in the French Lick case, should be enforced, the clandestine saloon on the Monument Circle in Indianapolis, almost within the shadow of the State House, and operated in the club building of a political party professing to stand for the principles of Lincoln, can be closed, and the public convinced that political party influence does not control the administration of public office.

In this club building, the criminal liquor statutes of the state are openly and flagrantly violated every day in the year. To enforce the law against this organization, may, as a party policy, be like the revision of the tariff. It may be too late to do it before the election and too early to do it afterward.

CHAPTER XX

SOLTAU VS. YOUNG

The following is a complete, verbatim copy of the opinion of Judge Artman in the case of Albert Soltau vs. Schuyler Young:

"At the January session, 1907, of the Board of County Commissioners of Marion county, Albert Soltau filed his application for a license to sell intoxicating liquors at retail in the tenth ward of the city of Indianapolis. Schuyler Young and William J. Trefz, voters of said ward, appeared before said board and filed their remonstrance. Such proceedings were had before the board that a license was granted to the applicant, and, from this order of the board, the remonstrators appealed to the Marion Circuit Court. From that court the case came to this court on a change of venue.

RIGHT TO LICENSE DENIED

In this court the remonstrators have filed what they term an amended remonstrance, in which they deny the right of the board of commissioners and also of this court to grant such a license, for the following reasons:

First-Because said board of commissioners did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of said application, and this court has not now jurisdiction over the subject matter of said application.

Second--Because the sale of intoxicating liquors at retail, to be drunk as a beverage, is destructive of the public morals, the public health and the public

safety, and is, therefore, inherently immoral and unlawful, and can not be licensed under the constitution of the state of Indiana, or the constitution of the United States.

Third-Because the sale of intoxicating liquors at retail, to be drunk as a beverage, upon the premises where sold, is destructive of public morals, the public health and the public safety, and is, therefore, inherently immoral and unlawful, and can not be licensed under the constitution of the state of Indiana, or under the constitution of the United States.

Fourth-Because Sections 7279, 7281, 7283 and 7284 of the Burn's Revised Statutes, 1901, and being license law of 1875, under which said license is sought to be granted, are unconstitutional as being in conflict with the spirit and purpose of the constitution of the state of Indiana, as set out in the preamble of said constitution.

Fifth-Because Sections 7279, 7281, 7283 and 7284 of Burn's Revised Statutes, 1901, and being license law of 1875, under which said license is sought to be granted, are unconstitutional as being in conflict with section one, article one of the constitution of Indiana.

Sixth-Because Sections 7279, 7281, 7283 and 7284 of Burn's Revised Statutes, 1901, and being license law of 1875, under which said license is sought to be granted, are unconstitutional as being in conflict with section one, article eight of the constitution of Indiana.

For which reasons the remonstrators pray, that the application be dismissed.

This so-called amended remonstrance is nothing more nor less, in legal effect, than a motion to dismiss the application. To this amended remonstrance the applicant has filed a demurrer, alleging that the same does not state facts sufficient to constitute a good and sufficient remonstrance under the

statute.

THE QUESTION AT ISSUE

Waiving all questions as to the form and sufficiency of the demurrer, the ultimate question for decision in this case is whether or not the sale of intoxicating liquors, at retail, for beverage purposes, can be legally licensed.

The court has no inclination to evade or side-step this proposition. The conclusions at which it has arrived have been reached after long, patient and mature deliberation and the most careful consideration that the court is capable of giving the question.

THE STATUTE ON THE SUBJECT

It must be conceded at the outset, that there is a statute of the state purporting to authorize such a license. Burns' Revised Statutes, 1901, Section 7276 et seq. It is not every act of the legislature that is the law. Only the valid acts of the legislature are law. It necessarily follows that the decision of the ultimate question involves the determination of the validity or invalidity of this license statute. To insure a logical and intelligent discussion of this question, it is well to first ascertain and state the basis upon which it is to be determined.

It may be considered as settled, that this statute was enacted in strict accordance with all constitu

tional formality, and hence the question of its validity will not be measured by the standard of constitutional formalities.

AUTHORITY OF THE LEGISLATURE

Did the legislature have the authority to enact the statute? Can the legislature authorize the licensing for a consideration, of the sale of intoxicating liquors, at retail, for beverage purposes? This is the basis upon which the ultimate question is to be determined. It is a question of power, and not one of formality.

It is contended by counsel for the applicant that the right of the legislature to authorize the granting of a saloon license is absolute and unqualified under the police power of the state.

In other words, he contends that this alleged right is to be measured by the fundamental principle of government, technically called the police power.

DEFINITION OF POLICE POWER

It is, then, proper, in order that we may be fully understood in this discussion, to ascertain as nearly as possible what is meant by the police power of the state. This principle of government or power is, after all, not very easily defined. It may be said to be the power to enforce the right and prohibit the wrong. It is the power to enforce the chief end of organized government, which is the preservation and development of the good order, the peace, safety, health, morals and welfare of the people.

In the case of the State vs. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. 451 the court said: