capable of attaining it.

The mind has been studied, by one set of philosophers, with too little reference to the body; and the laws of thought have been expounded with as much neglect of organization as if we had already "shuffled off this mortal coil." From this erroneous practice of many distinguished authors, such as Locke, Hume, Reid, Stewart and Brown, a prejudice has arisen against the physiology of man, as if the mind were degraded by contemplating it in connexion with matter; but man is the work of the Creator of the world, and no part of his constitution can be unworthy of regard and admiration. The whole phenomena of life are the result of mind and body joined, each modifying each; and how can we explain a result, without attending to all the causes which combine towards its production?

Another set of philosophers, in avoiding Scylla, have thought it necessary to dash into Charybdis, and have taught, that the mind is nought but a combination of matter; and have endeavored to explain its functions by supposed mechanical motions in its parts; but, as we shall hereafter see, this course of proceeding is equally erroneous as the other.

In surveying the phenomena of mind, we are struck with the variety of faculties with which it appears to be endowed. Philosophers and the vulgar equally admit it to be possessed of different powers. Thus it is by one faculty that it reasons; by another that it imagines, and, by a third, that it discriminates between right and wrong.

If, however, we inquire what progress has hitherto been made by metaphysicians in ascertaining the primitive mental powers, and rendering the philosophy of man interesting and practically useful to persons of ordinary understanding, we shall find a lamentable deficiency indeed. From the days of Aristotle to the present time, the most powerful intellects have been directed, with the most persevering industry, to this department of science, and system after system has flourished, fallen, and been forgotten, in rapid and melancholy succession. To confine our attention to modern times, Dr. Reid overturned the philosophy of Locke and Hume; Mr. Stewart, while he illustrated Reid, yet differed from him in many important particulars; and, recently, Dr. Thomas Brown has attacked, with powerful eloquence and philosophical profundity, the fabric of Stewart, and it already totters to its fall. The very existence of even the most common and familiar faculties of the mind is still in debate among these philosophers. Mr. Stewart maintains Attention to be a faculty, which these other philosophers deny. They, again, state Imagination to be a primitive power of the mind, while Mr. Stewart informs us, that "what we call the power of Imagination, is not the gift of nature, but the result of acquired habits, aided by favorable circumstances." (Elements, Chap. 7. § 1.) Common observation informs us, that a taste for music, and a genius for poetry and painting, are gifts of nature, bestowed only on a few; but Mr. Stewart, by dint of his philosophy, has discovered that these powers, and also a genius for mathematics, "are gradually formed by particular habits of study, or of business." (Outlines, p. 16.) On the other hand, he treats of Perception, Conception, and Memory, as original powers; while Dr. Thomas Brown denies them to be entitled to that appellation. Reid, Stewart, and Brown, admit the existence of moral emotions; but Hobbes, Mandeville, Dr. Paley, and many others, resolve the sentiment of Right and Wrong into a regard to our own good, into perceptions of utility, obedience to the laws, or to the Divine command. Thus, after the lapse and labor of more than two thousand years, philosophers are not yet agreed concerning the existence of many of the most important