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It is notorious, that specie payments were restored, and have been maintained, through the instrumentality of the Bank. It has, wherever its operations have been extended, effectually, checked excessive issues on the part of the State Banks. These issues, it had caused to be reduced, before the year 1820, from sixty-six to less than forty millions; and since that period has so confined them, that every where the paper of solvent State Banks is convertible into specie, within the local sphere of its circulation.

The manner of this restraint, is in receiving the notes of all solvent Banks, and requiring payment, from time to time, without suffering the balance, due by any, to become too large. On this operation, which requires particular attention and vigilance, great firmness, with due forbearance, depends, almost exclusively, the stability and the permanency of the currency of the country.

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And, now, as to the uniformity of the currency produced and sustained by the Bank. It is more uniform than any specie currency can be made. In this respect, it has been productive of results more salutary than were anticipated by its most sanguine advocates. No one contemplated, that, the Bank would redeem its bills at any of its offices, other than those by which they should be respectively issued. evitable effect of such a requirement, would have been to compel the Bank to perform the whole commercial exchanges of the country, without compensation. And yet, the Bank. has done, and continues to do, this. The bills of the Bank and of all its branches are invariably and promptly paid, in specie, whenever presented at the offices at which they are payable; consequently, within their respective spheres of circulation, they are equivalent to specie. If the Philadelphia merchant have silver, instead of Bank bills, and desires to purchase cotton at New Orleans, he must transport it thither, paying the expense of carriage, including the insurance. This expense constitutes the natural rate of exchange, between the cities, and is the sum the merchant must give as a premium for a bill of exchange, to avoid the trouble and delay of transporting his specie. But the bills of the Bank would purchase such bill of exchange at the same price as specie. What we have said of the Philadelphia merchant is true of every other merchant in any place of the Union. Therefore, if the Bank had not reduced the rate of exchange, its bills would be of equal value with silver, at every point, and for every purpose, whether local or general.

But, the Bank has reduced the rate of exchange to a mere fraction of one per cent., and has equalized the currency throughout the Union. If the whole circulation were specie, the average cost of transporting it from one point to another, would be one per cent., and such would be the price of a bill of exchange transferring the value. But the Bank, for less than one-half per ct., will give a draft, at, and on, the remotest points where it has offices. Or if the merchant prefers to transmit to his correspondent the bills of the office where he resides, although they be not strictly redeemable, at the residence of his correspondent, yet as they are receivable in payment of all dues to the Government, they are negotiable, at par, and are so received by the Bank. In 1832, the exchange operations of the Bank amounted to 241 millions of dollars, transferred at a premium of one-eleventh of one per cent.

For all the purposes of revenue, the reception of the Bank bills at the Treasury, gives to the national currency, that perfect uniformity, that ideal perfection which, in a country so extensive as ours, a metallic currency cannot attain. A bill issued at Missouri, is equivalent to specie at Boston, and wherever the Bank issues bills, and the Government collects its funds. When, therefore, it is considered, that, the Bank transfers, with scrupulous punctuality, the funds of the Government, wherever required, free of expense, it is obvious that it has furnished to the Government and the people, a currency of absolutely uniform value, in all places, for all the purposes of paying the public contributions, and disbursing the public revenue. And when the great amount, more than twenty-five millions of dollars, is considered, it will be perceived that a currency absolutely uniform for this operation, must be so for the general purposes of commerce.

Upon the whole, it may be confidently asserted, that no country in the world has a circulating medium of greater uniformity, than the United States, and that, no country of any thing like the same geographical extent, has a currency at all comparable with it, in that respect.

388. Such, then, were the condition and sources of the reviled Bank of the United States, when assailed by the first Magistrate of the country, and his administration. It had scrupulously fulfilled all the objects of its creation-had raised the currency from a deranged and unsound state, to uniformity and purity; transmitting the public monies from one point of the Union to another, whenever desired, promptly, and without charge; serving its financial operations, as no Gov

ernment was ever before served; collecting and disbursing, in the space of thirteen years, more than three hundred and fifty millions of dollars, without the loss of a cent; reducing the exchange, on the most distant commercial operations, to a charge almost nominal, only; in a word, spreading around it, all the blessings which security and judicious aid to the Government and people could give. All which was acknowledged and, gratefully, proclaimed, by every officer connected with our fiscal concerns, by the Committees of both Houses of Congress, and by the millions of citizens engaged in prosperous commerce; and all which, the Executive proposed to jeopard in the maintenance of an abstract opinion, which had, for years, been repudiated by a large majority of the people. Can men who would thus sacrifice the substantial realities of life to speculative notions, be qualified to guide the destinies of a nation? Or, rather, can it be credited, that such notions form the true motives of any statesman?

