struction, applied by an Indiana Justice of the Peace. to the criminal code. One of his neighbors claimed that his crow-bar had been stolen by another neighbor, so he went to the office of a Justice of the Peace to file an affidavit charging the other neighbor with the theft. The old Justice took the statutes and looked them through and through, again and again, for the word crow-bar, but he was unable to find it. He could find the language, "Whoever shall feloniously steal, take and carry, lead or drive away the personal goods of another is guilty of larceny,” but that did not say "crow-bar," and so he informed his neighbor that it was not unlawful to steal crowbars.

Reasoning from the object of government, it absolutely can not be that a state legislature has the same power to subject the peace, the good order and the morals of a community to the dangers of the saloon, by licensing it, that it has to protect the community by preventing it. It is never legitimately within the power of any legislature to authorize, by a license, a danger to the peace, good order or morals of any community, even though there may be no express denial of such authority.

It is the sole purpose of government to protect rights, not wrongs. When the wrongs imposed upon the American colonists, in the name of government, became intolerable, the forefathers, in the declaration of their independence, indicated very clearly the purpose and the extent of the authority of government, when they announced:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident-that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by

their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

In this, the purpose of government is unmistakably defined to be the security of the "inalienable rights" of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the extent to which just power was to be conferred upon the government was also limited to the scope of the "consent of the governed." This consent was given for the security of these rights, not to authorize their infringement. The man who adverts to this declaration of fundamental rights, as a guide in the determination of constitutional questions, may be, by reason thereof, a crank, but, in so doing, he is merely following the precedent of courts of last resort.

In Gulf etc. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while, in all cases, reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read

the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government."

The spirit and thought of the constitution are found in the Declaration of Independence, according to this judicial declaration. The language just quoted has been cited and approved by the Supreme Court of Indiana. While it is true, beyond the adventure of a doubt, that the spirit and thought of the constitution of the United States and equally so of the constitution of each of the states, is proclaimed in a general way in the Declaration of Independence, yet it is also just as true that the governing spirit and thought of each of these constitutions is directly and specially announced therein.

In the preamble of the United States Constitution, the people declared their purpose, in the establishment of the government, as follows: "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

Likewise, in the preamble of the state constitution and in the first section of the Bill of Rights, the sovereign people of Indiana, proclaimed the end and purpose of the state government to be the establish

ment of justice, the maintenance of public order, the perpetuation of liberty and the advancement of their peace, safety and well-being.

Desiring the perpetuation of a free government, and, expressing the belief that it can be preserved only by the general diffusion of knowledge and learning, in section one of article eight of the state constitution, the people expressly enjoined upon the general assembly the duty of encouraging, by all suitable means, their moral and intellectual improvement.

The just powers of the legislature, as one of the departments of government, are such only as the people, by their consent, have delegated to it, and, in a general way, the people have consented that it may have the just power to secure the inalienable rights of life, liberty and happiness, and then, to impress the full import of this grant upon the legislature, they say to the legislature you may or, perhaps, should legislate, in such a way as to accomplish the following results:

1. Establish justice.

2. Insure domestic tranquillity.

3. Provide for the common defense.

4. Promote the general welfare.

5. Secure and perpetuate the blessings of liberty. 6. Maintain public order.

7. The advancement of peace, safety and well

being.

8. To encourage moral and intellectual improvement.

In the first section of the Bill of Rights, the people announce the undisputed fact, that all governmental

power is inherent in themselves, so that their agent, the general assembly, can have only such power as they may consent to delegate to it. If the legislature were an agency of unlimited power, there would be no excuse for an enumeration of civic purposes. Is it a logical and reasonable method of determining the validity of legislative enactments to measure the results and effects of such enactments by the general purposes of government? This method is not an invention of the writer. It has often been employed by the courts, but they persistently refuse to do so when dealing with saloon statutes. If this be a legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, when dealing with things other than the saloon, it ought to be and is proper, when we seek to determine the constitutional status of the saloon. The Supreme Court of Indiana has committed itself to the proposition that an enactment of the general assembly contrary to and in violation of the spirit and purpose of the constitution is void.

In Columbia Athletic Club vs. State, 143 Ind. 110, the court said: "The constitution puts its special bans on lotteries, duels, and all infamous crimes; while at the same time it provides for the moral and intellectual improvement of the people. A statute which should attempt to authorize prize fighting would, most certainly, be opposed to the spirit of the constitution, and, indeed, to that of the law itself, long since defined to be ‘A rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power of a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.'"

A prize fight is contrary to the constitutional purposes of moral improvement, public order, the