of the southern one. But the condition of the southern man differs from that of the northern man in this, that to the former, the burden of taxation, whatever it may be, brings no compensating influence, whilst to the latter, the burden provides the means to sustain it.

341. Hence, it is apparent, the interests of the northern and southern portions of our country conflict, in some measure, with each other, and that the South has some, but we cannot think very grievous, cause of complaint, and none which is not compensated by the general benefits of the UNION. Considered as part of a great whole, she suffers from an inequality which is common to every community. It is impossible to devise any system of taxation which shall not operate, more or less, unequally, and she should not, therefore, complain, that like others, enjoying the benefits of society, she pays a portion of the price. But, if she take the selfish position, that nothing is to be given up, to the Union, and that a state of national polity, producing temporary, local, partial inconvenience, is cause for adverse, sectional organization, she may, indeed, find in the tariff system, motives to resistance, which one foreign State has to resist another. This is a view, however, which the patriotism and good sense of the greater portion of the South has, happily, rejected.

CHAPTER XIII.

NULLIFICATION AND PROCLAMATION.

342. When the near extinction o_ the public debt brought up the tariff system for consideration, in 1832, the champions of the South, headed by Mr. Hayne in the Senate, and Mr. McDuffie in the House of Representatives, ably and zealously exposed and amplified their grievances, and required of the North and West, not only, the reduction of the taxes which the extinguishment of the debt authorized, but the reduction of the protective duties, also, to the revenue standard. demand was resisted, by Mr. Clay and his compeers in the Senate, and Mr. John Q. Adams and his associates in the House, with triumphant success, by the passage of the bill, the principle of which we have stated,

The

343. In the sufferings of the South, South Carolina was the greatest sufferer, or, at least, the loudest complainant, and most active agitator. Her reason and her eloquence were powerless to induce three-fourths of the Union to surrender their interests, to the promotion of the wishes of the other fourth, and in casting about for a remedy, her ingenious representatives struck out one of a novel and most disorganizing character, to which they threatened, in 1831, to resort; unless their alleged grievances should be redressed, in the adjustment of the revenue to the wants of the Government. The nature of this remedy underwent a thorough discussion in the Senate of the United States, upon some resolution offered by Mr. Foot, relative to the public lands; and we shall give here a concise view of its character.

344. There exists in all political associations, an indefeasible right, among their constituents, to resist all acts which are plainly against the principles of the association, and too oppressive to be endured. This is the sacred right of insurrection, to be resorted to as medicinal, in extreme cases only. When, in the year 1798, the passage of the alien and sedition laws alarmed the democratic party, for the safety of the Constitution of the United States, the individual States were disposed to look into their powers, to ascertain the means they possessed, of resisting encroachments. Some_resolutions, prepared by Mr. Jefferson for the Kentucky Legisla

ture, were adopted by that body, and others of like character, prepared by Mr. Madison, were approved by the Assembly of Virginia, in which these subjects were considered. The Kentucky resolutions asserted, hypothetically, but without intention to apply them to the existing case, the following principles:

In case of acts being passed by Congress "so palpably against the Constitution, as to amount to an undisguised declaration, that the compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the General Government, but, that, it will proceed to exercise over the States all powers whatsoever, it would be the duty of the States to declare the acts void, and of no force, and that each should take measures of its own, for providing, that neither such acts, nor any other of the General Government, not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be exercised within their respective territories."

The case thus put is obviously one of great extremity, in which the obligation to maintain the Union would be dissolved, and the remedy would be a forcible dissolution of the compact.

Yet, upon such hypothetical case, the southern jurists have built up a doctrine, which teaches the right to nullify the laws of the United States, as a peaceable and constitutional remedy, whenever a State shall deem them unwarrantable. They say:

I. 345. That, the General Government, emanated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political communities and acting in their separate and sovereign capacities, and not from all the people, forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character above described; that the States have a right to judge of its infractions, and, in cases of deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, may, in the last resort, interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them, which right is the fundaniental principle of our system:

II. That, the doctrine which denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved powers, and vests in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers del egated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the States

and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union:

III. That, to give to the General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers is to make its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; and that, in all cases of compact, between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of redress:

IV. That, should the General Government and a State come into conflict, the power, which called the General Government into existence, which gave it all of its authority, which can enlarge, contract or abolish its powers, may be invoked. The States themselves may be appealed to; threefourths of which, in fact, form a power whose decrees are in the Constitution, itself:

V. That, the powers of the Supreme Court of the United States are judicial, not political; and are, expressly, confined by the Constitution, "to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under its authority;" and which exclude political questions and comprehend those only where there are parties amenable to the process of the Court, Nor is its incompetency less clear, than its want of constitutional authority. There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the Court as a judicial tribunal cannot, from its nature, take cognizance.

VI. But, supposing it competent to take cognizance of infractions of every description, it cannot be safely entrusted with the power. Power to protect can be, safely, confided only to those interested in protecting, or to their responsible agents. The danger, in our system, is, that, the General Government may encroach upon the States, or the States on the General Government. The Government, through all its departments, is administered by delegated agents, responsible to the high controlling power which impels every movement of the machine; That power is the majority compounded of the majority of the States taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of the people of the States, estimated in federal numbers. The majority of the States elect the majority of the Senate; of the people of the States, that of the House of Representatives; the two united, the President; and the President and a majority of the Senate appoint the

judges; a majority of whom, of the Senate and the House, with the President, really exercise all the powers of the Government, save where the Constitution requires a greater num-` ber than a majority. Thus, the judges are as truly the representatives of this united majority, as the majority of Congress itself or the President, is its legislative or executive representative. To confide the power, therefore, to the judges, to determine, finally, and conclusively, what powers are delegated and what reserved, is to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are and by whom they may be controlled in various ways. Nor will the tenure by which they hold their offices, materially, vary the case; its highest possible effect would be to retard and not finally to resist the will of a dominant majority:

VII. That, the Government is not one of majorities. The Constitution is the law of the Government, as the law is the rule of individuals; and this principle is as true, where the Government is administered by a majority as by an individual. The right of the Government is derived, only, from the assent of the governed. Where the interests of the people are homogenous, it may be wise to place them under the control of a majority, but where they are dissimilar, whether from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry or production, they must be protected, by constitutional provisions. In the United States, these interests are very diverse. To preserve them, a plan was devised suited to our situation, but novel in its character. The powers of Government were divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes of the people, but, geographically. One General Government was formed for the whole, with all the powers supposed necessary to regulate the interests common to all the States, leaving all others to the control of the States, respectively; being such as could not be subjected to the will of the majority of the whole Union without the certain hazard of injustice and oppression. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by constitutional compact, to which all the States are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. To preserve this distribution, by coercing each political body to move in its prescribed orbit, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which, the duration of our Constitution, and in all probability, our liberty depends: How is this to be effected?

Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been separately represented in any Government; whenever the