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the features, before it is uttered in words;-this is produced by much Imitation, Secretiveness, and Ideality.

This organ is possessed by some of the lower animals, such as parrots and monkeys, which imitate the actions of man.

When this organ and that of Benevolence are both large, the anterior portion of the coronal aspect of the head rises high above the eyes, is broad, and presents a level surface, as in Miss Clara Fisher, who, at eight years of age, exhibited great talents as an actress. When Benevolence is large, and Imitation small, there is an elevation in the middle, with a rapid slope on each side, as in Jacob Jervis. The organ is large in Raphael. It is regarded as ascertained.

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In both of these figures the head rises to a great height above the eyes; but in Jervis it slopes rapidly on the two sides of 13, Benevolence, indicating Imitation deficient; whereas in Miss Clara Fisher it is as high at 21 Imitation, as at Benevolence, indicating both organs to be large.

ORDER II.-INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.

THESE faculties communicate to man and animals knowledge of their own internal sensations, and also of the external world; heir object is to know existence, and to perceive qualities and relations. They consist of three genera; the first genus includes the Five Senses; the second, those powers which take cognizance of external objects and their relations, named Knowing or Perceptive Faculties; and the third, the faculties which trace abstract relations, and reason or reflect.

GENUS I.-EXTERNAL SENSES.

By means of the Five Senses, man and animals are brought into communication with the external world. Dr. Spurzheim, in his "New Physiognomical System," and, in his recent work "Phrenology," gives admirable treatises on the senses; of which I avail myself largely in the following pages.

The opinions entertained by philosophers in regard to the functions of the senses, have been whimsical, extravagant, and contradictory. Since the time of Bacon and Locke, the greater number of philosophical systems rest on the axiom of Aristotle, that all ideas come into the mind by means of the external senses. According to this notion, he who possesses them in the highest state of perfection, is able to manifest most powerfully the faculties of the mind; or, in other words, the faculties, both of man and animals, ought to be proportionate to the perfection of the five senses, and to the education bestowed upon them. Daily experience, however, contradicts this hypothesis.

Philosophers of another class maintain, that the mind acts independently of all organization, and that the senses, instead of being instruments of action, are rather impediments to it. They complain much of the illusions of the five senses; and despise all

testimony, and all conclusions grounded upon sensation. notions are unworthy of being refuted.

Such

A great many philosophers have also attributed to the external senses many acts which are performed by the internal faculties alone. For instance, Helvetius has said, that man owes his arts to the structure of his hands; and that, if the hoof of the horse had been joined to the human arm, he would have been still wandering wild in the woods. But many animals have instruments equally curious and perfect in their structure as those to which peculiar capacities of mind have been attributed in man; and yet these instruments do not produce in them the corresponding functions. Monkeys have hands almost as nicely formed as those which are attached to the human arm; but, do monkeys put wood upon the fire to support combustion? or, do they construct works of art? According to this opinion, also, insects, craw-fish, lobsters, and still more the cuttle fish, ought to have exact ideas of extension, of size, and of the theorems of geometry, in consequence of their numerous and perfect organs of touch.

In point of fact, however, the external instruments are often similar, while the functions performed by them are quite different. The hare and rabbit have similar feet, yet the hare lies on the surface of the fields, while the rabbit burrows under ground. We have also examples of similar functions observed in animals which have instruments quite different. The proboscis is to the elephant what the hand is to man and to the monkey. The hands of monkeys, and the feet of parrots and squirrels, are certainly different; yet, by means of these instruments, they all move their food to their mouths in eating. In order to dig up truffles, the hog ploughs the earth with his snout, and the dog scratches it with his feet.

Other philosophers, again, have taught, that the functions of the senses are not ordained by nature, but acquired by experience. For example, the metaphysicians have written much about the rectification of the sense of sight, by means of touch; and about what they call the acquired perceptions of sight.

Each sense, however, performs its functions in consequence of its own innate constitution alone, and the relations of every sense

to external impressions are determinate, and subjected to positive laws. If an odor make an impression upon the olfactory nerve, the impression is immediately found to be agreeable or disagreeable; and this feeling arises from the constitution of the sense, and the relation established betwixt it and the odorous particles which excite it to activity. The functions of every sense depend only on its peculiar organization; and hence no preceding exercise or habit is necessary, in order to acquire the special power of any sense. If the organization be perfect, the functions are perfect also; and if the organization be diseased, the functions are deranged, notwithstanding all preceding exercise. If the optic apparatus be perfect in newly hatched birds, their sight is perfect; as is the case with chickens, ducks, partridges, and quails: If, on the contrary, at the first entrance into life, the organization of the eyes or the ears be imperfect, the power of the animal to see or hear is proportionally deficient. In adult persons, vision is deranged if the eyes be diseased. In old persons, the functions of the five senses lose their energy, because the vital power of the organs is diminished.

It is indeed ridiculous to suppose that Nature should have produced any sense which could not perform its functions, without being supported by another and a different sense:-that, for example, we should not be able to see without feeling, or to hear without seeing. Hence the propositions appear self-evident,that no sense acquires its functions by means of any other sense, and that any one sense cannot be the instrument of producing the sensations experienced by means of all the senses collectively. But we must observe, that different senses may enable us to perceive the same object; and that one sense is more fitted than another to make us acquainted with different objects, and their qualities. For example, we may obtain a conception of the figure of a book, by means of the sense of touch, and also by means of the sense of sight.

Each sense, as already observed, is subject to its own positive laws. For example, we see, according to the laws of the refraction of light; and hence, a straight rod half plunged in water

appears crooked, although touch proves that, in this situation, the rod continues straight.

This is a kind of rectification; but it must not be confounded with the doctrine which maintains that one sense acquires its functions by means of the rectification of another sense. Touch may show, that a rod which is plunged in water, and looks crooked, is straight; but the eyes will see it crooked as before. The rectifications, thus effected by the senses, are mutual, and not the prerogative of one sense. In this view, the eyes may rectify the sense of touch. If, without our knowledge, a piece of thin paper be placed betwixt one of our fingers and the thumb, we may not feel, but we may see it. Even smell and taste may rectify the senses of seeing and of touch. Thus, many fluids look like water; and it would be impossible to discover them to be different substances by the sense of touch; but it is easy to do so by smell and taste. Thus each sense has its peculiar and independent functions, and each is subject to positive laws. But every sense also perceives impressions of which another is not susceptible; and it is in consequence of this circumstance that the external senses rectify one another; or rather produce, by their co-operation, an extent of accurate conception, which, in an unconnected state, they would have been incapable of producing.

It is a task of considerable difficulty to point out accurately the precise limits of the functions of the senses, because, in every act of perception, their instrumentality is combined with that of the internal faculties of the mind; and it is not easy to discriminate to what extent the act depends upon the one, and to what extent upon the other. For the elucidation of this point, I submit the following considerations to the attention of the reader.

The senses themselves do not form ideas. For example, when an impression is made upon the hand, it is not the organs of touch which form the conception of the object making the impression; but the nerves of feeling in the hand receive the impression, communicate it to the brain, and a faculty of the mind perceives the object. Without the nerves of feeling, the internal faculty could not experience the perception; because the medium of communi

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