ebullitions of his inveterate desire to regulate every thing by law yet the mania of this prince, like that of Don Quixote, was of the most beneficent kind, insomuch that those even who suffered by it could scarcely find in their hearts to complain. Misery, however, was the result of these ill-judged, though humane regulations, and universal discontent its ne cefsary consequence, as it ever must be in cases of the same kind. T

I know nothing that is so fallacious as human reasoning and therefore its decisions ought ever to be listened to with the most cautious circumspection. The knowledge of man is extremely limited: in no instance, does any one know enough to enable his reason to decide with absolute certainty. He can see only a few things with his own eyes; and even of these few he has not time or opportunities to examine any with that degree of accuracy which alone can preclude the pofsibility of being mistaken; he must rely on other persons for the great part of his information, and he has no certain means of ascertaining the degree of credit which he ought to attach to the representations of each. Innumerable are the temptations that may occur to induce individuals to disguise or pervert the truth; and if his information be false, the conclusions that his reason can derive from these data must, of course, be erroneous. A prince then, or a legislator, when he is called upon to enact restrictive laws, and surrounded by crowds of people of this description, cannot be so aptly compared to any thing that I know as to a blind man, who is under the necefsity of trying to advance in a difficult path abounding with trouble

some obstructions, and surrounded with pitfalls, which must prove his destruction if he does not avoid them: if he makes use of a staff, advances at a moderate pace, and gropes his way with caution, having his attention continually awake to discover when at any time he has made a false step, then to stop, and examine with care the nature of the objects that surround him, he will in time discover where he has gone wrong; and some compassionate observer will, perhaps, kindly lend his aid to put him once more in the right path, even were it only to bring him back to the place whence he set off. But if, instead of this cautious procedure, which a due consciousness of his own defect should inspire, he shall vainly throw away his crutch, and attempt to walk boldly on in his own strength, what' can be expected, but distress upon distress, and accumulated ruin? The only infallible conclusion, then, that man can draw from his reason, is, that the grounds on which he must decide, when he is called upon to enact regulating laws, are so obscure as to afford him at the best only a probability that he may be right; so that he ought at all times to proceed with a cautious moderation, and be ever attentive to notice such facts as may at any time give indications that he may have been wrong; that thus he may be enabled to relinquish his errors, and get once more into the true road.

If such be the case with even the best intentioned legislator, who is at pains to inform himself as well as he can before, he proceeds to act, what must be the case with regard to those persons who, in the most difficult cases, take it upon them positively to decide,

1

ebullitions of his inveterate desire to regulate every thing by law yet the mania of this prince, like that of Don Quixote, was of the most beneficent kind, insomuch that those even who suffered by it could scarcely find in their hearts to complain. Misery, however, was the result of these ill-judged, though humane regulations, and universal discontent its ne cefsary consequence, as it ever must be in cases of the same kind. am ↑

f.

know nothing that is so fallacious as human reasoning and therefore its decisions ought ever to be listened to with the most cautious circumspection. The knowledge of mancis extremely limited: in no instance, does any one know enough to enable his reason to decide with absolute certainty. He can see only a few things with his own eyes; and even of these few he has not time or opportunities to examine any with that degree of accuracy which alone can preclude the pofsibility of being mistaken; he must rely on other persons for the great part of his information, and he has no certain means of ascertaining the degree of credit which he ought to attach to the representation of each. Innumerable are the temptations that m occur to induce individuals to disguise or perver+ truth; and if his information be false, the concl that his reason can derive from these data m course, be erroneous. A prince then, or a les when he is called upon to enact restrictive la surrounded by crowds of people of this do cannot be so aptly compared to any thing th as to a blind man, who is under the necefsit to advance in a difficult path abounding w

vince those

s, that facts

ar to be ex ̈

are, and that

ed upon these

be more readily true, than that made, it should ce, that the preent to the amount nat is to say, of a aintain all the inve months, and no could be experienced rted as would sustain d, at the rate of their › space of three months of the year). This pron, that I suppose no persly adverted to the subject but would probably be dise who should pretend to deny

Yet the fact is, that the proI shall prove it beyoud the pos

y way of illustration, that the total age crop, that will serve the people year, is one hundred, be it tons, or or quarters of wheat.

this

average crop, on account of the eficiency, one fourth part, which, by

ebullitions of his inveterateo desire to regulate every thing by law yet the mania of this prince, like that of Don Quixote, was of the most beneficent kind, insomuch that those even who suffered by it could scarcely find in their hearts to complain.Misery, however, was the result of these ill-judged, though humane regulations, and universal discontent its ne cefsary consequence, as it ever must be in cases of the same kind. !

know nothing that is so fallacious as human reasonings and therefore its decisions ought ever to be listened to with the most cautious circumspection. The knowledge of man is extremely limited : in no instance, does any one know enough to enable his reason to decide with absolute certainty. He can see only a few things with his own eyes; and even of these few he has not time or opportunities to examine any with that degree of accuracy which alone can preclude the pofsibility of being mistaken; he must rely on other persons for the great part of his information, and he has no certain means of ascertaining the degree of credit which he ought to attach to the representations of each. Innumerable are the temptations that may occur to induce individuals to disguise or pervert the truth; and if his information be false, the conclusions that his reason can derive from these data must, of course, be erroneous. A prince then, or a legislator, when he is called upon to enact restrictive laws, and surrounded by crowds of people of this description, cannot be so aptly compared to any thing that I know as to a blind man, who is under the necessity of trying to advance in a difficult path abounding with trouble