389. There is a power incident to banking institutions, which is susceptible of great abuse. They may control their debtors and their customers, and may be used for political effect. But, in the ordinary, isolated and independent state of these institutions, their number and adverse interests almost annihilate this power. Their stock and their business are distributed throughout the community; and as no one, singly, can affect public opinion, attempts for that purpose have been, consequently, never made. But, a moment's consideration will show, a case wholly different, where many of these institutions in a State, or in the Union, combine, and are directed by the will of an individual or of a party. The restraint upon the dangerous power of each Bank is removed; the dependant upon bank favour cannot seek relief from oppression, by shifting his account; he has but one mean of obtaining, perhaps, indispensable pecuniary aid; he must conciliate the bank directors, and their favour is to be purchased, only, by his vote and influence in political contests. The possible abuse of this power, by individual Banks, has, by many sound political economists, been objected against their creation; but, their great use overpowered the objection from possible abuse, until their very number became protection. But, when the Banks combine, the power to pervert their faculties is increased, and the restraint wholly taken away. Amid all the excitements of party, for forty years, no one had conceived the design of combining the Banks, to control the popular voice. No bold and designing politician had ventured upon

this expedient, until the subtle genius of Mr. Van Buren seized it, in the project of the Safety Bank system of New York.

390. This system, we understand, is not the offspring of Mr. Van Buren's scheming and prolific brain. It was begotten, probably, in the purlieus of Wall street, in the commerce of money changers, who looked to it, only, so far as it regarded themselves, as a pecuniary speculation, but who were fully aware, that the political power it might give would be its best recommendation to Governor Van Buren When first submitted to him, it was received coldly. His attention, as he lay upon his couch, whilst the details were read, was divided between the reader and a newspaper; but when the suggestion was made, that the combined Banks would furnish a power which might, not only check the operations of the Bank of the United States, but might so control that institution as to render it a serviceable engine throughout the Union, instantly, all the energies of the careless listener were roused. No ear of love-sick girl ever drank with more intense delight the long desired, but unexpected, love tale. What a prospect was here opened! The Banks of the State of New York, weak and useless for party effect, in their individual existence, were hooped together, and became, like the fasces, the bundle of banded rods, borne by the lictors before the Roman Consuls, the representative of irresistible power; whilst the Bank of the United States, like a serpent, wrapt all opposing interests in its folds and crushed them beneath his feet. The project was instantly adopted, cherished, matured, and is now, in New York, in full tide of successful experiment. The State, overwhelmed by a monied aristocracy, is bound to the car of Mr. Van Buren's ambition. But the beatific vision, which enraptured his sight, could not, be immediately and wholly realized. The Bank of the United States could not be seduced or coerced to minister to his unhallowed ends. The attempt to influence it was not omitted, and the war upon that institution, which has ensued, so disastrous to the country, but so beneficent to the dominant party, is to be ascribed to Mr. Van Buren.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not aver that Mr. Van Buren openly recommended this safety fund system to the Legislature. On the contrary, with his characteristic caution, he refrained from this; submitting it as the offspring of a man of talents, worthy of the consideration of the Legislature. It was at first not favourably received. But, when

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he was transferred to the Department of State, at Washing. ton, the measure, under the auspices of his Lieutenant Governor, was urged upon the Legislature, as an executive recommendation, and the members were, emphatically, told, that its adoption would gratify the ex-Governor. By this policy, Mr. Van Buren might attain the benefits of success and avoid the mortification of failure, or if the consequences of the scheme proved pernicious, the odium of its origin.

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391. The safety fund act, passed in 1829, requires, that all Banks thereafter incorporated, should pay, annually, for six years, one-half per cent., equal to a contribution of three per cent, upon their respective capitals-to remain the property of such Banks respectively, but to be vested under the direction of the Comptroller of the State, in productive stocks, subject to the payment of the debts and losses, accruing to the community from insolvent Banks, thereby, making the combined Banks mutual assurers for each other, uniting them in such manner, that the whole may be moved by the same impulse, and operate irresistibly upon all other Banks in the State. Three commissioners preside over this monster; one appointed by the State, the others by the Banks. These are visiters of all the Banks of the association; on the suggestion of one of whom, the Chancellor of the State is required, by injunction, to stop the proceedings of a Bank, and unless cause be shown to the contrary, to subject it to the pains of insolvency. This power, unconnected with politics, may have little danger, may be, perhaps, useful; but in the hands of politicians, and in the condition of most country Banks, especially, in New York, may, and does, make the Banks, connected with the system, the subjects of party influence.

The Safety Fund combination, is hostile to the Bank of the United States, essentially; for that institution circumscribes the issues of the minor Banks, and discounting at six per cent. compels the State Banks to reduce the rate of interest, which, by the law of New York, may be seven per cent.; or to take the refuse paper of commerce. In the language of Shylock, these Safety Fund Banks might exclaim, in relation to the Bank of the United States, "Were he out of Venice, I can make what merchandise I will.”

It is said, that Gen. Jackson always denied the constitutional power to create a Bank; and that on this ground is based, his hostility to the present institution. But to this hour, such denial does not appear by any official document; and many favourable opportunities have been suffered to pass without the disclosure

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